Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---- ----R.3(i), Category (ii) & Appendix---Candidate belonging to backward area---Automatic age relaxation---Held, that where a candidate belonged to District Buner, which was included in the category of “backward areas” under the Appendix to R.3(ii) of the Rules, 2008, she was entitled to automatic relaxation of three years in upper age limit under Category (ii) of R.3(i). (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---- ----R.3(i), Category (iii)---General candidate---Further relaxation by appointing authority---Held, that in addition to automatic relaxation available to candidates from backward areas, a candidate could also claim relaxation available to general candidates under Category (iii) of R.3(i), whereby the appointing authority could grant relaxation up to two years in upper age limit. (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---- ----R.4, proviso---Backward area candidate---Additional relaxation besides automatic relaxation---Held, that under the proviso to R.4 of the Rules, 2008, candidates from backward areas, in addition to automatic relaxation of three years under Category (ii) of R.3, are entitled to one of the relaxations available to government servants, general candidates or disabled candidates, whichever is relevant and applicable to them---Respondent’s case was, therefore, covered both as a backward area candidate and as a general candidate for further age relaxation. (d) Service Law---- ----Appointment---Candidate securing first position---Appointment withheld on ground of overage---Entitlement to age relaxation---Held, that where respondent had appeared in the recruitment test, secured first position amongst successful candidates, and availability of one seat was not disputed, denial of appointment solely on the ground of overage was not sustainable when the applicable rules entitled her to relaxation in upper age limit. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Service appointment---Direction to consider age relaxation---Held, that High Court rightly exercised constitutional jurisdiction by directing the competent authority to consider the respondent’s request for age relaxation where the relevant statutory rules clearly covered her case---No illegality, irregularity or infirmity was found in the impugned judgment warranting interference by the appellate Court. (f) Service Law---- ----Age relaxation---Backward area candidate from District Buner---Effect of Rules, 2008---Held, that respondent, being from District Buner, was entitled to three years automatic relaxation as a backward area candidate and further relaxation up to two years by the appointing authority as a general candidate---Her entitlement flowed directly from the Rules, 2008, and could not be defeated merely by raising a general objection of overage. Disposition: Petition was dismissed and leave was refused; judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench, directing consideration of respondent’s request for age relaxation, was maintained.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XLI, Rr. 11, 12, 16 & 17---Appeal dismissed for non-prosecution---Appeal not fixed for hearing but for procuring attendance/service of respondent---Effect---Regular Second Appeal filed by petitioners was dismissed for non-prosecution on 26.10.2022---Record showed that on previous date, appeal had been adjourned for submission of correct address of respondent and for issuance of notice parvee, as respondent had reportedly shifted residence---Supreme Court held that on 26.10.2022 appeal was not fixed for hearing, rather it was fixed for procuring attendance of respondent by issuance of notice---High Court, in such circumstances, ought not to have dismissed appeal for non-prosecution, but should have passed an order in relation to service/proceedings for procuring attendance---Order XLI, Rule 17(1), C.P.C. applies where appeal is called on for hearing and appellant fails to appear; where appeal is not fixed for hearing, dismissal in default under said provision is not justified. Cited Cases: • Tehsil Municipal Administrator, Faisalabad v. Muhammad Saleem and others 2016 SCMR 2009 • Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XLI, Rr. 11 to 17---Expression “called on for hearing”---Meaning---Service of respondent and completion of earlier procedural steps---Supreme Court held that expression “called on for hearing” in Order XLI, Rule 17 presupposes completion of earlier steps envisaged by Rules 11 to 16 of Order XLI, C.P.C.---After appeal crosses preliminary hearing stage under Rule 11, appeal cannot be heard and decided without service of respondent or his counsel---Effective hearing of appeal means a date on which arguments are to be heard, which presupposes service of parties---Court must first ascertain whether respondent has been duly served before treating matter as one fixed for hearing---Where respondent had not yet been served and matter was pending for issuance of notice or correction of address, appeal could not be treated as having been called on for hearing for purposes of dismissal under Order XLI, Rule 17, C.P.C. Cited Case: • Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XLI, R. 17---Dismissal of appeal for non-appearance of appellant---Discretionary power---Mechanical dismissal deprecated---Supreme Court reiterated that under Order XLI, Rule 17, C.P.C., Court “may” dismiss appeal for non-appearance of appellant when appeal is fixed for hearing, therefore power is discretionary and not mandatory---Court is not bound in every case to dismiss appeal in default and may adjourn matter to another date where circumstances so require---Dismissal of appeal without appreciating that appeal was not fixed for hearing and without considering discretionary nature of power amounted to mechanical exercise of jurisdiction---Such order could not be sustained. Cited Case: • Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Arts. 168 & 181---Application for restoration/re-admission of appeal---Appeal not dismissed under Order XLI, Rule 17(1), C.P.C.