Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 22 & 24---Judgment passed by the Banking Court---Appeal, filing of---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause---Appellant (customer / Company), instead of filing within thirty days, filed appeal with a delay of atleast 08 months after passing of decree---Validity---Along with the application for condonation of delay, a photostat copy of a certificate, purportedly issued by a doctor had been filed by the deponent to support his statement / explanation ('certificate-in-question')---Certificate-in-question was issued on such date when at least seven months of impugned judgment has already elapsed---Certificate-in-question depicted that the deponent had remained under the treatment of said doctor for severe post trauma stress disorder ; however, it did not show that for how much period deponent remained under the treatment of the said doctor and from when---The doctor, in the certificate-in-question, had not clarified whether the deponent was not even able to communicate simple instructions to his lawyer to file an appeal within time, or that he was so incapacitated that his routine life had been compromised so much so that he had lost his ability to perform daily chores or run routine errands like a normal person---Therefore, certificate-in-question was of little help to the appellant for covering delay in filing the appeal---Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was also dismissed---Appeal, filed by customer / company was also dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 22 & 24---Judgment passed by the Banking Court---Appeal, filing of---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause---Appellant (customer / Company), instead of filing within thirty days, filed appeal with a delay of at least 08 months after passing of decree---Validity---It was not explained in the application for condonation of delay that when the certified true copy of impugned judgment and decree (documents) was obtained---Even, as per endorsement date on both the documents, the appeal was filed after delay of two months thereafter, and not within 30 days thereafter---Delay of each and every day in filing the appeal had to be explained---Appellant had miserably failed to account for delay of each and every day in filing the appeal as required by law---The delay apparently caused by indolence and negligence of the appellant was shocking and unconscionable in that no cogent material had been brought on record to justify the same except a vague statement that authorized officer was suffering from some stress causing him mental disorder ; neither the gravity, nor the duration of which had been specifically revealed---Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed---Appeal, filed by customer / company was also dismissed, in circumstances. (c) Limitation--- ----Condonation of delay---Cause(s) / ground(s)---Indolence of party seeking condonation---Effect---A counsel's neglect to inform his client about fate of the case would not per se be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay---Ground of living in a far off village and lack of knowledge regarding dismissal of the case was a matter purely between client and his counsel, and it cannot be considered a sufficient ground for condonation of delay---Non-supply of cause list to counsel for a party would not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay in absence of affidavit of the person concerned---Reasons to emphasize the law of limitation is that the same (limitation) has to be construed in strict sense because due to negligence and indolence of one party in pursuing the matter in the court, valuable rights are accrued in favour of the other party which cannot be done away with on flimsy and unsubstantiated grounds---Condoning the delay is not warranted without being satisfied about validity and sufficiency of the grounds raised for condonation of such delay. Muhammad Immad Qamar for Appellant. Muhammad Baqar Raza for Respondent.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 439 & 439-A---Enhancement of sentence in revision---Mandatory requirement of notice to accused---Scope---Trial Court convicted appellants under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hudood) Act, 1985 and sentenced them to five years’ imprisonment with fine---Appellate Court, while maintaining the sentence, additionally awarded 20 lashes without any appeal by the State or issuance of notice under S. 439(2) Cr.P.C.---Held, that although revisional jurisdiction permits enhancement of sentence even without an appeal by the State, such power is strictly conditional upon giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, as mandated under S. 439(2) Cr.P.C.---Omission to issue notice before enhancing the sentence violates the statutory right to a fair hearing and renders the order illegal and unsustainable. Cited Cases: • Noman Mansoor alias Nomi v. The State and another (PLD 2024 SC 805) • Farhad Ali v. Mutalib Khan and another (2012 SCMR 1072) (b) Criminal Procedure--- ----Revisional jurisdiction---Nature and limits---Revisional powers under Ss. 439 & 439-A Cr.P.C. are supervisory and corrective, not punitive in nature---Any order passed to the prejudice of an accused without hearing him personally or through counsel infringes upon fundamental rights under Arts. 10 and 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ensuring legal representation and fair trial---Failure to comply with such mandatory provisions constitutes miscarriage of justice. (c) Prohibition (Enforcement of Hudood) Act, 1985--- ----Ss. 3 & 4---Sentence of imprisonment and lashes---Enhancement without notice---Legality---Enhancement of punishment by awarding additional lashes without prior notice to convicts or appeal by the prosecution held violative of law and principles of due process---High Court erred in upholding such order without examining the procedural defect. Disposition: ---Appeal accepted. ---Judgments of the High Court and Additional District Criminal Court set aside. ---Case remanded to the trial court to rehear and decide afresh in accordance with Ss. 439 & 439(2) Cr.P.C. within two months.