Summary: There is no denial of the fact that trial Court is vested with the power u/s 227 Cr.PC to alter or add to the formal charges at any time before pronouncement of judgement, however, these powers should not be arbitrarily exercised in a manner prejudicial to any of the parties.

Summary: Section of Law: Article 199 of the Constitution (a) For passing a judgement under Order Xii Rules 6 of CPC the admission has to be clear, Unambiguous, unqualified & Unequivocal.

Summary: For proceeding for Contempt of Court against a contemnor, firstly his case must fall within the definition of at least one of three different types of Contempt of Court, which are (1) Civil Contempt (2) Criminal Contempt and (3) Judicial Contempt, and secondly there is material available to connect the contemnor with committing of Contempt. In the present case, explanation given by the respondent supported by his affidavit appears to be plausible, hence, this Court is not inclined to proceed further with the proceedings initiated against the respondent for allegedly committing Contempt of Court and he is exonerated from the charges/allegations against him. Resultantly, the show-cause notice mentioned above is withdrawn.

Summary: This constitutional petition involved a challenge to the validity of an order, issued by the Family Court in Sialkot, Pakistan. The order directed the petitioner to received dowry articles listed in the file, dismissing the petitioner's claim for the alternative price of the dowry items. The petitioner, and respondent No.2, Zafar Iqbal, were married in 1992, and a legal dispute arose over dowry articles following their separation. Despite earlier court decrees in favor of the petitioner, the executing court ordered her to receive the dowry articles rather than the alternate price. The petitioner argued that the dowry articles had deteriorated, were replaced by the respondent, and she preferred the alternative price. The court, however, insisted on the physical delivery of the dowry items. The petitioner contended that she had not used the dowry articles since leaving in 2001, and the respondent had been using them. The petitioner successfully challenged the order, citing legal precedents that support the decree holder's right to claim the value of dowry articles if physical delivery is impractical. The judgment also highlighted the earlier writ petition where the petitioner was entitled to recover gold ornaments or their market price. The court concluded that the executing court's observation, insisting on receiving the dowry articles and rejecting the alternate price claim, was not in accordance with the law. As a result, the petition was accepted.

Summary: Bomb Disposal Squad is meant to defuse the expected explosive -- Certified copy of a public document is issued under Article: 87 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---The appellant was convicted and sentenced for offenses under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Pakistan Arms Ordinance XX, 1965, and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The charges were related to the recovery of explosive material, safety fuse, and a pistol from Abbas. The court found that the recovery of explosive material and the pistol, as well as their submission to the forensic agency, were well-established. However, the court noted issues with the recovery of detonators, as the Bomb Disposal Commander did not extract explosive material from them, making it uncertain if they met the legal definition. The court also highlighted that the appellant's connection to any terrorist organization was not proven. The defense claimed that Abbas was abducted before the case's registration, but the appellant did not testify or present essential evidence supporting this claim. The court emphasized the importance of proving documents in defense, stating that the appellant failed to establish his version. Ultimately, the court set aside the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, citing a lack of evidence connecting Abbas to a banned organization. The conviction under the Explosive Substances Act was upheld, but the sentence was reduced from seven to three years of rigorous imprisonment. The conviction under the Pakistan Arms Ordinance was maintained. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently, and the appellant was granted the benefit of a specific legal provision. The appeal was dismissed with these modifications.

Summary: ''State Bank has no statutory duty to direct a private bank on its employees' terms and conditions'' ----- U.B.L being a private bank is not amenable to constitutional jurisdiction of this Court and similarly the State Bank of Pakistan has no statuary role or jurisdiction in respect of terms and conditions of service of employees of a private banks like U.B.L----The petitioner, a former Assistant Vice President at a bank, had his services terminated, leading to a writ petition. The appellant argued that as a private bank, constitutional petitions against it are not maintainable. They contend that the State Bank of Pakistan lacks jurisdiction over private banks' employee issues. The respondent argued that the termination was due to breach of trust and embezzlement, giving the State Bank jurisdiction. The court references previous cases to establish that the bank, post-privatization, is a private entity, not amenable to constitutional jurisdiction. It emphasizes the State Bank's regulatory role without financial interest, concluding that the constitutional petition is not maintainable. The court also clarified that the State Bank has no statutory duty to direct a private bank on its employees' terms and conditions. Previous cases are cited to support the argument that the State Bank cannot decide matters related to pensionary benefits for banking employees, reinforcing the appeal's stance. The court ultimately allowed the appeal.

