Summary: (a) Specific Relief / title---Mutation entries---Sale of crop rights versus transfer of ownership---Concurrent findings---Held, appellants failed to prove valid transfer of ownership in favour of predecessor; crop-rights sale and principle that mutation entries do not by themselves confer title support decree in favour of respondent-plaintiff---No illegality, material irregularity, misreading/non-reading or jurisdictional defect in concurrent judgments of Appellate Court and High Court. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs. Dated 23.06.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third proviso---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.324, 109, 148 & 149---Post-arrest bail---Statutory delay in conclusion of trial---Offences not punishable with death---Accused continuously detained for more than one year---Computation of statutory period---Petitioners were arrested on 17.03.2025 and trial had not concluded despite lapse of more than one year---Where offence did not entail punishment of death, accused was required to demonstrate continuous detention for one year---Statutory period was to be calculated from date of arrest and not from date of indictment or any subsequent stage of trial---Once prescribed period had elapsed without conclusion of trial, statutory right to release on bail ripened in favour of accused, subject to exceptions provided by law---Such right was time-based and its accrual did not remain within discretion of Court once statutory conditions stood fulfilled. Mehran v. Ubaid Ullah (PLD 2024 SC 843); Adnan Shafai v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 1543); Muhammad Umer Shahzad v. The State and others (2023 SCMR 1450); Syeda Ayesha Subhani v. The State (PLD 2023 SC 648); Nadeem Samson v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 112); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) and Saleem Khan v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 356) rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third proviso---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.9, 10-A & 14---Statutory bail---Fundamental rights to liberty, fair trial and dignity---Right to bail arising from statutory delay flowed from constitutional guarantees of liberty, fair trial and dignity---Purpose of third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C. was to ensure expeditious trial of an accused---Recurring statutory right could not be denied merely because an earlier post-arrest bail petition had been dismissed on merits---Denial of such right would confer upon prosecution an unfettered licence to delay trial indefinitely and leave an undertrial prisoner confined for an indeterminate period at the mercy of prosecution---Such consequence would be antithetical to constitutional scheme and would render fundamental rights of accused illusory. Syeda Ayesha Subhani v. The State (PLD 2023 SC 648); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1); Nadeem Samson v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 112) and Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) rel. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third and fourth provisos---Statutory delay---Exceptions to right of bail---Conjoint interpretation---Two exceptions to statutory right of bail were co-existent and were required to be interpreted conjointly---First exception applied where delay in conclusion of trial had been occasioned by an act or omission of accused or any person acting on his behalf---Court could refuse bail where record demonstrated a visibly orchestrated or concerted effort by accused or his counsel to hinder timely conclusion of trial by seeking adjournments without sufficient cause on crucial hearings---Exercise was not a mere mathematical counting of adjournments---Prosecution was required to establish from trial record that accused had deliberately contributed to delay. Ali Akbar v. The State and another (2020 SCMR 1225); Muhammad Usman v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 28); Muhammad Ali v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 1131) and Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) rel. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), fourth proviso---Previously convicted offender---Hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal---Scope---Previous conviction became relevant only where bail was claimed under third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---Conviction simpliciter did not debar an accused from statutory bail unless previous conviction related to an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life---Expression “hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal” referred to a person likely to seriously injure others without regard to consequences and capable of posing a serious threat to society if released---Tentative opinion regarding character of accused was to be formed upon careful consideration of nature of offence, its effect upon victim or society, role attributed to accused, manner of commission and conduct of accused---No such exception was found applicable to petitioners. Moundarr and others v. The State (PLD 1990 SC 934); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) and Allah Wasaya v. The State and others (PLD 2022 SC 541) rel. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss.205, 353 & 540-A---Recording of prosecution evidence---Absence of co-accused---Personal attendance dispensed with---Presence through pleader---General rule under S.353, Cr.P.C. requiring evidence to be recorded in presence of accused was expressly subject to contrary provisions contained in Code---Sections 205 and 540-A, Cr.P.C. constituted exceptions enabling Court to dispense with personal attendance of accused and permit representation through pleader---Object of S.353, Cr.P.C. was to prevent prejudice and safeguard right to fair trial, but it did not prohibit recording of evidence where personal attendance had lawfully been dispensed with and pleader of accused was present---Presence of pleader sufficiently satisfied statutory requirement in such circumstances---Trial Court had misconstrued S.353, Cr.P.C. by deferring prosecution evidence merely because attendance of certain co-accused had been dispensed with---No legal impediment existed to recording evidence on those dates when their pleaders were present. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v. The State (PLD 1979 SC 53); Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 1444); Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) and another v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 SCMR 1166); Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. (PLD 2009 SC 367) and Agha Shariq Raza v. The State (2025 YLR 808) rel. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third proviso---Delay caused by co-accused---Attribution to accused seeking bail---Requirements---Delay caused by one co-accused could not, as a matter of course, be attributed to another accused---For such delay to defeat statutory right of bail, prosecution was required to establish through undisputed material that accused seeking bail was complicit in acts or omissions of co-accused or had acted in aid of a concerted effort to delay trial without sufficient cause---Nothing on record demonstrated that petitioners were complicit with absent co-accused or had acted in aid of them---Delay caused by co-accused could not be allowed to hang as a sword of Damocles over petitioners while deciding their entitlement under third proviso. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) and Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) rel. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss.173 & 497(1), third proviso---Post-arrest bail---Examination of trial order sheets---Delay not attributable to accused---Interim challan was submitted approximately three months after arrest and petitioners were indicted on 24.07.2025---Thereafter case was repeatedly adjourned due to non-attendance of prosecution witnesses, absence of co-accused, dispensation of attendance of certain co-accused and failure to produce petitioners from jail owing to prevailing law and order situation---Petitioners could not be held responsible for such circumstances---Order sheets did not disclose any design, pattern or concerted effort by petitioners to delay conclusion of trial---Prerequisites of third proviso stood fulfilled and neither statutory exception was attracted---Petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail as a matter of right on ground of statutory delay---Statutory right could not be refused on hyper-technical grounds under discretionary power of Court. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28); Adnan Shafai v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 1543); Muhammad Umer Shahzad v. The State and others (2023 SCMR 1450); Syeda Ayesha Subhani v. The State (PLD 2023 SC 648); Nadeem Samson v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 112); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) and Zahid Hussain Shah v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 49) rel. (h) Criminal procedure--- ----Bail order---Tentative observations---Effect upon trial---Observations recorded while deciding bail petitions were purely tentative and confined to determination of entitlement to bail---Such observations were not to prejudice or influence trial proceedings---Trial Court was required to decide case independently and strictly upon evidence produced before it in accordance with law. Disposition--- Both petitions were allowed---Ghulam Rasool and Muhammad Jahangir were admitted to post-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds of PKR 1,000,000 with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of Trial Court---Trial Court was directed to conclude trial expeditiously, on merits of evidence, within two months from receipt of order.

Summary: (a) Power of attorney--- ----General Power of Attorney---Attorney’s fiduciary position---Alienation of principal’s property in favour of attorney’s close relative---Validity---Attorney occupied a fiduciary position and was bound to exercise delegated authority solely for benefit of principal---Attorney could not lawfully transfer principal’s property either to himself or to his kith and kin without prior knowledge, consent or specific authorization of principal---Such self-serving transaction involved an inherent conflict between attorney’s personal interest and fiduciary obligation and, therefore, invited strict judicial scrutiny---General Power of Attorney, however widely worded, did not by itself authorize attorney to alienate principal’s property in favour of himself or his close relative---General authority to sell could not be equated with authority to enter into a transaction involving self-dealing. Allah Bakhsh (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Muhammad Riaz and others (PLD 2025 Supreme Court 63); Muhammad Arshad and 2 others v. Haq Nawaz and 9 others (2019 YLR 958); Muhammad Anwar v. Mst. Bahrawar Sultana and others (2021 CLC 1707) and Muhammad Mansha and others v. Saleem Bibi (2026 MLD 320) rel. (b) Power of attorney--- ----Transfer by attorney to his brother-in-law---Burden of proof---Specific authority or ratification---Beneficiary of a transaction involving transfer of principal’s property to attorney’s close relative bore a heavy burden to establish that principal had expressly authorized, or subsequently ratified with full knowledge, the transaction and that it was bona fide and free from conflict of interest---Neither General Power of Attorney nor pleadings or evidence disclosed any express authority permitting attorney to transfer suit property in favour of his brother-in-law---Defence was silent regarding time, place or manner in which consent of principal had allegedly been obtained---Petitioners failed to establish specific authority enabling attorney to execute agreement to sell in favour of his close relative. (c) Registration--- ----Registered General Power of Attorney and registered agreement to sell---Presumption of due execution---Scope---Registration merely raised a rebuttable presumption regarding due execution of an instrument---Such registration neither enlarged authority conferred upon attorney nor validated a transaction beyond scope of delegated authority---Mere execution or registration of documents, or incorporation of mutation entries, did not by itself establish a valid transfer unless underlying transaction satisfied legal requirements governing fiduciary dealings---Registered instrument could not sanctify an otherwise unauthorized or legally impermissible transaction. (d) Fraud