Summary: ''The court must exercise vigilance and refrain from granting adjournments so liberally and without any compelling reasons.'' ---- The petitioners argued that the trial court had disregarded their request to summon official witnesses first and had hastily passed the impugned order without considering their legitimate request. They contended that the order suffered from illegality, misapplication of the law, and mis-appreciation of facts.On the other hand, the respondents supported the trial court's decision, claiming that the petitioners had deliberately prolonged the proceedings with various pretexts and that the impugned judgment was legally sound.The Supreme Court examined the trial court's proceedings and observed a concerning trend of frequent adjournments that contributed to a backlog in lower courts. The court emphasized the need to discourage this behavior to ensure the timely delivery of justice. The record revealed that the petitioners had been granted numerous adjournments over two years to produce their evidence. Despite clear warnings and costs imposed by the trial court, the petitioners failed to comply.The court referenced Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which allows the court to proceed to decide a suit if a party fails to produce evidence after being granted time. The court cited the precedent set in the case of Moon Enterpriser CNG Station, Rawalpindi, versus Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (2020 SCMR 300), which established the conditions for invoking this penal provision.The court found that both conditions were satisfied in this case, as the petitioners had repeatedly been warned, but they still failed to produce evidence. Therefore, the trial court's decision to strike off their right to produce oral evidence was justified. The High Court's dismissal of the F.A.O was also upheld. --- Supreme Court in its recent judgment held that taking too many adjournments is abuse of the process of law, the petitioner took 43 adjournment over a span of 2 years only for their evidence which was eventually closed due to non production --- The court further held that ''once the order sheet reflect last opportunity it must be given effect on the upcoming date''.

Summary: Appointment cannot be rejected for reason that the candidate is over qualified --- Despite being at the top of the merit list, he was not appointed because he was deemed overqualified. --- Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa criticized the provincial government for what he deemed frivolous litigation, highlighting that disqualifying a highly qualified candidate deprived both the candidate and the students of the benefits of superior knowledge. The court found no reason to interfere with the high court's judgment, declined leave to appeal, and dismissed the petition. The court ordered the government to pay two hundred thousand rupees in costs to Amjad ur Rahman and instructed the government to implement the judgment regarding his appointment by December 31, 2023. The court warned of contempt proceedings against the Secretary of Elementary & Secondary Education if the judgment was not complied with. The Chief Justice also emphasized the need to avoid generating unnecessary litigation, urging responsible officials to prevent such challenges without valid legal reasons, which drain government resources funded by taxpayers.

Summary: Background:In Civil Petition No. 3465-L of 2022 before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the petitioners challenged the order dated 25.11.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court in Civil Revision No. 4911 of 2016. The petitioners' predecessor had purchased land through sale mutation No. 727, attested on 13 June 1994. However, the respondent filed a suit on 6 November 2008 challenging the sale.---Issues:Whether the respondent's suit was time-barred.Whether the thumb impression on the sale mutation belonged to the respondent.Whether the petitioners were illegally possessing the land.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court found that the respondent's suit was decreed on 16 October 2014, and the petitioners' subsequent appeal and revision petitions were dismissed. Despite three court decisions against them, the petitioners continued to possess the land illegally.The burden of proving the sale lay on the beneficiary, which was not discharged. The Finger Print Bureau's report conclusively established that the thumb impression on the sale mutation did not belong to the respondent.The Court dismissed the petition with costs throughout and imposed compensatory costs of one hundred thousand rupees. The petitioners were directed to immediately hand over the land to the respondent, with revenue authorities instructed to ensure compliance.

Summary: Background:Civil Petition No. 946 of 2022 was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging an order dated 21.12.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Writ Petition No. 1325 of 2016. The petitioners opposed a partition application submitted by the respondents under section 135 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, leading to litigation.---Issues:Whether the petitioners' objection to the partition application was valid.Whether the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition was justified.Whether the costs imposed by the High Court were paid or recovered.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court, consisting of Justice Qazi Faez Isa, Chief Justice, Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan, and Justice Athar Minallah, dismissed the petition after considering the arguments and evidence presented. The Court found that the petitioners' objections to the partition lacked valid grounds and resulted in unnecessary litigation. Additionally, the Court noted the failure of revenue authorities to implement the orders and recover costs imposed by the High Court, undermining the rule of law. As no illegality was found in the impugned order, the Court declined to grant leave and imposed costs of one million rupees on the petitioners, in addition to the costs imposed by the High Court. The costs were to be deposited with the concerned revenue officer for distribution to the respondents, and failure to comply within 30 days would result in recovery as arrears of land revenue.----Quote:Costs of one million rupees imposed as case was utterly frivolous and has consumed 14 years.

