Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S.96---Appeal against decree---Scope---Respondent/Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of Rs.4,807,000/- along with prevailing bank profit rate and damages of Rs.35 million against the Appellants/Defendants on account of non-delivery of possession of four plots purchased in 2005 in a housing scheme “Morgah City Islamabad”---Trial Court partially decreed the suit for Rs.35,40,000/- and damages of Rs.15,00,000/---Appellants assailed the decree alleging misreading of evidence and that Respondent had avoided refund despite Supreme Court order dated 26.06.2012 permitting refund to members---Held, that evidence established that the Appellants failed to deliver possession or refund deposited amount despite lapse of nearly two decades---DW-1, Assistant Manager of Appellant company, admitted that no written notice was issued to allottees after the Supreme Court’s order inviting them to claim refund---Trial Court correctly held that Appellants were in breach of contractual obligation and liable to refund the deposited sum with damages for prolonged deprivation---Findings of the Trial Court were based on sound appreciation of evidence and did not suffer from any misreading or non-reading of record---Appeal dismissed. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872) ----S.73---Compensation for breach of contract---Failure to deliver possession or refund consideration---Appellants failed to fulfill contractual promise to deliver possession of plots by 2006 and also failed to return deposited amount despite directions of the Supreme Court in 2012---Respondent’s money remained blocked with Appellants for nearly 19 years---Such inaction justified award of damages for loss occasioned by depreciation in money value and denial of use of funds---Damages awarded by Trial Court were equitable and supported by evidence---No interference warranted in appellate jurisdiction. (c) Administration of justice---Scope of appellate interference---Appellate Court would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact or discretionary relief unless shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or contrary to law---Impugned Judgment and Decree found to be reasoned, fair, and based on proper appreciation of evidence---Regular First Appeal dismissed for being devoid of merit. Appeal dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 22-A & 22-B---Registration of FIR---Scope of interference by High Court---Petitioner, proprietor of a construction company, sought direction for registration of FIR against his site in-charge (Respondent No.4) alleging embezzlement of company funds amounting to Rs.20 million---Learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace dismissed the application holding that the petitioner had not produced proof of employment or documentary evidence supporting the alleged misappropriation---Held, that the report of Superintendent of Police confirmed that Respondent No.4 was engaged as an independent contractor and payments were made under a contractual arrangement acknowledged by petitioner’s signature---Alleged transactions arose out of civil/commercial relationship and did not disclose a cognizable offence---High Court found no illegality or irregularity in the impugned order, which was based on proper appreciation of record---Petition dismissed. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 22-A---Power of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace---Nature and limits---Justice of Peace is not bound to direct registration of FIR in every case presented; he must examine whether the complaint discloses a cognizable offence---Where allegations pertain to breach of contractual obligation or civil liability, remedy lies in civil proceedings and not in criminal prosecution---Order refusing registration of FIR found lawful and within jurisdiction. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 561-A---Inherent jurisdiction of High Court---Exercise thereof---Inherent jurisdiction under S.561-A Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to convert a civil dispute into a criminal matter---High Court, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction, will not interfere with a reasoned order declining registration of FIR when police inquiry and documentary record reveal absence of any cognizable offence---Petition dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 22-A(6)(iii), 22-B & 154----Registration of FIR---Duty of police to record information regarding cognizable offence---Petitioner challenged order of learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace dismissing her application under s.22-A(6)(iii) Cr.P.C. seeking registration of FIR against police officials alleged to have abducted her husband and later implicated him in a false narcotics case---Held, that u/s 154 Cr.P.C. the Officer In-charge of a police station is under a mandatory duty to record every information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence---Police officer has no discretion to refuse registration of FIR; his role thereafter is to investigate and if found false, to proceed under ss.169 and 173 Cr.P.C.