Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss.96 & 115; O.XLI, R.31---First appeal---Duty of first Appellate Court---First appeal constituted a valuable statutory right involving rehearing on questions of law as well as fact---First Appellate Court, being final Court of fact, was required to independently reappraise entire oral and documentary evidence, formulate points for determination, examine material grounds of appeal and record its own reasoned findings---Mechanical concurrence with Trial Court or reproduction of its reasoning did not satisfy statutory mandate. Cited Case: • Bashir Ahmed v. Mst. Taja Begum and others PLD 2010 SC 906 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XLI, R.31---Appellate judgment---Essential requirements---Judgment of first Appellate Court had to disclose what material was considered, which arguments were accepted or rejected and what reasons led to ultimate conclusion---Such requirement applied equally to an affirming judgment---Even where Trial Court had written a detailed decision, Appellate Court could not abdicate its independent adjudicatory function by merely adopting conclusions recorded below. Cited Case: • Pakistan Refinery Ltd., Karachi v. Barrett Hodgson Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2019 SCMR 1726 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XLI, R.31---Mechanical reproduction of Trial Court findings---Effect---Substantial portions of Trial Court’s findings were reproduced almost verbatim in appellate judgment, followed by cursory observation that evidence had been properly appreciated---No independent appraisal of oral or documentary evidence or meaningful adjudication of material grounds was discernible---Appellate judgment therefore suffered from jurisdictional infirmity and could not be sustained. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115; O.XLI, R.31---Revisional jurisdiction---Failure of first Appellate Court to decide appeal according to law---Such failure went to legality of appellate process itself rather than correctness of an individual factual finding---Revisional interference was warranted where statutory right of first appeal had been rendered illusory through absence of independent judicial scrutiny. (e) First appeal---Specific grounds raised in memorandum---Duty to decide---Appellants had specifically challenged respondent’s pleaded source of consideration by pointing out that mortgage mutations relied upon to finance purchase were dated after sale mutation---Such contention directly related to plea of ownership and consideration and required independent examination and a reasoned finding---Appellate Court’s silence on material plea amounted to failure to exercise jurisdiction. (f) Evidence---Revenue entries---Benami ownership---Appellants had questioned decisive reliance upon revenue entries and contended that such entries did not conclusively establish title in a dispute involving plea of benami ownership---They had also raised issues regarding agreement dated 29.08.1983, alleged admissions, oral evidence and contradictions in pleadings---Whether such grounds were ultimately correct was for Appellate Court to determine, but omission to address them independently rendered appellate decision defective. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XLI, R.31---Affirming judgment---Brevity and legality---A brief appellate judgment was not invalid merely because of its length; however, brevity could not excuse absence of points for determination, independent assessment of evidence and reasons---A detailed Trial Court judgment did not dispense with legal obligation of Appellate Court to undertake second factual scrutiny. (h) Civil revision---Remand---Appropriate course---Where first Appellate Court failed to perform its duty as final Court of fact, High Court was not to itself undertake detailed assessment of ownership, benami plea, source of consideration, agreement or oral evidence---Such examination could prejudice parties and usurp appellate function---Proper course was to set aside appellate judgment and remand appeals for fresh decision. Cited Case: • Muhammad Dawood v. Mst. Sakeena Farooque alias Aziza and others 2025 SCMR 1229 (i) Civil revision---Concurrent findings---Scope---Ordinarily concurrent findings were not open to fresh reappraisal in revision; however, principle did not protect an appellate judgment rendered without compliance with O.XLI, R.31, C.P.C.---Where first Appellate Court had not independently adjudicated appeal, concurrence was only apparent and did not bar revisional correction. (j) Remand proceedings---Observations on merits---High Court deliberately refrained from expressing any opinion on validity of benami plea, ownership, evidentiary value of agreement dated 29.08.1983, source of consideration, effect of revenue entries and oral evidence---All questions of fact and law were left open for determination by first Appellate Court uninfluenced by observations except finding regarding procedural defect. (k) Expeditious disposal---Old litigation---Appeals arising from suits instituted long ago had remained pending for considerable period---Upon remand, lower Appellate Court was directed to provide adequate opportunity of hearing, independently reappraise complete evidence, decide all material grounds through reasoned findings and endeavour to conclude proceedings preferably within three months. Disposition---Both civil revision petitions allowed---Consolidated judgment and decree dated 16.03.2019 passed by Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, set aside---Both appeals restored to their original numbers and remanded for fresh decision in accordance with O.XLI, R.31, C.P.C.---Parties directed to appear before Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, on 18.07.2026---No opinion expressed on merits. Riaz Ahmad Khan (deceased) through legal heirs and others v. Rafique Ahmad Khan and others, Civil Revision No.30580 of 2019 along with Civil Revision No.30568 of 2019, Lahore High Court, Lahore, heard on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act, 1877---Specific performance of agreement to sell---Burden of proof---Where defendants categorically denied existence and execution of sale agreement, payment of consideration and delivery of possession, heavy burden rested upon plaintiff to establish complete transaction, including oral bargain, execution of written instrument, payment of earnest money and subsequent consideration, through legally admissible and confidence-inspiring evidence. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---O.VI, R.2---Pleadings---Agreement to sell---Material particulars---Plaint in suit for specific performance was required to disclose material facts constituting transaction, including time and place of bargain, persons present, agreed consideration, dates and manner of payments and circumstances of execution---Plaint omitted place and time of oral settlement, names of witnesses and date of alleged subsequent payment of Rs.40,000---Material omissions could not be cured by introducing a new version for first time in evidence. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Arts.17 & 79---Agreement to sell---Financial and future obligations---Attestation and proof---Agreement creating financial and future obligations was required to be attested in accordance with Art.17 and could not be used in evidence unless at least two attesting witnesses were called to prove its execution, where available and capable of giving evidence---Production of only one marginal witness failed to satisfy mandatory evidentiary requirement. Cited Cases: • Mst. Rasheeda Begum and others v. Muhammad Yousaf and others 2002 SCMR 1089 • Abdul Khaliq v. Muhammad Asghar Khan and 2 others PLD 1996 Lahore 367 • Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and another v. Messrs Farrukh International (Pvt.) Ltd. through Proprietor 2023 SCMR 1118 • Khudad v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah alias S. Inaam Hussain and others 2022 SCMR 933 (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Arts.17 & 79---Non-production of second marginal witness---Explanation---Plaintiff alleged during arguments that second attesting witness had connived with defendants and was unwilling to appear---No evidence of such connivance or inability was produced---Unsubstantiated explanation was illusory and did not dispense with statutory requirement of examining two attesting witnesses. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Art.81---Admission of document---Applicability---Where execution of agreement was specifically denied by contesting defendant, document could not be treated as admitted so as to dispense with formal proof---First Appellate Court erred in invoking Art.81 and overlooking mandatory proof under Arts.17 and 79. (f) Evidence---Admission by co-defendants---Effect upon contesting defendant---Subsequent conceding statements made by some defendants did not bind another defendant who had consistently contested execution and consideration---Plaintiff was required to independently prove agreement against contesting defendant---Suit could not be decreed merely on basis of admission by some co-defendants. Cited Cases: • Shah Muhammad and 2 others v. Dullah and 2 others 2000 SCMR 1588 • Allah Rakha through legal representatives v. Nasir Khan and 4 others 2007 CLC 154 (g) Agreement to sell---Proof of execution---Contradictory testimony---Plaintiff and witnesses materially contradicted one another regarding date and time of bargain, whether transaction was settled one day earlier or on date of execution, identity of person who introduced vendor before stamp vendor and notary public and persons present at execution---Such contradictions went to root of transaction and rendered oral account unreliable. (h) Agreement to sell---Stamp vendor, notary public and deed writer---Evidence---Plaintiff claimed that vendor had been identified before stamp vendor and notary public, whereas marginal witness claimed that he had identified vendor and stamp vendor and notary public stated that no person had made such identification in their presence---Witnesses also differed regarding persons present at time of purchase of stamp and scribing of agreement---Conflicting testimony failed to inspire confidence. (i) Specific performance---Payment of consideration---Proof---Plaintiff alleged payment of Rs.75,000 as earnest money and further payment of Rs.40,000 but produced no receipt for either payment and failed to plead date, time or place of subsequent payment---Self-contradictory oral evidence did not establish payment of consideration---Specific performance could not be granted in absence of reliable proof of consideration. (j) Specific performance---Possession under agreement---Denial---Plaintiff asserted that possession had been delivered under agreement, while defendants categorically denied delivery and disputed plaintiff’s possession---In absence of cogent corroboration and in view of failure to prove foundational transaction, plea of possession could not independently sustain decree. (k) Civil revision---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---First Appellate Court reversed dismissal of suit by relying upon inadmissible and contradictory evidence, treating disputed agreement as admitted and overlooking non-compliance with Arts.17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Such findings suffered from material illegality and jurisdictional error warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. (l) Civil revision---Appellate reversal of Trial Court---Trial Court had correctly evaluated omissions in pleadings, contradictions in evidence, absence of receipts, non-production of second attesting witness and failure to prove consideration---First Appellate Court’s contrary findings rested upon misreading and non-reading of material evidence and were liable to be set aside. (m) Specific performance---Discretionary relief---Plaintiff seeking equitable enforcement had to establish lawful and proved agreement, performance or readiness to perform obligations and reliable proof of consideration---Where execution itself was not proved in accordance with mandatory law and evidence was contradictory, equitable relief could not be granted. Disposition---Civil revision accepted---Judgment and decree dated 27.04.2015 passed by Additional District Judge, Chichawatni, set aside---Judgment and decree dated 18.12.2012 passed by Civil Judge, Chichawatni, dismissing suit for specific performance restored---No order as to costs. Hanifan Bibi and others v. Muhammad Tayyab, Civil Revision No.562-D of 2015, Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, heard on 23.06.2026 and announced on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit---Withdrawal simpliciter and withdrawal with liberty to institute fresh suit---Distinction---Withdrawal simpliciter reflected plaintiff’s decision not to pursue claim and attracted bar against fresh suit under sub-rule (3)---Withdrawal with permission to sue afresh protected plaintiff from such bar and could be granted only where Court was satisfied that suit must fail because of formal defect or that other sufficient grounds existed---Both situations did not stand on same footing. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Permission to withdraw with liberty to file fresh suit---Judicial discretion---Discretion conferred upon Court was judicial, structured and not arbitrary---Court had to independently examine defect or ground asserted by plaintiff and determine whether it fell within clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-rule (2)---Permission could not be granted merely as a matter of course. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Speaking order---Requirement of reasons---Statutory satisfaction could not remain confined to mind of Court and had to be reflected from order itself---Mere recital that Court was satisfied or that valid reasons existed did not fulfill legal requirement---Order had to identify alleged defect or sufficient ground and explain why it justified liberty to institute a fresh suit. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Formal defect or other sufficient ground---Plaintiff merely stated that suit suffered from “some legal defects” and that plaint had been drafted on wrong facts contrary to his instructions---Neither nature of defect nor manner in which suit was likely to fail was specified---Trial Court failed to determine whether ground constituted formal defect under clause (a) or other sufficient ground under clause (b)---Permission granted without such determination was legally unsustainable. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Absence of objection by defendant---Effect---No-objection or concession by opposite party could be a relevant circumstance but could not substitute independent judicial satisfaction required by statute---Permission to institute fresh suit was not to be granted merely because defendant did not oppose request---Court remained duty-bound to record reasons showing that statutory conditions were fulfilled. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Expression “in the interest of justice”---Use of broad formula without analysis could not cure absence of reasons---Justice according to law required that basis for exercise of discretion be discernible from order---Trial Court’s reliance upon general phrase, without identifying defect or sufficient ground, rendered order non-speaking. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Composite request to withdraw with permission to file afresh---Indivisibility---Where plaintiff applied to withdraw suit only on condition that liberty to institute fresh suit was granted, request was one composite and indivisible prayer---Court could either accept both limbs or refuse permission and allow suit to continue---It could not treat withdrawal as final while refusing liberty unless plaintiff thereafter independently elected to withdraw simpliciter. Cited Cases: • Karim Gul and another v. Shahzad Gul and another 1970 SCMR 141 • Haji Abdur Rashid Sowdagar v. S.M. Lolita Roy PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 281 • Muhammad Yar (deceased) through legal representatives and others v. Muhammad Amin (deceased) through legal representatives and others 2013 SCMR 464 (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Order granting liberty without reasons---Legal consequence---Invalidity of permission did not automatically convert order into withdrawal simpliciter---Plaintiff had never elected to abandon suit without liberty---Proper course was to set aside impugned order, restore suit to its earlier stage and require Trial Court to reconsider composite request through a reasoned order. (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Refusal of permission---Procedure---If Court was not satisfied that formal defect or sufficient ground existed, it had to decline liberty while leaving suit pending---Plaintiff would then remain free to continue suit or thereafter elect to withdraw it simpliciter---Court could not prejudicially split composite request and impose unconditional withdrawal upon plaintiff. (j) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Suit at evidence stage---Heightened scrutiny---Where suit had crossed pleadings and issues and was fixed for plaintiff’s evidence, Court was required to exercise greater care before granting liberty to file fresh suit---Reasons had to demonstrate that permission was based upon genuine statutory defect and not an attempt to escape evidentiary or procedural consequences. (k) Civil revision---Order permitting withdrawal with liberty to file afresh---Revisional scrutiny---Trial Court granted permission without identifying formal defect or sufficient ground and Revisional Court affirmed order without examining absence of reasons---Both Courts acted with material illegality and irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction---Orders were liable to be set aside. (l) Adjournment---Illness of counsel---Sufficient cause---Bare request received one day before hearing, containing vague assertion of illness without identifying ailment or producing medical material, did not constitute sufficient cause---Party had adequate opportunity to engage alternate counsel or appear personally---Adjournment was not claimable as a matter of right and request was rightly declined. (m) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal after adjudication on merits---Distinction---Cases where suit had already culminated in a decree after full adjudication stood on different footing---A concluded judgment could not be effaced indirectly through withdrawal proceedings---Such precedents did not govern a suit still pending at plaintiff’s evidence stage when composite request for withdrawal