Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 ----Ss. 15, 34—Tenancy dispute—Applicability of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984—Standard of proof in rent proceedings. Petitioners sought eviction of the Respondent under Section 15 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, on the ground of personal need—The Rent Tribunal dismissed the petition, holding that the tenancy agreement was not proved under Articles 17(2)(a) and 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, as both attesting witnesses were not produced—The Additional District Judge reversed the decision, holding that the provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat did not strictly apply to rent proceedings—The High Court, however, set aside the appellate decision and restored the Rent Tribunal’s order—Supreme Court held that under Section 34 of the Act, the strict application of the Qanun-e-Shahadat is excluded in rent matters—However, general principles of evidence, such as burden of proof and relevancy, remain applicable—Held, Articles 17(2)(a) and 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, are special provisions and are not binding on Rent Tribunals—Failure to produce attesting witnesses does not automatically render a tenancy agreement inadmissible in rent proceedings—Appeal allowed, and eviction petition reinstated. ------ Cited Cases: Khadim Mohy-Ud-Din v. Rehmat Ali Nagra (PLD 1965 SC 459) Noori Trading Corporation v. Abdul Ghafoor (1997 CLC 205) Farzana Rasool v. Muhammad Bashir (2011 SCMR 1361) ------ (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 ----Arts. 17(2)(a), 79—Proof of tenancy agreement—Application in rent proceedings—Exclusion under special law. Respondent denied the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and challenged the validity of the tenancy agreement—Held, that under Section 34 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, the Rent Tribunal is not bound by Articles 17(2)(a) and 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984—The requirement of producing both attesting witnesses applies strictly to civil suits, not rent proceedings—Rent Tribunals must apply general principles of evidence to ensure fairness, but cannot enforce all strict evidentiary rules—Failure to produce attesting witnesses does not invalidate a tenancy agreement in rent cases. ------ Cited Cases: Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2011 SC 241) Farzand Ali v. Khuda Bakhsh (PLD 2015 SC 187) Farid Bakhsh v. Jind Wadda (2015 SCMR 1044) ------ (c) Rent Law—Standard of Proof ----Burden of proof in eviction proceedings—Preponderance of probability standard applicable. Petitioners produced the original tenancy agreement (Exh-P4), supported by their own testimonies and corroborating witnesses—Respondent merely denied the tenancy agreement’s authenticity but failed to present evidence proving forgery—Held, in rent proceedings, the standard of proof is the preponderance of probability, not strict proof as required in civil suits—Since Petitioners produced sufficient evidence to establish tenancy, burden shifted to the Respondent to disprove the agreement—Rent Tribunal and High Court erred in rejecting the tenancy agreement solely on technical grounds—Eviction petition reinstated. ------ Cited Cases: Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 2007 SC 45) Ahmad Ali v. Nasar-Ud-Din (PLD 2009 SC 453) ------ (d) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ----S. 106—Tenancy at will—Termination by notice—Eviction based on personal need. Tenancy agreement did not specify a fixed term—Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the tenancy was deemed to be from month to month, terminable by fifteen days’ notice—Petitioners served a one-month notice on the Respondent, as provided in the tenancy agreement, seeking possession for personal use—Respondent did not contest the bona fide nature of the requirement—Held, a landlord’s sworn testimony on oath, if unshaken in cross-examination, is sufficient to establish personal need—Failure to vacate after due notice entitles the landlord to eviction—Eviction petition rightly allowed by the Additional District Judge. ------ Cited Cases: Jehangir Rustom v. State Bank of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 1296) F.K. Irani & Co. v. Begum Feroze (1996 SCMR 1178) ------ (e) Constitutional Law ----Art. 10A—Right to fair trial—Relaxed evidentiary standards in rent proceedings—Balancing fairness and efficiency. While strict application of the Qanun-e-Shahadat is excluded in rent proceedings, the Rent Tribunal must apply general principles of evidence to ensure fairness—Relaxed evidentiary standards serve critical public policy objectives, such as reducing litigation costs and promoting access to justice—Held, evidentiary rules in rent matters should balance due process with the need for expeditious disposal—Supreme Court upheld the validity of relaxed standards in rent proceedings to protect tenants from unjust evictions while ensuring landlords have an efficient dispute resolution mechanism. ------ Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed. Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside. Decision of the Additional District Judge reinstated—Eviction petition allowed.