---Applicable limitation---Article 168 provides thirty days for application seeking re-admission of appeal dismissed for non-prosecution under Order XLI, Rule 17(1), C.P.C.---Supreme Court held that since dismissal order dated 26.10.2022 could not be termed as an order passed under Order XLI, Rule 17(1), C.P.C., Article 168 was not attracted---In such circumstances, residuary Article 181 applied, providing limitation period of three years---Restoration application filed on 08.10.2024 was therefore within time---High Court erred in dismissing restoration application as barred by limitation. Cited Case: • Tehsil Municipal Administrator, Faisalabad v. Muhammad Saleem and others 2016 SCMR 2009 (e) Administration of justice---- ----Act of Court---Party should not suffer due to act of Court---Technicalities not to defeat merits---Supreme Court held that petitioners should not be made to suffer due to act of Court, particularly when appeal had been dismissed on a date not fixed for hearing---Mere technicalities, unless presenting insurmountable hurdles, should not defeat ends of justice, as legal formalities exist to safeguard paramount interest of justice---In circumstances, restoration of appeal for decision on merits was in interest of justice, subject to costs because petitioners’ conduct was also not aboveboard. Cited Cases: • Abdul Qudoos v. Commandant Frontier Constabulary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and another 2023 SCMR 334 • Sherin and 4 others v. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others 1995 SCMR 584 • The State v. Asif Adil and others 1997 SCMR 209 • Sajawal Khan v. Wali Muhammad and others 2002 SCMR 134 • Jawad Mir Muhammadi and others v. Haroon Mirza PLD 2007 SC 472 • Zulfiqar and others v. Shahadat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582 • Homeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary Health Department and others 2022 SCMR 1546 • Mian Shehzad-ud-Din and 4 others v. Member, Board of Revenue S&E Chief Settlement Commissioner, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another 2002 YLR 3755 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----Restoration of Regular Second Appeal---Costs imposed to balance equities---Supreme Court found impugned order dismissing restoration application unsustainable---Regular Second Appeal was restored to its original number and deemed pending before Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, for decision afresh after hearing parties in accordance with law within one month from receipt of judgment---However, as petitioners’ conduct was not aboveboard, they were burdened with costs of Rs.50,000 to be paid to respondents before High Court on first date of hearing; in case of failure, High Court was empowered to pass appropriate order. Disposition: Civil Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; impugned order dated 03.11.2025 passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan was set aside; RSA No.50 of 2010 titled “Abdul Rehman, etc. v. Syed Jaffer Hussain (deceased) through L.Rs.” was restored/deemed pending before High Court for fresh decision after hearing parties within one month from receipt of judgment; petitioners were directed to pay costs of Rs.50,000 to respondents before High Court on first date of hearing, failing which High Court may pass appropriate order.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Fatal road accident---Offences under Ss. 322, 337-G & 279, P.P.C.---Further custody/investigation not required---Petitioner-accused sought pre-arrest bail in case registered under Ss. 322, 337-G and 279, P.P.C., arising out of a road accident wherein three persons had died after a Mazda Coaster allegedly hit their motorcycle in rash and negligent manner---Supreme Court observed that although three innocent persons had expired in the unfortunate incident, the material consideration was whether petitioner was still required for extracting further facts or for further inquiry/investigation---Investigating Officer, when specifically asked by Court, failed to give any plausible reason for further requirement of petitioner and conceded that petitioner was no more required for further inquiry or investigation---Held, in such circumstances no fruitful purpose would be served by refusing pre-arrest bail merely for extracting more facts from petitioner. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 322 & 279---Qatl-bis-sabab and rash/negligent driving---Bail before arrest---Nature of offences---Supreme Court observed that offence under S.322, P.P.C. entails diyat only, whereas offence under S.279, P.P.C. is bailable---When these factors were considered together with the fact that petitioner was no longer required for investigation, petitioner was entitled to grant of pre-arrest bail. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Name of accused not appearing in FIR---Allegation of fake driving licence---Effect---Petitioner’s name did not appear in the FIR, which was initially registered against an unknown driver---Allegation regarding petitioner possessing a fake driving licence was treated as a separate matter---Supreme Court observed that even if it was assumed that petitioner had a fake driving licence, such offence was bailable and did not justify refusal of pre-arrest bail in the circumstances of the case. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Tentative assessment at bail stage---Supreme Court clarified that observations made in bail before arrest order were tentative in nature and would not prejudice case of either party before Trial Court. Disposition: Petition seeking bail before arrest was converted into appeal and allowed; petitioner was granted pre-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.100,000 with one surety in the like amount to satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court; observations were declared tentative and not to prejudice trial.