---Respondent No.1’s impugned order was contrary to law and inconsistent with his own earlier direction dated 30.10.2024 requiring the SHO to act on the complaint---High Court set aside the impugned order and directed SHO Sabzi Mandi to register FIR against proposed accused forthwith. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 22-A & 22-B---Jurisdiction of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace---Nature and extent---Justice of Peace, when approached with a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence and police inaction, is bound to direct registration of FIR under s.154 Cr.P.C.---Failure to do so amounts to abdication of statutory responsibility---Subsequent contradictory orders by the same forum create uncertainty and are liable to be corrected in constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---High Court may exercise constitutional jurisdiction to enforce statutory duty of police to record FIR where refusal is arbitrary or mala fide---Contradictory orders of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace found to be without lawful basis and inconsistent with the settled principle that FIR registration is mandatory on disclosure of a cognizable offence---Petition allowed; order dated 04.01.2025 set aside; direction issued for immediate registration of FIR and compliance report to be submitted. Petition allowed.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Arts. 17(2)(a), 79 & 80----Proof of written agreement pertaining to financial obligation---Mandatory requirement of attestation and production of witnesses---Appellants/plaintiffs filed a suit on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 12.11.2004 for purchase of land measuring 1200 kanals, which was dismissed by the Trial Court---Held, that where a document relates to a financial or future obligation, Article 17(2)(a) of the QSO mandates its attestation by two male witnesses or one male and two female witnesses, and under Article 79, such attesting witnesses must be produced in evidence to prove execution of the document---Appellants failed to produce any attesting or marginal witnesses to prove the agreement-to-sell or to explain their absence under Article 80 of the QSO---Non-compliance with these mandatory provisions rendered the agreement inadmissible in evidence and incapable of proof---Reliance placed on Khudadad v. Syed Ghuzanfar Ali Shah alias S. Inam Hussain and others (2022 SCMR 933). (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S.96----Appeal against ex-parte judgment and decree---Scope of interference---Findings of Trial Court based on proper appreciation of record and in consonance with law---No illegality, irregularity, misreading or non-reading of evidence established---Appellate Court declined to interfere with the well-reasoned ex-parte judgment and decree. Appeal dismissed.

Summary: Bail denied ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 497----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.406----Post-arrest bail, refusal of---Principles governing grant of bail---Tentative assessment---Petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case under S.406 PPC alleging misappropriation of Rs.7,150,000/- received for import of a vehicle---Held, that while considering bail, only a tentative assessment of the record is permissible and deeper appreciation of evidence is not warranted---Record showed that petitioner was owner of “Japan Motors” and failed to deliver vehicle despite receiving full payment---Prima facie ingredients of criminal breach of trust under S.406 PPC were made out---Petitioner was involved in nine other cases of similar nature and had earlier remained absconder---Sufficient incriminating material connected him with commission of offence---No ground of further inquiry made out---Case did not fall within the ambit of S.497(2) Cr.P.C---Petition dismissed. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S.497(2)----Further inquiry---Scope---“Further inquiry” within meaning of S.497(2) arises only when, upon tentative assessment, some reasonable doubt exists about guilt of accused---Where record and surrounding circumstances establish habitual conduct and deliberate deception, benefit of further inquiry cannot be extended. (c) Bail---Abscondence---Effect---Accused who willfully avoids process of law loses entitlement to normal concessions of bail unless abscondence is satisfactorily explained---Abscondence coupled with involvement in multiple criminal cases disentitles accused from relief of bail---Reliance placed on Ibrahim v. The State (1985 SCMR 382) and Muhammad Sadiq v. The State (PLD 1985 SC 182). (d) Bail---Grounds for refusal---Likelihood of abscondence, tampering with evidence, or repetition of offence constitute valid grounds to decline bail---Applied principles laid down in Muhammad Imran v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 903) and Shaukat Ali alias Shoka v. The State (2004 SCMR 1068). Petition dismissed; trial court directed to conclude trial within one month.