and misrepresentation--- ----Unauthorized exercise of delegated authority---Proof of fraud in execution of General Power of Attorney---Effect---Even if execution of General Power of Attorney itself was accepted, surrounding circumstances established abuse of fiduciary authority---Impugned decrees substantially rested upon unauthorized exercise of delegated powers rather than fraud in execution of document itself---Challenge to Dastawaiz Yadasht was inconsequential because, even upon its exclusion, judgments remained sustainable on independent grounds of absence of specific authority, breach of fiduciary obligation, contradictory defence evidence, prompt revocation of authority and conduct of parties. (e) Power of attorney--- ----Revocation---Prompt repudiation of transaction---Conduct of principal---General Power of Attorney was executed on 08.02.2010; attorney executed agreement to sell in favour of his brother-in-law on the following day; principal revoked authority on 12.02.2010 and instituted declaratory suit on 13.02.2010---Prompt revocation and immediate institution of proceedings were wholly inconsistent with suggestion that principal had consented to or ratified impugned transaction---Subsequent conduct of principal supported finding that transfer had not been authorized. (f) Evidence--- ----Agreement to sell---Payment of consideration and execution---Contradictory evidence---Witnesses of petitioners contradicted one another regarding presence of principal at time of execution, payment of sale consideration and amounts allegedly paid---Further inconsistencies existed between written statement and subsequent suit for specific performance---Contradictions materially impaired credibility of petitioners’ case and supported concurrent findings recorded by Courts below. (g) Specific performance--- ----Discretionary and equitable relief---Readiness and willingness---Delay in seeking enforcement---Even where execution of an agreement was established, Court was required to examine authority of executant, fairness of transaction, conduct of parties and surrounding circumstances---Transaction originated from attorney dealing with principal’s property in favour of his close relative without proving specific authority---Vendee had immediate knowledge of dispute and contractual period of two months for execution of sale deed but remained inactive for almost nine years and instituted suit for specific performance only after death of attorney---Prolonged and unexplained delay was inconsistent with continuous readiness and willingness required for equitable relief of specific performance---Refusal of specific performance by Courts below called for no interference. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Revisional jurisdiction was supervisory and not appellate---Interference was permissible only where impugned judgments suffered from jurisdictional error, patent illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or findings based upon misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Appellate Court had independently reappraised evidence and rightly concluded that petitioners failed to prove specific authority enabling attorney to alienate property in favour of his brother-in-law---Absence of prior consent, contradictions in petitioners’ evidence, prolonged delay in seeking enforcement and prohibition against self-dealing fully supported concurrent findings---No jurisdictional defect, material illegality, perversity or misreading or non-reading of evidence was established. Abdul Hakeem v. Habibullah and 11 others (1997 SCMR 1139); Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar (2022 SCMR 1054) and Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb and others (2024 SCMR 916) rel. Disposition--- Civil revision petitions, being devoid of merit, were dismissed with no order as to costs.

Summary: A person drawing ex-gratia salary in lieu of compensatory employment would forfeit entitlement to said benefit, in case of variation in the family structure / unit, upon remarriage --- (a) Civil servants--- ----Civil Servant Family Assistance Package---Compensatory employment---Payment of salary to surviving spouse without assignment or performance of duties---Nature---Appellant was receiving salary following death of his wife under Government’s Family Assistance Package but was neither contractually appointed nor required to perform any duties---Such payment was ex gratia financial assistance extended to alleviate economic hardship caused to family by loss of an earning member and did not constitute an independent employment arrangement---Appellant could not claim vested or personal right to continuation of salary as though he had been regularly or contractually appointed to a post---Cases in which widows were appointed on contract and required to perform duties were distinguishable because such appointments constituted independent employment arrangements capable of attracting individual or constitutional protection. The Chief Commissioner Regional Tax Office, Bahawalpur and others v. Shaheen Yousaf (2025 SCMR 1076) and Zoya Islam v. Government of Pakistan etc. (PLJ 2024 Lahore 811) distinguished. (b) Civil servants--- ----Civil Servant Family Assistance Package---Surviving spouse---Remarriage---Continuation of compensatory salary---Effect---Compensatory employment was a welfare measure intended to support family of a civil servant dying in service---Remarriage of surviving spouse altered and voluntarily reconstituted family structure as it existed at time of death of employee---Such change constituted a fair, genuine and plausible ground for discontinuance of ex gratia salary---Appellant had other legal heirs besides himself and could not treat assistance intended for family as his exclusive personal entitlement---Remarriage was fatal to survival of benefit claimed by appellant. (c) Civil servants--- ----Civil Servant Family Assistance Package---Notification No.FD-SR-1/3-10/2004 dated 15.08.2017---Notification No.FD.SR-III-4-244/2023(B) dated 02.12.2024---Salary and pension---Construction---Notification of 2017 treated salary and pension as components of one integrated assistance package and both remained subject to prescribed conditions---Absence of specific reference to salary in Notification of 2024, which dealt with remarriage and pension, did not confer a right