Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: The power to arrest and detain a judgment-debtor in execution of a money decree is an exceptional mode of execution and can be exercised only upon strict compliance with the mandatory safeguards embodied in Section 51 and Order XXI Rule 40, CPC.---- (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51, O.XXI, Rr.37 & 40---Execution of money decree---Arrest and detention of judgment-debtor in civil prison---Mandatory procedure---Personal liberty could not be curtailed mechanically merely because decree remained unsatisfied---Before ordering detention, Executing Court was required to conduct judicial inquiry, afford judgment-debtor opportunity to show cause, permit parties to produce evidence and record reasons in writing showing existence of one or more statutory contingencies specified in proviso to S.51, C.P.C.---Inquiry contemplated by O.XXI, R.40 was substantive safeguard and not empty formality or procedural ritual---Section 51 prescribed substantive jurisdictional conditions for detention, while O.XXI, R.40 provided procedure for determining whether those conditions existed---Both provisions were complementary and had to be read harmoniously. Cited Cases: • Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lahore 290 • Raja Munsif Dad v. WAPDA through Chief Engineer, WAPDA, Mangla Dam Project, Mangla, Mirpur PLD 1991 AJ&K 8 • Ehtisham Ghazi v. Izharuddin and another 2001 YLR 526 Sindh • Muhammad Kaleem v. Arslan Aslam 2023 CLC 796 Lahore (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51 proviso---Execution by arrest and detention---Jurisdictional preconditions---Detention could be ordered only where Court, after hearing judgment-debtor and recording reasons, was satisfied that judgment-debtor, with object or effect of obstructing or delaying execution, was likely to abscond or leave jurisdiction; had dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed property or acted in bad faith after institution of suit; had or had had since decree sufficient means to pay decretal amount or substantial part thereof but wilfully refused or neglected payment; or was liable under decree for sum required to be accounted for in fiduciary capacity---Each condition, involving deprivation of liberty, required strict construction and affirmative establishment through cogent material---Mere non-payment of decretal amount did not satisfy statutory threshold. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51 proviso, clause (b)---Means to pay decretal amount---Burden of proof---Existence of sufficient means could not be presumed from status, occupation, social standing or mere fact that decree remained unpaid---Burden initially rested upon decree-holder to produce credible evidence showing that judgment-debtor possessed, or had possessed since decree, sufficient assets, income, resources or realizable means to satisfy whole or substantial part of decretal liability---Decree-holder was also required to establish that omission to pay resulted from deliberate or wilful refusal or neglect rather than genuine financial incapacity---Burden could be discharged through direct affirmative evidence or sufficient circumstances giving rise to lawful inference. Cited Case: • A.K. Subramania Chettiar v. A. Ponnuswami Chettiar AIR 1957 Madras 777 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51, O.XXI, R.40---Inquiry before civil imprisonment---Nature and scope---Executing Court was required to allow decree-holder to lead oral and documentary evidence supporting particular statutory ground invoked and provide judgment-debtor effective opportunity to rebut same by producing evidence regarding financial condition, liabilities and other relevant circumstances---Court could examine parties, summon financial or property records and adopt any lawful mode necessary to ascertain existence of statutory conditions---Mere assertions, apprehensions or allegations could not substitute judicial satisfaction based upon evidence. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51, O.XXI, R.40---Security furnished by judgment-debtor---Purpose---Pending statutory inquiry, security could be required to secure appearance of judgment-debtor when directed by Court---Such security did not mean security for payment of decretal amount---Failure to furnish security for decretal liability, without inquiry and findings required by S.51, could not by itself justify commitment to civil prison. Cited Case: • Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lahore 290 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51---Civil imprisonment---Nature and object---Arrest and detention in execution of money decree was exceptional, coercive mode of execution and not penal or retributive punishment for inability to pay---Object was to secure compliance with decree where obstruction, bad faith, deliberate evasion, wilful refusal despite sufficient means or fiduciary liability was affirmatively established---In absence of such findings, detention would cease to be lawful execution and assume character of impermissible punitive incarceration. Cited Case: • Allah Bakhsh and others v. Royal Bank of Scotland 2017 AC 663 (g) Statutory interpretation---Act required to be performed in prescribed manner---Effect of non-compliance---Where legislature prescribed particular procedure as condition precedent to exercise of jurisdiction, act had to be performed strictly in that manner and no alternate mode was permissible---Requirement became particularly mandatory where consequence was deprivation of personal liberty---Order of detention passed without inquiry, evidence, opportunity of hearing and written reasons under S.51 read with O.XXI, R.40, C.P.C. was without lawful authority and legally unsustainable. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51---Ex parte order of arrest---Recorded satisfaction---Even where judgment-debtor failed to appear or proceedings were ex parte, Court was still required to comply with mandatory provisions of S.51 and record reasons showing existence of statutory ground for arrest---Ex parte order of arrest and order after contest stood on same legal footing regarding statutory safeguards. Cited Case: • T. Kunhiraman v. Pootheri Illath Madhavan Nair AIR 1957 Madras 761 (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Execution proceedings---Judgment-debtor sent to civil prison for non-payment of decree---Judicial review---Executing Court neither conducted inquiry nor recorded evidence or findings regarding likelihood of absconding, dishonest transfer or concealment of property, sufficient means coupled with wilful refusal to pay, or fiduciary liability---Impugned order proceeded only on fact that decretal amount remained unpaid and judgment-debtor failed to furnish surety---Such mechanical approach ignored mandatory safeguards under S.51 and O.XXI, R.40, C.P.C., constituted patent error of law and unlawful curtailment of personal liberty---Constitutional interference was warranted. Disposition---Constitutional petition allowed---Order dated 13.05.2026 committing petitioner to civil prison set aside---Matter remanded to Executing Court with direction to conduct inquiry under O.XXI, R.40 read with proviso to S.51, C.P.C., afford parties adequate opportunity to adduce evidence and thereafter pass reasoned order strictly in accordance with law---Pending such determination, petitioner directed to be released forthwith subject to furnishing surety for appearance before Executing Court. Naseer Ahmad Nasir v. Ali Sher and others, Writ Petition No.31402 of 2026, Lahore High Court, decided on 01.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: Whether Civil Court was vested with the jurisdiction in terms of Section 9 of the C.P.C. to entertain and try the suit challenging the consolidation scheme and the orders passed by the consolidation officers ---- (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.9---Jurisdiction of Civil Court---General principle---Civil Courts were Courts of ultimate jurisdiction and ordinarily competent to try all suits of civil nature unless cognizance was expressly or impliedly barred or matter was governed by a general or special law---Where a statute entrusted determination of a particular matter to a designated authority and expressly excluded jurisdiction of Civil Court, parties were required to pursue remedies provided under such statute---Civil Court could not entertain an ordinary suit in disregard of statutory forum merely because civil rights were asserted. (b) Punjab/Sindh/NWFP/Balochistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960----S.26---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Consolidation proceedings---Challenge to consolidation scheme and orders of consolidation authorities---Jurisdiction of Civil Court---Section 26 expressly barred Civil Court from entertaining any suit or application seeking decision or order regarding a matter which Government, Board of Revenue or any officer was empowered under Ordinance to determine, decide or dispose of---Suit challenging consolidation scheme and orders passed by consolidation officers was therefore not maintainable before Civil Court. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ajmal and others v. Province of Punjab and others 2008 SCMR 1431 • Gul Meer and others v. Hassan Basri and others 2007 SCMR 1266 • Muhammad Ali v. Nawab Din and others PLJ 2020 Lahore Note 85 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.9, as amended by Act XIV of 2018---Jurisdiction of Civil Court---General or special law in force---Effect of amendment---Amendment introduced a radical and material change by extending exclusion of Civil Court’s jurisdiction to suits for which a general or special law was in force---Earlier limited space for invoking civil jurisdiction on allegations of fraud or mala fides stood substantially narrowed where special statute provided complete mechanism and forum for adjudication---Plaintiffs could not circumvent statutory scheme by merely describing consolidation proceedings as fraudulent. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.9---Bar of jurisdiction---Fraud, mala fides, coram non judice or void action---Scope---Even where statutory bar existed, Civil Court could in an appropriate case examine an act alleged to be mala fide, coram non judice or void---Such jurisdiction, however, was exceptional and could not be invoked as a routine substitute for remedies available under special law---Party was ordinarily required first to exhaust statutory remedies before approaching Civil Court. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XIV, R.2---Question of jurisdiction---Duty of Court---Issue relating to jurisdiction was foundational and obligatory and was required to be determined at earliest stage---Trial Court framed issue regarding maintainability but failed to decide it properly---Appellate Court was justified in examining jurisdiction and setting aside decree passed by Court lacking lawful authority---Judgment rendered without jurisdiction was coram non judice. Cited Cases: • Zahid Zaman Khan and others v. Khan Afsar and others PLD 2016 SC 409 • Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Tahir Edible Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2003 CLC 416 (f) Jurisdiction---Ground not specifically urged before Trial Court---Appellate Court’s power---Jurisdiction could be examined by Court at any stage because lawful assumption of jurisdiction was condition precedent to valid adjudication---Appellate Court did not act illegally by deciding jurisdictional question even if applicants asserted that particular ground had not been raised in that form before it. (g) Punjab/Sindh/NWFP/Balochistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960----Statutory appellate authority---Refusal to exercise jurisdiction---Effect upon Civil Court’s jurisdiction---Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue)/Collector Consolidation dismissed statutory appeal while observing that applicants should approach Civil Court---Such observation amounted to abdication of jurisdiction vested in statutory authority---Erroneous direction of revenue officer could not confer jurisdiction upon Civil Court where statute otherwise excluded it---Party ought to have challenged refusal of statutory authority before competent forum instead of relying upon such observation. Cited Case: • Evacuee Trust Property Board and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others 2007 SCMR 262 (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction---Divergent findings of Trial Court and First Appellate Court---Comparative appraisal---Where findings of First Appellate Court differed from Trial Court, appellate findings ordinarily prevailed unless shown to suffer from illegality, perversity or material irregularity---Revisional Court was required to compare both judgments but could not disturb well-reasoned appellate findings merely because Trial Court had reached a contrary conclusion. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs. v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through L.Rs. and others 2013 SCMR 1300 • Madan Gopal and others v. Maran Bepari and others PLD 1969 SC 617 • Muhammad Shafi and others v. Sultan Mahmood and others 2010 SCMR 827 • Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar and 2 others 2015 SCMR 1 • Muhammad Hafeez and another v. District Judge, Karachi East and another 2008 SCMR 398 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115---Revisional interference---Applicants failed to demonstrate illegality, jurisdictional defect or material irregularity in appellate judgment holding Civil Court incompetent to entertain suit against consolidation proceedings---Additional District Judge had correctly set aside decree of Trial Court as coram non judice---No ground for revisional interference was made out. Disposition---Civil revision dismissed in limine---Judgment and decree dated 20.04.2026 passed by Additional District Judge, Attock, setting aside decree of Trial Court and holding suit not maintainable for want of Civil Court jurisdiction, maintained. Amanat Khan and others v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Attock and others, Civil Revision No.515 of 2026, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, decided on 01.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Federal Excise Act, 2005----Ss.2(12-A), 2(23) & 3(1)(d), First Schedule, Table II, Serial No.11---Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, Ss.2(v), 4 & 20---Federal excise duty---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Regulatory functions---Taxability---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority was established as a statutory regulator for reorganization, supervision and governance of telecommunication sector---Its functions comprised licensing, spectrum management, enforcement of regulatory standards, consumer protection, promotion of competition, resolution of disputes and monitoring compliance by licensees---Authority did not itself establish or operate commercial telecommunication systems or render telecommunication services to consumers---Purely regulatory and supervisory functions did not constitute taxable provision of telecommunication or franchise services under Federal Excise Act, 2005. (b) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996----S.4(1)(a)---Interpretation of expression “regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of telecommunication systems and the provision of telecommunication services”---Operative word “regulate” governed both telecommunication systems and provision of services---Provision conferred power of control, supervision and standard-setting over licensed operators and did not assign function of providing telecommunication services to Authority itself---Reading phrase “provision of telecommunication services” in isolation so as to transform regulator into service provider would distort legislative intent and collapse fundamental distinction between regulator and regulated entity. (c) Statutory interpretation---Regulator and service provider---Distinction---Regulator stood outside market as a governmental supervisory authority entrusted with rule-making, licensing, enforcement, oversight and protection of public interest---Service provider participated in commercial market by directly furnishing services to customers for consideration---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority’s statutory, compulsory and governance-oriented functions were fundamentally different from voluntary, transactional and