Summary: If there are reasonable grounds available on the record to connect the petitioner with the commission of heinous offence then he does not deserve concession of bail even on the ground of juvenility in the light of sub-Section: (6) of Section: 4 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018.

Summary: Background: The appellant, a department, filed an appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenging the judgment passed by the Lahore High Court on 15.10.2020. The High Court had allowed an insurance appeal filed by the respondent (the widow of the deceased) and decreed her claim along with liquidated damages under Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. The deceased had purchased an insurance policy from the appellant in 2001 but passed away in a road accident in 2003. Despite the respondent fulfilling the procedural requirements for the claim, the insurance company failed to pay the due amount. The Insurance Tribunal dismissed the respondent's claim in 2015, which led her to appeal to the High Court, where she succeeded. -----Issues: 1- Whether the High Court's judgment misread or ignored the evidence on record. -----2- Whether the High Court failed to consider the provisions of Articles 117, 118, 119, and 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. -----3- Whether the burden of proof to establish the cause of death was improperly shifted to the insurance company. -----4- Whether the High Court's decision was in line with established principles of insurance law. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment. It held that the insurance company failed to dispute the validity of the death certificate and other official documents. The High Court had properly evaluated the legal and factual aspects of the case, concluding that the respondent was entitled to the insurance claim. The Court also noted that in cases of accidental deaths, post-mortem examinations are often avoided by legal heirs. The appellant, as the insurer, had the responsibility to ensure a post-mortem was conducted if deemed necessary. The appellant's failure to make the due payment in compliance with Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, resulted in the imposition of liquidated damages. -----Citations/Precedents: Khurshid Ali and 6 others v. Shah Nazar (PLD 1992 SC 822) Articles 117, 118, 119, and 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000