Summary: Acquittal granted----Background: The case involves multiple criminal petitions arising from a murder case registered under an FIR at a police station in Sargodha. The accused were charged under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The Trial Court convicted some of the accused, sentencing them to death, while others received life imprisonment. One of the accused was acquitted. The convicted individuals filed appeals in the Lahore High Court, which led to the modification of a death sentence to life imprisonment, acquittal of some co-accused, and acceptance of a compromise for another, resulting in his acquittal. The complainant, dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, filed petitions challenging these acquittals and the conversion of the death sentence. ----Issues: 1- Whether the conversion of the death sentence of one of the accused to life imprisonment by the High Court was justified. 2- Whether the acquittals of certain co-accused by the High Court should be upheld. 3- Whether the appeal against the acquittal filed by the complainant was maintainable without obtaining special leave to appeal. 4- Whether the complainant had the standing to challenge the compromise made by the legal heirs with one of the accused. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Conversion of Death Sentence: The Supreme Court found that the High Court was correct in converting the death sentence of one accused to life imprisonment. The decision was based on the fact that the injuries leading to the death were jointly attributed to all the accused, making it difficult to single out any one individual. The Court extended the benefit of the doubt to the accused, following the legal principle that even a single doubt in the prosecution's case warrants acquittal. --Acquittal of Co-Accused: The Court upheld the High Court’s acquittal of the co-accused, noting that the prosecution’s case had multiple contradictions and inconsistencies. Since the injuries were ascribed to all accused collectively, and not individually, it was unsafe to convict any one person without clear evidence. --Maintainability of the Complainant’s Appeal: The Supreme Court ruled that the complainant's appeal against the acquittal was not maintainable as it was filed without the mandatory special leave to appeal required under the law. The absence of this leave rendered the appeal incompetent. --Standing to Challenge Compromise: The Court held that the complainant, despite being the brother of the deceased, had no standing to challenge the compromise made by the legal heirs under Islamic law and Section 309 PPC. The legal heirs, having accepted the compromise, did not wish to pursue the case further, and the complainant could not undermine their legal rights. The Supreme Court allowed the petition of the accused whose death sentence was converted to life imprisonment, acquitting him of the charges. The petitions filed by the complainant were dismissed, and the acquittals of the co-accused were upheld. The Court emphasized that the legal heirs' right to compromise could not be overridden by the complainant, and pursuing the matter further would amount to promoting frivolous litigation. ----Citations/Precedents: Ahmad Ali Case (2023 SCMR 781) Muhammad Khalil Khan and others v. Mahbub Ali Mian (PLD 1948 Privy Council 131)

Summary: The petitioner sought the recovery of her mentally disordered brother, Syed Qadeer Abbas, from the alleged illegal custody of Respondents No.3 to 8. The petitioner claimed that these respondents intended to take control of Qadeer Abbas's 19 kanals 09 marlas land in Chak No.543/E.B. The court issued notices to Respondents No.3 to 8 and directed the SHO, Police Station Machiwal, District Vehari, to produce Qadeer Abbas.The SHO reported that Qadeer Abbas had been missing for 4/5 years, and the petitioner had applied for his death certificate in May 2022, stating that he died on 15.05.2022. The SHO provided details about the inheritance mutation, land transactions, and a conflict between the petitioner and Respondent No.4. FIR No.185/2023 was lodged on 25.02.2023 by Respondent No.4.After considering the SHO's report and confronting the petitioner's counsel, the court found that the petitioner had filed the petition with false assertions and submitted a false affidavit. The court held that the petitioner had rendered herself liable to criminal prosecution and contempt of court.The judgment cited various legal precedents to underscore the imposition of costs for false or vexatious claims, including cases such as Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma [(1995) 1 SCC 421], Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana [(1995) 3 SCC 757], B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Association and others [(2006) 11 SCC 731], K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited and others [(2008) 12 SCC 481], Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi [(2012) 4 SCC 307], ABCD v. Union of India and others [(2020) 2 SCC 52], and Qazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge, Gujrat, etc. (PLD 2023 SC 298).The judgment also referenced sections 35 and 35A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), as well as sections 147, 148, 491, and 547 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.). It emphasized the court's authority to impose costs in criminal matters and cited specific rules from the Lahore High Court Rules & Orders governing the imposition of costs in habeas corpus petitions.In line with these legal principles, the court invoked its inherent powers and dismissed the petition with costs of Rs.10,000/-. The petitioner was held to have incurred criminal liability and was deemed liable for contempt of court, for which separate proceedings would be initiated.