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4 & 199----Executive action—requirement of lawful authority and due process—High Court’s duty to enforce Art. 4----Islamabad Boy Scouts Association (IBSA) office allegedly sealed and keys taken by Assistant Commissioner (City) without any written/speaking order---Held, that every action detrimental to property or reputation must be “in accordance with law” (Art. 4); High Court, in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199, is bound to secure compliance with Art. 4 and to strike down arbitrary, mala fide or colourable acts not backed by lawful authority or proper legal process—Reliance placed on Ch. Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan and Government of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri (PLD 1969 SC 14). (b) Administrative law ----Ultra vires executive measures—Sealing/closure of premises—necessity of a speaking order----Record contained minutes of review meeting but disclosed no directive to seal IBSA office; no formal order of Chief Commissioner authorizing seizure of keys or closure was produced---Action held arbitrary, without jurisdiction, and violative of Art. 4; mere dissatisfaction with an organization’s performance cannot justify coercive measures without statutory basis and due process. (c) Pakistan Boy Scouts framework ----Pakistan Boy Scouts Association Ordinance, 1959 & Rules (1993)----Governance in ICT—scope noted----PBS functions under the Ministry of Federal Education & Professional Training; President is Chief Scout nationally; Governors act as Chief Scouts in provinces; for ICT, rules are silent as to Chief Scout—Court recorded the administrative backdrop but found that, irrespective of governance debates, the impugned sealing lacked any lawful order and could not stand. (d) Constitutional petition ----Maintainability despite factual controversies----Where undisputed absence of lawful authority and non-production of a speaking order impinging fundamental rights is shown, writ under Art. 199 is maintainable notwithstanding parties’ rival narratives on management/performance. Disposition: Petition disposed of with directions—Chief Commissioner, Islamabad, ordered to conduct a thorough inquiry into the illegal closure/seizure of IBSA office, fix responsibility, resolve the matter within seven (07) days, and submit a comprehensive report to the Additional Registrar (Judicial).

Summary: (a) Contempt of Court ----Constitution of Pakistan, Art.204----Scope of contempt jurisdiction----Compliance with Court’s judgment----Where respondent authority has implemented the operative direction of the Court and decided the matter as required, no contempt is made out. Petitioners alleged willful defiance of High Court judgment dated 30.03.2023, whereby State Life Insurance Corporation (SLIC) was directed to decide their representation regarding 20% pay increase from 01.01.2012. Record revealed that SLIC afforded opportunity of personal hearing to petitioners on 13.10.2023 and thereafter passed a speaking order rejecting their claim on merits. Held, that once the authority had complied with the direction by deciding the representation in accordance with law, no element of willful defiance or contumacious conduct was established. (b) Contempt of Court ----Nature of proceedings----Mere dissatisfaction with the decision taken in compliance of a Court order cannot constitute contempt; appropriate remedy lies in appeal or other legal recourse, not in contempt proceedings. (c) Administrative law ----Implementation of judicial directions----Duty of administrative authority----If judgment requires a decision to be taken, compliance is achieved when such decision is made after hearing and reasoned order, even if outcome is adverse to the claimant. Petition dismissed; no prima facie case of contempt made out.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––Ss. 22-A & 22-B–––Application for registration of FIR–––Scope and limitations of jurisdiction of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace–––Petitioner filed an application under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C., seeking direction for registration of FIR against certain police officials and private individuals allegedly involved in unlawful dispossession, criminal intimidation, and abuse of authority–––Learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace dismissed the application on the ground that no cognizable offence was made out–––Held, that jurisdiction under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. is supervisory in nature and does not empower the Justice of Peace to hold a detailed inquiry or assess veracity of the complaint–––However, such jurisdiction is also not to be exercised mechanically; the Justice of Peace is required to determine, from the record and police report, whether the information prima facie discloses a cognizable offence–––In the present case, reports submitted by the Superintendent of Police and SHO indicated that the dispute was of civil nature concerning possession of land allegedly purchased by the proposed accused in 2017, and preventive action had already been taken under Sections 107/151, Cr.P.C.