Summary: Punjab Industrial Relations Act (XIX of 2010)--- ----Ss. 44 & 47(5)---Payment of Wage Act (IV of 1936), S.15---Revisional jurisdiction---Scope- --Respondents / workmen were allowed recovery of their wages---Petitioner / employer was aggrieved of revisional jurisdiction exercised by Labour Appellate Tribunal---Validity---Labour Court constituted under S. 44 of Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, is empowered to exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, or any other law such as Payment Wages Act, 1936---Labour Court exercises jurisdiction over disputes beyond the purview of Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010---Labour Court under the command of S. 17 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936, is competent to hear appeals against Authority constituted under S. 15 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936---Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under S. 47 of Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, exercises both appellate and revisional powers with respect to orders passed by Labour Court subject to various provisions of Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010---There is no bar upon any party in laying information before Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal in the form of a Revision Petition not as a matter of right but in the discretion of Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which in turn may decide to assume revisional jurisdiction depending upon facts and circumstances of each case warranting exercise or otherwise of revisional jurisdiction---If Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal exercises its revisional powers, the Tribunal acts within its lawful revisional jurisdiction to examine correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by Labour Court---Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal had revisional power with respect to an order passed by Labour Court in appeal preferred under S.17 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936---Mere signing of unilaterally prepared 'Final Settlement Forms' by respondents / workmen could not be regarded as final settlements in absence of their free consent---Respondents / workmen promptly agitated their grievances and were still pursuing the same---Mere receipt of partial amounts based upon calculations of petitioner / employer did not place any bar upon respondents / workmen to invoke law for redressal of their grievances---High Court declined to interfere in judgments passed by for a below as there was no illegality or infirmity or jurisdictional defect--- Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Habib Bank Ltd. through President and 2 others v. Authority under Payment of Wages Act and another 2016 PLC 61; Marhaba Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore and others (W. P. No. 21196 / 2016); Muhammad Hussain and others v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Chairman, Railway Board Lahore and others PLD 1991 SC 385; Jang Group of Newspapers Limited and others v. Presiding Officer and others (W.P. No. 10067 / 2017); Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. v. Member, NIRC and others 2014 SCMR 535; Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others PLD 2016 SC 712; Khan Bahadur Khan v. Khan Malook Khan PLD 2022 SC 482 and Messrs Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Limited v. Muhammad Javed Iqbal and another 1986 SCMR 1071 ref. ------ Background: The petitioners challenged judgments dated 20.03.2023 by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLAT), Lahore, which enhanced the claims of the respondents under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The respondents, employees of the petitioner company, had filed claims before the Authority under Section 15 of the Wages Act for recovery of deducted wages. After partial relief from the Authority, the parties appealed to the Labour Court, which dismissed the appeals. Subsequently, the respondents filed revision petitions before PLAT, which enhanced their claims, prompting the petitioner to file writ petitions. ------- Issues: ------- 1) Whether PLAT has the jurisdiction to entertain revision petitions under Section 47(5) of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 (PIRA), regarding orders passed by the Labour Court under Section 17 of the Wages Act. ------- 2) Whether the impugned judgments by PLAT were illegal or suffered from any jurisdictional defect. ------- 3) Whether the respondents were entitled to additional payments despite signing "Final Settlement Forms." ------- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction of PLAT: The Court held that PLAT had jurisdiction under Section 47(5) of PIRA to revise orders passed by the Labour Court, including those under Section 17 of the Wages Act. The Court explained that PIRA's broader scope allows the Labour Court to exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising from other laws, including the Wages Act. Therefore, PLAT could lawfully exercise revisional powers to correct the legality or propriety of the Labour Court's orders, as established in Muhammad Hussain vs. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1991 SC 385). ------- Legality of PLAT Judgments: The Court found no illegality or jurisdictional defects in PLAT’s judgments. PLAT had appropriately scrutinized the evidence, including the respondents' service certificates and other records, which were not effectively disproven by the petitioner. PLAT calculated the respondents' claims based on the length of their service and properly assessed their entitlement to wages, gratuity, and other benefits. The Court dismissed the petitioner’s argument that signing the "Final Settlement Forms" precluded further claims, as the respondents had not freely consented to these settlements. ------- Entitlement of the Respondents: The Court confirmed that the respondents were entitled to the enhanced amounts determined by PLAT. It dismissed the petitioners’ claims that the respondents had accepted full settlement, noting that the employees promptly pursued their legal remedies and that the settlement forms lacked free consent. ------- Outcome: The Court dismissed the writ petitions with costs of Rs. 100,000 for each respondent, to be paid within 30 days. ------- Citations/Precedents: Habib Bank Ltd. vs. Authority under Payment of Wages Act (2016 PLC 61) Muhammad Hussain vs. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1991 SC 385) Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs. Member NIRC (2014 SCMR 535) Messrs Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd. vs. Muhammad Javed Iqbal (1986 SCMR 1071) S.M. Rahman & Co. vs. Motabar (PLD 1981 SC 282) Ghulam Qadir vs. Sheikh Abdul Wadood (PLD 2016 SC 712) Khan Bahadur Khan vs. Khan Malook Khan (PLD 2022 SC 482)