upon appellant to continue receiving salary---Family of deceased civil servant was central to scheme of compensatory assistance and any alteration in composition of family affected entire arrangement---Notification of 2017 neither protected nor guaranteed continuation of salary after remarriage. (d) Civil servants--- ----Civil Servant Family Assistance Package---Salary till projected superannuation followed by pension---Integrated components---Disjunctive interpretation---Package contemplated payment of salary up to projected date of superannuation of deceased employee and pension thereafter---Both components formed parts of one continuous compensatory arrangement and could not be interpreted separately---Where remarriage disentitled surviving spouse from pension, same change in status necessarily defeated salary component as well---Allowing ex gratia salary to continue after remarriage while pension stood discontinued would create an irrational and asymmetrical result---Voluntary decision to remarry carried legal consequences which appellant had chosen to accept. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Discrimination and arbitrariness---Family Assistance Package---Cessation of benefit upon remarriage---Distinguishable precedents---Cases concerning independent contractual appointments of widows or unauthorized executive curtailment of accrued benefits did not govern payment of ex gratia salary without performance of duties---Case concerning entitlement of daughter to pension of both parents was also distinguishable---Stoppage of appellant’s salary was aligned with applicable policy and underlying object of assistance package and did not amount to arbitrary or discriminatory treatment. Province of Punjab through Secretary, Finance Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others v. Kanwal Rashid and others (2021 SCMR 730); The Chief Commissioner Regional Tax Office, Bahawalpur and others v. Shaheen Yousaf (2025 SCMR 1076); Zoya Islam v. Government of Pakistan etc. (PLJ 2024 Lahore 811) and Province of Sindh through Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and others v. Mst. Sorath Fatima and another (PLD 2025 SC 856) distinguished. (f) Intra-court appeal--- ----Concurrent dismissal of representation and constitutional petition---Scope of interference---Claim for continuation of compensatory salary after remarriage had rightly been declined---No legal infirmity warranting interference in judgment of learned Single Judge was established. Disposition--- Intra-court appeal, being without merit, was dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4, 5, 23, 24 & 25---Overseas Pakistanis---Protection of legal and property rights---Equality before law---Overseas Pakistanis, despite residing abroad, remained citizens of Pakistan and were entitled to same constitutional safeguards, remedies and protection of law as citizens residing within country---Their property rights were protected under Arts.23 and 24, while Arts.4, 5 and 25 guaranteed lawful treatment and equal protection---Overseas Pakistanis could not place themselves above law, claim preferential treatment or bypass due process merely by reason of residence abroad---Nevertheless, practical disadvantages faced by them in pursuing litigation justified affirmative institutional measures and special procedures for expeditious protection of their lawful rights. Tahir Mirza v. Saleha Mehmood, DCO and others (2019 YLR 2852); Tanvir Chishti v. City Police Officer and another (PLD 2020 Lahore 453); Abdul Wali through Special Attorney v. State Bank of Pakistan through Director Banking Conduct and Consumer Protection Department and 4 others (2020 CLD 147); Muhammad Yaqoob v. Commissioner Lahore Division etc. (2021 CLD 392) and Haji Muhammad Yunis (deceased) through legal heirs and another v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others (2022 SCMR 1282) rel. (b) Punjab Establishment of Special Courts (Overseas Pakistanis Property) Act, 2025--- ----Preamble---Object and purpose of enactment---Interpretation---Act was enacted to secure and protect ownership and possession rights of Overseas Pakistanis in respect of immovable property and to provide a specialized, expeditious and accessible mechanism for resolution of their disputes---Preamble, though not an operative part of statute, served as a useful guide for discovering legislative purpose, mischief sought to be remedied and intention underlying substantive provisions---Act introduced specialized judicial forums, strict timelines, electronic filing, video-link evidence and mechanisms aimed at overcoming procedural delays faced by litigants residing abroad. Director General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others (2016 SCMR 447) rel. (c) Punjab Establishment of Special Courts (Overseas Pakistanis Property) Act, 2025--- ----Ss.9, 10, 11 & 12---Expeditious adjudication, appeal, execution and protective orders---Legislative scheme---Section 9 prescribed strict period for disposal, restricted adjournments and empowered Special Court to summon official record---Section 10 provided a streamlined appellate remedy while preventing routine suspension of decrees and interlocutory obstruction---Section 11 automatically converted proceedings into execution after decree, authorized assistance of police and law-enforcement agencies and permitted imposition of penalty for mala fide objections intended to delay execution---Section 12 empowered Special Court to restrain alienation, attach property, transfer possession, appoint receivers and pass orders even against third parties or benami holders---Collectively, provisions demonstrated legislative intent that judgments concerning property of Overseas Pakistanis should not be frustrated through procedural devices, fraudulent transfers or collateral proceedings. (d) Punjab Establishment of Special Courts (Overseas Pakistanis Property) Act, 2025--- ----Execution of order for delivery of possession---Objection petition based upon subsequent ex parte decree---Maintainability---Special Court had earlier recalled ejectment order and directed petitioner to hand over vacant possession to attorney of Overseas Pakistani owner---Challenge to said order through constitutional petition had already been dismissed, while subsequent appeal against consequential order for delivery of possession had been