Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964 – Ss. 5, 17 – Maintenance of child – Scope and quantum – Principles derived from Islamic jurisprudence and case law - Held, father is under a continuous legal and religious obligation to maintain his children regardless of the marital status with the mother or custodial arrangements – This obligation is derived from the immutable bond of paternity and not contingent upon cohabitation or custody – Cited with approval: Humayun Hassan v. Arsalan Humayun (PLD 2013 SC 557); Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law, Sections 369–370. (b) Islamic law – Nafaqah (maintenance) – Determination of amount – Considerations of child's needs and father's financial capacity - Held, maintenance must include all reasonable expenses essential for physical, mental, and emotional development of the child, including food, shelter, healthcare, education, and social needs – The father’s income and earning capacity must be weighed, but mere unemployment is not a valid defense if the father is physically and mentally capable of earning – Hanafi position noted: obligation to earn subsists even if wealth is not currently possessed – Cited texts: Hedaya, Ameer Ali on Mahomedan Law, Fyzee’s Outlines of Muhammadan Law. (c) Family law – Custody and maintenance – Distinction – Termination of marriage does not absolve father from child support - Held, the obligation to maintain a child continues post-divorce and is independent of the wife’s right to maintenance – Such duty is not diminished if the child is in the hizanat of the mother – Ethically and legally untenable to link maintenance with custody. (d) Constitutional petition – Scope of interference – Concurrent findings – No material evidence produced to displace factual findings - Held, petitioner failed to produce any documentary evidence (e.g., salary slips, income tax returns) to disprove the findings of the lower courts regarding his financial ability – Petitioner’s claim of limited income and remarriage not substantiated – High Court rightly dismissed the constitutional petition as no jurisdictional error or illegality found in concurrent decisions. (e) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Art. 185(3) – Leave to appeal – Principles – Concurrent findings of fact by trial, appellate, and High Court – No interference warranted Held, Supreme Court declined to grant leave as no question of law of public importance was made out, and the findings of the courts below were duly supported by the record and legal principles. Disposition: Leave to appeal declined. Petition dismissed. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 9, 14, 25 & 27 – Right to Life, Dignity, Equality and Non-Discrimination Marital status as bar to family pension entitlement—Scope—Held, a daughter’s right to family pension of a deceased civil servant cannot be extinguished merely due to change in marital status after the pensioner’s death—Family pension is not a discretionary grant but a legal and constitutional entitlement grounded in Articles 9 and 14, encompassing both the right to life and to live with dignity—Denial of pension based solely on a woman’s change in marital status, without regard to actual financial need, constitutes systemic gender bias and violates Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution—Presumption that married women are financially secure and unmarried/divorced women are dependent, held, to be a flawed and patriarchal assumption—Eligibility for pension must be based on need, not formal status—Court observed that such restrictive interpretations fail to recognize women as autonomous right-holders and reinforce unconstitutional and discriminatory stereotypes. (b) West Pakistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963 – Rr. 4.7(1), 4.10(2)(B), 4.10(3) Interpretation of “unmarried” and “divorced” daughter—Scope—Held, Rules entitle both unmarried and divorced daughters to family pension without conditioning eligibility on the timing of marital status—Circular dated 05.12.2022 issued by Government of Sindh interpreted Rule 4.10(2)(B) restrictively by linking pension entitlement to status at time of death of the pensioner—Such restriction, held, had no support in the Act or the Rules and unlawfully curtailed an otherwise vested right—Rules confer pensionary entitlement based on category of beneficiary, not time-based marital conditions—Circular found to exceed its administrative scope and struck down as void. (c) Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 – S. 20 Right to pension—Nature and succession—Held, pension is not an ex gratia or charitable benefit but a legally accrued right of a government servant for past service—In case of death, this right devolves onto legal heirs under the Act and must be administered in accordance with law—Delay in disbursement or imposition of arbitrary restrictions amounts to negligence and breach of statutory and constitutional duty—Government departments bound to uphold fair, timely, and lawful distribution of pensionary benefits. (d) Executive Instructions and Circulars – Legal Status Administrative clarifications—Scope—Held, executive instructions or departmental circulars cannot override, amend, or narrow the operation of parent statutes or delegated legislation—Circular dated 05.12.2022 imposed an unauthorised condition that conflicted with the statutory pension framework—Court reaffirmed that executive authorities cannot issue