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Challenge to mutation---Suit filed after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Effect---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas suit challenging the same was instituted on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years---Plaintiff remained silent during such prolonged period and took no steps to question validity of mutation or underlying transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---Held, that person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraudulent document or transaction---Suit for declaration/cancellation---Limitation---Plaintiff attempted to avoid bar of limitation by alleging that mutation was procured through fraud and misrepresentation---Held, that although fraud vitiates solemn acts, allegation of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Where a document or transaction is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 and suit seeking declaration or cancellation must be filed within limitation prescribed under Art.91 of Limitation Act, 1908, i.e. three years from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Plea of fraud could not be invoked merely to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Burden of proof---Mutation challenged after long delay---Plaintiff alleged that mutation was result of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and had been sanctioned without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, concurrently held that plaintiff failed to prove fraud through independent evidence---Held, that bald allegations of fraud were insufficient---Fraud being a question of fact had to be established by reliable, convincing and cogent evidence---Plaintiff’s long silence for more than two decades further undermined credibility of allegation. (d) Revenue record--- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Laches, limitation and third-party rights---Effect---Mutation in question remained incorporated in revenue record for decades without challenge and third-party rights had also come into existence---Held, that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights accrued on their basis---Challenges to old mutation entries after prolonged inaction must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 (e) Revenue record--- ----Mutation incorporated in Jamabandi---Presumption of correctness---Burden to rebut---Once mutation was sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it formed part of regular revenue record and carried statutory presumption of truth---Plaintiff failed to produce convincing evidence to rebut such presumption---Held, that presumption of regularity and correctness attached to revenue entries could not be lightly displaced---Courts below rightly gave due weight to revenue record and held that plaintiff failed to discharge heavy burden required to dislodge presumption attached thereto. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (f) Land Revenue Act--- ----Mutation proceedings---Procedural irregularity---Effect on otherwise established sale transaction---Plaintiff raised objections regarding procedure adopted in attestation of mutation---Held, that even if certain procedural irregularities existed in attestation of mutation, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Where authenticity and genuineness of underlying sale transaction is established, mere irregularity in mutation procedure does not affect binding effect of mutation---Technical defects in mutation process cannot defeat substantive rights where transaction is proved by credible oral and documentary evidence. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (g) Revenue record--- ----Mutation entries---Nature and evidentiary value---Mutation entries by themselves do not create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, such entries may validly reflect transfer of rights---In the present case, subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and plaintiff had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Held, that procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings recorded by subordinate Courts. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently held that mutation reflected genuine sale transaction, fraud was not proved and suit was time-barred---High Court, in revision, reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, perversity or material illegality in findings of Courts below---Held, that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into a third Court of fact---Concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed unless based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, or suffering from perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits of case---High Court exceeded settled limits of revisional jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Misreading, non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---Distinction---Scope of revisional Court---Held, that misreading or non-reading of evidence may justify revisional interference where finding is perverse, absurd, jurisdictionally defective or contrary to law---Mere misappreciation or possibility of another view does not permit revisional Court to substitute its own conclusion for concurrent findings of Courts below---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and both reached same conclusion, High Court should not revisit evidence merely to draw another conclusion. (j) Civil suit--- ----Challenge to mutation---Solitary statement of plaintiff versus documentary proof---Effect---Plaintiff alleged that he did not visit Patwari’s office on date of mutation but produced no independent witness and remained confined to his solitary statement---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day with same identifying witnesses, which negated plaintiff’s stance---Held, that solitary statement was insufficient to dislodge documentary proof and revenue record produced by defendants---Subordinate Courts correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation. (k) Civil suit--- ----Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Concurrent dismissal by Trial Court and First Appellate Court---High Court decreeing suit in revision---Supreme Court interference---Held, that cumulative effect of record showed that suit was hopelessly barred by limitation; allegations of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation remained unsubstantiated; mutation incorporated in revenue record for decades carried presumption of correctness; third-party rights had intervened; and High Court transgressed limits of revisional jurisdiction by interfering with concurrent findings without showing misreading or non-reading of evidence---Impugned High Court judgment could not be sustained. Disposition: Appeals were allowed. Judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court was set aside. Concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored. Civil suit filed by respondent No.1 stood dismissed. Pending CMAs were disposed of as infructuous. No order as to costs.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: a. When a special statute created a specialized forum and provided an effective specific remedy for redressal of grievances then jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Law Court would be deemed impliedly barred. b. Civil Law Courts should not entertain suits in respect of matters which falls in the jurisdiction of National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA).

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Electronic evidence---Audio/video recording---Admissibility---Authentication and proof of genuineness---Supreme Court held that electronic evidence may be admissible under Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, and may be treated as primary evidence, but its admissibility is subject to strict conditions---Source, origin and manner of obtaining recording must be proved, and expert confirmation must establish that recording was not tampered with, altered or doctored---No audio tape or video can be relied upon by Court unless proved genuine and free from tampering---In present case, prosecution primarily relied upon clandestine audio recording allegedly containing conversation between accused persons regarding payment of bribe, but no additional independent witness or incriminating evidence was available. Cited Cases: • Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 SC 675 • Ahmed Omar Sheikh v. State 2021 SCMR 873 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984) / Electronic Transactions Ordinance (LI of 2002)---- ----Secret audio/video recording---Recording made to trap, humiliate, scandalize, extort or procure evidence---Lawfulness and admissibility---Supreme Court held that recording of a conversation in which recorder is participant may generally not constitute illegal wiretapping, even if other person is unaware; however, recording conversation between two other persons is illegal---Audio recordings as evidence must be relevant, duly obtained and must not infringe rights of parties---Secret recordings intended to humiliate, disgrace, scandalize, outrage, insult, trap or extort an accused or any individual are not to be treated as lawful basis for conviction---Illegality of complainant cannot be used as solitary foundation for convicting accused. (c) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016)---- ----S. 23---Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 389---Unauthorized surveillance---Capturing image or voice with dishonest intent---Secretly collecting information about private conversation without consent for extortion or illegal purpose amounts to criminal conduct---PECA recognizes unauthorized surveillance, and S.23 criminalizes unauthorized taking, capturing or transmission of a person’s image or voice with dishonest intent---There is a distinction between routine recordings made in ordinary course of duty and recordings made for purpose of laying a trap to procure evidence---Latter category is punishable and cannot be given judicial legitimacy. Cited Cases: • Hakim Ali Bhatti v. Abdul Hakim 1986 CLC 1784 • Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 SC 675 (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 14---Dignity of man and privacy of home---Secret recording of private conversation---Constitutional violation---Supreme Court held that inviolability of dignity of man and privacy of home are guaranteed under Art.14 of Constitution---Recording citizen’s conversation secretly and using it as a weapon in judicial proceedings directly violates constitutional guarantee of privacy and dignity---Such practice reduces society to a surveillance theatre where end is treated as justifying means---Where complainant resorts to unlawful surveillance, he may transform from victim into offender, while person against whom such audio/video is leaked may be victim rather than accused. Cited Case: • Hamna Qaiser v. Chairman PEMRA 2024 MLD 243 (e) Islamic jurisprudence---- ----Right of privacy---Prohibition against spying---Surah Al-Hujurat 49:12---Supreme Court observed that right of privacy is firmly embedded in Islamic jurisprudence and constitutional thought---Holy Qur’an commands “Do not spy”---Inviolability of home and prohibition against unwarranted surveillance are foundational principles---Incident from era of Hazrat Umar ibn al-Khattab (RA) was referred to, where even suspected illegality did not justify spying, entering without permission or violating sanctity of home---Privacy is a protected right and cannot be curtailed except strictly in accordance with law. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Electronic/CCTV evidence---Doctrine of silent witness---Distinction between routine CCTV footage and clandestine private recording---Supreme Court distinguished the present case from Zahir Jaffer case, wherein CCTV footage was obtained from permanently installed security system operating routinely at place of occurrence, extracted from original DVR/hard disk by law enforcement, forensically examined by Punjab Forensic Science Agency, and certified to be unedited with affirmative facial recognition---Such evidence was forensically verified, authenticated and primary---In present case, none of those features existed; it was not routine stationary CCTV performing ordinary security function, but secret private recording of conversation by an individual with dishonest intent, sought to be converted into basis for conviction. Cited Case: • Zahir Jaffer 2025 SCP 220 (g) Criminal trial---- ----Private surveillance---Warrantless surveillance by citizens---Judicial legitimacy refused---Supreme Court held that permitting conviction on basis of such secretly procured private recordings would amount to granting general licence to citizens to conduct warrantless surveillance of fellow citizens---Such practice would empower every citizen to act as prosecutor, technician and witness while bypassing constitutional safeguards and investigative procedures---Private surveillance violating law, Islamic principles and fundamental rights cannot be justified or clothed with judicial legitimacy. (h) Criminal appeal against acquittal---- ----Double presumption of innocence---Interference with acquittal---Scope---Trial Court acquitted respondents of offences under Ss.161, 420 and 409, P.P.C. read with S.5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and High Court upheld acquittal---Supreme Court found no illegality, misreading or non-reading of evidence in impugned judgments---Acquitted accused enjoys double presumption of innocence: first before trial and second after acquittal---Acquittal cannot be interfered with except for strong and exceptional reasons, which were absent in the case. Disposition: Criminal Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused; acquittal of respondents No.1 and 2 recorded by Trial Court and upheld by Lahore High Court was maintained.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas respondent No.1 instituted suit on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years alleging fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Supreme Court held that unexplained delay in challenging a mutation renders the claim legally untenable---Respondent remained completely silent for more than two decades and took no step to question validity of mutation or underlying sale transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---A person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Law of limitation is designed to bring certainty and finality to legal relations and prevent reopening of stale claims---Suit was clearly and hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and 10 others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and 4 others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraud alleged in respect of mutation/sale transaction---Fraud vitiates all solemn acts, but must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved---Supreme Court reiterated that fraud vitiates solemn acts and any instrument, deed, judgment or decree obtained through fraud is a nullity, but allegation of fraud cannot be accepted on mere assertion---Fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Question of fraud involves finding of fact regarding conduct of party concerned---Even where fraud is alleged in relation to an instrument or transaction, party challenging such instrument is required to seek cancellation within prescribed limitation period---Where document is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act and suit seeking declaration/cancellation must be filed within three years under Art.91 of Limitation Act from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Respondent failed to produce convincing evidence of fraud and remained silent for more than two decades; plea of fraud could not be used to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Proof of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Independent and reliable evidence required---Respondent alleged that Mutation No.684 dated 15.03.1980 was procured through fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, held that respondent failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation through independent evidence---Supreme Court held that such allegations remained unsubstantiated and were rightly disbelieved by subordinate Courts---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day and identifying witnesses were the same, which negatived respondent’s stance that he had not visited office of Patwari on relevant date---Respondent remained confined to his solitary statement and did not produce independent witnesses sufficient to dislodge documentary proof brought on record. (d) Revenue record---- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Presumption of correctness---Jamabandi---Revenue entries remaining unquestioned for decades---Supreme Court held that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they have remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights have subsequently accrued on their basis---Once mutation is duly sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it forms part of regular revenue record and carries statutory presumption of truth unless rebutted by strong and cogent evidence---Mutation in question remained part of revenue record for more than two decades without challenge---Respondent produced no convincing evidence to rebut presumption attached to revenue entries---Courts below were justified in giving due weight to revenue record and holding that respondent failed to discharge heavy burden required to displace statutory presumption. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (e) Mutation---- ----Procedural irregularity in attestation---Effect on proved sale transaction---Mutation entries do not themselves create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, technical defects in mutation proceedings cannot invalidate transaction---Supreme Court held that even if certain procedural irregularities in attestation of mutation were assumed, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and respondent had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently dismissed suit after proper appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, holding that sale transaction was genuine, fraud was not proved and suit was barred by limitation---Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits---Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into third court of fact---High Court reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, material illegality or perversity in findings of subordinate Courts---Such approach was inconsistent with settled limits of revisional jurisdiction and amounted to impermissible interference with concurrent findings of fact. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim, etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Difference between misreading/non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---High Court’s limits in revision---Supreme Court reiterated that scope of appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be confused---Revisional Court cannot upset finding of fact merely because another view appears more plausible---Interference is permissible only where finding is result of misreading, non-reading, perverse or absurd appraisal of material evidence, jurisdictional error, illegality or serious miscarriage of justice---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and same conclusion has been reached concurrently, revisiting evidence in second appeal or revision to draw another conclusion would offend doctrine of finality---High Court cannot independently reassess evidence to supplant its own conclusion unless findings below are legally flawed. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (h) Revenue record / Limitation---- ----Third-party rights and finality of long-standing entries---Mutation remaining incorporated for decades---Effect---Supreme Court held that where revenue entries have remained unchallenged for prolonged period and third-party rights have intervened, challenges to such entries must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained---In present case, during long interregnum of over twenty-two years, third-party rights had come into existence, further strengthening need to uphold sanctity and finality of long-standing revenue entries---Belated suit challenging mutation could not be permitted to unsettle settled rights. Disposition: Appeals were allowed; judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court in Civil Revision No.410 of 2017 was set aside; concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored; civil suit filed by respondent No.1 was dismissed; no order as to costs; connected CMAs No.12138 and 12580 of 2019 and CMA No.2581 of 2022 were disposed of as infructuous.

Summary: ----Ss.3(9), 10, 11 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.10-A, 14, 20 & 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XX, Rr.1 & 6---Constitutional petition---Judicial separation/dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses---Scope and evidentiary discipline---Petitioner contracted Christian marriage and sought dissolution---Concurrent judgments dismissing petitioner’s petition for failing to prove allegation of adultery, challenge to---Legality---Courts below failing to evaluate other statutory grounds such as cruelty and desertion---Effect---Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioner/husband and respondent No.3/wife, both Christians by faith, contracted marriage; the petitioner initially filed a petition for dissolution/judicial separation under the (Christian) Divorce Act, 1869 before the Civil Court, which was dismissed and the appeal thereagainst was later withdrawn with permission to file afresh; he subsequently instituted a fresh petition under Ss. 7 & 10 of the Act, 1869 which was dismissed and the dismissal was maintained by the District Court; aggrieved, the petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below---Pivotal questions for determination were as to “whether the allegations of adultery and cruelty had been adjudicated after strict compliance with the evidentiary discipline required under the C.P.C. read with Ss. 10 & 12 of the Act, 1869?”; and “whether the plea of desertion was legally available on the facts and properly examined by the Courts below?”---Held: Impugned judgments were passed without fully considering the evidence, which amounted to non-compliance of the requirements of O.XX, Rr. 1 & 6 of the C.P.C.---To discuss or elaborate reliance upon an allegation of adultery in the absence of cogent and legally admissible evidence was not only contrary to the procedural mandate of the C.P.C. and the statutory safeguards of the Act, 1869 but also implicated the constitutional guarantee of dignity under Art.14 of the Constitution---Since it was admitted that the parties had been living apart, it became apparent that the constituent elements of desertion were not examined by the Courts below while framing issues---The matter therefore had to be remanded for proper framing of issues---The right of Christian citizens to seek dissolution or judicial separation through Civil Courts was a manifestation of their freedom to profess, practice and manage matters arising out of their religious law---In the present case, the courts below failed to examine the petitioner’s claim in the light of this constitutional mandate, as neither the ground of cruelty nor the admitted state of separation was analyzed within the statutory framework of Ss. 10 & 22 of the Act, 1869---Such omission constituted non-compliance of the procedural discipline of law and also infringed the petitioner’s right to fair trial and due process secured under Art.10-A, read with Art.4 of the Constitution---Concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below were set aside---Matter was remanded to Trail Court for fresh