Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a suit for the recovery of dowry articles, which was decreed ex-parte by the Trial Court on 16.01.2019 due to the absence of the respondent. The respondent later challenged the ex-parte judgment by filing an appeal, which was delayed by 98 days. Despite this delay, the Appellate Court accepted the appeal, set aside the ex-parte judgment, and remanded the case to the Trial Court for fresh proceedings. The petitioner contended that the appeal should not have been allowed due to the respondent's prior statement in the Executing Court, where he expressed willingness to return the dowry articles, and because the appeal was time-barred. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Appellate Court’s remand order is legally valid and amenable to constitutional jurisdiction. 2- Whether the respondent’s appeal, which was delayed by 98 days, was maintainable. 3- Whether the respondent’s conduct and prior statements should preclude him from obtaining relief. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court held that the Appellate Court erred in its judgment by failing to address the issue of the delay in filing the appeal and by not considering the respondent's conduct in the Executing Court. The High Court allowed the petition, set aside the remand order, and directed the Appellate Court to reconsider the appeal. The Court emphasized that the law of limitation is not a mere technicality and must be applied strictly. Since the respondent’s appeal was time-barred by 98 days, the delay required proper justification, which the Appellate Court failed to consider adequately. The respondent had made a binding statement in the Executing Court on 24.04.2019, agreeing to return the dowry articles. The High Court found that this statement should have been given more weight, especially since the respondent had not fulfilled his commitment and later filed an appeal without disclosing this fact to the Appellate Court. The High Court noted that the conduct of the respondent—evading the return of dowry articles and disappearing during the bailiff’s attempt to enforce the Court’s order—was improper and relevant to the decision. The Court emphasized that it must take into account the conduct of the parties when exercising constitutional jurisdiction. The Court also rejected the respondent's argument that the admission of the appeal automatically settled the limitation issue, finding that the Appellate Court did not properly adjudicate the limitation question. The High Court found that the Appellate Court’s remand order was flawed as it did not address the question of limitation or the respondent’s conduct and statement in the Executing Court. Outcome: The High Court allowed the constitutional petition, set aside the remand order of the Appellate Court, and directed the Appellate Court to reconsider the appeal, specifically addressing the issues of limitation and the respondent's conduct. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Nadira Shahzad v. Mubashir Ahmad and others (1995 SCMR 1419) Fateh Sher v. Sarfraz and others (1986 SCMR 1356) Mst. Salim-un-Nisa and others v. Aziz and another [2009 CLC 860 (Peshawar)] Amir Shahzad v. Additional District Judge, Multan and 2 others [2015 CLC 632 (Lahore)] Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others (PLD 2021 SC 715)

Summary: Background: The petitioner, representing the legal heirs of a deceased, filed a suit for declaration and injunction to claim inheritance rights over land that was previously allotted on lease. The petitioner sought to invalidate several historical mutations (ownership transfers) from 1935 and 1937, arguing that these were contrary to Christian inheritance laws. The respondents countered, arguing that the petitioner was not the rightful heir, as the original heir (the petitioner's claimed mother) had predeceased the allottee. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner, as the alleged daughter of the original allottee, was entitled to the disputed inheritance under Christian inheritance law. -----2- Whether the historical mutations (ownership changes) were valid and conformed to the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. -----3- Whether the suit was time-barred, given the delay of over 70 years before the petitioner brought the claim. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Petitioner's Status as Heir: The court held that while the petitioner's relationship as the original allottee’s daughter was initially contested, the petitioner was unable to substantiate her claim through sufficient evidence. Furthermore, the court determined that the mutations were legally valid under the tenancy succession rules set out in the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, which prioritize widow rights over unmarried daughters. --Legitimacy of Historical Mutations: The mutations transferring the original tenant's property to the widow (later transferring it upon her remarriage) were validly sanctioned according to Sections 20 and 21 of the Act. These provisions restrict tenancy inheritance to widows and male descendants unless no such heirs exist, thus precluding the petitioner’s inheritance claim. --Limitation: The court upheld that the petitioner's suit was time-barred, as the petitioner did not seek to challenge the disputed mutations within a reasonable time frame, waiting over 70 years to file suit. The court emphasized that the principle of limitation applies even in inheritance matters, particularly where longstanding public records and third-party interests were established without challenge. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Inayat Bibi through legal heirs v. Issac Nazir Ullah and others (PLD 1992 SC 385) Mst. GRANA through Legal Heirs and others v. SAHIB KAMALA BIBI and others (PLD 2014 SC 167) Mst. Phaphan v. Muhammad Bakhsh (2005 SCMR 1278) Lal Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 2011 SC 657) Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh (2007 SCMR 1446) Syed KAUSAR ALI SHAH and others v. Syed FARHAT HUSSAIN SHAH and others (2022 SCMR 1558)