Summary: Background: An appellant filed an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court, which decreed a suit for recovery of Rs. 1,128,429.24 filed by the respondent bank. The appellant's petition for leave to appear and defend the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, leading to the decree being passed without a discussion on the merits or recording of evidence by the respondent. ----Issues: 1- Does the Banking Court have the jurisdiction to dismiss a petition for leave to appear and defend for non-prosecution? 2- Should the Banking Court have recorded evidence before passing a decree? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the Banking Court did not have the jurisdiction to dismiss the petition for leave to appear and defend for non-prosecution without considering its merits. The court emphasized that Section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO, 2001) requires the Banking Court to consider the contents of the plaint, the petition for leave to defend, and the reply thereto to determine if substantial questions of law or fact require evidence. The court found that the Banking Court must apply its mind to the petition for leave to defend, regardless of the defendant’s presence, and cannot dismiss it solely for non-prosecution. The judgment and decree were set aside, and the case was remanded to the Banking Court for a decision on the petition for leave to appear and defend within 30 days. ----Citations/Precedents: Messrs Bahawalpur Cotton Company Vs. United Bank Limited, 2023 CLD 1116 Oil and Gas Development Company Limited Vs. Muhammad Ilyas Mian, 2018 CLC 1666 Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) Vs. Mst. Naima Ayub, 2013 CLC 1191 Abid Aziz Khan Vs. Bank of Punjab, 2007 CLD 997 Syed Asad Abbas Vs. Allied Bank of Pakistan, 2006 CLD 79 Syed Rashid Hussain Vs. Bank of Punjab, 2005 CLD 1823 National Bank of Pakistan Vs. Messrs ARK Garments Industry (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director, 2015 CLD 179 Ghulistan Textile Mills Limited Vs. Askari Bank Ltd., 2013 CLD 2005 Messrs United Bank Limited Vs. Banking Court No.II, 2012 CLD 1556 United Bank Limited Vs. Mehmood Ilyas Khan, 2012 CLD 1372 Admore Gas (Pvt.) Limited Vs. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited, 2013 CLD 423 Dr. Jamil Masood Usmani Vs. Messrs Askari Bank Limited, 2016 CLD 387 Askari Leasing Limited Vs. Sher Bahadur, 2011 CLD 1186 Faysal Bank Limited Vs. National Electric Company Pakistan and others, 2023 CLD 879

Summary: On 13th of December 2023, the Supreme Court of Pakistan temporarily suspended the order that declared civilian trials in military courts under certain clauses of the Army Act as being ultra vires the constitution, subject to the condition that no final judgment would be passed against the 103 accused by the military courts until the next date of hearing --- the impugned order pertains to the decision of the bench on 23.10.2023 that declared clause (d) of subsection (1) of Section 2 of the Army Act (in both of its subclauses (i) & (ii)), and subsection (4) of Section 59 of the said Act as being ultravires the Constitution. Next date of hearing set to be third week of January 2024 --- applications related to live streaming and reconstitution of benches to be decided on the next date of hearing.

Summary: Documents Upon Which prosecution can be structured must be supplied to the accused well in time, If Not Supplied Such A Document Cannot Be Used As Evidence Later Without The Consent Of The Other Party Or The Court --- The petitioner challenged an order by the Additional Sessions Judge which denied the petitioner's request for a copy of the Call Data Record (CDR) mentioned in the recovery memo --- The primary contention raised by the petitioner, through counsel Malik Saeed Ejaz, centered on the right of the defense to access relevant documents crucial for trial preparation. The petitioner relied on legal precedent, specifically citing "The STATE versus Chaudhry MUHAMMAD USMAN" (2023 SCMR 1676), to assert that the court retains the authority to summon essential documents at any stage of the inquiry or trial, even post the disclosure stage under section 265-C of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C).The judgment delved into the constitutional dimension, invoking Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, which guarantees due process and a fair opportunity to the accused. Justice Rafiq emphasized that denial of access to material evidence, such as the CDR in question, would constitute a violation of this fundamental right.Addressing the legal nuances, the judgment scrutinized Articles 159 and 160 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Article 159 establishes the obligation of a party to present a document in evidence if it has been called for and inspected by the other party. Article 160 underscores the consequence of a party's refusal to produce a document after notice ? such a document cannot be used as evidence later without the consent of the other party or the court.The judgment highlighted the interplay between the right of the accused to access material evidence and the principle of fairness in legal proceedings. It asserted that, under the principles of due process, the accused must be given adequate time and opportunity to prepare a defense against evidence that may be used against them.In conclusion, Justice Muhammad Amjad Rafiq allowed the revision petition, acknowledging the petitioner's entitlement to a copy of the CDR and recovery memo before the appearance of the relevant witness, Dilawar Hussain SI/I.O.