adjudication---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. The Queen v. Leresche and another 1891 QB 2418; Azhar Abbas Haideri v. Government of the Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 278 and PLD 2026 SC 53 ref. (b) Administration of justice--- ----The expectation that the judiciary must act to eliminate any form of injustice serves as a cornerstone of trust in the legal system---It is this ability to priorities substantial justice over mere technical compliance that fortifies the integrity and efficacy of our legal processes. Province of Punjab through the District Collector, Bhakkar v. Muhammad Chiragh and others PLD 2026 SC 53 rel. (c) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----Ss.10 & 22---Dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses---Scope---The bond of Christian marriage is treated as a solemn and enduring civil status, and its dissolution is not to be granted lightly---There exists no concept analogous to dissolution at will; relief is conditioned upon strict proof of statutory grounds. Mst. Parveen Amanual v. ADJ I and 2 others PLD 2009 Lah. 213 ref. (d) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----S.10---Dissolution of marriage---Statutory grounds---Proof---Requirement---Unless and until anyone of the grounds is not proved, marriage cannot be dissolved, meaning thereby, to get the dissolution of marriage, the party is required to allege and prove the allegation of adultery. Saima v. Additional District Judge PLD 2022 Lahore 214 and Mushtaq v. Mst. Fareeda 1979 CLC 457 ref. (e) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----Ss.10 & 22---Dissolution of Christian marriage---Desertion---Concept and essential ingredients---Desertion is not a mere physical separation, it consists of certain essential constituent elements, namely: i. the factum desired: the fact of separation; ii. the animus deserendi: the intention to permanently abandon the matrimonial union; iii. absence of consent of the other spouse; iv. absence of reasonable cause for such withdrawal; and v. the completion of the statutory period of desertion as required under the law---The concept may manifest either as actual desertion or constructive desertion, depending upon whether the abandonment arises from physical departure or from conduct rendering cohabitation impossible. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---In exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, High Court can review the judgments to ensure that the lower courts acted in accordance with law and properly considered the evidence before them---However, High Court cannot assume the functions of a civil court to re-examine evidence or to pass a decree in favor of either party---The primary responsibility for determining the facts and granting relief rests with the Civil Court, which is empowered to adjudicate disputes based on the evidence and material placed before it---High Court under its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, is neither an appellate forum nor a vehicle for re-appraisal of evidence meticulously recorded by the forums below---The Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is not designed to undertake a roving exercise of re-evaluating factual findings or to substitute its own opinion for that of the Family Court and the Appellate Authority, who are the primary fact-finding tribunals entrusted with the appreciation of evidence---While the High Court retains the power to interfere where orders are suffering from jurisdictional defects, patent illegality, non-consideration of material evidence, or where the forums below have acted in violation of the law declared by the superior courts, it cannot embark upon a de-novo assessment of the evidence as if sitting in regular appeal---However, where the impugned judgment demonstrably overlooks crucial admissions and fails to apply settled legal principles, the appropriate remedy is not for the High Court to re-adjudicate the factual matrix itself, but to remand the matter for fresh determination in accordance with law. Shahbaz v. Fakhira Bibi 2021 MLD 1506; Tariq Javed v. Mst. Tahira Bibi and 2 others 2006 MLD 1956 and Tahir Umar v. Messrs Bata Shoe (Pakistan) Limited through Managing Director and 3 others 1991 MLD 1236 ref. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.20---Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions---Constitutional guarantee---Scope---Article 20 of the Constitution has been interpreted as a broad guarantee of equal religious freedom for all citizens; Muslims and non-Muslims alike---Article 20 ensures both individual and collective rights of conscience, protecting citizens not only from interference by other religious groups but also from coercion within their own faith communities. PLD 2014 Supreme Court 699 rel. (h) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4 & 10-A---Fair trial and due process, right of---Procedural compliance---Constitutional obligation of the Courts---Scope---After insertion of Art.10-A of the Constitution in the list of fundamental rights, it has become obligatory upon the Court to adhere to the procedural steps and to avoid from doing anything which caused prejudice to the rights of the parties---Article 10-A of the Constitution provides right of fair trial and due process for determination of rights and obligations---It is also pertinent to mention here that Art.4 of the Constitution clearly states that it is inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and no action detrimental to the reputation, life, and liberty shall be taken except as per law. Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 and Syed Tahir Hussain Mehmoodi and others v. Agha Syed Liaqat Ali and others 2014 SCMR 637 rel. Muhammad Ahsan Khan and Mudassar Hassan for Petitioner. Muhammad Musarrat Nawaz Khan and Syed Haider Ali Shah for Respondents. Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General, assisted by: Ms. Areej Omar Ramay for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 9th and 23rd February of 2026.