Summary: Background: This petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) challenged the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Khushab, and Civil Judge Class-I, Noorpur Thal, regarding the inheritance rights of a woman (referred to as “respondent”), a descendant of the deceased, Janan Khan. The dispute centered on the property owned by Janan Khan, with the petitioners (his other heirs) contending that the respondent was not entitled to a share. The respondent sought a declaration that inheritance mutations relating to the legacy of Janan Khan had been illegally sanctioned, excluding her predecessor, Walayat Khatoon, from the estate. -----Issues: 1- Whether the suit was time-barred. 2- Whether the inheritance mutations were valid and in accordance with the law, or whether they were based on fraud and misrepresentation, depriving the respondent of her rightful inheritance. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Limitation: The court rejected the argument that the suit was time-barred, noting that the respondent had no knowledge of the disputed mutations and initiated the suit promptly upon learning of the alleged fraud. It emphasized that limitation could not bar someone from claiming their rightful inheritance if fraud was involved. Validity of Mutations: The court found that the respondent, as the legal heir of Walayat Khatoon, was entitled to a share in Janan Khan’s property. The petitioners had consistently argued that Walayat Khatoon was not Janan Khan's daughter, but the relationship was conceded during the hearing. The court held that the petitioners could not later argue that she was disinherited under customary law, particularly as they had not raised this defense earlier. The court emphasized that the estate should devolve according to Shariat law, which grants daughters inheritance rights. The petition was dismissed, and the judgment of the lower courts was affirmed, recognizing the respondent’s entitlement to her share of the property. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. J-I.V.V71-IN and others v. Mst. TAGGI through L.Rs. and others (PLD 2006 SC 322) Shahro and others v. Mst. Fatima and others (PLD 1998 SC 1512) Ghulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1)

Summary: Facts:Bentonite Pakistan Limited (Petitioner) received a financing facility from Bankers Equity Limited (Respondent No.1) and syndicate banks for establishing a Bentonite clay manufacturing unit in Lahore.Following the petitioner's default on the loan, Respondent No.1 initiated a recovery suit, which was dismissed due to non-compliance with the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinances, 2001.Subsequent appeals by Respondent No.1 were dismissed until an appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed, directing an amended suit to be filed.The Lahore High Court eventually passed decrees in favor of Respondent No.1 for recovery of the loan amounts.Separately, the petitioner filed a suit for damages against Respondent No.1, which was set aside pending leave from the Company Judge due to a winding-up order.After approximately 17 years, the petitioner sought leave under Section 310 of the Companies Act, 2017 to pursue the damages suit, which was dismissed by the High Court of Sindh.---Issue:Whether the High Court of Sindh erred in dismissing the petitioner's application for leave to proceed with the damages suit against Respondent No.1, considering the long delay and the winding-up proceedings against the petitioner.---Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing leave to appeal against the High Court of Sindh's order.---Rationale:The Supreme Court found no jurisdictional error or illegality in the High Court's decision. The petitioner's long delay of about 17 years in seeking leave, without plausible explanation, was seen as an attempt to frustrate the liquidation proceedings against Respondent No.1.The application for leave to proceed with the damages suit was governed by the general provision of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes a three-year limitation period for applications where no specific period is provided. The petitioner's application, filed well beyond this period, was rightly dismissed by the High Court.The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's reasoning and found no merit in the petitioner's arguments for interference.Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the civil petition for lack of merit, upholding the High Court of Sindh's order.