Summary: ''In order to provide for constitution of Board of Revenue, the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1957") was promulgated. The Board of Revenue was constituted in terms of section 3 of the "Act, 1957", which was given the general superintendence and control over all Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts. Section 5 of the "Act, 1957" vests certain powers upon the Board. Section 8 of the "Act, 1957" bestows power of review upon the Board. Article 199 of the "Constitution" though bestows power upon this Court to issue different kinds of writs mentioned therein but powers so ordained are not unbridled as is evident from the bare perusal of Article 199 of the "Constitution". There is no cavil to the proposition that despite availability of alternate remedy, this Court is not precluded to exercise its jurisdiction as a rule of thumb and even in case of availability of alternate remedy, if the circumstances so demand that the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction is inevitable, a High Court can invoke the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the "Constitution" but at the same time, such exercise cannot be made in an omnibus fashion. It is an oft repeated principle of law that where any party opts to choose a statutory remedy against an order, it cannot abandon or bypass it without any valid or reasonable cause and file constitution petition challenging such order. Such a trend is even offensive of doctrine of election. Guidance in this respect can be sought from COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES-II and another v. HAMDARD DAWAKHANA (WAQF), KARACHI (PLD 1992 Supreme Court 847) --- The revision petition sought to challenge an earlier decision related to the partition of joint land in a village in Chakwal under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967.The court observed that a question was raised regarding the maintainability of the petition, suggesting that the remedy of review under Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957, might be more appropriate. The petitioner argued that the remedy of review was not efficacious, and the constitutional petition was maintainable. On the other hand, the respondents contested the maintainability of the petition.The judgment delves into the background of the case, outlining the various stages of the proceedings related to the partition application and subsequent appeals. It also highlights the relevant sections of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957, empowering the Board with control over revenue matters.The court then discusses Article 199 of the Constitution, emphasizing that the High Court may exercise its jurisdiction if no other adequate remedy is provided by law. However, the judgment emphasizes that the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction should not be made in an omnibus fashion and cites precedents cautioning against bypassing statutory remedies without valid reasons.In conclusion, the court finds that the petition is not maintainable, dismissing it without costs. The judgment underscores the importance of adhering to statutory remedies and discourages the trend of bypassing them without compelling and justifiable reasons.

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed a suit for declaration, specific performance, and injunction against the respondents before the learned Civil Judge Class-I, Rawalpindi. Due to the respondents' absence, they were proceeded against ex-parte on 7th February 2020, and the suit was decreed ex-parte on 5th July 2021. The respondents filed an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to annul the decree, which was accepted on 7th July 2023. The petitioners' revision petition against this decision was dismissed on 14th October 2023, leading to the current petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. ----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court's decision to proceed ex-parte against the respondents was lawful. 2- Whether the annulment of the ex-parte decree by the trial court and the subsequent dismissal of the revision petition by the Additional District Judge were justified. 3- Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Ex-parte Proceedings: The trial court proceeded ex-parte against the respondents due to their absence and issued a proclamation in the newspaper without proper efforts for personal service. The trial court did not follow the mandatory provisions of Order V Rules 16, 18, and 19 of the CPC, which require substantial compliance before resorting to substituted service through publication. ---Annulment of Ex-parte Decree: The respondents were residents of England, and proper service procedures, including personal service and postal communication, were not followed. The court found that the substituted service was invalid, as it was not justified by prior efforts to serve the respondents personally. Consequently, the ex-parte proceedings and decree were annulled, and this decision was affirmed by the revisional court. ---Relief under Article 199: The petitioners failed to demonstrate any material irregularity or legal perversity in the decisions of the lower courts. The petitioners' request for writ of certiorari under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution of Pakistan was found to lack merit, as they could not show that the annulled order was without lawful authority or suffered from material illegalities. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, upholding the decisions of the lower courts to annul the ex-parte decree and denying the petitioners' request for relief under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. ----Citations/Precedents: Mrs. NARGIS LATIF vs Mrs. FEROZ AFAQ AHMED KHAN (2001 SCMR 99) Haji AKBAR and others vs GUL BARAN and 7 others (1996 SCMR 1703) WAPDA vs GHULAM HUSSAIN (2000 CLC 530) Syed SAJJAD HUSSAIN SHAH vs Messrs FEDERATION OF EMPLOYEES COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETIES LTD. (2003 CLC 1011) MEHR DIN through Legal Heirs vs AZIZAN and another (1994 SCMR 1110) AMJAD KHAN v. MUHAMMAD IRSHAD (DECEASED) through LRs (2020 SCMR 2155) CHIEF EXECUTIVE MEPCO and others v. MUHAMMAD FAZIL and others (2019 SCMR 919)