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu & Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 –– Scope and object –– Compromise and reconciliation –– Private settlement of family disputes. Parties to the family appeal informed the Court that they had reached an out-of-court compromise through private settlement. Held, amicable resolution of family disputes is consistent with the spirit and object of the AJ&K Family Courts Act, 1993, which aims at expeditious disposal of matrimonial and custody matters through reconciliation. Such settlements are to be encouraged, as they serve the ends of substantial justice and promote social harmony within the family unit. Role of counsel in facilitating compromise was duly appreciated by the Court. (b) Constitution of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (Interim Constitution, 1974) –– Art. 3-G –– Protection of family, marriage, mother and child –– Constitutional obligation of the State and Courts. Article 3-G mandates protection of the marriage, the family, the mother and the child. Courts are therefore required to lean towards reconciliation and preservation of marital relations wherever possible. In family disputes, not only spouses but entire families suffer; judicial approach must thus favour “make-up rather than break-up”, treating dissolution of marriage as a last and least-favoured resort. (c) Family law –– Reconciliation –– Judicial approach. In family litigation, Courts should actively explore reconciliation whenever there exists even a remote possibility of settlement. Family Courts and appellate forums alike must remember that their primary duty is to restore harmony, not to perpetuate estrangement. (d) Disposition –– Appeal consigned to record –– Appreciation of counsels’ role. Since parties privately settled their dispute, the appeal was disposed of and consigned to record. Court recorded appreciation for both counsel for facilitating compromise in accordance with the spirit of family law and constitutional mandate. Held: Family settlements are consistent with constitutional and statutory duty to protect the family; reconciliation should be preferred over dissolution. Appeal consigned to record.

Summary: Acquittal granted---(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 409, 420, 468, 471: (b) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947): ----S. 5(2) (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 173, 342, 382-B (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: ----Arts. 54–58 Forgery, criminal breach of trust, cheating and use of forged documents by public servants---Benefit of doubt---Accused were charged with fraudulently inserting their names in land mutation entries through connivance with revenue officials, with the aim of illegally acquiring high-value property---Allegation was that the accused Raja Shahid Ahmad and Haq Nawaz Abbasi got their names added as vendees in Mutations No. 5442 and 5442/1 with the aid of Aurangzeb and Malik Muhammad Safdar---Punjab Forensic Science Agency (PFSA) forensic report negated allegation of subsequent insertion of names in mutation entries—Report confirmed ink, writing instrument and script were consistent, showing no tampering---Complainant admitted under cross-examination that he had neither challenged the mutation entries before a civil court nor disputed the PFSA report---No corroborative evidence was produced by prosecution to prove exclusive ownership or sole vendeeship---Vendor Haji Muhammad Azram had verified and sanctioned the mutations during his lifetime, with all legal formalities and signatures from marginal witnesses duly recorded—Vendor’s son Majid Khan Azram and the marginal witnesses confirmed sale in favour of all four accused---Despite land being transferred as early as 2015, complainant raised objections only after vendor's death in 2021, suggesting mala fide intent—Mutations not cancelled, and subsequent sale transactions based on them remained intact and unchallenged---Contradictions in complainant's claims regarding agreements and ownership further undermined credibility---Held, conviction cannot be sustained based on conjecture when documentary and witness evidence establish genuineness of transaction—Serious doubts cast on prosecution case, warranting acquittal on settled principle that benefit of doubt must go to the accused as a matter of right, not concession—Appeals allowed and accused acquitted. ---Cited Cases: • Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 • Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 • Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 736 • Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64 • Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 • Abdul Jabbar v. The State 2010 SCMR 129 ---Disposition: Convictions set aside---Appeals allowed---Accused acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

Summary: The following legal questions arise for determination by this Court: i. Whether a single application, under Sections 8 & 20 of the Act, was maintainable for disputes under two separate agreements, each having an independent arbitration clause? ii. Whether the respondent prematurely invoked Section 8, without first exhausting the procedure outlined in the agreements? iii. Whether the arbitration clauses in both agreements fell within the scope of Section 9, rather than Section 8 of the Act?