Summary: The petition was filed with a delay of 11 days. The petitioners sought to condone the delay through CMA No. 10322/2022, explaining that they had to fulfill certain formalities and obtain permission from higher authorities before filing the petition. During the hearing, the court inquired about the amount of revenue involved, which was stated to be 2.8 million rupees, while a court fee of 250 rupees was payable for the petition. The court further inquired whether any action was taken against the person responsible for the delayed filing, to which it was informed that no such action was taken. The court expressed surprise that the petitioners risked losing a claim of 2.8 million rupees to save a court fee of 250 rupees. It criticized the petitioners for neglecting the larger goal and emphasized that if decisions are to be challenged, they should be done within the prescribed period. In this case, since there was no valid reason to condone the delay, the court dismissed the application to condone the delay and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched., Art. 113---Specific Relief Act ( I of 1877), S. 12---Suit for specific performance, filing of---Limitation---Date of terminus a quo---Suit filed by the petitioner was concurrently dismissed---Validity---Limitation to file a suit for specific performance of sale agreement is regulated by Art. 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 which provides that if a date is fixed for performance, the suit could be instituted within three years from the date so fixed and if no such date is fixed the suit could be filed when the vendee has noticed that the performance has been refused---Suit of the petitioner falls in the first part of said Art. 113 as in the agreement-in-question itself the parties had fixed date for the payment of balance consideration and completion of sale till 01.5.2008---Said fact was also admitted by the petitioner in his statement as witness wherein in cross-examination he stated that it is correct that the agreement was executed on 01.2.2008 and that the suit was instituted on 17.12.2013---It was also admitted that in the agreement it was stipulated that balance amount of Rs.2,00,000/- was payable till 01.5.2008 and in case of non-payment the agreement would stand rescinded and earnest money would be liable to be forfeited---In view of the admission made in the statement of P.W.1, the plaintiff that agreement provided for a date of terminus a quo, under Art. 113 of the Limitation Act, suit could be instituted only within three years from the date which the parties had agreed for the completion of the deal---In the present case, the suit was filed after more than five years and seven months from the date fixed in the agreement for payment of balance consideration which was obviously barred by time and it was rightly so concluded by the courts below to be so, which findings did not suffer from any error of law or from any misreading of record---In the present case, after considering all said material facts, the Court below rightly concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement---No error of law, misreading and non-reading of evidence or any jurisdictional defect was noticed in the impugned judgements passed by both the Courts below to call for interference---Revision petition was dismissed , in circumstances. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Discretionary relief---Balance sale consideration---Buyer's willingness and readiness to make payment(s), absence of---Petitioner' suit was concurrently dismissed---Validity---For the relief of specific performance, which is discretionary in its nature, the petitioner was expected to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement from the date of its execution till the date fixed for payment of balance sale consideration; and also had to prove that he did take necessary steps for the performance of his part---Record revealed that the petitioner could not prove having ever paid or tendered for payment the balance amount of consideration nor produced any documentary evidence such as cheque, pay order, for payment of balance consideration---So much so, after the filing of suit till the filing of appeal no attempt was made to deposit the balance sale price---It was, therefore, a case in which the discretionary jurisdiction could not be exercised in his favour and was rightly declined by the Courts below---Buyer's primary obligation in a contract of sale is to make payment of the balance sale consideration as stipulated in the contract and that if the seller refuses to receive payment the buyer must establish that he had the required money which was kept aside for the seller, for instance, by making a pay order or cashier cheque in his name as this would show that the buyer no longer had access to the sale consideration and that alternatively the buyer could have deposited it in court---If a buyer does not fulfill its primary obligations to secure/tender the sale consideration and files suit and does so without depositing the sale consideration in court, the seller is placed in an advantageous position---In the present case, after considering all said material facts, the Court below rightly concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement---No error of law, misreading and non-reading of evidence or any jurisdictional defect was noticed in the impugned judgements passed by both the Courts below to call for interference---Revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Nazar Hussain and another v. Syed Iqbal Ahmad Qadri (Deceased) through his L.Rs. and another 2022 SCMR 1216 ref. Imtiaz Hussain Khan Baloch for Petitioner. Haider Ali Khan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 25th January, 2023.

Summary: Article 181 of the Limitation Act is applicable to application under section 12(2) C.P.C.

Summary: Background: The appellants filed a civil appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge Sehnsa on May 29, 2012, which had reversed the decision of the Civil Judge Sehnsa from April 30, 2009. The respondents had initially filed a suit for declaration, claiming ownership of ancestral land in Thalyara, Tehsil Sehnsa, District Kotli, and sought the cancellation of mutations No. 71 and 82, which they alleged were fraudulent. The trial court dismissed the suits, but the appellate court reversed this decision, leading to the current appeal by the appellants. ----Issues: 1- Whether mutation No. 71, related to the inheritance of Lal Khan’s property, was justified and legally valid. 2- Whether the suits filed by the respondents were barred by limitation. 3- Whether the family of Lal Khan was governed by custom or by Muslim personal law regarding inheritance. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Additional District Judge Sehnsa. The court reasoned that: Mutation No. 71: The mutation was found to be unjustified and fraudulent. The appellants claimed that the mutation was made according to custom, but they failed to provide satisfactory evidence to prove that the family of Lal Khan followed any custom that derogated from Muslim personal law. The court presumed that, being Muslims, the family of Lal Khan was governed by Islamic law, under which the daughters and widow of Lal Khan were rightful inheritors. Limitation: The court held that the suits were not barred by limitation, as the matter involved inheritance rights. It is a well-established principle that no limitation runs against a party for claiming their inheritance rights. Custom vs. Muslim Law: The court emphasized that custom must be proved by solid and reliable evidence, and there is no presumption in favor of custom over personal law. Since the appellants could not prove the existence of a valid custom that would override the Muslim law of inheritance, the court applied Muslim personal law, declaring the mutation fraudulent. The court concluded that the Additional District Judge Sehnsa had correctly assessed the evidence and legal principles, and the appeal had no merit. ----Citations/Precedents: 1998 SCR 333 1985 CLC 217 2000 SCR 328 2002 CLC 1539 2006 MLD 1422 Ishaq’s case, PLD 1983 SC 273 Ms. Shela Zia & others V. WAPDA, PLD 1994 SC 693