Summary: (a) Maintainability of Writ Petition ----Jurisdiction of High Court—Transfer of Civil Servant—Exclusive jurisdiction of Service Tribunal—Petitioner, a civil servant, challenged transfer order through constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution—Held, under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, civil servants must first exhaust departmental remedies before approaching the Service Tribunal—Article 212 of the Constitution ousts High Court jurisdiction in matters related to terms and conditions of service—Reliance placed on Chief Secretary Punjab v. Ms. Shamim Usman (2021 SCMR 1390) and Muhammad Hassanullah v. Chief Secretary Balochistan (2025 PLC (C.S.) 287). (b) Transfer & Terms of Service ----Transfer of civil servant—Legal validity—Service jurisprudence—Petitioner argued that her transfer violated the Transfer Policy, 2024, as she did not have the longest tenure at the station—Held, transfer is an administrative matter and falls within the discretion of the competent authority—A civil servant cannot challenge a transfer order unless it is shown to be malafide, coram non judice, or in violation of statutory rules—Reliance placed on Government of Pakistan v. Farheen Rashid (2011 SCMR 1) and Taufiq Asif v. Gen. Pervez Musharraf (PLD 2024 SC 610). (c) Doctrine of Exhaustion of Remedies ----Availability of alternative remedy—Exhaustion of remedies before invoking constitutional jurisdiction—Petitioner failed to avail departmental remedies before filing writ petition—Held, where a statutory remedy exists, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked—Litigants must exhaust alternate remedies before approaching the High Court—Reliance placed on Silver Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamal Pipes Industries (2023 CLD 1342). (d) Disposition Writ Petition dismissed as not maintainable. Petitioner directed to approach the Punjab Service Tribunal for redressal of grievance.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Exclusive Jurisdiction of Banking Court ---- Art. 199 of the Constitution, Ss. 154 & 489-F, Cr.P.C., Ss. 2(a), 7 & 20(4), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO) – Jurisdiction – Dishonour of Cheque – Financial Institution – Maintainability of FIR – Petitioner sought quashing of FIR registered under S.489-F, PPC, contending that Finja Lending Services Limited (FLSL), a Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC), qualified as a “financial institution” under S.2(a) of the FIO, and thus any prosecution for dishonestly issuing a cheque should be initiated before the Banking Court under S.7 of the FIO rather than through an FIR – FLSL was licensed by SECP to provide Investment Finance Services and did not qualify as a microfinance institution under the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 (MIO) – The jurisdiction of the Banking Court was exclusive where a dishonoured cheque was issued in repayment of “finance” under S.2(d) of the FIO – Provisions of the FIO had overriding effect under S.4, barring jurisdiction of ordinary criminal courts in such cases – Since the parties acknowledged that the petitioner was a “customer” of FLSL and the dishonoured cheque was issued for the repayment of “finance” as defined under the FIO, the matter fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court – FIR registered under S.489-F, PPC, was quashed, with liberty to FLSL to initiate proceedings before the Banking Court under S.7 of the FIO. ---- Petition allowed. (b) Banking Law – Dishonour of Cheque – FIO vs. PPC ---- Ss. 2(a), 7 & 20(4), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO), S. 489-F, Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) – Banking Court Jurisdiction – Scope of “Finance” – Applicability of General Criminal Law – Under S.20(4) of the FIO, dishonestly issuing a cheque for the repayment of finance is a specific offence falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court – For the FIO to apply, the transaction must involve a financial institution, a customer, and a financial obligation arising from a defined form of “finance” under S.2(d) of the FIO – If the dishonoured cheque is related to finance, the Banking Court has sole jurisdiction, and general criminal law provisions such as S.489-F, PPC, do not apply – In contrast, if the cheque relates to a non-finance commercial obligation, S.489-F, PPC, may be invoked – FIR in the present case was incompetent as it fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court. ---- FIR quashed; remedy lies before the Banking Court. (c) Interpretation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ---- Ss. 2(a), 2(d), 2(e), 7 & 20(4), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO) – Definitions – “Financial Institution” – “Finance” – “Obligation” – The definition of a “financial institution” under S.2(a) of the FIO includes NBFCs licensed to provide Investment Finance Services – “Finance” under S.2(d) of the FIO covers a range of financial transactions, including loans, advances, leasing, and credit facilities – “Obligation” under S.2(e) must arise directly from a finance transaction – Any dispute arising out of such financial arrangements falls within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court, and its proceedings take precedence over general criminal proceedings. ---- FIR under S.489-F, PPC, against a customer of a financial institution quashed as incompetent; proper remedy lies under S.7 of the FIO before the Banking Court. Disposition: ---- FIR No.1127/2024 quashed – Respondent financial institution may initiate proceedings before the Banking Court under S.7 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ---- S. 173 ---- Framing of charge ---- Trial commences only after framing of charge ---- Jurisdiction of Special Court under the Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021 ---- Petitioner's case was registered under S. 