clarifications that create new legal obligations or exclusions absent legislative backing. (e) Gender Equality – International Obligations – CEDAW, ICCPR, ICESCR, ILO Convention No. 111 Discriminatory pension frameworks based on marital status—Effect—Held, Pakistan’s international treaty obligations prohibit laws or practices that deny women access to economic benefits due to sex or marital status—Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ICCPR, ICESCR, and ILO Convention No.111 obligate the State to eliminate gender-based legal inequalities and stereotypes—Circular impugned was found to contravene Pakistan’s treaty commitments and reinforced unjust assumptions about women’s dependency and financial security—Court emphasized the need for a needs-based and dignity-affirming pension framework in line with global standards. (f) Comparative Jurisprudence – Pension Entitlement of Daughters Reference to Indian, Bangladeshi, and European legal frameworks—Held, India and Bangladesh have adopted progressive pension frameworks that assess entitlement based on financial need rather than marital status—Indian courts have interpreted “unmarried daughter” to include widowed and divorced daughters, and recognized pension as a constitutional right—European Court of Human Rights has held that denial of social security based on arbitrary classifications violates proportionality and equality principles—Pakistan’s rigid framework found to lag behind global standards and in need of reform. Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused. Circular declared void ab initio for being unconstitutional and contrary to statutory law and international obligations.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908): —S. 115—Revision—Concurrent findings of fact—Scope of interference—Where both the trial court and appellate court concurrently dismissed the suit for declaration and the subsequent appeal, revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC could not be exercised unless findings were perverse, based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, or suffered from jurisdictional defect—Petitioner failed to demonstrate any such illegality—Revision petition dismissed. (b) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958: —Ss. 10, 22, 25—Ouster of civil court’s jurisdiction—Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD)—Jurisdiction—Matters relating to issuance or cancellation of PTDs fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Authorities—Civil court barred from entertaining such disputes—Consistent view of the superior courts affirms that orders passed under the Settlement Act cannot be challenged via civil suits but only through statutory appeals or writ jurisdiction—Failure of petitioner to approach Settlement Authorities renders civil suit incompetent—PLD 1962 SC 42, PLD 1965 SC 404, PLD 1966 Lah. 33, PLD 1984 SC 213, 2004 SCMR 1640, PLD 1971 SC 762, 2017 SCMR 468 and 2022 SCMR 1481 relied upon. (c) Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975: —S. 2(2)—Scope of notified officers’ powers—Cut-off date—Proceedings pending as of 30.06.1974 could be adjudicated by notified officers, but fresh proceedings challenging PTDs could not be initiated post-repeal—Petitioner’s failure to initiate proceedings before relevant forums prior to the cut-off date rendered claim non-maintainable—2005 SCMR 1650, 2022 SCMR 1481 cited. (d) Law of Limitation—Limitation Act, 1908: —Arts. 14 & 120—Suit to set aside PTD—Limitation period—Article 14 provides one year to challenge an act or order of a government officer; Article 120 provides a six-year limitation in residuary cases—Petitioner instituted suit in 1979 challenging PTD issued in 1965—Suit was hopelessly time-barred under both Articles—No justification for condonation of delay—2022 SCMR 1481 relied upon. (e) Civil Law—Family settlements—Panchayat—Proof of oral family arrangements—Plaintiff claimed ownership based on a family settlement through Panchayat—However, no evidence was produced regarding the date, time, venue, or participants of the Panchayat—Neither the plaintiff appeared as witness nor any Panchayat member was produced—Claim remained unsubstantiated—Findings of courts below held to be lawful and evidence-based. ----Disposition: Civil revision dismissed. No illegality, jurisdictional defect, or misreading of evidence found in the impugned judgments.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Contractual disputes—Scope of interference by High Court—Limitation of writ remedy in purely private contractual matters The Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, ordinarily refrains from interfering in matters arising purely out of contractual obligations between private parties, particularly where disputed questions of fact require evidence. The impugned judgment of the High Court had ventured into adjudication of a contractually governed employment termination without assessing available alternate remedies or following due evidentiary processes. Cited Case: Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed (2013 SCMR 1707) (b) Service Law—Private contractual employment—Termination simpliciter—Distinction between regular government service and private/contractual appointment—Employee not governed by statutory rules—Remedy lies in civil suit, not writ The appellant's employment was governed exclusively by the terms of a contract, and no statutory rules were shown to apply. The Supreme