Summary: [Period of limitation for filing an application for restoration of a civil revision is three years under Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908] The Supreme Court examined the case and found that the petitioner's application for restoration of the civil revision had been dismissed by the High Court on the grounds of being time-barred. The High Court had relied on an incorrect article of the Limitation Act, 1908, in its order. The Supreme Court clarified that since there was no specific article addressing the restoration of a civil revision dismissed in default, Article 181 of the Act should be applied. According to Article 181, the petitioner had three years from the accrual of the right to apply for restoration. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order, converted the petition into an appeal, and allowed it.However, the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding the discrepancy in the periods of limitation for restoration applications. While the Act prescribes a 30-day limitation for restoration applications in suits and appeals, there is no specific provision for the restoration of a civil revision. The Court suggested that this distinction should be examined in an appropriate case.

Summary: Section(s) of law; Article 199 of The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.1. It is explained with reference to certain rulings of the Supreme Court of Pakistan that once a defendant joins the proceedings and then remains absent, limitation for setting aside the ex-parte decree would be governed by Article 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ---Ss. 115 & O. VI, R. 2---Revision jurisdiction of High Court---Scope and limitations---Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below---Principles---High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C., cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of facts recorded by subordinate courts unless those findings suffer from misreading, non-reading of evidence, or involve jurisdictional defects, illegality, or material irregularity that materially affects the outcome of the case---High Court has no authority to substitute findings merely because an alternative interpretation of evidence is possible---Findings of subordinate courts were upheld as they were in accordance with law and evidence---Civil revisions were dismissed. Cited Cases: • Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar 2022 SCMR 1054 • Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353 • Muhammad Sarwar v. Hashmal Khan PLD 2022 SC 13 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: ---Arts. 117 & 119---Burden of proof---Scope---Party asserting a fact must prove it---Petitioners/defendants failed to produce any evidence to justify the ownership of the disputed property, whereas respondents/plaintiffs successfully proved their claim through documentary evidence and testimonies---Revenue entries favoring petitioners/defendants lacked reference to any legal transaction in support of their ownership claim---Burden of proof was not discharged by the petitioners, and their claims were rejected. Cited Cases: • Messrs Noorani Travels Karachi v. Muhammad Hanif 2008 SCMR 1395 • Atta Muhammad v. Nasir-ud-Din PLD 1993 Peshawar 127 (c) Law of Limitation: ---Time-barred suit---Exceptions---Vulnerable parties---Respondents/plaintiffs were either minors or Pardanasheed lady at the time of alleged fraud in 1977-78, making the strict application of limitation law inequitable---Possession of the property by petitioners/defendants as tenants did not confer ownership rights, and the suit was held maintainable. (d) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)L ---Defective title---Principle---A vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor---Petitioners/defendants lacked lawful ownership of the disputed property and, thus, could not transfer valid title to co-petitioner (vendee)---Appellate court directed petitioners to compensate the vendee with the current market value of the property. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ---O. VI, R. 2 & O. VIII, R. 2---Pleading and evidence---Principle of secundum allegata et probata---Party cannot lead evidence beyond pleadings---Petitioners failed to plead any transaction supporting their ownership claim in their written statement and thus could not rely on subsequent oral evidence to establish ownership---Evidence beyond pleadings was excluded. Cited Cases: • Rana Abdul Rasheed v. Iqbal Hussain 2008 CLC 1 • Messrs Choudhary Brothers Ltd. v. Jaranwala Central Co-Operative Bank 1968 SCMR 804 • Government of West Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad PLD 1976 SC 469 ----Disposition: Both civil revision petitions dismissed for lack of merit. Subordinate courts' judgments and decrees upheld.