Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Interference with concurrent findings of Rent Controller and First Appellate Court---Principles---High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction might not upset concurrent findings recorded by courts below unless, on the face of it, such findings were structured on gross misreading or non-reading of evidence, were illogical, based on guesses and mere speculation, were recorded without jurisdiction or in excess of lawful authority, or the courts below had employed incorrect provision of law, or the cumulative effect of oversights gave rise to severe prejudice or violated express statutory provisions or fundamental constitutional rights---Power of judicial review under Art. 199 neither empowered High Court to revisit judgments of lower fora as if hearing a second appeal, nor to substitute its own opinion merely because another view of evidence was possible, nor to resolve complicated factual disputes so as to act as an appellate court in rent disputes---Writ jurisdiction was confined to re-examining lawfulness of the decision-making process and whether the lower forum acted within its jurisdiction, and could not re-weigh evidence or overturn factual findings unless completely perverse, whereas appellate jurisdiction encompassed a full hearing on facts and law. (b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979----Ss. 3, 16 & 18---Rent laws---Special laws---Object---Rent laws were special laws, self-contained and self-regulated in substantive and procedural provisions, aimed at ensuring speedy resolution of tenancy disputes between landlords and tenants rather than dragging the controversy for an unlimited period like civil suits---Ejectment proceedings---Dispute as to title of landlord raised by tenant (Government of Sindh) at a belated stage---Landlord/purchaser of property under two registered sale deeds had sought ejectment of Government as tenant; Rent Controller and First Appellate Court concurrently decided in favour of landlord; High Court in writ jurisdiction set aside those findings and called upon landlord to file civil suit for resolution of title dispute---Supreme Court observed that sale deeds forming part of the record escaped attention of High Court; issue relating to cancellation of auction, if any, was not properly adverted to and could only be decided after affording ample opportunity of hearing to both parties and placing relevant documents on record, if High Court wanted to embark upon the question of title in rent proceedings, which was otherwise not possible in writ jurisdiction where disputed questions of fact could not be decided---Tenant in earlier rounds of litigation had never raised plea that auction was cancelled, had recognized the relationship of tenant with original owner and had paid rent without demur---Tenancy issue was transformed into a dispute of title after change of ownership at a highly belated stage when the matter had reached an advanced stage---Merely alleging orally that auction was cancelled in 1974 did not suffice to give cause of action to defy the relationship of landlord and tenant in ejectment proceedings, which was not the forum to decide title to property. (c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979----S. 3---Applicability of Ordinance to premises owned or requisitioned by Government---Notification excluding premises---S. 3 of the Ordinance was not activated automatically; it provided that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, all premises other than those owned or requisitioned under any law by or on behalf of the Federal or Provincial Government, situated within an urban area, would be subject to the Ordinance, and under S. 3(2) Government might by notification exclude any class of premises or all premises in any area from operation of all or any of its provisions---If any such notification had ever been issued, it should have been produced before the Rent Controller before acquiescing to the relationship of landlord and tenant. (d) Estoppel----Approbate and reprobate---Contradictory stands---Maxims "Allegans contraria non est audiendus" and "Quod approbo non reprobo"---Person could not be allowed to testify hot and cold at different times about the same event or give contradictory statements; doctrine of approbate and reprobate meant that what a party approves it cannot disapprove---Said principles were relevant where tenant first acknowledged landlord-tenant relationship and later disputed title. (e) Civil petition for leave to appeal---Setting aside of concurrent findings by High Court in writ jurisdiction under special law---Remand---Crucial points falling within the ambit of rent laws, particularly relating to setting aside of concurrent findings of two courts below in writ jurisdiction under special law, required reconsideration---Civil petition was converted into appeal and allowed, judgment of High Court was set aside and matter was remanded to High Court for fresh adjudication with independent application of mind, preferably within six months from receipt of judgment. Disposition: Civil petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment dated 05.12.2023 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No. S-1114 of 2022 set aside; matter remanded to High Court for fresh adjudication, preferably within six months. (Civil Petition No.15-K of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 23.06.2026; Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ. Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (1) Distinction between “supersession” and “deferment” (2) Rule 13-A of 1975 Rules for determination of inter-se seniority (3) Principle “Birds of a feather flock together” explained. --- (a) Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973----Ss.8 & 9---Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, Rr.9, 10, 11 & 13-A---Seniority of Mukhtiarkars (BPS-16)---Promotees, deferred promotees and direct recruits---Seniority was to be determined according to mode and date of regular appointment and relevant statutory rules---Civil servant possessed no vested right to a particular position in seniority list, but appointing authority was required to prepare and revise seniority according to law---Seniority on promotion ordinarily took effect from date of regular appointment, subject to protection of inter-se seniority of persons belonging to same promotion batch---Direct recruits were to reckon seniority from date of their regular appointment and according to merit assigned by selection authority. (b) Service law---Promotion---“Supersession” and “deferment”---Distinction---Supersession involved conscious assessment by competent selection forum that civil servant was not fit or suitable for promotion on a particular occasion, resulting in promotion of junior and ordinarily affecting inter-se seniority---Deferment was temporary postponement of consideration due to incomplete service record, missing training, pending disciplinary or criminal proceedings or other administrative impediment and did not amount to adverse determination on fitness or merit---Supersession and deferment carried distinct legal consequences and could not be used interchangeably---Deferred civil servant, upon subsequent promotion after removal of impediment, could retain seniority with original batch in accordance with governing rules. (c) Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975----R.13-A---Deferred civil servant---Subsequent promotion---Inter-se seniority with juniors---Civil servant not promoted on his turn because seniority was disputed, he was on deputation, training or leave, disciplinary proceedings were pending, or for a reason other than unfitness for promotion, was, upon subsequent promotion and subject to competent authority’s order, deemed for purposes of inter-se seniority in higher post to have been promoted in same batch as his juniors---Fifty-four Assistant Mukhtiarkars had not been meaningfully considered and superseded on merit but were deferred because departmental, criminal or anti-corruption proceedings were pending---Upon subsequent promotion, their inter-se seniority with batchmates promoted on 03.01.2011 was protected under R.13-A. (d) Service law---Deferment from promotion---Non-reservation of vacancies---Effect upon seniority---Argument that deferred candidates could not claim seniority with original batch because no posts had been reserved for them was not sustainable---Deferred candidates were temporarily kept out of consideration and available candidates could lawfully be promoted against existing posts without suspending entire promotion process---Requirement to reserve posts for every deferred candidate would create administrative stalemate and frustrate Departmental Promotion Committee proceedings---Mere exhaustion or non-availability of promotion quota at time of subsequent promotion did not by itself deprive deferred civil servants of inter-se seniority protected by R.13-A after removal of impediment and regular promotion. (e) Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973----S.8---Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, Rr.10 & 11---Initial appointees and promotees---Determination of inter-se seniority---Seniority of civil servant was ordinarily reckoned from date of regular appointment and ad hoc appointment could not be retrospectively regularized---Among direct recruits, earlier selection ranked senior to later selection and merit assigned by selection authority governed inter-se position---Among promotees, seniority in lower post governed their inter-se ranking---Rule 11 further required determination of relative seniority of promotees and direct recruits according to prescribed statutory criterion---Department was bound to reconcile seniority positions strictly under applicable rules. (f) Service law---Promotion quota---Earlier remand directions of Supreme Court---Compliance---Earlier judgment dated 19.01.2021 required department to follow fifty percent quota each for direct recruits and promotees, ensure promotion only against available post in relevant quota, prohibit cross-quota promotion, treat persons promoted without available posts as ad hoc promotees until regular appointment and determine seniority from date of regular appointment under relevant rules---Grant of inter-se seniority to genuinely deferred promotees under R.13-A did not, by itself, violate said directions---Deferred candidates had not been promoted cross-quota merely by being placed with their original batch for inter-se seniority. Previous Proceedings: • Civil Appeals Nos.489 to 491 of 2017 and connected petitions, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 19.01.2021 (g) Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975----Rr.10 & 11---Promoted Mukhtiarkars vis-à-vis directly recruited Mukhtiarkars---Final seniority list dated 08.06.2021---Promotees, including deferred promotees accorded batch seniority, claimed promotion date of 03.01.2011, whereas direct recruits were regularly appointed on 31.10.2011---Service Tribunal correctly held that direct recruits’ seniority commenced from date of regular appointment, but did not clearly determine whether their placement above promotees regularly promoted from an earlier date was consistent with governing rules---Matter required limited administrative reconciliation and re-examination rather than wholesale disturbance of seniority already determined regarding deferred promotees. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.212(3)---Service Tribunal judgment---Seniority dispute---Scope of interference---Tribunal’s conclusion applying R.13-A to protect inter-se seniority of deferred promotees with their original batch was maintained---Interference was required only to extent that relative ranking between regularly promoted Mukhtiarkars and directly recruited Mukhtiarkars had not been examined with clarity under Rr.10 and 11 of the 1975 Rules. Disposition---Civil petitions converted into appeals and partly allowed---Finding protecting inter-se seniority of deferred Mukhtiarkars with their original batch maintained---Matter remanded to Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Sindh, for limited re-examination of seniority ranking of promoted Mukhtiarkars from dates of promotion vis-à-vis directly recruited Mukhtiarkars from dates of appointment---Competent authority directed to hear stakeholders and, if any lapse, apparent error or violation of 1975 Rules was found, make necessary correction in Final Seniority List dated 08.06.2021 within two months. Faheemuddin Memon and others v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others, C.P.L.A. Nos.914-K to 919-K of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 25.03.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: The ultimate purpose of procedural law is to give voice to human suffering, not to silence it. Principally, the procedural framework under the Cr.P.C. facilitates the observance of due process and the right to a fair trial, thereby securing the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution. Section 360(2) of the Cr.P.C. provides the procedure when a witness challenges the written record of his statement, mandating the Judge to append a “memorandum” of the objection, setting out Judge’s own remarks regarding the objection, and recording the correct version of the statement of the witness. --- (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Condonation of delay---Criminal petition for leave to appeal---Grounds stated in application were found plausible---Delay in filing petition was condoned. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360(1)---Recording of evidence of witness---Reading over and correction of statement---Trial Court was required, upon completion of testimony, to read over statement to witness in presence of accused or his counsel and correct any mistake, where necessary, before obtaining signature of witness---Object of provision was to ensure that testimony was reduced into writing accurately and substantially word for word---Recording of evidence through video link did not dilute statutory obligation to ensure correctness of written statement. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360(2)---Witness disputing correctness of recorded statement---Memorandum of objection---Where witness asserted that exact narrative had not been correctly reduced into writing, Magistrate or Sessions Judge was required, after hearing parties, to make memorandum of objection, append appropriate remarks and record correct version of testimony---Provision vested Trial Court with jurisdiction to rectify discrepancies, omissions and inaccuracies in written statement and cross-examination---Such jurisdiction was required to be exercised whenever accuracy of judicial record was legitimately questioned. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.10-A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.360---Fair trial and due process---Accurate recording of testimony---Procedural framework governing recording and correction of evidence served vital purpose of ensuring fairness and transparency in criminal trial---Procedure was an instrument for advancement of justice and could not be applied through purely technical approach so as to frustrate ends of justice---Failure to correct material inaccuracies in statement of witness could seriously impair evidentiary value of testimony and prejudice merits of criminal case---Ultimate purpose of procedural law was to give voice to human suffering rather than silence it. (e) Criminal trial---Evidence recorded through video link---Written statement inconsistent with video recording---Rectification---Witness stated in video recording that incident occurred on 31.05.2018, whereas Trial Court inadvertently recorded date as 30.05.2018---Supreme Court examined video recording and written statement and found material discrepancies and inaccuracies---Respondent also conceded mistakes and raised no objection to correction---Video recording constituted reliable contemporaneous source for comparison and rectification of written judicial record. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss.360(2) & 435---Trial Court and Revisional Court---Failure to exercise jurisdiction---Witness specifically sought comparison of written statement with available video recording, but Trial Court declined application and High Court maintained such order---Both fora were required to exercise jurisdiction conferred by Ss.360(2) and 435, Cr.P.C. to examine and rectify irregularity in proceedings---Non-exercise of such jurisdiction, despite admitted non-verbatim recording of testimony, amounted to illegality. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360(2)---Correction of testimony---Presence of parties---Procedure after remand---Trial Court was required to re-examine video recording and compare it with written examination-in-chief and cross-examination in presence of accused, counsel for parties and Prosecutor---Where discrepancy, omission or inaccuracy was found, Trial Court was to incorporate correct version of witness’s statement through memorandum containing its remarks and make same part of judicial record---Correction exercise was to preserve transparency and protect rights of all parties rather than permit unilateral alteration of evidence. Disposition---Criminal miscellaneous application allowed and delay in Criminal Petition No.1033 of 2024 condoned---Criminal petitions disposed of---Orders of Trial Court and High Court set aside---Trial Court directed to compare video recording with written statement, prepare memorandum under S.360(2), Cr.P.C. containing correct version and complete exercise within fifteen working days from receipt of certified copy of order---Thereafter parties to be afforded opportunity of re-arguments and criminal case to be decided within thirty working days strictly in accordance with law and on merits. Mst. Nayab v. The State through Prosecutor General, Sindh and others, Criminal Petitions Nos.1033 and 1036 of 2024 along with Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.1207 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 23.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: 1. The failure of the prosecution to substantiate its case through an ocular account does not mean the accused can go scot-free; rather, they can be legally convicted to the extent of the incident conclusively established on the sole basis of an unedited video film. 2. Since admitted facts need not to be proved, a photogrammetric test is only essential when identity is disputed, rendering it entirely redundant when the defense categorically admits the presence and identity of the accused in the video film. 3. An unedited video film serves as an incorruptible silent witness that overrides discredited eyewitness narratives, successfully redefining criminal liability and securing a conviction for proven events?such as an involuntary gunshot during a struggle?even when the broader prosecution case collapses.

Summary: 1. Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure-1898. 2. Article 161 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order-1984.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss. 7 & 8(1)(a)---Input tax adjustment---Raw material destroyed by fire before being consumed in manufacture of taxable supplies---Entitlement---Question whether input tax paid on raw materials destroyed in fire could be claimed in adjustment by the manufacturer-assessee against output tax, although such raw materials were not available for making taxable supplies, was no longer res integra, having been settled in Mayfair Spinning Mills---Under S. 7, a registered person seeking adjustment of input tax against output tax was required to establish, firstly, that input tax paid on purchases of inputs or raw materials was intended for the purpose of making taxable supplies; secondly, that the input tax paid was for producing taxable supplies, irrespective of whether those taxable supplies had actually been made or were to be made in the future; and thirdly, that input tax paid in a tax period was to be deducted from output tax due for the same tax period and not against any future tax period---Appellant had met those conditions, and the department had not disputed that factual aspect---S. 8 only prohibited claim, credit or deduction of input tax on inputs or raw materials that were either never intended for use in making taxable supplies or were actually used for purposes other than making taxable supplies---Destruction of raw material through fire did not fall within the scope of "used or to be used for any purpose other than for taxable supplies made or to be made" as stipulated in S. 8---Loss of goods due to damage, or where raw material had been lost through fire, was not covered under S. 8(1)(a)---Question formulated in the leave-granting order was answered in the affirmative. Cited Cases: • The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Large Tax Payers Office, Lahore and another v. Messrs Mayfair Spinning Mills Ltd. 2025 SCMR 1 (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990----S. 8(1)(a)---Tax credit not allowed---Scope---High Court had set aside the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and held that the appellant was not entitled to deduct or adjust input tax against goods which had not been used in taxable supplies as required by S. 8(1)(a)---Supreme Court held that the ratio of Mayfair Spinning Mills was fully applicable to the facts of the case---Appeal allowed; impugned judgment of High Court set aside and judgment of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue restored. Disposition: Appeal allowed; impugned judgment dated 27.09.2017 of the Peshawar High Court in Sales Tax Reference No.R.33/2011 set aside; judgment dated 11.05.2010 of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar Bench restored. Question whether input tax paid on raw materials destroyed in fire can be claimed in adjustment against output tax answered in the affirmative. (Civil Appeal No.1137 of 2018, Supreme Court of Pakistan, reasons dated 22.06.2026 for short order of the same date; Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ. Approved for reporting.)

Summary: Where period of tenancy is orally extended, the said extension at the most can be treated as for one month only and cannot be treated as an extension for a period beyond the said time frame unless the other party concedes to the same, hence, the ground raised by the petitioner that tenancy had been orally extended for 15-years cannot be assumed to be correct as the other side has not conceded to the same.

Summary: Summary pending