Summary: Background: An appeal was filed under Section 114 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, against an order passed by the Intellectual Property Tribunal, Lahore. The respondent instituted a suit claiming to be the bona fide owner and prior user of the trademark "SAMSARA" or "SAMSARA by Khadija Batool." The respondent alleged that the registration and use of the mark "SAMSARA Couture House (Pvt.) Limited" by the appellants infringed her rights. The Tribunal granted an interim injunction restraining the appellants from using the disputed mark. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent has established a prima facie case of prior use and goodwill of the trademark "SAMSARA." 2- Whether the requirements for granting an interim injunction, such as prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, are met. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the respondent did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of prior use and goodwill of the trademark "SAMSARA." The documents provided by the respondent, including invoices and Facebook pages, need to be verified during the trial. The court noted that the partnership agreement between the parties, which is undisputed, indicates that the business name "SAMSARA" was agreed upon by both parties, with no mention of prior use by the respondent. The court concluded that the three necessary elements for granting an interim injunction (prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss) were not co-existing in this case. The order of the Intellectual Property Tribunal was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. The Tribunal was directed to decide the suit on its merits within five months. ----Citations/Precedents: Messrs Unique School vs. Messrs Unique Group of Institutions, 2015 CLD 1297 Pioneer Cement Limited through Company Secretary vs. Fecto Cement Limited through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others, 2013 CLD 201 Qadeer Ahmed vs. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, The Trade Marks Registry and another, 1999 YLR 96 Muhammad Kashan vs. Coca Cola Export Corporation through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others, 2015 CLD 1513 Yaqoob vs. Additional Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and 2 others, 1973 SCMR 116 Kohinoor Soap and Detergents (Private) Ltd through Chief Executive of the Company vs. Basra Soap Factory and 4 others, 2002 CLD 1223, Karachi

Summary: Background: The petitioner stood as a surety for an accused, Muhammad Siddique, in a criminal case under sections 324/341, 337-D, 337-F(3), 34 of the Azad Penal Code (APC), and section 15(2) of the Arms Act. Upon the accused's failure to appear, the Additional Sessions Judge of Kotli ordered the forfeiture of the surety bond worth Rs. 10,00,000 and initiated proceedings for the attachment and auction of the petitioner’s property. ----Issues: 1- Whether the order of the Additional Sessions Judge for forfeiture of the bond and attachment of property was passed without due process. 2- Whether the petitioner was given an opportunity to explain or contest the forfeiture before the property attachment order was issued. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Due Process Violation: The court held that the Additional Sessions Judge did not follow the mandatory procedure under Section 514 Cr. P. C., which requires three stages: recording reasons for forfeiture, calling upon the person bound by the bond to pay the penalty or show cause, and considering any explanation provided by the person bound by the bond. The order was deemed non-speaking and procedurally flawed. Opportunity to Contest: The petitioner was not given an opportunity to explain or contest the forfeiture, as required by law, before the order of attachment of property was issued. The High Court quashed the order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 03.01.2023, and all subsequent proceedings were declared illegal and ineffective. The case was remanded to the Additional Sessions Judge for a decision in accordance with the law. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P. C) This section outlines the procedure for the forfeiture of bonds and requires the court to: Record the reasons for forfeiture. Call upon the person bound by the bond to pay the penalty or show cause why it should not be paid. Consider any explanation provided by the person before proceeding with the recovery of the penalty through attachment and sale of property.