with liberty was made. Distinguished Cases: • Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 • Khawaja Bashir Ahmed and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Martrade Shipping and Transport and others PLD 2021 SC 373 • Muhammad Ashraf and others v. Muhammad Khan and others 2025 SCMR 1066 (n) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Principles governing permission---Plaintiff was required to disclose formal defect or other sufficient ground; Court had to examine whether stated ground fell within statutory parameters; order had to record reasons demonstrating satisfaction; and if permission was refused, suit was to continue unless plaintiff thereafter withdrew it simpliciter---Permission granted without reasons was unsustainable but did not extinguish suit. Disposition---Constitutional petition allowed---Order dated 23.06.2025 passed by Civil Judge, Wazirabad, and order dated 20.02.2026 passed by Additional District Judge, Wazirabad, set aside---Suit deemed pending before Trial Court at stage existing on 23.06.2025---Trial Court directed to reconsider plaintiff’s request for withdrawal with liberty to institute fresh suit, if still pressed, through a speaking order in accordance with law---In case permission was refused, suit to proceed unless plaintiff thereafter elected to withdraw it simpliciter---Parties directed to appear before Trial Court on 22.07.2026. Ghulam Hussain v. Additional District & Sessions Judge, Wazirabad and others, Writ Petition No.19357 of 2026, Lahore High Court, Lahore, heard on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Intra-Court Appeal---Maintainability---Where order challenged before Single Judge had been passed by a statutory forum in exercise of appellate, revisional, review or reconsideration jurisdiction, judgment rendered under Art.199 of Constitution was not amenable to Intra-Court Appeal---Nature and substance of statutory jurisdiction, rather than nomenclature assigned to remedy, determined applicability of bar. (b) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014----Rr.35, 38, 67 & 67-A---Technical evaluation of bids---Statutory remedial mechanism---Technical proposal rejected by Technical Evaluation Committee could be challenged before Grievance Redressal Committee, which possessed authority to uphold, set aside or modify decision and recommend scrapping of procurement process---Aggrieved bidder could thereafter submit representation before Managing Director, Punjab Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, whose decision was final and binding---Remedies were substantive and effective rather than cosmetic or illusory. (c) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014----Rr.67 & 67-A---Complaint and representation---Character of jurisdiction---Where statutory forums could re-examine record and affirm, vary, reverse or set aside decision of Technical Evaluation Committee, remedies partook character of appeal, review or reconsideration for purposes of proviso to S.3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972---Use of terms “complaint” or “representation” did not alter appellate substance of jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Messrs Shahzadi Polypropylene Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 PTD 2019 • Muhammad Ashraf Saeed v. Habib Bank Limited 2018 PLC (C.S.) Note 13 • Hassan Mahmood v. Habib Bank Limited 2020 PLC (C.S.) 272 • Federation of Pakistan v. Messrs Sahib Jee 2017 PTD 1481 (d) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Expression “original order”---Meaning---Original order was order with which proceedings under relevant statutory framework commenced---Procurement proceedings commenced when Technical Evaluation Committee rejected technical bids under R.38---Subsequent orders passed by Grievance Redressal Committee and Managing Director, PPRA, upon statutory challenges were not original administrative determinations. Cited Case: • Muhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Centre-I, Lahore PLD 1985 SC 107 (e) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014----R.67-A---Order of Managing Director, PPRA---Original or appellate order---Managing Director set aside decisions of Technical Evaluation Committee and Grievance Redressal Committee and declared previously rejected bidders technically responsive---Such order arose from successive statutory scrutiny and plainly exercised reconsideration jurisdiction---It could not be treated as original order merely because Managing Director was located outside procuring agency. (f) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Special statute providing complete remedies---Where special statutory framework created successive forums capable of reviewing and reversing original decision, scope of Intra-Court Appeal stood extinguished unless legislature expressly conferred such right---Procurement laws provided no independent right of Intra-Court Appeal. Cited Cases: • Frontier Holdings Limited v. Petroleum Exploration (Pvt.) Ltd. 2025 SCMR 1907 • International Islamic University, Islamabad v. Syed Naveed Altaf 2024 SCMR 472 (g) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Representation---Omission of particular nomenclature---Absence of word “representation” from statutory text did not preserve right of Intra-Court Appeal where representation involved full statutory reconsideration of decision below---Controlling test was whether authority possessed jurisdiction to reconsider, uphold, reverse or modify prior determination. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.189---Binding precedent---Supreme Court had authoritatively clarified that complete and self-contained mechanism of appeal, review or reconsideration excluded Intra-Court Appeal unless expressly provided---High Court was bound to apply such dictum while determining maintainability. (i) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Settlement proceedings---Principle from precedent---Where relevant statute provided adjudicatory or remedial mechanism and excluded further challenge, Intra-Court Appeal was barred---Principle equally supported conclusion that statutory procurement remedies having attributes of appeal or review attracted legislative bar. Cited Case: • Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh PLD 1984 SC 344 (j) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014----Rr.38, 67 & 67-A---Successive tiers of scrutiny---Technical Evaluation Committee constituted first decision-making tier; Grievance Redressal Committee constituted first statutory corrective tier; and Managing Director, PPRA, constituted final statutory reconsideration tier---Order ultimately challenged under Art.199 had thus emerged from completed statutory remedial hierarchy. (k) Intra-Court Appeal---Preliminary objection---Effect---Question of maintainability went to root of proceedings and was required to be decided before examination of merits relating to technical responsiveness, expert evaluation or jurisdictional correctness of procurement decision---Once statutory bar was attracted, merits did not call for adjudication in appeal. Disposition---Intra-Court Appeal dismissed as not maintainable under proviso to S.3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972---No order as to costs. M/s Popular International v. Government of Punjab and others, Intra-Court Appeal No.17271 of 2026, Lahore High Court, Lahore, heard on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.5---Intra-court appeal---Condonation of delay---Appellant asserted on affidavit that judgment reserved after hearing was later announced upon relisting through supplementary cause list without notice to its outstation counsel and remained unavailable in Writ Branch for a considerable period---Appellant acquired knowledge only upon receipt of departmental notice---Procedural rules of limitation were intended to advance and not defeat justice---Where explanation disclosed good faith and absence of culpable negligence, delay could be condoned through pragmatic and justice-oriented approach, particularly where appeals raised substantial questions concerning statutory powers of revenue authorities---Delay condoned and appeals heard on merits. (b) Administrative law---Nature of document---Substance over form---Legal character of an official communication was determined by its substance, purpose and legal effect rather than nomenclature, title or express recital of statutory provision---Notice identifying discrepancies in tax declarations and requiring explanation, reconciliation and production of information constituted an inquiry or investigative exercise notwithstanding omission of words “inquiry” or “investigation”---Failure to cite a specific statutory provision was a defect of form and did not invalidate an otherwise lawful act issued by competent authority. (c) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.25 & 38-B---Inquiry into discrepancies in sales tax declarations---Initiation---Communication issued by Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue identifying discrepancies for tax periods July to September 2015 and calling upon registered person to explain and reconcile them contained essential characteristics of an inquiry---Essence of inquiry lay in commencement of examination, verification and information-gathering by competent authority rather than use of any particular expression---Such inquiry remained pending when subsequent notice for stock information was issued. (d) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.25 & 38-B---Audit and information-gathering powers---Distinct fields of operation---Section 25 governed a formal audit of sales tax affairs, including authorization, recorded reasons, procedure and consequences---Section 38-B independently empowered Inland Revenue officers to obtain documents, records, explanations and information relevant to audit, inquiry or investigation---Operation of S.38-B was not expressly or impliedly made conditional upon prior initiation of audit under S.25---Both provisions could operate concurrently but neither was textually subordinate to the other. (e) Sales Tax Act, 1990----S.38-B---Jurisdictional precondition---Prior audit under S.25---Statutory precondition affecting jurisdiction had to be found in express language or necessary implication of statute and could not be imported through assumption or administrative preference---Reading a mandatory prior audit into S.38-B would add words deliberately omitted by Legislature and amount to judicial legislation---A formal audit under S.25 was therefore not a sine qua non for requiring information or documents under S.38-B. (f) Sales Tax Act, 1990----S.38-B---Pre-audit inquiry and information gathering---Purpose---Revenue legislation equipped tax authorities with separate tools for preliminary scrutiny, inquiry, risk assessment, formal audit and adjudication---Information-gathering power was intended to enable authorities to examine discrepancies and determine whether formal proceedings were warranted---Requiring a formal audit before preliminary information could be obtained would invert statutory design, impair risk-based enforcement and frustrate rather than advance purpose of Act. Cited Cases: • Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a • Notham v. London Borough of Barnet [1978] 1 WLR 220 • R. (on the application of HMRC) v. First-tier Tribunal [2010] UKSC 28 • R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte T.C. Coombs & Co. [1991] 2 AC 283 • Halifax plc v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [2006] Ch. 387 (g) Statutory interpretation---Purposive construction of fiscal enforcement provision---Court was required to identify legislative mischief, remedy and practical administrative context and adopt interpretation suppressing evasion and advancing enforcement---Tax information-gathering provisions were not to be construed narrowly so as to disable revenue authorities at preliminary intelligence-gathering stage---Purposive interpretation of S.38-B supported power to requisition relevant records before commencement of a formal audit or adjudicatory proceeding. (h) Sales Tax Act, 1990----S.38-B---Notice requiring location-wise stock of finished goods and quantity available on specified date---Nature---Notice merely sought factual information relevant to scrutiny of discrepancies already noticed in declared supplies---It did not determine liability, impose tax, levy penalty, confiscate property or alter legal status of registered person---Such notice was investigative and informational rather than