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (PPC), and the challan report was submitted to the Judicial Magistrate ---- The Magistrate, considering the offense as a scheduled offense under the Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021, referred the matter to the Sessions Judge, who subsequently assigned it to the Additional Sessions Judge ---- The Additional Sessions Judge, without framing charge, ruled that S. 354 PPC was not attracted and remanded the case back to the Area Magistrate for trial ---- Held, trial commences only after framing of charge, and any determination regarding the applicability of scheduled offenses must occur during trial as per S. 16(3) of the Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021 ---- Impugned order, having been passed before framing of charge, was held to be premature and beyond jurisdiction. (b) Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021: ---- S. 16(3) ---- Exclusive jurisdiction of Special Court to determine whether an offense falls within the schedule ---- Interpretation of "in the course of trial" ---- The Act empowers the Special Court to determine during the course of trial whether an offense is a scheduled offense or not ---- Trial, as settled in precedent, commences only upon framing of charge ---- Impugned order held to be in violation of S. 16(3) of the Act, as no charge had been framed before making such a determination ---- Case law relied upon: Haq Nawaz v. State (2000 SCMR 785) and Niaz Ahmed v. Aijaz Ahmed (PLD 2024 SC 1152) ---- Application of the legal maxim A communi observantia non est recedendum (when the law prescribes a particular procedure, it must be followed accordingly or not at all). (c) Administration of Justice: ---- Jurisdictional error ---- Special Court can only exercise powers prescribed under law ---- Decision rendered in absence of proper legal procedure is not sustainable ---- The Additional Sessions Judge, having disregarded the mandatory procedure under the Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021, acted beyond jurisdiction ---- The impugned order, therefore, was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication after framing of charge, ensuring compliance with procedural requirements. ----Disposition: Petition allowed. The impugned order dated 30.08.2023 was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Additional Sessions Judge, Chunian, for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Administration of justice--- ----When the record of the Trial court is attached with the appeal then there is no need to summon the record of the Trial court and the same is to be considered. Sohail Hameed Butt v. Mst. Nudrat Nafees 2008 SCMR 635 and Ashiq Ali and others v. Mst. Zamir Fatima and others PLD 2004 SC 10 ref. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Ss. 3, 5 & First Sched., Art. 156---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 54---Land acquisition, matter of---Appeal filed against Referee Court---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause---Scope ---Appellant being a Government Department ---Appeal was filed by Secretary–Government Department with the delay of 318 days ---Stance taken by the appellants (Secretary -Government Department) was that reference/ judgment was not in the knowledge due to prolonged correspondence among the offices---Validity ---Under S.3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it is the inherent duty of the Court to dilate into the question of limitation---Notably, the references were filed by the respondents in 2014 and after adopting due process, the same were decided by the Trial Court in the year 2024 which had been assailed under S.54 of the Land Acquisition Act---Present appeal had been filed with the delay of 318 days---The communication and correspondence inter se the departments cannot be considered a valid and reasonable ground for condonation of delay---Provisions of Art.156 of the Limitation Act, 1908, would apply to appeals filed under S.54 of the Land Acquisition Act--- The law of limitation is designed to ensure diligence in pursuing legal remedies---Appellants had to explain the delay of each and every day with justified and cogent reasons---In the absence of any reasonable cause, the delay for such a long period cannot be condoned---Record revealed that the counsel for the appellants was appearing during the proceedings before the Trial court and participated in each and every step---Thus, the ground for no knowledge was against the admitted facts and record of the Trial court, therefore, had no substance---Even otherwise, limitation is not a mere technicality rather it creates a vested right for the opposite party and delay results in the extinction of a legal remedy unless valid reasons are taken---Record also revealed that the counsel for the appellants cross-examined the respondents and was present during the proceedings---Thus, the