Court held that the respondent, not being a civil servant or a statutory employee, could not invoke the writ jurisdiction to challenge the termination. Where the relationship is that of master and servant without statutory backing, the remedy lies in ordinary civil proceedings for damages or reinstatement subject to contract terms. Cited Case: Pakistan Red Crescent Society v. Syed Nazir Gillani (PLD 2005 SC 806) (c) High Court Judgment—Error of jurisdiction—Substitution of contractual terms by judicial reasoning—Improper assumption of fact-finding role—High Court exceeded constitutional jurisdiction The Court held that the High Court erred in law by effectively rewriting the employment terms and substituting its own findings over matters contractually agreed upon between the parties. This amounted to judicial overreach and transgression into a domain reserved for trial courts. The writ jurisdiction was exercised in a manner that disrupted the legal sanctity of mutually agreed contracts. Cited Case: Province of Punjab v. Asif Jamil (PLD 2021 SC 741) (d) Contract Act, 1872—Contractual obligations—Termination clause—Binding nature—Courts not to rewrite terms—Freedom of contract upheld The appeal involved the enforcement of a contractually stipulated termination clause. The Supreme Court reiterated that where a contract allows either party to terminate without cause, courts must respect such autonomy unless vitiated by fraud, coercion, or illegality. The High Court had misapplied equitable considerations in disregard of binding contractual terms. Cited Case: Shafique Ahmed Khan v. NESPAK (PLD 2011 SC 610) Disposition: Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside. Constitutional petition dismissed. Supreme Court upheld the appellant's right to terminate the respondent in accordance with contract terms.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Contractual disputes—Scope of interference by High Court—Limitation of writ remedy in purely private contractual matters The Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, ordinarily refrains from interfering in matters arising purely out of contractual obligations between private parties, particularly where disputed questions of fact require evidence. The impugned judgment of the High Court had ventured into adjudication of a contractually governed employment termination without assessing available alternate remedies or following due evidentiary processes. Cited Case: Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed (2013 SCMR 1707) (b) Service Law—Private contractual employment—Termination simpliciter—Distinction between regular government service and private/contractual appointment—Employee not governed by statutory rules—Remedy lies in civil suit, not writ The appellant's employment was governed exclusively by the terms of a contract, and no statutory rules were shown to apply. The Supreme Court held that the respondent, not being a civil servant or a statutory employee, could not invoke the writ jurisdiction to challenge the termination. Where the relationship is that of master and servant without statutory backing, the remedy lies in ordinary civil proceedings for damages or reinstatement subject to contract terms. Cited Case: Pakistan Red Crescent Society v. Syed Nazir Gillani (PLD 2005 SC 806) (c) High Court Judgment—Error of jurisdiction—Substitution of contractual terms by judicial reasoning—Improper assumption of fact-finding role—High Court exceeded constitutional jurisdiction The Court held that the High Court erred in law by effectively rewriting the employment terms and substituting its own findings over matters contractually agreed upon between the parties. This amounted to judicial overreach and transgression into a domain reserved for trial courts. The writ jurisdiction was exercised in a manner that disrupted the legal sanctity of mutually agreed contracts. Cited Case: Province of Punjab v. Asif Jamil (PLD 2021 SC 741) (d) Contract Act, 1872—Contractual obligations—Termination clause—Binding nature—Courts not to rewrite terms—Freedom of contract upheld The appeal involved the enforcement of a contractually stipulated termination clause. The Supreme Court reiterated that where a contract allows either party to terminate without cause, courts must respect such autonomy unless vitiated by fraud, coercion, or illegality. The High Court had misapplied equitable considerations in disregard of binding contractual terms. Cited Case: Shafique Ahmed Khan v. NESPAK (PLD 2011 SC 610) Disposition: Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside. Constitutional petition dismissed. Supreme Court upheld the appellant's right to terminate the respondent in accordance with contract terms.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Multiple FIRs—Positive jurisdiction under S. 185 Cr.P.C.