Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 205 & 561-A----Exemption from personal appearance of accused----Scope----Accused was granted exemption under S. 205, Cr.P.C. on medical grounds, but the complainant challenged the order, arguing that exemption could not be granted where a warrant had been issued in the first instance----Held, S. 205 applies when a Magistrate issues a summons in the first instance, allowing an accused to appear through counsel unless personal appearance is deemed necessary----Precedents establish that where warrants were issued initially, they may be substituted with summons to enable application of S. 205----Magistrate’s order substituting summons for warrants was validly passed----Order of exemption maintained. (b) Inherent powers of High Court---- ----S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.----Exercise of inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process of court----Accused had been subjected to multiple complaints on the same facts, all of which had previously been dismissed----High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under S. 561-A, substituted warrants with summons to prevent undue harassment of the accused and to secure the ends of justice. ----Cited Cases: • Abdul Hamid v. King Emperor • In re: Ummal Hasanath • Emperor v. Sardar • Mst. Kamal Devi v. Pannalal Agarwalla • Aditya Pd. Baghchi v. Jogendra Nath Maitra ----Disposition: Reference rejected; exemption from personal appearance maintained.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third proviso---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.324, 109, 148 & 149---Post-arrest bail---Statutory delay in conclusion of trial---Offences not punishable with death---Accused continuously detained for more than one year---Computation of statutory period---Petitioners were arrested on 17.03.2025 and trial had not concluded despite lapse of more than one year---Where offence did not entail punishment of death, accused was required to demonstrate continuous detention for one year---Statutory period was to be calculated from date of arrest and not from date of indictment or any subsequent stage of trial---Once prescribed period had elapsed without conclusion of trial, statutory right to release on bail ripened in favour of accused, subject to exceptions provided by law---Such right was time-based and its accrual did not remain within discretion of Court once statutory conditions stood fulfilled. Mehran v. Ubaid Ullah (PLD 2024 SC 843); Adnan Shafai v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 1543); Muhammad Umer Shahzad v. The State and others (2023 SCMR 1450); Syeda Ayesha Subhani v. The State (PLD 2023 SC 648); Nadeem Samson v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 112); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) and Saleem Khan v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 356) rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third proviso---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.9, 10-A & 14---Statutory bail---Fundamental rights to liberty, fair trial and dignity---Right to bail arising from statutory delay flowed from constitutional guarantees of liberty, fair trial and dignity---Purpose of third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C. was to ensure expeditious trial of an accused---Recurring statutory right could not be denied merely because an earlier post-arrest bail petition had been dismissed on merits---Denial of such right would confer upon prosecution an unfettered licence to delay trial indefinitely and leave an undertrial prisoner confined for an indeterminate period at the mercy of prosecution---Such consequence would be antithetical to constitutional scheme and would render fundamental rights of accused illusory. Syeda Ayesha Subhani v. The State (PLD 2023 SC 648); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1); Nadeem Samson v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 112) and Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) rel. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third and fourth provisos---Statutory delay---Exceptions to right of bail---Conjoint interpretation---Two exceptions to statutory right of bail were co-existent and were required to be interpreted conjointly---First exception applied where delay in conclusion of trial had been occasioned by an act or omission of accused or any person acting on his behalf---Court could refuse bail where record demonstrated a visibly orchestrated or concerted effort by accused or his counsel to hinder timely conclusion of trial by seeking adjournments without sufficient cause on crucial hearings---Exercise was not a mere mathematical counting of adjournments---Prosecution was required to establish from trial record that accused had deliberately contributed to delay. Ali Akbar v. The State and another (2020 SCMR 1225); Muhammad Usman v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 28); Muhammad Ali v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 1131) and Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) rel. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), fourth proviso---Previously convicted offender---Hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal---Scope---Previous conviction became relevant only where bail was claimed under third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---Conviction simpliciter did not debar an accused from statutory bail unless previous conviction related to an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life---Expression “hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal” referred to a person likely to seriously injure others without regard to consequences and capable of posing a serious threat to society if released---Tentative opinion regarding character of accused was to be formed upon careful consideration of nature of offence, its effect upon victim or society, role attributed to accused, manner of commission and conduct of accused---No such exception was found applicable to petitioners. Moundarr and others v. The State (PLD 1990 SC 934); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) and Allah Wasaya v. The State and others (PLD 2022 SC 541) rel. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss.205, 353 & 540-A---Recording of prosecution evidence---Absence of co-accused---Personal attendance dispensed with---Presence through pleader---General rule under S.353, Cr.P.C. requiring evidence to be recorded in presence of accused was expressly subject to contrary provisions contained in Code---Sections 205 and 540-A, Cr.P.C. constituted exceptions enabling Court to dispense with personal attendance of accused and permit representation through pleader---Object of S.353, Cr.P.C. was to prevent prejudice and safeguard right to fair trial, but it did not prohibit recording of evidence where personal attendance had lawfully been dispensed with and pleader of accused was present---Presence of pleader sufficiently satisfied statutory requirement in such circumstances---Trial Court had misconstrued S.353, Cr.P.C. by deferring prosecution evidence merely because attendance of certain co-accused had been dispensed with---No legal impediment existed to recording evidence on those dates when their pleaders were present. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v. The State (PLD 1979 SC 53); Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 1444); Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) and another v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 SCMR 1166); Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. (PLD 2009 SC 367) and Agha Shariq Raza v. The State (2025 YLR 808) rel. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third proviso---Delay caused by co-accused---Attribution to accused seeking bail---Requirements---Delay caused by one co-accused could not, as a matter of course, be attributed to another accused---For such delay to defeat statutory right of bail, prosecution was required to establish through undisputed material that accused seeking bail was complicit in acts or omissions of co-accused or had acted in aid of a concerted effort to delay trial without sufficient cause---Nothing on record demonstrated that petitioners were complicit with absent co-accused or had acted in aid of them---Delay caused by co-accused could not be allowed to hang as a sword of Damocles over petitioners while deciding their entitlement under third proviso. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) and Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) rel. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss.173 & 497(1), third proviso---Post-arrest bail---Examination of trial order sheets---Delay not attributable to accused---Interim challan was submitted approximately three months after arrest and petitioners were indicted on 24.07.2025---Thereafter case was repeatedly adjourned due to non-attendance of prosecution witnesses, absence of co-accused, dispensation of attendance of certain co-accused and failure to produce petitioners from jail owing to prevailing law and order situation---Petitioners could not be held responsible for such circumstances---Order sheets did not disclose any design, pattern or concerted effort by petitioners to delay conclusion of trial---Prerequisites of third proviso stood fulfilled and neither statutory exception was attracted---Petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail as a matter of right on ground of statutory delay---Statutory right could not be refused on hyper-technical grounds under discretionary power of Court. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28); Adnan Shafai v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 1543); Muhammad Umer Shahzad v. The State and others (2023 SCMR 1450); Syeda Ayesha Subhani v. The State (PLD 2023 SC 648); Nadeem Samson v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 112); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) and Zahid Hussain Shah v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 49) rel. (h) Criminal procedure--- ----Bail order---Tentative observations---Effect upon trial---Observations recorded while deciding bail petitions were purely tentative and confined to determination of entitlement to bail---Such observations were not to prejudice or influence trial proceedings---Trial Court was required to decide case independently and strictly upon evidence produced before it in accordance with law. Disposition--- Both petitions were allowed---Ghulam Rasool and Muhammad Jahangir were admitted to post-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds of PKR 1,000,000 with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of Trial Court---Trial Court was directed to conclude trial expeditiously, on merits of evidence, within two months from receipt of order.