withdrawn---Orders directing restoration of possession had, therefore, attained finality---Petitioner could not resist their implementation by subsequently obtaining an ex parte judgment and decree from Civil Court---Rights crystallized through final judicial determinations could not be defeated by a later decree obtained in collateral proceedings. (e) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2)---Ex parte decree---Suspension of operation---Legal effect---Ex parte judgment and decree relied upon by petitioner had subsequently been suspended by Civil Court upon application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Once operation of decree stood suspended, petitioner could derive no legal advantage therefrom and such decree could not furnish a lawful basis to obstruct or nullify implementation of earlier binding judicial orders---Even otherwise, a decree obtained subsequent to orders sought to be executed could not eclipse determinations that had already attained finality, particularly where validity of subsequent decree itself remained under challenge. (f) Administration of justice--- ----Finality of judicial determinations---Successive and collateral proceedings---Reopening concluded issues---Petitioner, under guise of filing objections, sought to reopen matters already finally adjudicated---Chronology of proceedings showed repeated resort to different forums with apparent object of frustrating implementation of binding orders---Judicial process could not be permitted to become an instrument for defeating final determinations through successive, collateral or ex parte proceedings---Such conduct constituted abuse of process of law. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Nature and scope---Re-agitation of concluded matters---Constitutional jurisdiction was supervisory and extraordinary in nature---It could not be invoked to re-agitate issues which had already attained finality between parties or to defeat implementation of binding judicial orders by relying upon a subsequent ex parte decree, especially where operation of such decree stood suspended---No jurisdictional defect, illegality, material irregularity or violation of law was found in order of Special Court dismissing objections---Interference under Art.199 was, therefore, unwarranted. Disposition--- Constitutional petition, being devoid of merit, was dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Sindh Civil Servants Act (XIV of 1973)----Ss. 8 & 9---Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975----Rr. 9, 10, 11 & 13-A---Seniority of Mukhtiarkars (BPS-16)---Promotees, deferred promotees and direct recruits---Petitioners, regular promotee Mukhtiarkars, challenged the judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal upholding the Final Seniority List dated 08.06.2021 prepared after remand by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos.489 to 491 of 2017 (judgment dated 19.01.2021)---Controversy involved three categories: (i) Mukhtiarkars promoted on regular basis on 03.01.2011 (including those earlier posted on acting charge); (ii) Assistant Mukhtiarkars deferred by the Departmental Promotion Committee convened on 27.11.2010, later promoted in 2012, 2013 and 2014, who had been assigned retrospective seniority from 03.01.2011; and (iii) Mukhtiarkars directly recruited through the Sindh Public Service Commission on 31.10.2011---Held, that S. 8 of the Act obligated the appointing authority to prepare a seniority list but conferred no vested right to a particular seniority, seniority on promotion taking effect from the date of regular appointment, and civil servants selected for promotion in one batch retaining their inter-se seniority as in the lower post---Rule 10 provided that seniority was to be reckoned from the date of regular appointment and that no ad-hoc appointment was to be regularized retrospectively---Rule 11 prescribed inter-se seniority, including that persons appointed by promotion ranked senior to persons appointed by initial recruitment---Directions in the earlier remand judgment, requiring strict observance of the 50% quota of direct appointees and promotees, promotion only against available posts in the relevant quota, prohibition of cross-quota promotion, treatment of promotions without available posts as ad-hoc, and determination of inter-se seniority from the date of regular appointment, were not shown to have been violated merely because deferred candidates were granted inter-se seniority with their batchmates according to the Rules. (b) Civil service---Supersession and deferment---Distinction---Supersession, as understood in service law and illustrated by Rule 2 of the Sindh Civil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules, 2022, denoted a decision of the appointing authority, on recommendations of the selection board or Departmental Promotion Committee, to supersede an officer as presently unsuitable for promotion, with loss of inter-se seniority---Deferment denoted an administrative postponement, typically for incomplete PERs, missing training or pending disciplinary proceedings, and was not a negative judgment on merit or fitness---Held, that supersession could not be confused with deferment; on subsequent promotion after deferment, seniority remained protected with original batchmates---Argument that 54 deferred Assistant Mukhtiarkars had been superseded by 37 promotees notified on 03.01.2011 was rejected, no specific order of supersession having been passed, their cases having been left out of meaningful consideration only because of pending departmental, criminal and anti-corruption proceedings---Plea that no post had been reserved for deferred candidates was held feeble; had posts been reserved for all 54 deferred officers, the entire DPC process against the 37 available promotion posts would have been stalemated. (c) Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975----R. 13-A---Deferred civil servant---Deemed promotion in the same batch as juniors---Rule 13-A provided that a civil servant not promoted on his turn on the ground that seniority was under dispute or not determined, or that he was on deputation, training or leave, or that disciplinary proceedings were pending, or that he was not considered for promotion for any reason other than unfitness, shall, on subsequent promotion, subject to any order of the competent