stance taken by the appellants was not justified and there was no sufficient reason to condone the limitation---Therefore, relying on the internal correspondence amongst the appellants was not sufficient cause and plausible explanation for condonation of delay---The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the appellants could not justify such a long delay; thus, the appeal was badly time barred---Application for condonation of delay was dismissed---Consequently, the appeal, being barred by time, was dismissed. Cholistan Co-operative Wool Development Marketing Union Ltd., Bahawalpur v. Bashir Ahmad and another 1983 SCMR 1105; Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Br. Jehanzaib Rahim v. Dr. Shaukat Pervez, Dr. Hamida Rahim and others PLD 2007 SC 560; Ajab Khan and others v. Government of NWFP of others 2007 SCMR 860 and Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Works and another v. Messrs Malbrow Builders, Contractor, Sialkot 2006 SCMR 1248 ref. WAPDA v. Muhammad Khalid 1991 SCMR 1765; Hussain Spinning Unit No. 2 v. Authority Under The Payment of Wages and another 2008 PLC 280; Teekam Das M. Haseeja, Executive Engineer, WAPDA v. Chairman, WAPDA and another 2002 SCMR 142 and Managing Director, Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd., Karachi v. Ghulam Abbas and others PLD 2003 SC 724 distinguished. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Application for condonation of delay---Ground taken being of general nature---Effect---The application for condonation of delay filed by the appellants was of general nature---Therefore, relying on the internal correspondence amongst the offices was not sufficient cause and plausible explanation for condonation of delay---The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the appellants could not justify such a long delay; thus, the appeal was badly time barred---Application for condonation of delay was dismissed---Consequently, the appeal, being barred by time, was dismissed. Province of Punjab through Secretary Education v. Kishwar Qudus Paul 2004 SCMR 571 ref. (d) Limitation--- ----Question of limitation---Government departments/appellants---No preferential treatment---Government departments cannot be treated differently from the ordinary litigants---The government departments are not entitled to any leniency while deciding the question of limitation---Cases of government departments must be assessed on the same standards applicable to public litigants and application for condonation of delay requires same scrutiny---Even otherwise, law favours the vigilant not the indolent---Relying on the internal correspondence amongst the government departments is not sufficient cause and plausible explanation for condonation of delay. Town Administration and another v. Mohammad Khalid and others 2024 SCMR 1852 and Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Works and another v. Messrs Malbrow Builders, Contractor, Sialkot 2006 SCMR 1248 ref. Rana Shamshad Khan, Addl. Advocate General with Farman Ullah Baig Law Officer for Respondent No. 1.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 341, 500, 147 & 34---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, wrongful restraint, defamation, rioting, common intention---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the accused-petitioner was that he made firing upon the complainant and his son with the intention to kill them---All offences reflected in the FIR except S.324, P.P.C., were bailable---Admittedly, the allegation pertained to ineffective aerial firing and no one had sustained injuries, as such it would be moot question for the Trial Court to determine whether the allegation of attempt to murder was established in the case or not, which could be done at the time of conclusion of trial, which made the instant case of prosecution as one of further inquiry under S.497(2),Cr.P.C.---Investigation of case was complete and the accused petitioner was behind bar since his arrest---Accused was no more required for further investigation or for any other case to the prosecution---Speedy trial was the right of the accused and was now guaranteed under the Constitution but trial of the case did not witness any progress because complete challan of the case was still awaited---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Sajjad Hussain v. State 2021 YLR Note 150; 2020 MLD 1187; 2018 MLD 724; 2020 YLR Note 147; 2019 MLD 724 and 2022 YLR 2082 ref. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail---Observations of the Court---Scope---Findings of the Court made in bail order are tentative in nature and the Trial Court need not be influenced in any way---Trial Court may reach its own conclusions after recording evidence in the case. Burhan Wali for Petitioner. Malik Sher Baz Addl. AG for the State. Shehbaz Ali for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XVII, R. 3---Suit for recovery of Rs. 6,70,00,000/---Failure to produce evidence---Dismissal of suit---Principle---Appellant/plaintiff was aggrieved of dismissal of suit on failure to produce evidence---Validity---As per record, the case had been adjourning for recording evidence of the appellant till 18.11.2024 for more than 1½ year after framing of issues---Appellant availed sufficient opportunities for producing and recording of her evidence but she remained unable to do the same---Trial Court granted ample opportunities and even absolute last and final opportunity was granted to her with the warning i.e. if evidence would not be produced her right to produce evidence would be closed and before passing impugned order cost was imposed in presence of the appellant with the said warning---During that span, statement of even a single witness could not be recorded---No other option was left with the Trial Court except to invoke the penal jurisdiction of O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C.