customer-oriented activities of telecom operators---Authority could not be characterized as commercial service provider merely because it regulated entities that supplied telecommunication services. (d) Federal Excise Act, 2005----Ss.2(23) & 3(1)(d)---Taxable service---Provider-recipient relationship---Charging provisions contemplated actual rendering of specified service by a provider to a recipient in commercial sense for consideration---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority neither emitted, conveyed, switched nor received intelligence for customers, nor operated telecommunication systems commercially---Licensing, allocation of spectrum and enforcement of statutory compliance lacked essential attributes of commercial service provision---Federal excise duty could not be imposed without establishing taxable service falling within charging provisions. (e) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996----S.20---Telecommunication licence---Nature---Statutory licence did not amount to transfer or assignment of any proprietary or commercial right belonging to Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Authority possessed no commercial right to provide telecommunication services which could be conferred upon another---Section 20 imposed statutory prohibition upon operation of telecommunication systems or provision of services without regulatory permission---Licence merely authorized qualified entity to undertake otherwise restricted activity within controlled legal framework and source of operator’s right flowed from statute rather than commercial grant by Authority. (f) Federal Excise Act, 2005----S.2(12-A)---“Franchise”---Essential ingredients---Franchise required authority from franchiser, corresponding right in franchisee, identifiable franchised product or service, fee or consideration and, critically, identification of product, service or business activity with franchiser---Element of commercial identity with franchiser was overriding requirement---Telecom operators provided services under their own names, infrastructure, brands and commercial arrangements and were not represented to public as extensions of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Absence of branding, representation, business-system replication and market identification negatived franchiser-franchisee relationship. Cited Case: • Pakistan Television Corporation v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2023 PTD 102 (g) Federal Excise Act, 2005----S.2(12-A)---Statutory licensing fee---Franchise consideration---Distinction---Payment of prescribed licence fee under regulatory statute was a statutory charge for permission to operate in controlled sector and lacked commercial mutuality, brand use, goodwill and business-system replication characteristic of franchise fee or royalty---Mere grant of licence for consideration did not create franchise---Contrary interpretation would absurdly convert driving licences, power-generation licences, import licences and other regulatory permissions into franchise arrangements. Cited Case: • Pakistan Telecommunication Authority v. Additional Collector Sales Tax and others, F.E.R.A. No.1 of 2014, Islamabad High Court, decided on 30.05.2024 (h) Federal Excise Act, 2005----S.2(12-A)---Telecom operators’ audited accounts---Description of payments as licence fee, royalty or technical service fee---Effect---Accounting treatment adopted by regulated operators could not determine legal character of relationship between statutory regulator and licensees---Interpretation and application of taxing statute depended upon true legal nature of transaction and statutory framework, not nomenclature used in private accounts---No technical service was rendered by Pakistan Telecommunication Authority to its licensees. Distinguished Case: • M/s CM Pak Limited v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Islamabad 2013 SCMR 749 (i) Taxation---Charging provision---Strict construction---Regulatory authorization alleged to be taxable franchise---Department was required to establish every essential ingredient of taxable service within language of statute---Concept of franchise could not be expanded by analogy to encompass every statutory licence carrying a fee---Mischaracterization of sovereign licensing function as commercial franchise amounted to assumption of jurisdiction not supported by Federal Excise Act, 2005. (j) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.165---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Limb of Federal Government---Exemption from taxation---Authority’s annual budget was submitted to Federal Government; surplus receipts were remitted to Federal Consolidated Fund; deficits were made good by Federal Government; accounts were audited by Auditor-General; and fines and penalties were credited to Federal Consolidated Fund---Upon lifting statutory veil, ultimate destination and source of Authority’s receipts and expenditure was Federal Government---Authority performed functions on behalf of Federation and qualified as limb of State entitled to protection under Art.165. (k) Rules of Business, 1973----R.14---Opinion of Ministry of Law and Justice---Inter-departmental tax dispute---Legal opinion obtained through Cabinet Division concluded that Pakistan Telecommunication Authority was limb of State and entitled to constitutional tax exemption---Such opinion reinforced statutory and constitutional character of Authority and negated Department’s attempt to treat regulatory receipts as consideration for taxable franchise services. (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Tax show-cause notice---Alternative statutory remedy---Maintainability of constitutional petition---Ordinarily tax disputes were to proceed through statutory adjudicatory hierarchy, but constitutional jurisdiction was available where show-cause notice was ex facie without lawful authority, ultra vires, jurisdictionally defective or tainted by mala fides---A party was not required to submit to proceedings founded upon patent absence of jurisdiction merely because appellate remedies existed---Threshold interference was justified to prevent continuation of an unlawful tax proceeding. Cited Cases: • Messrs Pakistan Oilfields Limited through General Manager v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and others 2020 PTD 110 • PKP Exploration Limited and others v. Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and others 2021 PTD 1644 • Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex 2011 PTD 2260 • Northern Power Generation Company Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2015 PTD 2052 (m) Federal Excise Act, 2005---Show-cause notices demanding federal excise duty and penalties from Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Jurisdiction---Notices proceeded upon erroneous assumption that Authority exclusively provided telecommunication services and had transferred such rights to operators as franchisees---Authority was neither commercial telecommunication service provider nor franchiser and its licence fees were regulatory receipts---Essential taxable nexus was absent---Show-cause notices suffered from patent lack of jurisdiction and were issued without lawful authority. Disposition---All six writ petitions allowed---Impugned show-cause notices demanding federal excise duty and penalties on licence fees and regulatory receipts of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority set aside as being without lawful authority and jurisdiction---No order as to costs. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority through its Director Budget & Accounts/Director General Law & Regulation v. Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman and others, Writ Petitions Nos.2398, 2433 and 3877 of 2021, 1570 and 1572 of 2020 and 652 of 2024, Islamabad High Court, heard on 07.04.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Islamic law---Gift (Hibba)---Essential ingredients---Burden of proof---Female heirs---Mutation not proof of title---Roshan son of Bora, owner of the suit property, died in the year 1955---Inheritance Mutation No.74 was entered on 04.04.1955 in favour of his legal heirs---On the same day, Mutation No.75 was also entered on the basis of an alleged oral gift purportedly made by the widow and daughters of the deceased in favour of his two sons/brothers---Both mutations were sanctioned on 17.04.1955---Plaintiffs/petitioners asserted that the alleged gift never took place and that Mutation No.75 was wrongly sanctioned to deprive the female heirs of their lawful inheritance---Sons and their successors subsequently dealt with the property through exchange mutations and gift transactions in favour of their descendants---Suit for declaration challenging Mutation No.75 and subsequent transactions was dismissed by Trial Court, Appellate Court and Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, vide judgment dated 26.01.2016 in C.R. No.231-D of 2010---Held, that a gift, in order to be valid and binding, must fulfil three conditions, namely (i) declaration of gift by the donor, (ii) acceptance of gift by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession of corpus---Where beneficiaries of a gift seek to exclude female heirs from inheritance, the onus lies upon them to prove the gift---Beneficiary of a document is not only bound to prove execution of the document but also to prove the gift by producing cogent and reliable evidence that the three necessary requirements have been fulfilled---Courts are not divested of the power to scrutinize the reasons and justification for a gift so that no injustice is done to a legal heir who otherwise stands to inherit and that the course of inheritance is not bypassed or artificially blocked---Where validity of a gift mutation is challenged, it is incumbent upon the beneficiary not only to prove the mutation but also to independently establish the gift itself through credible evidence---Mere existence of a mutation is insufficient to establish title---Alleged transaction had the effect of divesting the widow and daughters of Roshan of valuable inheritance rights which had already vested in them by operation of law---It was incumbent upon the respondents, as beneficiaries, to establish through cogent and convincing evidence not only that declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession had taken place, but also that the female heirs were fully aware of the nature, extent and consequences of the rights sought to be relinquished---Record was conspicuously silent on both counts---No evidence demonstrated that the widow and daughters were apprised that they would stand permanently divested of their proprietary rights, nor that they consciously and voluntarily elected to abandon such rights---Alleged gift was not in favour of strangers but in favour of the very persons who stood to benefit from exclusion of the female heirs, and the law requires the court to subject such a transaction to the closest scrutiny---Mere proof of a mutation entry or long possession cannot substitute proof that the female heirs knowingly