authority, be deemed for the purpose of inter-se seniority in the higher post to have been promoted in the same batch as his juniors---Held, that Rule 13-A was rightly applied by the departmental authority to the inter-se seniority of deferred Assistant Mukhtiarkars, and the Tribunal's judgment was maintained to that extent---Mere non-availability of promotion quota at the time of deferment did not debar deferred candidates from claiming inter-se seniority with their batchmates after subsequent promotion once the stigma, if any, was removed. (d) Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975----Rr. 10 & 11---Inter-se seniority of promotee Mukhtiarkars vis-a-vis directly recruited Mukhtiarkars---Promotees (including deferred promotees accorded inter-se seniority from 03.01.2011) claimed seniority from the date of regular promotion, whereas they had been placed in the impugned seniority list below directly recruited Mukhtiarkars appointed on 31.10.2011---Tribunal had observed that seniority of direct recruits was to be reckoned from the date of regular appointment under Rule 10, but had not clearly adverted to whether inter-se seniority of promoted Mukhtiarkars vis-a-vis those directly recruited on 31.10.2011 had been rightly fixed, and had simply dismissed the service appeals---Held, that this aspect required further consideration and a reconciliation exercise by the department---Matter remanded only for limited re-examination of the seniority ranking of promoted Mukhtiarkars from the date of promotion and of directly recruited Mukhtiarkars from the date of appointment, and if any lapse, apparent error or violation of the 1975 Rules was found, for an appropriate order of correction, if required, in the Final Seniority List dated 08.06.2021, after hearing the stakeholders, within two months. Disposition: Civil petitions converted into appeals and partly allowed; matter remanded to the Secretary Revenue Department, Government of Sindh, for limited re-examination of seniority ranking of promoted Mukhtiarkars vis-a-vis directly recruited Mukhtiarkars in the Final Seniority List dated 08.06.2021, with a direction to pass an appropriate order within two months after hearing the stakeholders; Tribunal's judgment maintained to the extent of deferred Mukhtiarkars' inter-se seniority under R. 13-A. (C.P.L.A. Nos.914-K to 919-K of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard 25.03.2026 at Islamabad; approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360---Limitation---Condonation of delay in filing criminal petition for leave to appeal---Grounds mentioned in Crl.M.A. No.1207 of 2024 were found plausible---Delay in filing Criminal Petition No.1033 of 2024 condoned. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss.360(1), 360(2) & 435---Chapter XXV---Recording of evidence---Statement of witness recorded through video link---Discrepancies between video recording and written statement---Duty of Trial Court to read over testimony and to correct errors---Memorandum of objection---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10A---Petitioner was a prosecution witness in case FIR No.33 of 2018 registered at Police Station District Jacobabad under Ss.302, 109 and 449 read with S.34, P.P.C., trial of which was pending before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad---With permission of Trial Court, petitioner recorded her statement through video link from Islamabad in presence of a coordinate Judge, while Trial Court reduced her statement into writing at Hyderabad---Upon obtaining certified copy, petitioner noticed that her statement had not been recorded verbatim and contained inaccuracies, errors and mistakes on different pages of her statement and the cross-examination portion, particularly with regard to the date of the incident, which was incorrectly recorded as 30.05.2018 instead of 31.05.2018---Application under S.360, Cr.P.C. was dismissed by Trial Court, and criminal revision before High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad, was also dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 01.03.2024---On direction of Supreme Court, Trial Court transmitted a USB device containing the video recording---Supreme Court examined the recording in presence of counsel for the parties and Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh, and observed that the petitioner had stated that the incident occurred on 31.05.2018, whereas in the written statement the date was inadvertently recorded as 30.05.2018, and certain other discrepancies and inaccuracies were also noticed---Counsel for the respondent frankly conceded material discrepancies and mistakes and showed no objection to rectification---Held, that the procedure for recording evidence is prescribed under Chapter XXV of the Cr.P.C.---S.360(1) mandates that where a witness completes his testimony, it shall be read over to him in presence of the accused or his counsel, and shall, if necessary, be corrected---Object of the provision is to ensure that the statement of the witness is recorded word by word and that, before obtaining the witness's signature on each page, the Trial Court rectifies any mistake or error that may have occurred while recording it---S.360(2) enables a witness to object to the correctness of his or her statement if the exact narrative is not recorded---Magistrate or Sessions Judge, after hearing the parties, may make a memorandum of the objection raised by the witness and shall add such remarks as he thinks necessary, recording the correct version of the statement---Procedure prescribed under the Cr.P.C. serves a vital role in ensuring fairness in criminal trials and maintaining transparency in recording of statements of witnesses---Procedural framework under the Cr.P.C. facilitates observance of due process and the right to a fair trial, thereby securing the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art.10A of the Constitution---A Judge must not adopt a purely technical approach that frustrates the ends of justice; rather, the procedure must be employed as an instrument to promote justice---In matters concerning rectification of a witness's statement, particularly where the witness specifically asserts that the statement has not been recorded verbatim, the principle of justice requires that the Trial Court shall exercise its jurisdiction, as non-exercise