---From the bare perusal of said facts and referred provisions of law it became crystal clear that the trial Court ordered a specific warning and imposition of cost therefore once the final opportunity was granted along with a clear warning, the Court must enforce its order strictly and without exception---Lis of the present matter remained pending before the Trial Court for almost more than three years and the other party kept on facing the agony of the trial for such a long period---Appellant could not produce her evidence before the Trial Court despite availing reasonable opportunities---Lis was prolonged on one pretext or the other despite clear orders of the Trial Court---Cases must be decided promptly, otherwise it causes heavy backlogs of controversies between the parties, that amounts to abuse of legal system and a hurdle in fair and timely disposal of cases---In such circumstances, case of the appellant squarely fell within the mischief of provision of O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C. and appellant's suit was rightly dismissed by the Trial Court after affording reasonable and justified opportunities to produce her evidence---Appeal being devoid of any force and substance was dismissed in limine. Moon Enterpriser CNG Station, Rawalpindi v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through General Manager, Rawalpindi and another 2020 SCMR 300; Duniya Gul and another v. Niaz Muhammad and others PLD 2024 SC 672 and Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh PLD 2024 SC 887 rel. Hafiz Rehman Aziz for Appellant.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S. 45---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Entries, alteration of---Aggrieved party not intimated---Scope and effect---Petitioners filed an application in the year 2017 before the Deputy Commissioner challenging two mutations being attested in the year 2012 which essentially changed/altered the earlier entries having been initially incorporated in the year 1929---Said application was rejected being barred by limitation---Constitutional petition was filed as said rejection order was concurred up to Board of Revenue---Case of the petitioners was that the longstanding entries in their names consistently coming from 1929/30 have been altered on the basis of fake and fraudulent documents; that these attestations in the revenue record were made behind their back in the year 2012; that they acquired knowledge about the said alteration of their longstanding entries in the year 2017 and immediately challenged the same---Validity---From perusal of record it is clear that entries in favour of the petitioners were being consistently reflected in the revenue record since 1929-30---Admittedly, said longstanding entries in their favour were altered in the year 2012 on the basis of provisional allotment Form LC-9 dated 21.10.1959 and LC-11 dated nil---In fact, the respondents first entered and attested Mutation No. 3507 on 10.03.2012 in favour of their predecessor and then through inheritance Mutation No. 3553 dated 07.04.2012 became owners themselves---There is nothing on record to establish that before altering the said longstanding entries, the petitioners were put on notice---As such it is only natural that petitioners would learn about the said change only when any interference was made in their possession or they were informed by someone---In absence of any evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to disbelieve the petitioners when they assert knowledge from 2017 when they immediately challenged the altering/disputed mutations before the revenue hierarchy---Said aspect also needs consideration and, in such circumstances, the grievance of the petitioners is valid and needs to be properly addressed after affording the proper opportunity of hearing as required by Art. 10-A of the Constitution---Respondents (revenue fora) ignored this aspect of the case and rejected petitioners' application on the ground of limitation, holding that they could not challenge the entries---Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the respondents (revenue fora) were against the law resulting in grave miscarriage of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned orders and the matter was remanded to respondent / Deputy Commissioner to decide the matter afresh on merits after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----Ss. 42 & 45---Records---Restriction on variations of entries in records---Long standing entries---Petitioners filed an application in the year 2017 before the Deputy Commissioner challenging two mutations being attested in the year 2012 which essentially changed/altered the earlier entries having been initially incorporated in the year 1919---Said application was rejected being barred by limitation being not maintainable---Constitutional petition was filed as said rejection