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Art. 120----Suit for declaration----Bar of limitation----Petitioners challenged registered exchange deed and corresponding mutation after a delay of 28 years and 24 days, whereas the prescribed limitation for such suits is six years----Failure to provide a convincing explanation for the delay rendered the suit time-barred----Courts rightly refused to condone the delay as each day of delay must be sufficiently explained----Reliance placed on Agha Syed Mustaque Ali Shah v. Mst. Bibi Gul Jan (2016 SCMR 910). (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Admitted facts----Petitioners did not dispute the existence of registered exchange deed No. 966 dated 12.04.1981 and corresponding mutation No. 1371 dated 23.08.1981----It is a settled principle that admitted facts do not require proof----Reliance placed on Mst. Rehmat v. Mst. Zubaida Begum (2021 SCMR 1534). (c) Civil Procedure ----Concurrent findings of fact----Trial Court and Appellate Court both dismissed petitioners’ suit, finding no illegality, misreading, or non-reading of evidence----Petitioners failed to bring any solid, concrete, or trustworthy evidence in support of their claim----High Court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, declined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact----Reliance placed on Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain (2014 SCMR 1469). (d) Administration of justice ----Delay and laches----Petitioners’ failure to justify an excessive delay in challenging the exchange deed and mutation prevented the Court from granting relief----Legal rights must be exercised within the prescribed time limits to ensure certainty in transactions and avoid stale claims. Disposition: Civil revision dismissed. Judgment and decrees of lower courts upheld. Suit time-barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Cited Cases: Mst. Rehmat v. Mst. Zubaida Begum (2021 SCMR 1534) Agha Syed Mustaque Ali Shah v. Mst. Bibi Gul Jan (2016 SCMR 910) Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain (2014 SCMR 1469)

Summary: Excessive adjournments ---- (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) –– O.XI, Rr.1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11 & 21 –– Interrogatories –– Power of court to direct discovery –– Scope and compliance requirements The trial court is empowered under the amended Rule 1 of Order XI, CPC (as amended by Lahore High Court, 2018), to direct parties to deliver interrogatories in writing and to specify which of the interrogatories are to be answered. Once interrogatories are served, Rule 2 requires their communication to the other party for submission of replies within a specified time. Rules 6 and 7 allow objections and applications to strike out irrelevant or oppressive interrogatories, but the time period for such applications is seven days. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to comply with the court’s directions by seeking repeated adjournments and filing objections nearly two months late without seeking condonation of delay or showing exceptional circumstances. The trial court lawfully overruled the objections under Rule 7 and directed submission of replies, and this action was held to be within jurisdiction and consistent with the principles of procedural discipline. —Leave to appeal was refused. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) –– O.XI, R.21 –– Non-compliance with interrogatory order –– Striking off defence –– Judicial discretion –– Contumacious conduct –– Interpretation of “order to answer” Under Rule 21 of Order XI, CPC, a court may strike out the defence for non-compliance with an “order to answer interrogatories.” The term includes both orders under Rule 2 (initial submission) and Rule 11 (requiring proper response after insufficiency). The Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its powers in striking out the defence of the petitioner, who failed to answer interrogatories even after receiving multiple opportunities and a final warning. Petitioner’s default was deemed willful and contumacious given his prolonged dilatory conduct over several years of proceedings, including over 80 adjournments and a four-year delay in filing his written statement. The court rejected the argument that the action could only be taken upon written application by the opposing party, holding that oral opposition suffices under Rule 21 and the Lahore High Court amendments empower proactive judicial management of interrogatories. —Leave to appeal was declined. (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction –– Art. 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan –– Discretionary jurisdiction of Supreme Court –– Conduct of petitioner material in exercise of discretion The Supreme Court reiterated that the grant of leave under Article 185(3) is discretionary and the petitioner’s conduct is a relevant consideration. A party that has repeatedly delayed proceedings, disobeyed court directions, and abused procedural opportunities is not entitled to discretionary indulgence of the Court. In the present case, the petitioner’s consistent pattern of protracting litigation, including refusal to answer interrogatories despite judicial warnings, justified the denial of leave. —Petitions dismissed. (d) Administration of Justice –– Delay in civil trials –– Role of trial courts –– Need for case management and enforcement of orders The Court highlighted systemic concerns over delay in civil litigation and emphasized the importance of trial courts enforcing procedural orders with firmness. Judges must balance courtesy with control and refrain from granting repetitive “last and final” adjournments, which erode public confidence and undermine judicial authority. A peremptory order, once made, must be backed by legal consequences in