—High Court’s non-determination of jurisdictional claim—Remand ordered The petitioner challenged the registration of multiple FIRs under writ jurisdiction, invoking Section 185 Cr.P.C. before the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court failed to examine the petitioner’s core contention under Section 185 Cr.P.C., as it confined its decision only to joinder of charges under Section 239 Cr.P.C. The omission warranted interference, and the case was remanded for fresh adjudication. Held: Failure to decide a critical jurisdictional plea amounts to a legal error and justifies remand. Relevant Provision: Section 185, Cr.P.C. (Jurisdiction to try offences subject to High Court’s direction) (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199—Scope of remand—Maintainability objections—Trial continuation not barred—Direction to High Court to decide pending writs uninfluenced by Supreme Court observations The Court clarified that its earlier remand order in Civil Petition No. 14 of 2025 was limited to addressing the Office’s objections to maintainability and did not preclude the High Court from examining merits. In the instant case, the Supreme Court directed the High Court to adjudicate both connected writ petitions afresh, uninfluenced by prior procedural history. Held: The High Court must decide all pending matters, including joinder and multiple FIR issues, independently and expeditiously. (c) Anti-Terrorism Trials—Simultaneous proceedings—No bar on trial progression—Remedy for suspension lies before High Court Petitioner requested suspension of trials in Anti-Terrorism Courts at Lahore and Faisalabad pending High Court proceedings. The Supreme Court refused to interfere, holding that suspension of trial is within the High Court’s jurisdiction, and that the trial courts should proceed in accordance with law unless directed otherwise by competent authority. Held: No stay on ATC proceedings; High Court empowered to decide suspension on merits. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and partially allowed. Impugned judgment of Lahore High Court dated 20.03.2025 set aside. Writ Petition No. 17090/2025 deemed pending and remanded for fresh decision along with Case Diary No. 174515/2024.

Summary: (a) Guardians and Wards—Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5—Maintenance allowance for minor daughters—Scope of enhancement—Family Court’s jurisdiction to alter without fresh suit Petitioners challenged High Court's enhancement of maintenance allowance from Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 2,500 per month per child. Both daughters and their father filed opposing petitions: the former for further enhancement, the latter for reduction. The Supreme Court held that the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain an application for enhancement of maintenance under S.151, C.P.C., without requiring a new suit. Held: Family Court may alter maintenance if existing allowance is inadequate, treating it as an application under S.151 C.P.C. Cited Case: Lt. Col. Nasir Malik v. ADJ Lahore (2016 SCMR 1821) (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)—Leave to appeal—Salary increase post-HC judgment—Grounds for remand to trial court for fresh assessment The petitioner’s salary had significantly increased (from Rs. 33,026 to Rs. 161,148) since the High Court’s judgment. The Court held that such a material change in financial circumstances warranted reassessment. The matter was remanded to the Family Court to re-evaluate the adequacy of maintenance allowance in light of current income. Held: Changed financial circumstances may justify remand for reassessment of fair maintenance. (c) Execution of Maintenance Decrees—Default in payment—Determination of arrears—Direction to clear in instalments Despite court orders, the father failed to pay the enhanced maintenance in full. The Supreme Court directed both parties to file concise statements before the executing court. Any determined arrears would be payable in three equal monthly instalments. Held: Defaulter must clear maintenance arrears as per court determination within fixed timeline. (d) Practice and Procedure—Remand—Expeditious disposal—Trial court directed to decide application within one month The trial court was directed to decide the application for enhancement within one month, preferably by holding day-to-day hearings, and to inform the Deputy Registrar of progress. Held: Remand with timeline ensures expedited relief in matters concerning welfare of minors. Disposition: CPLAs disposed of. Matter remanded to trial court for reassessment of maintenance allowance under S. 151 CPC, with arrears (if any) to be cleared in 3 monthly instalments.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure—Doctrine of Lis Pendens—Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 52—Sale during pendency of pre-emption suit—Applicability of doctrine to restored suits Respondents No. 2 to 4 purchased suit land during the pendency of a pre-emption suit that had been restored after earlier dismissal for non-prosecution. The Supreme Court held that under the doctrine of lis pendens (Section 52, Transfer of Property Act), such purchasers are bound by the outcome of the ongoing litigation. Held: Restoration of suit relates back to its original filing; thus, any sale during the pendency—even after a temporary dismissal—is subject to lis pendens. Cited Cases: Basit Sibtain v. Muhammad Sharif (2004 SCMR 578) Malik Amanullah v. Haji Muhammad Essa (2024 SCMR 1258) (b) Bona Fide Purchaser—Transfer by ostensible owner—TPA, S. 41—No shield against lis pendens Even a bona fide purchaser without notice is bound by the result of pending litigation. The Court reaffirmed that the doctrine of lis pendens is not based on notice but on the principle of finality in litigation. Held: Transferee steps into shoes of transferor and cannot escape legal consequences of the pending suit. Cited Cases: Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Khan (2002 SCMR 2003) Muhammad Ashraf Butt v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti (PLD 2011 SC 905) Tabassum Shaheen v. Uzma Rahat (2012 SCMR 983) Aasia Jabeen v. Liaqat Ali (2016 SCMR 1773) (c) Practice and Procedure—High Court’s remand order set aside—Suit for pre-emption restored The High Court’s decision to remand the case for fresh evidence on merits was held erroneous. The Supreme Court restored the trial court’s decree dated 22.01.2008, which had been passed after the plaintiff deposited the sale consideration in full. Held: High Court committed legal error by disregarding lis pendens and disrupting the finality of the trial court’s decree. Disposition: Appeal allowed. High Court’s impugned order dated 12.07.2010 set aside. Trial court’s decree dated 22.01.2008 restored.