Summary: (Change of AOR and ASC without consent of the earlier AOR or permission of the Court) After hearing the petitioner's counsel and examining the record and Supreme Court Rules, the court found that the restoration application was filed 46 days beyond the prescribed period and failed to provide sufficient cause for the delay. Furthermore, the application was not filed by the original AOR or drawn by the original ASC, which was in violation of the Supreme Court Rules. The court referred to Rules 6, 15, 23, and 24 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, which state that only an Advocate-on-Record (AOR) can appear or plead in a case, and no other advocate can act for a party unless instructed by an AOR. Additionally, a power of attorney authorizing another AOR to act in the same case requires consent from the former AOR or leave of the Court. The restoration application failed to meet the requirements of these rules and disregarded them. The court deemed the application as frivolous, having wasted the time of the Court, and dismissed it with costs of Rs. 20,000/-. The petitioner was given the opportunity to file a fresh restoration application, strictly following the Supreme Court Rules.

Summary: The court raises concerns about the grounds for granting permission to engage a new counsel. The court cites previous judgments discouraging the substitution of counsel at the review stage unless there are compelling circumstances or unavoidable absence. The court concludes that there are no compelling circumstances in this case and dismisses the application for permission to change counsel. All other related applications are also dismissed.

Summary: [Scope of Order XXVI, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, regarding change of Advocate in a review petition] The petitioner in a review petition, seeking to replace their earlier counsel, Mr. Shuja ud Din Hashmi, due to his ill health and old age. The application did not provide a reason for replacing the Advocate on Record, Mst. Tasneem Amin, who had appeared on behalf of the applicants in the previous proceedings. The court referred to Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1980, which outlines the practice and procedure for review petitions. It emphasized the role and obligation of the advocate who appeared in the original case to draw up the review application and appear in support of it before the court. The court highlighted that the scope of a review petition is limited to the grounds mentioned in the rules and should not amount to a rehearing of the main case. The court noted that the requirement for granting permission to substitute a counsel in a review petition is justified only when the appearance of the earlier counsel is not possible due to unavoidable circumstances. It criticized the practice of changing counsel without justifiable reasons and condemned the filing of review applications without proper grounds. In this case, the court found that the application seeking permission to replace the counsel did not provide sufficient reasons or medical certification for the ill health and old age claimed. Additionally, it was noted that the application did not explain the change of the Advocate on Record or provide her consent as required by the rules. The court concluded that there were no valid reasons or unavoidable circumstances to grant the special leave requested, and therefore, the application was rejected, and the review petitions were not entertained. The court reaffirmed its previous decision in a similar case and emphasized the importance of exercising discretion judiciously when granting special leave to substitute counsel in a review petition. Overall, the court denied the application for permission to represent the petitioner in the review petition and upheld its previous decision.

Summary: [Scope of Order XXVI, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, regarding change of Advocate in a review petition] The petitioner in a review petition, seeking to replace their earlier counsel, Mr. Shuja ud Din Hashmi, due to his ill health and old age. The application did not provide a reason for replacing the Advocate on Record, Mst. Tasneem Amin, who had appeared on behalf of the applicants in the previous proceedings. The court referred to Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1980, which outlines the practice and procedure for review petitions. It emphasized the role and obligation of the advocate who appeared in the original case to draw up the review application and appear in support of it before the court. The court highlighted that the scope of a review petition is limited to the grounds mentioned in the rules and should not amount to a rehearing of the main case. The court noted that the requirement for granting permission to substitute a counsel in a review petition is justified only when the appearance of the earlier counsel is not possible due to unavoidable circumstances. It criticized the practice of changing counsel without justifiable reasons and condemned the filing of review applications without proper grounds. In this case, the court found that the application seeking permission to replace the counsel did not provide sufficient reasons or medical certification for the ill health and old age claimed. Additionally, it was noted that the application did not explain the change of the Advocate on Record or provide her consent as required by the rules. The court concluded that there were no valid reasons or unavoidable circumstances to grant the special leave requested, and therefore, the application was rejected, and the review petitions were not entertained. The court reaffirmed its previous decision in a similar case and emphasized the importance of exercising discretion judiciously when granting special leave to substitute counsel in a review petition. Overall, the court denied the application for permission to represent the petitioner in the review petition and upheld its previous decision.

Summary: The applicants filed a civil miscellaneous application (C.M.A.) seeking permission to include Tuba Sahab (respondent No. 2) as the daughter of Muhammad Zareef. The applicants had filed a suit alleging that Tuba Sahab was not the daughter of Azhar Hussain but of Muhammad Zareef. However, the High Court judge determined that Tuba Sahab was indeed the daughter of Azhar Hussain. The application was considered unnecessary as the petition for leave to appeal had been filed within the required time, and the application could only be granted if the High Court's judgment was set aside. Therefore, the court decided to proceed with hearing the petition for leave to appeal and directed the office to number the civil petition accordingly. In CPLA No. 3842/2022, the applicants claimed to be the siblings of Azhar Hussain, who passed away without any children on June 4, 2013. The applicants' contention was that if Tuba Sahab was considered Azhar Hussain's daughter, their share in his estate would be significantly reduced. They argued that Azhar Hussain followed the Sunni Hanafi fiqh of Islamic Shariah and that Tuba Sahab was actually the daughter of Muhammad Zareef, not Azhar Hussain. The suit was filed approximately seven months after Azhar Hussain's death when Tuba Sahab was around 17 years old. However, Tuba Sahab was raised by Azhar Hussain and Riffat Shamim as their daughter, and her paternity was not questioned by the applicants until after Azhar Hussain's passing. Riffat Shamim, the mother (respondent No. 1), testified that Tuba Sahab was her and Azhar Hussain's daughter. The High Court judge referred to various precedents, including the case of Laila Qayyum v Fawad Qayum, which dealt with the scope of declaratory suits filed under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, where the plaintiffs denied the paternity of another individual. The Supreme Court held in the Laila Qayyum case that challenging another's paternity or legitimacy did not constitute an assertion of one's own legal character under Section 42. The same principle applied to the present case, as the applicants lacked legal character under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The court found no distinction between the instant case and the Laila Qayyum case. Based on these considerations, the court concluded that the High Court judge had correctly applied the law, as interpreted in the Laila Qayyum case. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition (CPLA No. 3842/2022) and CMA No. 3492/2022, without any order regarding costs, as no respondent had filed a caveat.