order was concurred up to Board of Revenue---Held: From perusal of record it is clear that entries in favour of the petitioners were being consistently reflected in the revenue record since 1929-30---Admittedly , said longstanding entries in their favour were altered in the year 2012 on the basis of provisional allotment Form LC-9 dated 21.10.1959 and LC-11 dated nil---In fact, the respondents first entered and attested Mutation No. 3507 on 10.03.2012 in favour of their predecessor and then through inheritance Mutation No. 3553 dated 07.04.2012 became owners themselves---Longstanding entries in the revenue record, particularly those reflected in successive Jama bandis, cannot be altered by revenue authorities in summary manner---No such power was vested in the revenue authorities---The correction of entries envisaged under S. 45 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, has very limited scope and can be invoked only in cases where all the parties consented or where it is supported by a decree or order of the Court binding on all parties---Longstanding entries in revenue record reflected in successive Jama bandis have a presumption of truth and correctness is attached to them, which cannot be dislodged lightly in summary manner---Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the respondents (revenue fora) were against the law resulting in grave miscarriage of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned orders and the matter was remanded to respondent /Deputy Commissioner to decide the matter afresh on merits after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Waris Khan v. Col. Humayun Shah PLD 1994 SC 336; Rasta Mal Khan v. Nabi Sarwar Khan 1996 SCMR 78; Nemat Ali v. Malik Habib Ullah 2004 SCMR 604; Muhammad Naeem v. Siraj-ud-Din and 6 others 215 CLC 1084; Muhammad Khaliq v. Gul Afzal Khan PLD 2015 SC 247; Inayat Khan and others v. Allah Ditta 2007 SCMR 655 and Abdul Rasheed v. Manzoor Ahmad PLD 2007 SC 287 ref. (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S. 42---Records, alteration of---Acquiescence of the party seeking alteration---Scope and effect---Petitioners filed an application in the year 2017 before the Deputy Commissioner challenging two mutation, being attested in the year 2012 which essentially changed / altered the earlier entries having been initially incorporated in the year 1929---Said application was rejected being barred by limitation being not maintainable---Constitutional petition was filed as said rejection order was concurred up to Board of Revenue---Held: From perusal of record it is clear that entries in favour of the petitioners were being consistently reflected in the revenue record since 1929-30---Admittedly, said longstanding entries in their favour were altered in the year 2012 on the basis of provisional allotment Form LC-9 dated 21.10.1959 and LC-11 dated nil---In fact, the respondents first entered and attested Mutation No. 3507 on 10.03.2012 in favour of their predecessor and then through inheritance Mutation No. 3553 dated 07.04.2012 became owners themselves---There is the element of acquiescence for having taken no steps for rectification /alteration of record since long---Astonishingly, the respondents’ predecessor kept his relied document (the LC-9) of the year 1959 to himself and never sought to give effect to them during his lifetime and the respondents after his death gave effect to it in the year 2012, which clearly suggests that, regardless of the genuineness / veracity of the documents in his favour, the predecessor of respondents had acquiesced to the entries in favour of the petitioners for as along he was alive---Respondents (revenue fora) ignored this aspect of the case and rejected petitioners' application on the ground of limitation, holding that they could not challenge the entries---Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the respondents (revenue fora) were against the law resulting in grave miscarriage of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned orders and the matter was remanded to respondent / Deputy Commissioner to decide the matter afresh on merits after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Sultan v. Abdullah Khan 1992 SCMR 1457 ref. Mian Asif Aman for Petitioners. Muhammad Ibrar Khan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2)---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss.41 & 52---Application under S.12(2) C.P.C., filing of---Plea of fraud and misrepresentation---Maintainability of application filed under S.12(2), C.P.C. by a non-party---Summary dismissal of the application---Circumstances where framing of issues and recording evidence are necessary---Doctrine of lis pendens, applicability of---Effect of collusive compromise on applicability of lis pendens principle---Scope---Where decree procured through fraud and collusion lis pendens is not applicable---Exception to lis pendens doctrine---Misuse of consent decree---Applicability of S.41 Transfer of Property Act, 1882---Right of bona fide purchaser---Scope---The cardinal issue that engaged the consideration of the High Court was as to “whether an application under S.12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was maintainable by a bona fide purchaser of property, who was not a party to the original suit, against a consent decree allegedly obtained through collusion or fraud, and whether