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ---- S. 96--- Regular First Appeal---Deprivation of inheritance rights---Challenge to mutation of inherited property---Respondent (legal heir) challenged Mutation No. 226, dated 04.04.1981, which allegedly deprived her of her rightful share in her father’s estate---Trial court decreed the suit in favor of respondent, declaring the mutation illegal and restoring her share in the inheritance---Appellants (brothers of respondent) contended that the respondent voluntarily transferred her share in their favor through the impugned mutation---Appellants failed to provide documentary evidence to substantiate their claim of a voluntary transfer of ownership by respondent---Court reaffirmed that a mere entry in the revenue record does not confer title and must be supported by evidence of a valid transaction---Appeal dismissed. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)--- ---- Arts. 119, 120 & 79---Burden of proof---Validity of Hiba (gift) mutation---In a case where inheritance rights are denied on the basis of a gift, the burden of proof lies upon the donee to establish that: (i) the donor had full knowledge of the transfer, (ii) the gift was made voluntarily, and (iii) possession was delivered---Appellants, who were beneficiaries of the disputed mutation, failed to prove that respondent voluntarily transferred her share as a gift---No independent witnesses or documentary proof of the alleged transfer were produced---Revenue record alone is insufficient to prove a valid transfer of ownership---Reliance placed on Peer Baksh v. Mst. Khanzadi (2016 SCMR 1417) and Muhammad Bakhsh v. Ellahi Bukhsh (2003 SCMR 286). (c) Islamic Law--- ---- Hiba (gift)---Essentials---A valid Hiba under Islamic law requires: (i) an offer by the donor, (ii) acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession---Appellants failed to prove that the essential elements of a valid Hiba were fulfilled---No evidence of an express declaration of gift by the respondent was provided---Court held that mere possession by the donee does not establish a valid gift unless accompanied by independent evidence proving donor’s intention---Reliance placed on Abid Hussain v. Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 2022 SC 395). (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ---- Inheritance rights---Effect of delay in filing suit---Court held that limitation does not apply to a void transaction, and efflux of time does not extinguish a legal heir’s right in ancestral property---Inheritance rights are imprescriptible and cannot be defeated by lapse of time---Mutations based on fraudulent transfers do not create ownership rights unless supported by lawful transactions---Reliance placed on Muhammad Iqbal v. Mukhtar Ahmad (2008 SCMR 855) and Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad (1992 SCMR 1832). (e) Revenue Law--- ---- Mutation---Effect of revenue entries---Mutation is only a fiscal entry and does not create or extinguish ownership rights---A person relying on mutation as proof of title must establish the original transaction upon which it is based---Court held that since the appellants failed to provide any independent evidence supporting their claim of ownership, the disputed mutation was ineffective against the respondent’s inheritance rights---Reliance placed on Muhammad Akram v. Altaf Ahmad (PLD 2003 SC 688). ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed---Trial court’s judgment declaring the mutation illegal upheld---Respondent’s inheritance rights restored. ----Cited Cases: Peer Baksh v. Mst. Khanzadi (2016 SCMR 1417) Muhammad Bakhsh v. Ellahi Bukhsh (2003 SCMR 286) Abid Hussain v. Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 2022 SC 395) Muhammad Iqbal v. Mukhtar Ahmad (2008 SCMR 855) Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad (1992 SCMR 1832) Muhammad Akram v. Altaf Ahmad (PLD 2003 SC 688)

Summary: The petitioner claimed restoration of seniority from back dates.Held: There can be no exception to the rule that the delay in seeking the remedy of appeal, review or revision beyond the period of limitation provided under the statute, in absence of reasonable explanation, cannot be condoned and in the same manner if the remedy of writ petition is not availed within reasonable time, the interference can be refused on the ground of laches.