Summary: The appellant had attended Government High School in Reshun, Chitral and requested a character certificate. The school issued a certificate stating that the appellant was caught cheating in an examination and had displayed inappropriate behavior. The appellant filed a suit seeking damages, which was partially decreed, and an appeal was filed by both parties. The school and other respondents were directed to pay damages to the appellant. However, they filed a civil revision before the High Court, and the revision was allowed, setting aside the damages. Subsequently, the appellant filed another suit seeking significant damages, but the school filed an application seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application was dismissed, but the school filed a civil revision, and the impugned order was passed, rejecting the appellant's plaint. The Supreme Court heard the arguments and examined the documents. It noted that the appellant had abused and misused the court's process and engaged in frivolous litigation. The court dismissed the appeal, imposed costs on the appellant, and upheld the previous judgment of the High Court.

Summary: (Service Tribunal can impose special costs while deciding the service appeal of a civil servant) The central issue before the court was whether the Federal Service Tribunal, while deciding appeals under the Service Tribunals Act 1973 or any application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, had the power to award costs. After considering the arguments presented by the petitioner's counsel and examining the case record, the court referred to Section 5(2) of the Act, which grants the Tribunal powers similar to a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The court concluded that since the Tribunal can interfere with factual findings and correct legal errors, the appeals before it are akin to first appeals under the CPC. Thus, the Tribunal possesses the powers of a first appellate civil court, including the power to award costs. The court explained that a first appellate court can award actual costs incurred in the appeal under Order 41, Rule 35(3) of the CPC. Additionally, it can impose special costs under Section 151, CPC if necessary to secure justice or prevent abuse of the court's process. These powers extend to applications under Section 12(2) of the CPC and other applications. In this case, the Tribunal, located in Islamabad, imposed special costs of Rs. 50,000 on the petitioner for filing a vexatious application under Section 12(2) of the CPC. The court found the Tribunal's exercise of discretion in imposing costs justified based on the facts and circumstances presented. The court dismissed the petitioner's leave to appeal, emphasizing the importance of regularly imposing reasonable costs to discourage frivolous litigation. The court highlighted the benefits of cost imposition, including promoting fairness, deterring frivolous lawsuits, encouraging settlement, and fostering efficient use of resources. By making litigants aware of potential costs, it ensures that only legitimate grievances are pursued, discourages baseless claims, encourages settlement, and streamlines proceedings. The court urged courts and tribunals to utilize their powers to impose costs effectively to address the problem of excessive pending cases and promote a more efficient justice system.

Summary: (Change of AOR and ASC without consent of the earlier AOR or permission of the Court) After hearing the petitioner's counsel and examining the record and Supreme Court Rules, the court found that the restoration application was filed 46 days beyond the prescribed period and failed to provide sufficient cause for the delay. Furthermore, the application was not filed by the original AOR or drawn by the original ASC, which was in violation of the Supreme Court Rules. The court referred to Rules 6, 15, 23, and 24 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, which state that only an Advocate-on-Record (AOR) can appear or plead in a case, and no other advocate can act for a party unless instructed by an AOR. Additionally, a power of attorney authorizing another AOR to act in the same case requires consent from the former AOR or leave of the Court. The restoration application failed to meet the requirements of these rules and disregarded them. The court deemed the application as frivolous, having wasted the time of the Court, and dismissed it with costs of Rs. 20,000/-. The petitioner was given the opportunity to file a fresh restoration application, strictly following the Supreme Court Rules.

Summary: (The scope of interference in the Award of an Arbitrator. The imposition of costs for frivolous and vexatious litigation) The case involves a dispute between the National Highway Authority (petitioner) and M/s Sambu Construction Co. Ltd. (respondent) regarding additional work performed by the respondent for the rehabilitation of a national highway. The main contention in the Supreme Court was whether the arbitrators had conducted themselves improperly under Section 30(a) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The petitioner argued that the minutes of the pre-bid meeting should not be considered part of the contract and that the arbitrators wrongly relied on them. However, the respondent contended that the pre-bid meeting minutes formed an integral part of the contract, as reflected in the signed contract documents. After examining the record and considering the arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that the minutes of the pre-bid meeting were indeed part of the contract document. The court highlighted that the scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is limited and should not involve a re-assessment of evidence. The court found no jurisdictional, procedural, or substantive error in the award that warranted interference. Furthermore, the court addressed the issue of alleged misconduct by the arbitrators. It stated that misconduct refers to a failure to perform essential duties or conduct inconsistent with those duties, resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice. However, the petitioner's objections were deemed to pertain more to the merits of the case rather than misconduct, and no specific grounds for misconduct were presented. The court dismissed the petitioner's claims of misconduct. Lastly, the court expressed concern over the petitioner's prolonged litigation, spanning more than ten years, which it deemed vexatious. It emphasized the importance of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) and discouraged parties from challenging arbitration awards in court, as it defeats the purpose of ADR. The court imposed costs of Rs. 300,000 on the petitioner and emphasized the need to discourage frivolous litigation.