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O. IX, R. 13---Setting aside ex-parte judgment---Power of attorney---Scope---Appellant filed an application under O. IX, R. 13, CPC for setting aside an ex-parte judgment and decree---Trial Court dismissed the application based on a special oath administered by the attorney of the appellant---Additional District Judge, in appellate jurisdiction, set aside the trial court's decision and remanded the matter for recording of evidence---High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, reversed the appellate court’s decision and upheld the trial court’s ruling---Supreme Court held that revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction under S.115, CPC by interfering in the well-founded appellate court decision---A power of attorney merely authorizing an attorney to pursue litigation does not empower the attorney to make binding settlements or propose decisions based on special oaths---Held, that the revisional court had erred in misinterpreting the scope of the attorney’s authority, and the judgment of the Additional District Judge was restored accordingly. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ali v. Muhammad Aslam (PLD 1990 SC 841) (b) Administration of Justice ----Revisional jurisdiction---Scope and limitations---High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by replacing the well-reasoned findings of the Additional District Judge in appellate jurisdiction---Where the appellate court has exercised its jurisdiction properly and in accordance with law, interference by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction is not warranted under S.115, CPC---Revisional powers do not extend to mere substitution of opinion where no jurisdictional defect is found---Supreme Court restored the decision of the appellate court, emphasizing that remanded matters should be taken to their logical conclusion expeditiously. (c) Law of Evidence ----Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (P.O. 10 of 1984), Art. 163---Oaths Act (X of 1873), Ss. 8 & 9---Decision on special oath---Scope and effect---A case decided on a special oath must be carefully examined to determine whether the authority to propose such an oath was legally conferred---Power of attorney enabling an attorney to "pursue" litigation does not imply the authority to compromise the case or bind the principal to a settlement via a special oath---Held, that the attorney in the present case had exceeded the scope of authority conferred by the power of attorney, rendering the decision based on special oath unsustainable.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a), (e)---Murder---Benefit of doubt---Burden of proof---Scope---Appellants convicted and sentenced to death for the abduction and murder of a minor---High Court reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment but denied the benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C.---Supreme Court held that conviction was primarily based on weak and unreliable evidence, including voice recognition and a retracted judicial confession---Voice recognition as the sole identification method in a capital case, without forensic corroboration, was deemed inherently unreliable---Retracted confessions, particularly when forming the principal basis of conviction, necessitate independent corroboration---Prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt---Appellants acquitted while extending benefit of doubt. (b) Law of Evidence ----Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (P.O. 10 of 1984), Art. 37---Judicial confession---Evidentiary value---Scope---Confession made in police custody and later retracted before the magistrate cannot be relied upon as the sole basis for conviction in a capital offense unless it is corroborated by independent evidence---Supreme Court held that the alleged confession lacked credibility as (i) the accused did not confess before the magistrate, (ii) the place of the dead body’s recovery was already known to the investigating agency, and (iii) forensic or medical evidence did not substantiate the confession---Held, conviction based on an uncorroborated retracted confession is unsustainable in cases carrying the death penalty. (c) Criminal Trial ----Burden of proof---Capital punishment---Standard of evidence---Scope---In cases involving capital punishment, the burden of proof lies entirely on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt---Any uncertainty or unreliable evidence must benefit the accused, as the irreversible nature of the death penalty necessitates the highest standard of proof---Supreme Court held that prosecution failed to furnish unimpeachable evidence connecting the accused with the crime, making the conviction unsustainable under settled principles of criminal law---Appellants acquitted and released forthwith.