case of non-compliance. The case serves as a judicial endorsement of active case management and procedural discipline in civil trials. —Observations endorsed; trial court action upheld. (e) Civil Procedure –– Interrogatories –– Misuse of process –– Purpose and limits The Court reaffirmed the purpose of interrogatories under Order XI as a tool to narrow down issues, reduce trial length, and secure admissions. However, it noted with disapproval the abuse of the process in this case where interrogatories became a means to delay rather than expedite trial. The Court observed that civil courts must encourage the fair use of interrogatories, in line with the purpose of inexpensive and expeditious justice, and discourage any misuse that frustrates judicial efficiency. —Abuse condemned; due process clarified. (f) Dissenting Opinion –– Application of penal provision under O.XI, R.21 CPC –– Whether default was willful –– Delay due to genuine hardship –– Discretion ought to have been exercised cautiously Justice Ayesha A. Malik (dissenting) agreed with the majority regarding dismissal of objections (C.P. No. 3436-L/2022) but differed on the legality of striking off defence (C.P. No. 3437-L/2022). She held that the petitioner’s failure to submit replies between 08.11.2022 and 24.11.2022 was due to a genuine and well-known event — a public assassination attempt and hospitalization — which was acknowledged in court orders. Therefore, the delay was not willful, and the extreme penal consequence of striking off defence was neither warranted nor proportionate. Courts must exercise caution in applying Rule 21 CPC, especially when alternative measures such as costs could achieve compliance. She held that trial court’s order was mechanically passed and failed to account for legitimate hardship. —Dissenting view: Order striking defence set aside and case remanded to trial court for one final opportunity. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused by majority (2–1). Petitions dismissed. Cited Cases: • Moon Enterpriser v. SNGPL 2020 SCMR 300 • Messrs United Bank Limited v. Yousuf Haji Noor Muhammad Dhadhi PLJ 1987 SC 636 • Mirza Ali Khan v. Mst. Shahida Parveen 1992 SCMR 2112 • Babar Sewing Machine Company v. Tirlok Nath Mahajan (1978) 4 SCC 188 • Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash (1980) 3 SCC 610 • Bilmal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal (1981) 3 SCC 486 • Asha Rani Gupta v. Vineet Kumar (2022 SCC OnLine SC 829) • Qazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge (2023 SCP 32) ---- ''Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution to grant leave to appeal is discretionary. Conduct of a petitioner has a substantial bearing on the question of granting or declining such leave to him: (ii) Procedural rule prescribing the timeframe for doing a certain act in the course of the proceedings of a case should be followed as a rule and the departure therefrom can be made only as an exception in exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the party concerned; (iii) A radical approach is required to tackle the problem of delay in the litigation process by enforcing a court-controlled case management system, (iv) Granting repetitive adjournments with warnings of "last and final" and "absolute last and final" opportunity shatter confidence of litigant public in the court orders and consequentially weaken the authority and fiat of court: (v) A court has the power to take the penal action suo motu if its order is not complied with despite giving the warning of last opportunity for compliance. Toothless court is the worst form of injustice; (vi) Meaning and scope of the amended rules of Lahore High Court on the process of interrogatories, explained. ''

Summary: Background: The petitioner was residing abroad when a suit for declaration and permanent injunction was filed against him by Mst. Sarran Bibi and others. The Trial Court decreed the suit ex parte, as the petitioner was not served properly. The petitioner's application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree was dismissed by the Trial Court and the appellate court. The petitioner then filed a revision petition. -----Issues: 1- Proper Service of Summons: Whether the petitioner, residing abroad, was properly served with summons. 2- Validity of Ex Parte Judgment: Whether the ex parte judgment and decree were validly passed in light of the service issues. 3- Application for Setting Aside Ex Parte Judgment: Whether the application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree was justifiably dismissed. 4- Limitation: Whether the application for setting aside the ex parte judgment was filed within the limitation period. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Proper Service of Summons: The Court found that the petitioner, residing abroad, was not properly served. The Trial Court did not exhaust all available modes of service, such as sending the summons through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by registered post to the petitioner's address abroad. Instead, the service was attempted through a local newspaper, which was inadequate. --Validity of Ex Parte Judgment: The ex parte judgment was based on defective service. The Court held that improper service adversely affects the rights of the litigants and renders court proceedings defective --Application for Setting Aside Ex Parte Judgment: The application for setting aside the ex parte judgment was dismissed by the lower courts without proper consideration of the service issues. The High Court emphasized that courts should decide such questions after recording evidence, not based on conjecture. --Limitation: The limitation period for setting aside an ex parte decree runs from the date of knowledge. The petitioner filed the application immediately after gaining knowledge of the decree, making the application timely. The revision petition was allowed. The impugned orders by the Trial Court and the appellate court were set aside. The petitioner's application for setting aside the judgment and decree was allowed. The Trial Court was directed to conclude the suit afresh, providing a fair opportunity for the petitioner to lead his defense. -----Citations/Precedents: Aziz Khan v. Maiz Muhammad Khan and 6 others PLD 1980 Peshawar 227 Anwar Ahmed v. Waqar Ahmed and 8 others PLD 2015 Sindh 326 Muhammad Anwar v. Abdul Haq 1985 SCMR 1228 Haji Akbar v. Gul Baran 1996 SCMR 1703 Nargis Latif v. Feroz Afaq Ahmed Khan 2001 SCMR 99 Muhammad Nawaz v. Amir Sultan 2013 CLD 1174 Sh. Mukhtar Ahmad and others v. Muhammad Saleem Bhatti and others 2013 MLD 1383 Iftikhar Ahmed Qureshi and others v. Muhammad Abrar Ahmed Qureshi through Attorney and others 2020 CLC 1857 Gohar Ayub v. Muhammad Shafiq 2015 YLR 163 Qazi Laeeq v. Najeebur Rehman and others 2012 MLD 50 Haji Shah Nawaz Ranjha and another v. Punjab Small Industries Corporation, through Regional Director, Sargodha and 4 others 2007 CLD 1637 WAPDA through Chairman, Lahore v. Muhammad Sanaullar Khan through Legal Heirs and another 2003 CLC 737 Mst. Mahmooda Begum v. Muhammad Iqbal 1989 MLD 311

Summary: Background:Allah Ditta filed a civil revision against the judgments and decrees dated 06.02.2010 and 19.06.2010 by the Civil Judge and Additional District Judge, Burewala, respectively, which dismissed his suit for declaration concerning his inheritance rights. Allah Ditta claimed his share as the legal heir of Mst. Fazal Noor, out of her share from the estate of her brother Sakhi Muhammad, specifically challenging mutations No. 820 and 821 dated 15.09.1990.-----Issues:Whether the mutations No. 820 and 821 dated 15.09.1990 were against law and facts, void, and liable to be canceled, affirming Allah Ditta as the legal heir of Sakhi Muhammad.The applicability of the statute of limitations to inheritance claims.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court allowed the revision petition and set aside the lower courts' judgments and decrees, decreeing Allah Ditta's suit in his favor. The court observed that:Allah Ditta, as the real son and sole legal heir of Mst. Fazal Noor (deceased), who was the real sister of the deceased Sakhi Muhammad, is entitled to his share in Sakhi Muhammad's inheritance.The evidence, including the succession certificate and Jamabandi records, supported Allah Ditta's claim as the legal heir.The principle that no limitation runs in inheritance matters was emphasized, stating that a claim to inheritance can be made at any time, and wrongful entries in the revenue record do not extinguish a party's right to inheritance.The court criticized the lower courts for deciding the case on technical grounds without considering the substantive rights of the parties involved in inheritance matters.-----Citations/Precedents:Mst. Janat Bibi through L.Rs. v. Aslam Khan and 13 others (2017 CLC 436): Highlighted the principle that no limitation runs in matters of inheritance.Nusrat Abbas v. Nighat Parveen and others (2018 CLC 1115) and Muhammad Amin through Legal Heirs and 2 others v. Mst. Ashraf Bibi through Legal Heirs and another (2018 YLR 2524): Reinforced the notion that rights to inheritance are not extinguished by adverse entries in the revenue record and that the statute of limitations does not apply to inheritance claims.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, working as an Assistant Professor in BPS-19 at a university, challenged an advertisement published on 10.01.2021 by the university for the appointment of an Associate Professor in BPS-20. The petitioner argued that the criteria for the post set by the university did not align with the Higher Education Commission's (HEC) prescribed qualifications. The petitioner sought directions to allow her application for the position and to be considered for the appointment process based on the HEC's criteria. -----Issues: 1- Whether the university's advertisement, setting higher qualification requirements than those prescribed by HEC, is valid? -----2- Whether the petition can be entertained despite a significant delay of 22 months in filing the challenge? -----3- Can the recruitment process be halted at this stage based on the petitioner's claim? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the petition on the grounds of laches (delay) and acquiescence by the petitioner. University's Authority: The court held that HEC provides minimum guidelines, but universities are allowed to set higher qualifications for appointments. Therefore, the university's criteria for the Associate Professor position were not automatically invalid. Delay in Filing: The petitioner filed the petition 22 months after the advertisement’s publication and the closing date for applications, without providing any valid reason for the delay. The court cited the legal maxim "vigilantibus non dormientibus acquitas subvenit," which means equity helps the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. Impact on Recruitment Process: Stopping the recruitment process at this advanced stage would cause injustice to candidates who applied within the prescribed time frame. The petition was dismissed due to the delay (laches) and the petitioner’s conduct, which barred her from challenging the process at this stage. ------Citations/Precedents: Masooda Begum through Legal Heirs vs. Government of Punjab (PLD 2003 SC 90): The Supreme Court held that a writ petition can be dismissed on the ground of laches even if the underlying order is void. Zaheer Ahmad Chaudhry & others vs. City District Government Karachi (NLR 2007 Civil 129): The principle that a writ may be refused on grounds of laches was reiterated. Abdul Rehman Janjua vs. Punjab Bar Council (PLD 1983 Lah 47): Writ petitions can be refused even against void orders if the petitioner is guilty of laches. Syed Asif Majeed vs. A.D.C.(C)/ASC(L) (2000 SCMR 998): The court upheld the dismissal of a petition due to laches where the petition was filed decades after the impugned order. Mirza Maqbool Elahi vs. Capital Development Authority (1998 SCMR 1074): The Supreme Court reaffirmed that constitutional jurisdiction is an equitable jurisdiction and petitions may be dismissed due to laches and acquiescence. Soofi Muhammad Din vs. Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner (1991 SCMR 905): The court dismissed a petition on the grounds of laches where the delay in challenging the order was substantial. M.H. Abidi vs. State Life Insurance Corporation (1990 MLD 563 Karachi): The court held that in the absence of a limitation bar, the remedy must still be sought within a reasonable time. Ahmed vs. Ghama (2005 SCMR 119): The Supreme Court held that a delay of 108 days in pursuing a case was sufficient ground to dismiss a petition for laches.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964) ––– ---Non-payment of maintenance and dissolution of marriage--- Respondent No.1 filed for dissolution of marriage on grounds of non-payment of maintenance and alleged mental incapacity of Petitioner No.1---Trial court dissolved the marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, citing non-provision of maintenance for over two years and directed payment of outstanding Haq-Meher (85 Misqal gold) and maintenance allowance---Held, dissolution of marriage was justified based on admitted failure to provide maintenance. (b) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 ––– ---Non-payment of maintenance as a ground for dissolution--- Marriage dissolved due to non-payment of maintenance for a continuous period of over two years, as stipulated under the Act---Trial court also awarded ancillary relief for unpaid Haq-Meher and maintenance despite the absence of a specific prayer clause, citing principles of justice and fair play. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ––– ---Art. 120---Claim for past maintenance--- Trial court erroneously awarded maintenance for 17 years preceding the filing of the suit---Held, claims for past maintenance are subject to a six-year limitation period under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act---Past maintenance award modified to comply with statutory limitations, reducing the maintenance period to six years. (d) Haq-Meher ––– ---Failure to pay agreed dower--- Haq-Meher of 100 Misqal gold was agreed at the time of Nikah, of which 85 Misqal remained unpaid---Held, trial court correctly decreed payment of unpaid Haq-Meher, as evidence showed petitioners failed to establish that any additional amount had been paid. (e) Family Responsibility ––– ---Payment by family members of petitioner--- Petitioner No.2 (grandfather of minors) was directed to pay decretal amounts on behalf of Petitioner No.1 due to his mental incapacity, following precedents permitting such orders to protect dependents' rights. (f) Precedents and Legal Principles ––– ---Scope of ancillary relief in family cases--- Courts have discretion to grant ancillary relief even when not specifically prayed for, as long as it serves justice and equity---Reliance placed on Jamila Begum v. Awam-un-Nass (PLD 2005 SC 831) and Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal (2022 CLC 158). -----Cited Cases: Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal, 2022 CLC 158 Muhammad Sharif v. Additional District Judge, PLD 2020 SC 481 Jamila Begum v. Awam-un-Nass, PLD 2005 SC 831 Bushra Qasim v. Abdul Rasheed, 2019 CLC 1234 Sultan Ahmad v. Judge Family Court, PLD 2018 SC 292 -----Disposition: Petition partly allowed; past maintenance award reduced to six years preceding the filing of the suit. Remaining findings and decrees upheld.

Summary: Where the application for leave to defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII C.P.C. requires resolution of certain disputed facts for allowing the said application, the said application must be accompanied by an affidavit otherwise Court would be justified to dismiss the same. Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and Court has to decide the question despite the fact that same has been raised as defence or not.