Summary: Article 174 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ordains that the Federation may sue or be sued by the name of Pakistan and a Province may sue or be sued by the name of the Province. Admittedly due compliance was not made to the said mandatory provision of law while filing the constitutional petitions, which sole fact is sufficient for dismissal of constitutional petitions. From the joint analysis of the Contract Appointment Policy, 2004, the Rules, 2003 and relevant provisions of the Act, 2003 reproduced hereinabove, it can safely be inferred that the respondents were not appointed under the Contract Appointment Policy, 2004, as such the notification dated 14th October, 2009 is not attracted to their case. The judgments referred by the learned counsel for the respondents in the cases of 2018 SCMR 1405, 2015 SCMR 1257 and 2013 SCMR 1547, it is observed that in the said cases, though the employees were either daily wagers or contract employees but they were working for a considerable long time against the permanent posts and as such the Hon?ble Supreme Court of Pakistan directed their regularization in service. The facts of the said cases are thus quite distinguishable as compared to the present case. The respondents were since appointed by the Board of Management against temporary posts under the Act, 2003, so they cannot claim similar treatment. There is yet another important aspect that during the pendency of the constitutional petition before the learned Single Bench, the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 was promulgated, which provides a detailed mechanism qua the regularization of the services of contract employees. The respondents if are desirous for the regularization of their service, they may have a resort to the provisions of the said Act and if they move for the said purpose, their cases shall be decided in accordance with law.

Summary: Bail granted----In this petition under Section 497 Cr.P.C., the petitioner, Zulfiqar alias Bhutto, seeks post-arrest bail based on the grounds of hardship due to prolonged incarceration and delay in concluding the trial for a case filed in 2009. The petitioner argued that despite court directions for swift trial, the proceedings have been delayed, and he should not be left at the mercy of the prosecution. The petitioner emphasized his lack of responsibility for the trial delay and asserted his right to bail. Conversely, the Deputy Prosecutor General opposes the bail, labeling the petitioner as a dangerous and hardened criminal. The court considered two main grounds for bail: non-compliance with trial conclusion directions and statutory delay. The court observed that this is the petitioner's sixth post-arrest bail petition. While acknowledging the importance of expeditious trials, the court stated that non-compliance alone isn't an absolute right for bail but can be considered as a fresh ground for the court's discretion. Regarding statutory delay, the court delves into the provisions of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C., particularly the 3rd Proviso. It notes that the petitioner has been in custody for over four years, and there is no indication of delay caused by the petitioner. The court highlighted the complainant's and private witnesses' failure to appear, leading to non-bailable warrants. The court granted bail to the petitioner.

Summary: [Gift, its requirements and inheritance] The appellant claimed her right to inheritance in the property left by her paternal grandfather, Ahmad, relying on Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The respondent uncles allegedly prepared a gift document, showing that Ahmad had gifted his entire land to them, thereby attempting to deprive the appellant of her rightful share in the estate.The appellant filed a suit in 1997, seeking cancellation of the gift deed and gift mutation and claiming her inheritance in her grandfather's estate. The High Court had previously set aside the judgment of the Appellate Court, dismissing the appellant's suit, leading to this appeal.The court examined the essential elements of a valid gift under Muslim law: a declaration of gift, acceptance of the gift, and delivery of possession of the subject of the gift. It was argued that the gift was not accepted by the donees (respondents) as required for a valid gift. The court analyzed the evidence and testimonies and found that the gift had not been accepted by the respondents.Furthermore, the court addressed the argument that Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance was no longer applicable due to a decision by the Federal Shariat Court. However, the court clarified that the case challenging the validity of Section 4 was still pending before the Shariat Appellate Bench, and until a final decision is reached, Section 4 remains the subsistent law of Pakistan.Ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the judgment of the Appellate Court, which recognized the appellant's right to inheritance in her grandfather's estate. No costs were awarded in the case. The judgment was delivered on 27th January 2022.

Summary: [ (1) Under Section 4 of Quetta Development Authority Ordinance, 1978, the general directions and administration of the Authority and its affairs are vested in the Governing Body including the promotions of the posts lying in grade-18 and above. (2) The claim of antedated promotion w.e.f. 2004 was not permissible due to non-availability of post. (3) The adjustment could only be possible in case the post was abolished/redundant, or the appellant was found surplus or sent to a surplus pool due to any reorganizational or restructuring steps. (4) The expression up-gradation is disparate and incongruent to the term promotion. (5) A wrong benefit extended beyond the scope of law and rules/policy cannot be claimed in perpetuity or eternity]----The appellant's case revolved around his claim for promotion and adjustment to the post of Chief Officer in the City District Government Quetta. The appellant contended that his case for promotion was recommended and approved by the Governing Body of Quetta Development Authority (QDA) in 2004. However, his promotion was not realized until 2012 when he was promoted to the post of Chief Accounts Officer (BPS-19). The appellant filed a representation and a constitutional petition to contest the delay in his promotion and the discrepancy in the effective date of promotion.The Supreme Court examined the case's facts and legal aspects, considering the appellant's arguments and the respondents' defense. The Court noted that the post of Chief Accounts Officer (BPS-19) was not available in the service structure at the time of the appellant's claimed promotion in 2004. The post was subsequently created in 2012. The Court also analyzed the Quetta Development Authority Employees (Service) Regulations of 2010, which governed appointments, promotions, and upgradations within the organization.The Court concluded that the appellant's claim for antedated promotion to 2004 lacked legal basis, given the absence of the relevant post at that time. The Court also found that the subsequent promotion of the appellant in 2012 was consistent with the availability of the post of Chief Accounts Officer. The Court cited previous legal precedents to emphasize that promotions are not automatic vested rights and that upgradation policies are based on policy decisions for specific categories of employees.Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment that had rejected the appellant's claims for antedated promotion.