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure: --- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, O. XXII, R. 10 --- Assignment and transfer of interest --- Standing to file revision petition --- The petitioner claimed to be an assignee under Order XXII, Rule 10 CPC by virtue of a sale deed executed in his favor by Shafi, who had previously purchased the disputed land during litigation. The High Court dismissed the revision petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked standing, as his predecessor-in-interest (Shafi) was found not to be a bona fide purchaser. Held, a sale of immovable property is not equivalent to an assignment of rights in litigation, and the petitioner failed to establish a legitimate claim in the proceedings. (b) Property Law: --- Validity of sale during pending litigation --- Effect of prior agreements --- The disputed property was originally jointly acquired by three individuals (Fazal, Rustam, and Hanif), and an agreement was made for Rustam and Hanif to sell their shares to Fazal. However, Rustam passed away before execution, invalidating the power of attorney used to effectuate the sale. Held, once the first suit annulled the sale deed in Fazal’s favor, any subsequent sales of the land could not confer valid title, particularly in light of the pre-existing agreement in favor of Fazal. The subsequent sale to Shafi and, in turn, to the petitioner, was legally unsustainable. (c) Litigation & Bona Fide Purchaser Rule: --- Constructive notice and impact on later purchasers --- The second suit, filed by Fazal’s heirs, successfully enforced the original agreement. A specific issue was framed and decided against Shafi, holding that he was not a bona fide purchaser without notice of the prior agreement. Held, since Shafi’s claim of title was negated in earlier proceedings, the petitioner, who derived title from him, could not acquire a better right than his predecessor. Accepting such a claim would create an endless chain of assignments, diluting legal rights and creating instability in property transactions. (d) Judicial Review & Acquittal Principles: --- Appellate intervention in High Court orders --- Standard for granting leave --- The High Court's dismissal of the revision petition was based on a proper interpretation of contractual rights and prior judicial determinations. Held, appellate courts interfere with acquittals or dismissal of claims only when judgments are perverse, arbitrary, or based on misreading of evidence. In the absence of such glaring defects, the Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal. (e) Disposition: Leave to appeal refused. Petition dismissed. Prior High Court judgment upheld.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act, 1940: ----S. 20(4)----Reference to arbitrator----Mandatory requirement----Court must frame a formal reference before appointing an arbitrator and directing arbitration proceedings----Failure to issue an order of reference renders arbitration proceedings void ab initio----Arbitrator cannot proceed suo motu without a proper reference from the court----Award set aside due to procedural illegality. (b) Arbitration proceedings: ----Invalidity of arbitration award----Arbitration without a proper court reference is a fundamental procedural flaw----Trial court erred in making the award a rule of the court despite the absence of a valid reference----Entire proceedings declared null and void, necessitating fresh arbitration with proper court directives. (c) Administration of justice: ----Effect of procedural lapses----When arbitration proceedings suffer from inherent legal defects, the resulting award cannot stand----Court must ensure strict compliance with statutory requirements before allowing arbitration to proceed----Superstructure of arbitration proceedings crumbles when its foundation is legally defective. ----Disposition: Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment and decree set aside. Petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, remanded to the Senior Civil Judge, Rawalpindi, for fresh proceedings, including appointment of an arbitrator and framing of reference. ----Cited Cases: China International Water v. Pakistan WAPDA (PLD 2005 Karachi 670) Pakistan through Ministry of Defence v. Ch. Fazal Muhammad (2005 YLR 2896) Oil and Gas Development Corporation Ltd. Pakistan v. Claugh Engineering Ltd. (1999 MLD 254)