of such jurisdiction may seriously impair the evidentiary value of the witness's statement and prejudice the merits of the case---Admittedly, petitioner objected to certain portions of her statement and requested comparison with her video recording, but the request was declined---Had the fora below exercised jurisdiction under S.360(2), Cr.P.C. at the appropriate stages, the petitioner would not have been compelled to invoke jurisdiction of Supreme Court---Trial Court and High Court were required to exercise jurisdiction granted by S.360(2) and S.435, Cr.P.C., respectively, for rectification of any irregularity in the proceedings, but the needful was not done, which was an illegality---Impugned order of High Court and that of Trial Court set aside---Trial Court directed to carefully re-examine the video recording of the petitioner's statement and compare the same with her written statement available on the record, in presence of the accused, counsel for the parties and the Prosecutor---Upon such comparison, if any discrepancy, omission or inaccuracy is found in the petitioner's written statement and cross-examination, Trial Court shall make its remarks by incorporating the correct version of the witness's statement in a memorandum, as provided by S.360(2), Cr.P.C., and make it part of the record---Such exercise to be completed within fifteen working days from receipt of a certified copy of the order---Thereafter, Trial Court shall, after providing opportunity of re-arguments to the parties, decide the case within thirty working days, strictly in accordance with law and on its own merits. Disposition: Delay in filing Crl.P. No.1033 of 2024 condoned; Criminal Petitions Nos.1033 and 1036 of 2024 disposed of; impugned order dated 01.03.2024 of High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad, in Criminal Revision Application No.S-08 of 2024, and order of Trial Court dismissing application under S.360, Cr.P.C., set aside; Trial Court directed to compare video recording with written statement and make memorandum under S.360(2), Cr.P.C., within fifteen working days, and thereafter decide the case within thirty working days after re-arguments. (Crl.P. Nos.1033 & 1036 of 2024 with Crl.M.A. No.1207 of 2024, decided at Islamabad on 23.06.2026, by Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. (Salahuddin Panhwar, J. on the Bench); Approved for reporting)

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sacked Employees (Appointment) Act, 2012----Ss. 2(g), 3, 5, 7 & 9---Sacked employees re-appointed as fresh appointees---Back benefits barred---Pensionary benefits---Counting of past service rendered before termination---Petitioners/respondents were appointed in 1995 as Theology Teachers, their services were terminated in 1996, and upon promulgation of the Act of 2012 they were re-appointed but back benefits were denied---Service Tribunal allowed their appeals only to the extent of counting service from the date of promulgation of the Act for payment of pensionary benefits---Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa contended that under S. 5 the appointment was a fresh appointment with no entitlement to seniority, promotion or other back benefits, and that even counting from promulgation was unjustified---Employees contended that the intervening period from original appointment till fresh appointment ought to be counted as qualifying service for pension---Held, that the Act of 2012 was enacted as a remedial measure for persons appointed on regular basis to civil posts who possessed the prescribed qualifications and experience but were dismissed, removed or terminated during the period from 1st November 1993 to 30th November 1996---S. 5 contains a negative covenant that a sacked employee appointed under S. 3 shall not be entitled to any claim of seniority, promotion or other back benefits and that the appointment shall be considered as fresh appointment, while S. 9 gives the Act overriding effect---While denying seniority, promotion or other back benefits, the legislature did not embed an exact restrictive clause repudiating the claim of pensionary benefits for past service rendered before sacking. (b) Service---Back benefits and pension---Distinction---Doctrine of "no work, no pay"---Protected period---Expression "back benefits" applies to discharge of liability for retroactive wages or arrears when a wrongful dismissal or termination is overturned, whereas the right of pension is a separate vested retirement benefit which accrues only on superannuation and cannot be mixed up with back benefits---Back benefits are compensation for financial losses during the period of termination and are subject to the exception of gainful employment and the doctrine of "no work, no pay"---Pension operates under a different regime, is neither dependent upon nor subject to deduction for gainful employment, and cannot be denied or forfeited without cover of law---Purpose of pension is to provide old-age security as a vested right---Term "protected period", used in an earlier leave-refusing order of the Court, is neither defined in the Act of 2012 nor given an exact definition in that order---"No work, no pay" applies to deny back benefits from the date of sacking till re-appointment under the Act of 2012, during which the employees did not perform work, but that doctrine does not apply to counting of the period already served before sacking in order to meet deficiency in length of service for pension eligibility at retirement---Period out of employment cannot be treated as continuity of service from the date of re-appointment. Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police 2021 SCMR 962; Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1689; Qazi Khalid Ali v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCP 305 and Muhammad Ismail Memon v. Government of Sindh PLD 2007 SC 35 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes---Beneficial and remedial legislation---Purposive interpretation---Reading down---Harmonious construction---Dominant object of the Act of 2012 was to undo unfairness to sacked employees who were welcomed back to the same place and post---Held, that the Act is beneficial legislation and the Courts are obligated to interpret such laws moderately and judiciously so that the objectives are enforced---If a provision of beneficial legislation may be interpreted in two ways, the interpretation which preserves the benefit is to be preferred---Law is to be read as a whole without annihilating other provisions; the Court must adopt an interpretation which is just, reasonable and sensible and must do substantial justice---There is no lawful justification to scrap the period of previous service smoothly rendered before sacking without the employees' own fault or misconduct, which period should be protected for counting in the length of service for pension eligibility. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary v. Azhar Ali 2026 SCLR 6 rel. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police 2021 SCMR 962 • Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1689 • Qazi Khalid Ali v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCP 305 • Muhammad Ismail Memon v. Government of Sindh PLD 2007 SC 35 • Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary v. Azhar Ali 2026 SCLR 6 Disposition: Civil Petitions converted into appeals and allowed; impugned consolidated judgment dated 23.09.2024 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Camp Court Abbottabad, in Appeals No.618 and 619 of 2022 set aside; declared that the period of services rendered by the employees before termination of service shall be counted and included for deciding eligibility of pensionary benefits only after re-appointment under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sacked Employees (Appointment) Act, 2012. (Civil Petitions No.856-P, 857-P, 5393 and 5469 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, announced in open court at Islamabad; Date of Hearing 05.03.2026, Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J. (Musarrat Hilali, J. on the Bench); Approved for reporting)

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964----S. 14---Jactitation of marriage---Cancellation of Nikahnama---Mental incapacity to consent to marriage---Fraud---Concurrent findings of Family Court, Appellate Court and High Court---Suit for jactitation of marriage, cancellation of a forged Nikahnama and declaration was instituted on behalf of Allah Ditta (since deceased), through his next friend, asserting that he was a lunatic by birth, mentally incapacitated to perceive the consequences of a matrimonial contract, and that appellant No.1, Mst. Sarwar Mai, had fabricated a false Nikahnama and falsely claimed that appellant No.2, Bilawal, was born out of the wedlock, to grab his landed property---Family Court decreed the suit vide judgment dated 27.05.2000, holding the Nikahnama to be a forged document and appellant No.2 not to be the son of Allah Ditta; the appeal under S. 14 of the Act was dismissed on 13.01.2001; and the High Court dismissed the writ petition on 10.07.2009---Supreme Court noted that the Family Court and Appellate Court had meticulously threshed out the medical and oral evidence and concluded that Allah Ditta lacked the cognitive capacity to give valid consent for marriage---Appellate Court found that even at the time of Nikah he was not of sound mind; that the alleged Nikahnama was executed on 04.12.1991 whereas a document dated 14.5.1991 showed him to be of insane mind and his custody given to his nephew; that the person produced as a witness was not the Nikah Registrar of the relevant mauza; and that the original Union Council record of the Nikah was not produced---Nikahnama being a civil contract could only be made between competent persons, and a person of unsound mind was legally not competent to enter into contractual obligations, including a contract of marriage---High Court found no misreading or non-reading of evidence or any illegality or jurisdictional defect in the concurrent judgments. (b) Fraud---Fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings---Next friend---Welfare of incapacitated person---Lineage and inheritance claims founded on a fraudulent Nikahnama---Courts below concurrently found that the next friend acted strictly in the welfare of the incapacitated person to ward off an apparent fraud---Held, that fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings---If the foundational document, the Nikahnama, was a product of fraud and misrepresentation executed upon an incompetent person, the entire superstructure built upon it, including claims of lineage or inheritance rights, must fall---Any authority or tribunal retains the inherent power to undo and recall transactions or orders obtained through fraud, as a party cannot be allowed to enjoy or retain ill-gotten gains through deceptive means. Cited Cases: • The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Mohammad Fazil Khan PLD 1975 Supreme Court 331 (c) DNA test---Exhumation---Parentage---Supreme Court, vide order dated 15.09.2016, with the consent of the parties, directed the District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffargarh, to depute a Magistrate for disinterment of the body of the deceased to enable the Punjab Forensic Science Agency to take samples for a DNA test---Judicial Magistrate visited the graveyard on 04.10.2016, but since no one could point out or identify the grave, exhumation could not be conducted---Held, that the issue raised by the appellants that Bilawal was the son of Allah Ditta remained unproved. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference by Supreme Court and by High Court in writ jurisdiction---Well-entrenched principle that the Supreme Court will not routinely interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless they are shown to suffer from a gross misreading or non-reading of material evidence, perversity, or jurisdictional error---Constitutional writ jurisdiction under Art. 199 is not an automated forum of appeal, and High Courts must decline to disrupt the factual findings of the Courts unless a manifest illegality or grave miscarriage of justice is established, which was lacking---Counsel for the appellants failed to demonstrate any such legal infirmity or perversity in the impugned orders. Cited Cases: • Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1454 • Muhammad Shamim Ali v. Mst. Asma Begum 2024 SCMR 1642 Disposition: Civil Appeal No.193-L of 2010 dismissed; no order as to costs. Judgment by Irfan Saadat Khan, J. (Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ. agreeing). Islamabad, 23.06.2026. Approved for reporting.