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 — Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), Ss. 35, 382-B & 397 — Sentences from multiple cases — Power to order concurrency — Jurisdiction of High Court — Scope Concurrent running of sentences — Two separate murder cases — Trial courts and appellate courts silent on concurrency — Jail authorities treating sentences as consecutive — Scope of High Court’s power to intervene — Petitioner was convicted in two separate murder trials (FIRs No. 297/2001 and 47/2006) and awarded life imprisonment in both cases — In both appeals, High Court had modified death sentences to life but did not specifically order concurrency of sentences — Petitioner sought relief under Art. 199 of the Constitution to have his sentences run concurrently — Jail authorities were treating the sentences consecutively due to absence of specific order — Held, in light of Rahib Ali v. The State (2018 SCMR 418) and Noor Muhammad v. The State (2025 SCMR 540), the High Court has jurisdiction under S. 397 CrPC read with S. 561-A and S. 35 CrPC to direct concurrency of sentences arising out of separate trials where circumstances justify — Petitioner had been in custody since 2006, had served his sentence in one case with remission, and no appeal/review was pending — Relief granted. Held, the High Court has constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to direct concurrent running of sentences in multiple trials, especially when justice demands it and no statutory bar exists. Cited Cases: • Rahib Ali v. The State (2018 SCMR 418) • Noor Muhammad v. The State (2025 SCMR 540) (b) Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), Ss. 35, 382-B & 397 — Concurrent sentences — Principle of judicial discretion — Remissions and fairness in sentencing Convict had earned over five years of remission and completed sentence in one case by March 2023 — Second sentence had commenced without concurrency order — Held, once benefit of S. 382-B CrPC and remission has been granted, further incarceration due to administrative interpretation offends fairness — Courts are expected to exercise discretion in favour of concurrency unless public interest dictates otherwise — No evidence of aggravating circumstances justifying consecutive execution — Benefit of concurrency directed to be applied to all substantive sentences except default imprisonment for non-payment of fine, compensation, and Daman. Held, concurrency is to be presumed in absence of express direction to the contrary when no compelling reason exists to treat sentences consecutively. (c) Disposition Writ petition accepted in terms — Petitioner’s sentences in FIR No. 297/2001 and FIR No. 47/2006 to run concurrently — Sentences in default of compensation, fine, and Daman excluded — Petition disposed of accordingly. "If any person has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in more than one case and it is not mentioned in the judgments of the cases about running of sentences concurrently, then High Court can pass order for running of sentences in all the cases "concurrently".

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 11.05.2023 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Criminal Appeal No. 30 of 2022 and Confirmation Case No, 01 of 2022). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 46---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Dying declaration---Scope---Accused-appellant was charged for committing murder of his wife by setting her on fire due to some domestic quarrel---Record revealed that the main case of the prosecution hinged on the dying declaration given by deceased---In order to do substantial justice, the said dying declaration was played in the Court, however, it was an admitted fact that the said dying declaration was not properly audible---In the instant case it had come on the record that deceased was 38.5% burnt and whether she was able to give a dying declaration in such a situation was again a question to be answered by the prosecution---Moreover, such declaration was neither recorded by the Investigating Officer or the Medical Officer or any other independent person but by the relatives of deceased---Even otherwise the same was, admittedly, not properly audible---On first principle, the sanctity attached to such a statement by the statute should be respected unless there were clear circumstances brought out in the evidence to show that a dying declaration was not reliable---An audio tape or video produced before a Court as evidence ought to be clearly audible or viewable---Video recording of the dying declaration showed the deceased had not made any statement at her own rather she was being dictated and tutored by her relatives to make a statement against the petitioner---Moreover, it was clear that deceased was only saying yes or no in response to the statements made by her relatives present at the relevant time and as such it was not her own statement rather the statement of her relatives which was recorded in the video recording---Thus, the said statement could not be considered as the dying declaration of the deceased---Even otherwise it clearly showed that deceased was under the influence of her relatives who were present at the relevant time and recorded her alleged dying declaration---No certificate of the concerned Medical Officer had been produced in the prosecution evidence to show that the deceased was medically fit to make the statement---None from the hospital staff appeared in the witness box to affirm that any dying declaration was made by the deceased as claimed by the prosecution---Video recording of the dying declaration of deceased was never sent to the office of the Forensic Science Laboratory to determine its genuineness, therefore, it was not safe to rely upon said recording---All these factors when read in conjunction with each other and in juxtaposition would reveal that the instant case was not free from doubts and surmises---Dying declaration was not recorded in accordance with the law; there was no Forensic Science Laboratory Report about the authenticity of the video recording of the dying declaration of the deceased and the dying declaration admittedly not being properly audible could not be relied upon---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Saeed and another v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 1421; Ghulam Zohra v. Muhammad Sadiq 1997 SCMR 449; Zahida Bibi v. State PLD 2006 SC 255; Tahir Khan v. The State 2011 SCMR 646 and Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 SC 675 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused-appellant was charged for committing murder of his wife by setting her on fire due to some domestic quarrel---Record showed that there were major contradictions in the deposition of complainant, deceased's sister, other sister of deceased and a witness---Complainant stated at one stage that he heard deceased himself with regard to her dying declaration and that she told that it was accused who had set her on fire, whereas at another place he stated that he was available outside the room---Similarly, sister of deceased stated in her deposition that when they recorded the dying declaration on the mobile phone of accused's brother there were 5 to 6 persons available in the room who heard the dying declaration, whereas according to the deposition of sister of deceased, she stated that witness recorded the dying declaration on the mobile phone of brother of accused in her presence---Moreover, there was also a contradiction in the deposition of witnesses inter se, as according to deposition of complainant and sister of deceased the incident took place due to a quarrel between accused and deceased whereas according to the deposition of deceased's sister, when deceased used to visit her parents' house regularly she had never complained about the attitude of deceased---According to some witnesses it was accused who took deceased in an injured and burnt condition in a rickshaw to the Civil hospital, whereas at a different place it was mentioned that he was not available at the time of the incident and had gone out to fetch bread etc. for breakfast---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 46---Dying declaration---Scope---Dying declaration is, at best, a weak type of evidence which requires cautious appraisal and must ordinarily be corroborated by other reliable and confidence-inspiring material---Conviction cannot rest solely on a dying declaration if the same is shrouded in mystery or is fraught with infirmities---Credibility, voluntariness and the mental fitness of the declarant, along with the absence of extraneous influence, are sine qua non for its evidentiary acceptance---Dying declaration must not only be truthful and free from external coercion but also supported by surrounding circumstances. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Motive not proved---Accused-appellant was charged for committing murder of his wife by setting her on fire due to some domestic quarrel---Matrimonial/domestic dispute between the petitioner and the deceased was alleged to be the motive behind the occurrence---Admittedly, the deceased and petitioner were living together in their house as husband and wife till the date of occurrence---No litigation, civil or criminal, was pending between them till the date of the unfortunate incident of the instant case---Record showed that the petitioner himself took his wife/deceased from his house to the hospital---Deceased was alive when she was brought to the hospital by the petitioner and she died after four days from the date of her admission in the hospital---If the petitioner had any intention to commit the murder of his wife/deceased then he should have made sure the death of his wife at the spot instead of taking her to the hospital in injured condition---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (e) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---In the case of slightest doubt, the benefit of such doubt has to be given to the accused who is the favourite child of the law. Ms. Amna Bano, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Ms. Rahat Ehsan, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 26th June, 2025.