Summary: (a) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline & Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA Act) ----Ss. 5, 13(5)(ii), 4----Disciplinary proceedings against civil servant----Absence from duty----Imposition of major penalty----Interpretation of second proviso to S. 13(5)(ii)----Scope----Whether absence from duty for less than one year mandates a major penalty----Principles of proportionality and structured discretion. The petitioner, employed as an Assistant at the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE), Rawalpindi, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings under S. 5 of the PEEDA Act, 2006, on charges of wilful absence from duty, inefficiency, and misconduct. Following an inquiry, a recommendation was made for his removal from service, but instead, he was awarded the major penalty of compulsory retirement by the competent authority vide order dated 29.04.2013. The appellate authority dismissed his appeal on 19.06.2013, and the Lahore High Court dismissed his writ petition on 30.05.2022. The petitioner then filed a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The petitioner contended that his absence from duty lasted only 48 days, whereas the second proviso to S. 13(5)(ii) of the PEEDA Act mandates the imposition of a major penalty only if the absence exceeds one year. The respondent, however, argued that the competent authority retains discretion to impose any major penalty, irrespective of the duration of absence. The Supreme Court examined S. 13(5)(ii) of the PEEDA Act, which empowers the competent authority to impose any penalty enumerated in S. 4, subject to the mandatory imposition of a major penalty (compulsory retirement, removal, or dismissal) if absence exceeds one year. The Court held that the proviso restricts discretion only in cases of prolonged absence (exceeding one year), but does not preclude the imposition of major penalties in cases of shorter absences, provided such penalties are proportionate to the misconduct. The Court reiterated the importance of maintaining discipline in the civil service, emphasizing that prolonged unauthorized absence disrupts public service delivery, weakens institutional discipline, and undermines government efficiency. However, the imposition of penalties must be structured, reasoned, and proportionate to the misconduct, ensuring that disciplinary actions are neither arbitrary nor excessive. (b) Judicial review of disciplinary penalties----Principles of proportionality----Scope of interference by courts. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of proportionality, holding that disciplinary penalties must be rational, necessary, and balanced. Relying on Sabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board (PLD 2019 SC 189), Muhammad Iqbal Khan Noori v. NAB (PLD 2021 SC 916), and Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Nadeem Raza (2023 SCMR 803), the Court applied a three-pronged proportionality test: 1) Suitability – Whether the penalty imposed serves a legitimate objective. 2) Necessity – Whether a less severe penalty could achieve the same purpose. 3) Balancing – Whether the penalty is excessive in relation to the misconduct. 4) Applying these principles, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner’s 48-day absence did not justify the major penalty of compulsory retirement, as it failed the test of proportionality. The Court set aside the penalty and remanded the matter to the competent authority for reconsideration. ----- Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; competent authority directed to revisit the penalty in light of proportionality principles. ------ Cited Cases: • Sabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board (PLD 2019 SC 189) • Muhammad Iqbal Khan Noori v. NAB (PLD 2021 SC 916) • Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Nadeem Raza (2023 SCMR 803) • Sunni Ittehad Council v. Election Commission of Pakistan (PLD 2025 SC 67) • East and West Steamship v. Pakistan (PLD 1958 SC 41) • Pramath Nath v. Kamir Mondal (PLD 1965 SC 434) • Hamdard Dawakhana v. C.I.T (PLD 1980 SC 84) • Kadir Bux v. Province of Sindh (1982 SCMR 582) • K.E.S.C. Progressive Workers’ Union v. K.E.S.C Labour Union (1991 SCMR 888) • Nawaz Bibi v. Allah Ditta (1998 SCMR 2381)