adjudicatory. (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Constitutional petition against preliminary tax inquiry or information notice---“Aggrieved person”---Constitutional jurisdiction was remedial and ordinarily required an actual legal injury, adverse determination or civil consequence---A person merely asked to produce information, explain discrepancies or facilitate verification was not thereby an aggrieved person in constitutional sense---Speculative apprehension that inquiry might later result in adverse action did not create a present cause of action. (j) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Judicial review---Premature challenge to statutory process---High Court was not to supervise every preliminary or exploratory step of an administrative inquiry---Interference before authority had examined explanation or reached any conclusion would obstruct lawful administration and convert constitutional jurisdiction into a mechanism for pre-empting statutory fact-finding---Party was expected to participate in inquiry and, if an adverse order was eventually passed, pursue remedies then available under law. Cited Case: • Attock Gen Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others, Writ Petition No.1756 of 2018, Islamabad High Court (k) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Sales Tax Act, 1990---Alternative statutory remedies---Fiscal matters---Sales Tax Act provided a complete and specialized mechanism for adjudication and redress against adverse tax orders---Constitutional jurisdiction was not intended to supplant or bypass such mechanism, particularly where no liability had yet been determined and technical questions of tax administration remained before competent authority. (l) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.38 & 38-B---Routine inspection, verification or search---Appellant contended that intended stock verification was in substance a search requiring warrant under S.40---Impugned communication, however, only demanded production of specified stock information and formed part of an ongoing inquiry into declared supplies---No coercive search, seizure or entry producing adverse civil consequences had yet occurred---Challenge based upon anticipated exercise of search powers was premature. (m) Intra-court appeal---Scope of interference---Single Judge had correctly appreciated that departmental scrutiny was lawfully initiated, S.38-B was not dependent upon prior audit under S.25 and impugned communications had caused no adverse civil consequences---No illegality, jurisdictional defect or material irregularity warranting appellate interference was established. Disposition---Applications under S.5 of Limitation Act allowed and delay in filing intra-court appeals condoned---Intra-Court Appeals Nos.284 and 285 of 2016 dismissed on merits along with pending applications---Judgment of learned Single Judge dismissing constitutional petitions maintained---No order as to costs. Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others, Intra-Court Appeals Nos.284 and 285 of 2016, Islamabad High Court, heard on 08.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Suo motu jurisdiction of High Court---Not vested in High Court under Art. 199---Judicial overreach---Policy guidelines---Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh, in constitutional petition No. S-1139 of 2025, by orders dated 27.10.2025 and 03.11.2025, exercised suo motu jurisdiction against police officials and interfered in policy guidelines, going beyond the lis fixed before the Single Judge---Held, High Court under Art. 199 is not vested with suo motu jurisdiction; the impugned orders, to the extent of exercising suo motu jurisdiction against police officials and interfering in policy guidelines without justification, were the result of assumption of such jurisdiction and the observations contained therein amounted to judicial overreach---Courts, as a general rule, must not interfere with policy guidelines, a position with which the Court expressed full agreement---Impugned orders to that extent set aside. (b) Inquiry and investigation against petitioners---Observations and directions of High Court beyond the lis---Held, inquiries initiated and investigation to be conducted against the petitioners in both petitions shall continue in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observation(s) or direction(s) which were beyond the lis fixed before the Single Judge of the High Court in the constitutional petition. Disposition: C.P.L.A. Nos. 1199-K & 1200-K of 2025 converted into appeals and disposed of; orders dated 27.10.2025 and 03.11.2025 of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in Constitutional Petition No. S-1139 of 2025, to the extent of exercising suo motu jurisdiction against police officials and interfering in policy guidelines without justification, set aside; inquiries and investigation against the petitioners to continue in accordance with law uninfluenced by the said observations/directions. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Suo motu jurisdiction of High Court---Not vested in High Court under Art. 199---Judicial overreach---Policy guidelines---Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh, in constitutional petition No. S-1139 of 2025, by orders dated 27.10.2025 and 03.11.2025, exercised suo motu jurisdiction against police officials and interfered in policy guidelines, going beyond the lis fixed before the Single Judge---Held, High Court under Art. 199 is not vested with suo motu jurisdiction; the impugned orders, to the extent of exercising suo motu jurisdiction against police officials and interfering in policy guidelines without justification, were the result of assumption of such jurisdiction and the observations contained therein amounted to judicial overreach---Courts, as a general rule, must not interfere with policy guidelines, a position with which the Court expressed full agreement---Impugned orders to that extent set aside. (b) Inquiry and investigation against petitioners---Observations and directions of High Court beyond the lis---Held, inquiries initiated and investigation to be conducted against the petitioners in both petitions shall continue in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observation(s) or direction(s) which were beyond the lis fixed before the Single Judge of the High Court in the constitutional petition. Disposition: C.P.L.A. Nos. 1199-K & 1200-K of 2025 converted into appeals and disposed of; orders dated 27.10.2025 and 03.11.2025 of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in Constitutional Petition No. S-1139 of 2025, to the extent of exercising suo motu jurisdiction against police officials and interfering in policy guidelines without justification, set aside; inquiries and investigation against the petitioners to continue in accordance with law uninfluenced by the said observations/directions. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) g Ordinance, 2001?Section 22?Contract Act, 1872?Sections 171 & 176?Regular First Appeal?Foreign Currency Deposit?Banker's Lien?Collateral Security?Joint Account?Either or Survivor Mandate?Unilateral Encashment?Appropriation of Deposit?Due Process?Demand Notice?Judicial Determination of Liability?Scope of Banker's Rights?Restitution. A banker's lien is fundamentally a right of retention and, in the absence of an express statutory provision or an unequivocal contractual stipulation, does not by itself confer authority to unilaterally encash, realize or appropriate a customer's deposit towards an alleged outstanding liability. Where a financial institution seeks to deprive a customer of proprietary rights in funds held as collateral security, the burden lies upon it to establish clear contractual authority, effective service of demand notice, compliance with due process and lawful determination of liability. Internal statements of account, unilateral calculations or self-assessment of default cannot substitute judicial adjudication nor authorize the bank to simultaneously assume the roles of claimant, adjudicator and executing authority. The expression "either or survivor" merely regulates the operational mandate of a joint account and cannot be construed as empowering one account holder to create a security interest binding upon the proprietary rights of the other, nor does it authorize a financial institution to appropriate the entire joint deposit in satisfaction of the liability of one account holder or of a third-party borrower without the express consent of the co-holder. Failure to prove effective service of demand notice deprives the customer of the opportunity to redeem the security, dispute the alleged liability or seek protection from a competent judicial forum, thereby rendering any unilateral realization of the security inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, fairness and due process. A financial institution is undoubtedly entitled to recover amounts lawfully due and enforce valid securities; however, recovery must always be pursued through lawful means. Banking convenience, contractual expediency or commercial necessity cannot override the rule of law or justify unilateral deprivation of proprietary rights. Liability must first attain the character of a due, certain and legally determined obligation before any right of set-off, adjustment or realization can lawfully be exercised. Where a bank, without prior judicial determination of liability, without effective demand notice, and without lawful authorization from all persons having proprietary interest in the secured asset, unilaterally encashes and appropriates a foreign currency deposit held as collateral security, such action is legally unsustainable and liable to be reversed through restitution. Restoration of the amount wrongfully appropriated, together with consequential profit, constitutes an equitable and restorative remedy designed to place the parties in the position they would have occupied had the unlawful appropriation not occurred. Held: A banker cannot convert a disputed claim into an enforceable liability through its own internal determination, nor can it exercise the powers of claimant, judge and execution Court simultaneously. A lien remains a right of retention unless enlarged by clear contractual authority and exercised strictly in accordance with law, due process and prior lawful determination of liability.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 64---West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---Execution of decree for maintenance of minor children---Attachment of immovable property---Transfer of attached property through subsequent mutation---Validity---Property measuring one kanal was attached by the Executing Court on 16.07.2021 in execution of a decree for recovery of maintenance of minor children---Mutation transferring the attached property in favour of petitioners was sanctioned subsequently on 21.12.2022---Once a valid attachment order had been passed and remained operative, judgment-debtor was legally incompetent to create any interest in the attached property so as to prejudice or defeat the rights of decree-holder---Principle embodied in S.64, C.P.C. reflected the settled rule that a private transfer of attached property effected after attachment was void against all claims enforceable under the attachment---Object of attachment was to preserve the sanctity of judicial process and prevent a judgment-debtor from frustrating execution through clandestine alienations---Subsequent mutation could not defeat the attachment already operating against the property---Cancellation of mutation by Executing Court was a necessary legal consequence of the subsisting attachment and was not without lawful authority. Amjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others (2015 SCMR 128) and Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabira Sultana (2002 SCMR 1950) rel. (b) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 64---Transfer of attached property---Bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration---Constructive notice---Plea of petitioners that they were bona fide purchasers without notice was devoid of substance---Order of attachment passed by a competent Court constituted constructive notice to the public at large---Subsequent transferee was deemed to have notice of attachment and could not avoid its legal consequences by merely pleading ignorance---Executing Court and Revisional Court had concurrently found that petitioners were closely related to judgment-debtor and were aware of pending litigation---Timing of transfer, relationship between parties and subsisting attachment unmistakably indicated that transaction was intended to defeat realization of maintenance decree---Transfer effected after attachment was not legally sustainable and could not defeat rights of decree-holder. Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabira Sultana (2002 SCMR 1950) rel. (c) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 64---Specific performance decree---Consent decree obtained after attachment of property---Effect---Decree for specific performance in favour of predecessor of petitioners was passed after property had already been attached in execution of maintenance decree---Judgment-debtor had filed a consenting written statement and unequivocally admitted the claim while execution proceedings were pending and attachment was already operative---Sequence of events prima facie suggested that civil proceedings had been utilized as a device to create an apparent legal shield against execution of maintenance decree---Attachment already operating against property could not be nullified by a subsequent consent decree between judgment-debtor and another party---Decree for specific performance did not confer any superior right upon petitioners capable of defeating rights of decree-holder in execution proceedings. (d) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 12(2)---West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.13(3)---Execution of maintenance decree---Pendency of application challenging decree for specific performance---Whether execution proceedings were liable to be suspended---Mere pendency of proceedings under S.12(2), C.P.C. did not automatically stay operation of the decree or suspend execution proceedings pending before a competent Court---Unless a competent Court specifically restrained continuation of execution proceedings, Executing Court was bound to proceed in accordance with law---No order staying execution proceedings had been produced---Pendency of application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was, therefore, of no legal consequence for deciding validity of execution proceedings. Mst. Safia Bibi and others v. Additional District Judge and others (PLD 2019 Lahore 502) rel. (e) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Execution order---Remedy---Proceedings initially instituted as appeal---Conversion into revision---Technicalities---Additional District Judge rightly noticed that proper remedy against execution order was revision under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964---Instead of dismissing proceedings on a technical ground, Court converted them into revision to advance substantial justice---Revisional Court independently appraised record and concurred with findings of Executing Court that mutation had been sanctioned during subsistence of attachment and was intended to frustrate execution of decree---Findings disclosed neither misreading or non-reading of evidence nor any jurisdictional infirmity. (f) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Execution of maintenance decree---Sale of attached property through public auction---Persistent default by judgment-debtor---Procedural safeguards---Judgment-debtor had persistently defaulted in satisfying decree for maintenance of minor children and had deliberately avoided appearance before Executing Court---Order directing sale of attached property through public auction was a lawful continuation of execution proceedings---Executing Court appointed an independent auctioneer, fixed remuneration, prescribed publication schedule, directed public proclamation, ordered market valuation through concerned Patwari for fixation of reserve price and scheduled auction proceedings accordingly---No violation of any mandatory provision governing execution proceedings was established. (g) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Maintenance of minor children---Nature and object---Duty of Court---Maintenance was not merely a money claim but embodied a continuing statutory obligation intended to secure welfare, sustenance and upbringing of minors---Courts were under a corresponding duty to ensure that maintenance decrees were not rendered illusory by permitting judgment-debtors to defeat execution through colourable, sham or collusive transfers of property---Conduct of a father seeking to avoid maintenance obligations through unlawful transactions could not be countenanced by a Court exercising parental jurisdiction---Orders cancelling subsequent mutation, maintaining attachment and directing auction were consistent with the obligation to protect lawful maintenance rights of minor children. Amjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others (2015 SCMR 128) rel. (h) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Challenge to legal consequences of attachment order which had attained finality---Petitioners had not challenged original attachment order at the appropriate stage and approached High Court only after Executing Court declined to recognize a transfer made during subsistence of attachment---Constitutional jurisdiction could not be invoked to indirectly nullify legal consequences of an attachment that had attained finality---Parties could not be permitted to achieve indirectly what law did not permit them to do directly. (i) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of Executing Court and Revisional Court---Reappraisal of facts---Jurisdiction under Art.199 was supervisory and was not intended to provide another forum for reappraisal of facts or substitution of concurrent findings recorded by competent Courts---Interference was warranted only where impugned orders suffered from patent lack of jurisdiction, material illegality, procedural impropriety, violation of mandatory law or perversity resulting in miscarriage of justice---Petitioners failed to establish existence of any such ground---Courts below had correctly appreciated factual matrix, applied governing legal principles and recorded concurrent findings supported by material on record---No illegality, jurisdictional defect, material irregularity or perversity was found in the impugned orders. Disposition--- Writ petition, being devoid of merit, was dismissed with no order as to costs.