–––No material was produced by the petitioner to rebut this position–––Held, that the learned Justice of Peace committed no illegality in declining direction for registration of FIR when no cognizable offence was disclosed from record. (b) Constitution of Pakistan–––Art. 199–––Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court–––Interference with discretionary orders–––High Court observed that where an order of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is based on due consideration of police record and factual assessment, it does not warrant interference under constitutional jurisdiction–––Finding of the trial Court that the dispute was essentially civil in nature was duly supported by the official reports–––No violation of law, arbitrariness, or procedural irregularity was shown–––Interference by High Court declined. (c) Administration of justice–––Registration of FIR–––Duty of police–––Although under Section 154, Cr.P.C., police are bound to register FIR when information discloses a cognizable offence, such obligation does not extend to situations where the matter relates to civil ownership or possession dispute without criminal intent–––Refusal to register FIR, in such circumstances, held justified. Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––Ss. 22-A & 22-B–––Application for registration of criminal case–––Scope and object–––Respondent No. 4 filed an application under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace alleging abduction of her son by unknown persons in official uniform–––Learned Justice of Peace, upon obtaining report from police, directed registration of a case–––Petitioner contended that the order was passed without hearing him and in ignorance of material facts showing involvement of respondent’s family members in various criminal cases–––Held, that proceedings under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. are meant to ensure that a citizen’s complaint regarding commission of a cognizable offence is duly entertained and that no person is deprived of legal recourse owing to inaction of police–––Justice of Peace rightly exercised jurisdiction to direct registration of FIR when the report showed unexplained delay between respondent’s 15-call and formal arrest of her son, giving rise to reasonable apprehension of unlawful detention–––No illegality or irregularity found in the impugned order directing registration of FIR. (b) Constitution of Pakistan–––Arts. 4, 9 & 10–––Fundamental rights–––Unlawful detention–––Protection of liberty–––Court observed that wrongful confinement of respondent’s son by police amounted to gross violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 4, 9 and 10 of the Constitution–––Such conduct reflected abuse of authority and disregard for rule of law and could not be condoned. (c) Administration of justice–––Exercise of revisional or constitutional jurisdiction–––Interference with orders of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace–––High Court held that where an order is well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of record, no interference is warranted–––Petition challenging order dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––S. 497–––Cancellation of bail–––Principles governing recall of bail order–––Petitioner, accused in FIR No.561/2021 under Section 406, PPC, was granted post-arrest bail on the basis of a written compromise/Iqrarnama dated 01.07.2022–––Her bail was later recalled by the trial Court for breach of the agreed terms, and the order was upheld in revision–––Held, that once bail is granted on the basis of a conditional compromise voluntarily executed by the accused herself, any failure to comply with those conditions constitutes sufficient cause for its recall–––Accused did not object to the compromise deed when it was recorded in her presence before the Magistrate, nor did she challenge its validity before any competent forum–––Allegation of coercion or duress raised belatedly after default was devoid of merit–––No illegality found in cancellation of bail based on breach of voluntarily agreed conditions. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––S. 497–––Bail granted on compromise–––Effect of breach–––Although bail cannot ordinarily be made conditional, when an accused seeks release based on a settlement and undertakes specific obligations, those undertakings become enforceable–––Default or non-compliance with such voluntarily assumed conditions justifies recall of bail–––Practice deprecated where accused obtain conditional bail and later retract under pretext of coercion after benefiting from release. (c) Constitution of Pakistan–––Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A–––Due process and protection of liberty–––Scope–––Court held that cancellation of bail in consequence of non-compliance with a lawful compromise does not violate constitutional guarantees of liberty or due process when the bail order itself arose from voluntary consent of the accused–––No violation of fundamental rights established. (d) Administration of justice–––Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court–––Interference with concurrent findings–––Where both the trial Court and revisional Court have passed concurrent reasoned orders after examining the record, the High Court would not interfere in constitutional jurisdiction absent illegality or material irregularity–––Both Courts below rightly concluded that the petitioner failed to honour her own undertakings and that cancellation of bail was lawful. Disposition: Petition dismissed.