summary dismissal of such application without framing issues and recording evidence was sustainable in law”---Petitioner filed application under S.12(2), C.P.C. with the grievance that he had purchased 4-kanal 7.5 marla land from a person namely ‘MR’ and mutation was also sanctioned in his favour---‘MR’ had already obtained a declaratory decree dated 09.07.2014 against a person namely ‘AQ’---‘MR’ then appeared in appeal filed by ‘AQ’ challenging that very declaratory decree and got recorded his statement before the District Court to the effect that he had no objection to set-aside the decree and suit be dismissed as withdrawn upon which the District Court on the same day dismissed the suit on 20.10.2014---On 11.12.2014 the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. was filed by the petitioner which was summarily dismissed by the District Court without framing issues and recording evidence on the grounds that rule of lis pendens was applicable to the case and no fraud had been committed with court which was essential to maintain an application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Held: Under settled law a genuine compromise was a normal conduct of parties but a compromise entered into by collusion or fraud excludes the application of S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882---The application of doctrine of lis pendens was circumscribed by certain conditions---One of the well recognized exceptions was when the provisions of S. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 were squarely applicable to the case---If the fraud was inter se the parties and no fraud with the Court was committed or no misrepresentation was made before the court, the provisions of S.12(2) of the C.P.C. would not be applicable, in absence of jurisdictional defect---However, the position was different when consent decree was obtained to have the premium of the fraud---When no case of fraud or misrepresentation or jurisdiction was made out and it was apparent from the record that application under S. 12(2) of the C.P.C. was filed just to derail the proceedings, or it was to cause delay in execution; such attempt required summary dismissal---Oral and / or written submissions were sufficient when no complicated question was involved---Nevertheless, when facts required determination, recording evidence and question being a mixed question of law and facts, would need proper determination---The court below fell in error while refusing to frame issues and recording evidence---The civil revision was allowed and while setting aside the impugned judgment, the case was remanded to the District Court concerned for decision on the application after framing issues and providing opportunity to produce evidence. Muhammad Ashraf Butt and others v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti and others PLD 2011 SC 905; Fazal Karim through Legal Heirs and others v. Muhammad Afzal through Legal Heirs and others PLD 2003 SC 818; Sheikh Muhammad Iftikhar Ahmad and others v. Faiz Ahmad and others 2023 SCMR 2158; Syed Mehmood Ali Shah v. Zulfiqar Ali and 5 others PLD 2013 SC 364; Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Khan and 2 others 2002 SCMR 2003 and Mrs. Anis Haider and others v. S. Amir Haider and others 2008 SCMR 236 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2)---Application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. filing of---Plea of fraud and misrepresentation---Maintainability of application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. by a non-party---Legislative intent---The provision of S. 12(2), C.P.C. does not confine its applicability solely to parties to the original proceedings---In S. 12(2), C.P.C. the word 'person' and not the judgment-debtor or his successor-in-interest or the word party to the suit have been used, thus it would not be permissible to import into this provision of law something which has not been mentioned therein---It appears that the law-maker has purposely used the word 'person'---Had the intention of the law-maker been to restrict the right of filing the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. only to the judgment-debtor or his successor-in-interest or a person who was party thereto then it was easy for the law-maker to have said so---If the argument is accepted that application under S.12(2), C.P.C. is not maintainable since the applicant was not party in the original proceedings, then the very purpose behind enacting the aforesaid provision of law would be frustrated because then a person not being a judgment-debtor or his successor-in-interest or a party to the suit, although his rights may have been jeopardized by the decree obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, shall be obliged to undergo the exercise of filing a suit for the purpose because a number of cases can be visualized in which fraudulent decrees are obtained in order to cast clouds on the legal rights of opponents. Abdur Rauf and others v. Abdur Rahim Khan, Advocate PLD 1982 Peshawar 172 ref. Ch. Jalal Din v. Mst. Asghari Begum and others 1984 SCMR 586 rel. Shezada Mazhar and Syed Sumir Sohail for Petitioner. Muhammad Mahmood Chaudhary for Respondents Nos. 1 to 7 and 14. Muhammad Akram Khan for Respondent No. 8. Ex-parte for Respondents Nos. 9 to 13. Date of hearing: 10th February, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending