Summary: Acquittal granted---The case involved the murder of Kamran Haider, wherein Saqlain Shah was convicted based on the prosecution's evidence. The defense argued that the prosecution's key witnesses, Imran Haider and Durrab Hussain, were "chance witnesses" whose presence at the crime scene lacked credible explanation. Moreover, the acquittal of Saqlain Shah's co-accused, Muhammad Saleem alias Kali Gujjar, raised doubts about the credibility of the prosecution's case. The court concluded that the same evidence used to convict Saqlain Shah had been disbelieved in Muhammad Saleem's case, necessitating independent corroboration, which was lacking. They emphasized the concept of "chance witnesses" and cited legal rulings that scrutinized testimonies lacking credible explanations for the witnesses' presence at the crime scene. Notably, references were made to cases such as "Mst. Sughra Begum and another Vs. Qaiser Pervez and others" (2015 SCMR 1142) and "Sufyan Nawaz and another Vs. The State and others" (2020 SCMR 192) to underscore the importance of corroboration and justification of witness presence.Furthermore, the defense highlighted cases like "Mushtaq and 3 others Vs. The State" (PLD 2008 Supreme Court 1) and "Jehangir Vs. Nazar Farid and another" (2002 SCMR 1986), which questioned the reliability of evidence when the recovery of weapons was not handled properly or when the same evidence was disbelieved in a co-accused's case. These legal precedents were pivotal in demonstrating inconsistencies and casting doubt on the prosecution's case. Ultimately, the court's decision to overturn Saqlain Shah's conviction and dismissed the revision for sentence enhancement hinged upon the application of legal precedents and the lack of reliable evidence that could withstand scrutiny beyond a reasonable doubt.

Summary: Bail granted---Muhammad Waqas and his co-accused were initially indicted in a murder case, where Muhammad Waqas later claimed to have lost mental capacity. The trial court postponed proceedings and directed him to be shifted to a mental hospital. Despite several appeals, including one to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Muhammad Waqas remained confined due to his mental condition. The Lahore High Court examined the legality of Muhammad Waqas's detention and application for release under section 466(1) Cr.P.C., which provided for the release of an accused person found to be of unsound mind. The court emphasized that when an accused is deemed mentally unfit, the trial court must adhere to the procedures outlined in the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), specifically Chapter XXXIV. The court found that Muhammad Waqas's mental condition rendered him incapable of understanding the proceedings against him. Therefore, it accepted his petition, setting aside the lower court's order and directing his release under section 466(1) Cr.P.C. The court also addressed the issue of security, determining a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 as justifiable. As Muhammad Waqas was released under sufficient security, the court dismissed Rana Sardar Ahmad's petition for re-summoning the case file and starting proceedings.

Summary: The petitioner, filed a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking directions against the Chief Secretary to implement an order passed by the Ombudsperson Punjab. Shahzadi also challenged the legality of the suspension order and prayed for the registration of a case for workplace harassment against certain respondents. The petitioner's submissions outlined her appointment as an Assistant Director with the Punjab Land Record Authority (PLRA) and alleged mistreatment, including suspensions and transfers. The respondents, represented by law officers and advocates, objected to the petition's maintainability. In the petitioner's submissions, reliance was placed on various provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan, including Article 9 (right to life), Article 14 (dignity of man and privacy of home), Article 27 (prohibition of discrimination), Article 34 (full participation of women in national life), and Article 35 (protection of women). Additionally, reference was made to the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, and a recent judgment of the court regarding the Act's intention to protect employees from harassment. On the respondents' side, reliance was placed on legal precedents such as "MABASHAR MAJEED Versus PROVINCE OF PUNJAB and 3 others" (2017 P L C (C.S.) 940), "PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE CORPORATION Versus TANWEER-URREHMAN" (PLD 2010 SC 676), and "Dr. M. AFZAL BEG Versus UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB and others" (1999 PLC (C.S.) 60). These cases addressed issues related to contractual employment, master-servant relationships, and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The court also cited legal precedents such as "ASIF SALEEM Versus CHAIRMAN BOG University of Lahore etc" (2019 PLD Lahore 407), "INDUS TRADING AND CONTRACTING COMPANY Versus COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (Preventive) Karachi and others" (2016 SCMR 842), "DR. SHER AFGAN KHAN NIAZI Versus ALI S. HABIB and others" (2011 SCMR 1813), and "MUHAMMAD ABBASI Versus S.H.O. Bhara Kahu and 7 others" (PLD 2010 SC 969) to emphasize the principle that jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked when an alternate efficacious remedy is available. The court, determined that the petition was not maintainable. It noted the availability of an alternate remedy before the Ombudsperson under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2012. The court emphasized that the Ombudsperson had the authority to enforce its orders, including punishment for non-compliance, under Section 10(vi) of the Act. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition, citing the availability of an alternate remedy and the lack of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- Mirza Abid Majeed, DPG and Imtiaz Ahmad, SI for the State.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)-- ----S. 12(2)--Specific Relief Act, (I of 1877), Ss. 9, 42 & 54--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Suit for declaration possession and permanent injunction--Joint statement--Compromise--Request for withdrawal of suit--Dismissed as withdrawn--Application for setting aside--Consenting order--Allegation of fraud on part of respondents--Authority of judicial record--Challenge to--Neither deceased challenged order in his lifetime nor plaintiff has challenged said order--Petitioners failed to substantiate alleviation of fraud on part of respondents/defendants--Mere allegation not supported by any material would not invariably warrant inquiry or investigation--Authenticity of judicial record cannot be doubted without any solid proof and only on oral arguments--Petitioners has not been able to point out any plausible ground due to which he is seeking setting aside of impugned orders, hence, they are not entitled to any relief--No infirmity, legal or factual, has been pointed out in impugned orders, requiring interference--Petition dismissed. ----- The petitioners, legal heirs of the plaintiffs, filed a writ petition challenging orders related to a suit for declaration, possession, and permanent injunction that had been withdrawn based on a compromise. The plaintiffs, during their lifetime, had recorded a joint statement for withdrawal of the suit, which was dismissed on June 16, 2009. Subsequently, the petitioners filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to set aside the compromise order, alleging fraud by the respondents. The application and a subsequent civil revision were dismissed, leading to this writ petition. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the withdrawal of the original suit based on a compromise was fraudulently obtained by the respondents. ------ 2) Whether the petitioners could successfully challenge the authenticity of the judicial record and set aside the compromise order under Section 12(2) of the CPC. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of fraud. There was no material evidence to support the allegation, and mere allegations without proof do not warrant an inquiry. The court emphasized that judicial records are presumed authentic under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and Article 150 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Without solid proof, the authenticity of these records cannot be doubted. It was noted that the original plaintiffs themselves, during their lifetime, had willingly withdrawn the suit based on a compromise, and this was reflected in the trial court's order, which included their thumb impressions and signatures. As the petitioners were unable to provide any plausible ground or material evidence to substantiate their claims, they were not entitled to relief. The court found no legal or factual infirmity in the impugned orders, and thus, the petition was dismissed. ------ Citations/Precedents: Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 12(2): Application for setting aside a consent order. Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Article 129(e): Presumption of the truth attached to judicial records. Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Article 150: Authenticity of judicial records. Muhammad Aslam and others vs. Mst. Kundan Mai and others (2004 SCMR 843): Distinguished from the facts of the present case.

Summary: Particulars of Call detail record (CDR) and the mode and manner in which it connects the chain from crime to the accused. It is secondary evidence which can be taken into considerationprovided the same is accurate and exclusion of any possibilityof tempering or manipulation.

Summary: Lucky Cement Limited, a cement manufacturer, had imported plant and machinery in 1995, claiming tax/duty concessions which were later denied. Despite securing an interim order from the Peshawar High Court for the release of the imported items against indemnity bonds, the final judgment by the Supreme Court was not in favor of Lucky Cement. The company then filed a review application which was resolved by allowing them the chance to contest the recovery notice through departmental remedies.The main arguments from Lucky Cement centered on the legality of the recovery notice without prior adjudication, the necessity of providing notice before proceeding against someone, and the illegality of imposing surcharge without an adjudicated mens rea. They argued that the High Court could convert the proceedings into departmental ones and remand them accordingly.However, the respondents, represented by Ms. Masooda Siraj and the Deputy Attorney General, contended that the recovery notice was based on the Supreme Court's order, making the petition by Lucky Cement misconceived. They emphasized that Lucky Cement had been using the plant and machinery for over 25 years without paying the due taxes and duties, which constituted a violation of the indemnity bond terms.The court concluded that Lucky Cement had chosen to bypass the departmental dispute resolution process initially and sought resolution through constitutional jurisdiction, a process that reached the Supreme Court. The court found no jurisdictional, procedural, or substantive errors with the recovery notice issued following the Supreme Court's order. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition, deeming it devoid of merit, and upheld the recovery notice, emphasizing the principle of election and the finality of the Supreme Court's judgments in such matters. ---- Doctrine of Election----The court, comprising Mohammad Junaid Ghaffar and Agha Faisal, JJ., deliberated on the validity of the recovery notice and the petitioner's contentions.The Supreme Court order stated that the petitioner could contest the recovery notice through departmental remedies. The notice demanded payment of duties and taxes totaling Rs. 942.11 million and surcharges amounting to Rs. 33,903 million, citing the Supreme Court's disposition of the case.Lucky Cement had imported machinery in 1995 with tax concessions, later denied by authorities. Despite interim orders for release, the final judgment favored the authorities, prompting the Supreme Court's involvement. Lucky Cement challenged the recovery notice, arguing that departmental adjudication was necessary, and the notice lacked a show cause procedure.The respondents contended that the notice was based on the Supreme Court's order and emphasized Lucky Cement's 25-year avoidance of tax obligations.The court dismissed the petition, stating that Lucky Cement had deliberately bypassed departmental resolution avenues, thus precluding its invocation at this stage. Despite arguments for departmental recourse, the court found no merit in revisiting the matter. The judgment concluded that the petition lacked merit and was therefore dismissed.

Summary: The case involved Writ Petition filed by Mst. Shahnaz Begum and others against the Additional District Judge, challenging the dismissal of their appeal under section 388(2) of the Succession Act, 1925. The dispute arose over the distribution of service benefits of Rana Muhammad Akram, a deceased ASI in the Punjab Police. Mst. Shahnaz Begum and her minor children filed for a Succession Certificate, while Respondents No. 4 & 5 claimed a share as the deceased's second widow and son, respectively. The petitioner argued that the lower courts exceeded their jurisdiction by deciding intricate factual matters summarily. They contested the finding that Respondents No. 4 & 5 were legal heirs, claiming it was based on conjectures. However, the respondents argued in favor of the impugned order. The court delved into the provisions of the Succession Act, emphasizing that the purpose of a Succession Certificate is to facilitate debt collection and protect debtors dealing with the deceased's representatives. It highlighted that such certificates are granted only for debts and securities, not for other property, and do not establish the grantee's title as an heir. The court analyzed several legal precedents to underscore the fundamental principles governing the issuance of Succession Certificates under the Succession Act, 1925. These precedents helped establish the parameters within which the court adjudicated the matter. Notable cases mentioned includes, Mst. Jameela Akhtar v. Public-at-large (2002 SCMR 1544): This case highlighted the necessity of obtaining a civil court declaration regarding the status of a claimant, particularly in disputes concerning marriage or relationship status. Aziz Ahmad v. Hakimzadi and 7 others (2013 CLC 406): The court emphasized the requirement for claimants to seek declarations from the civil court regarding their legal status when disputes arise during Succession Certificate proceedings. Liaqat Zaman Khan and others v. Mst. Tazeem Akhtar and others (2017 YLR 150): This case illustrated situations where the court upheld the issuance of a Succession Certificate pending a civil suit for declaration, emphasizing the need for due process and legal clarity. Sofia Ashfaq v. Haseeb Ashfaq Bhatti and others (PLD 2019 Islamabad 238): The judgment discussed the circumstances under which a Succession Certificate could be granted, subject to the outcome of a civil suit, especially when disputes exist regarding the validity of marriage or inheritance rights. These precedents served as guiding principles for the court in determining the validity of the claims presented before it and in ensuring the proper application of the law in the case at hand. Ultimately, the court directed the issuance of a Succession Certificate to Respondents No. 4 & 5, subject to them furnishing a bond and filing a civil suit to establish their status. It allowed the petitioner to seek revocation if the respondents failed to establish their claim in the civil suit.