and voluntarily relinquished rights which had already vested in them by succession. Faqir Ali v. Sakina Bibi PLD 2022 SC 85; Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi 2020 SCMR 276 and Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 ref. (b) Mutation---Fiscal entry---Not a document of title---Oral gift---Courts below proceeded on the assumption that Mutation No.75 itself constituted proof of the transaction---A mutation is maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and neither creates nor extinguishes title---Where ownership is claimed through an oral gift, title flows from the gift itself and not from the mutation recording it---Mutation may at best corroborate an otherwise established transaction; it cannot substitute proof thereof---Consolidation proceedings of 1968, preparation of Wanda Jaat, subsequent private partition between Sardar and Laal, and later course of dealings had no bearing upon the real controversy, which was whether a valid oral gift had been made in 1955---Events occurring many years thereafter could not relieve the respondents of their obligation to establish the essential ingredients of the alleged gift---Testimony of Noor Muhammad (D.W.1) was not evidence of the transaction itself; he was not present before the Revenue Officer at the time of attestation of Mutation No.75, did not participate in the mutation proceedings, and was unable to identify the persons who appeared before the revenue authorities---Knowledge of a mutation may be relevant for purposes of limitation, but it is not proof of the transaction recorded therein---Respondents themselves relied upon evidence suggesting that for several years after the death of Roshan, shares in the produce of the land (hissa batai) continued to be given to the female heirs, which created doubt regarding complete and irrevocable divestment in 1955. Ghulam Sarwar v. Ghulam Sakina 2019 SCMR 567; Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim 2025 SCMR 955; Noor Ud Din v. Pervaiz Akhtar 2023 SCMR 1928; Mst. Barikhna v. Faiz Ullah Khan 2020 SCMR 1618; Zohra Bibi v. Haji Sultan Mahmood 2018 SCMR 762; Khan Muhammad v. Mst. Khatoon Bibi 2017 SCMR 1476; Muhammad Munir v. Muhammad Saleem 2004 SCMR 1530; Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 and Noor Ahmad v. Mst. Zeba 1991 SCMR 1990 ref. (c) Islamic law---Gift---Delivery of possession---Co-heirs---Possession of one heir---There was a complete absence of proof regarding delivery of possession, an indispensable ingredient of a valid gift under Muhammadan Law---No witness identified the act by which possession was allegedly transferred, when such transfer took place, in what manner it was effected, or how the donors relinquished dominion---Evidence merely established that Sardar and Laal remained in possession of the land, which was not necessarily referable to the alleged gift because they were already among the legal heirs of the deceased and were cultivating the property in that capacity---Continued possession by a co-heir cannot, without more, be treated as proof of delivery of possession pursuant to a gift---Possession of one heir is ordinarily deemed possession on behalf of all heirs unless there is a clear and unequivocal repudiation of the rights of the other co-heirs---Possession of the brothers would be taken to be the possession of their sisters, unless there was an express repudiation of the claims of the sisters by the brothers---Possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be for the benefit of all co-sharers, and doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment and adverse possession generally do not operate amongst co-heirs. Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 and Abrar Hussain v. Mst. Bibi Shahida PLD 2026 SC 42 ref. (d) Limitation Act---Limitation---Stale claims---Fresh cause of action---Subsequent transactions---While delay may, in an appropriate case, furnish a valid defence, limitation cannot be permitted to eclipse the anterior and foundational question whether the alleged gift itself stood proved in accordance with law---Before examining the effect of delay, courts were first required to determine whether the respondents had discharged the burden of establishing a valid gift---Having instead presumed the existence of the gift from subsequent possession, revenue entries and lapse of time, the courts below fell into a manifest error of law---Entries in the revenue record do not by themselves create or extinguish proprietary rights---Present case was not confined to the original mutation of 1955---Respondents and their successors subsequently executed exchange transactions and gift transactions founded upon Mutation No.75, which constituted independent assertions of exclusive ownership, thereby furnishing fresh causes for judicial scrutiny---Controversy could not have been dismissed merely by counting the years from the date of the original mutation while ignoring whether the alleged gift itself stood proved. Haji Muhammad Yunis v. Mst. Farukh Sultan 2022 SCMR 1282 ref. (e) Concurrent findings of fact---When interfereable---Where concurrent findings rest upon a misconception of the governing legal principles and result from misreading and non-reading of material evidence, such findings cease to enjoy the sanctity ordinarily attached to concurrent findings of fact and interference becomes not only permissible but necessary---Courts below failed to appreciate that the respondents were required to prove the gift and not merely the mutation; that possession by one co-heir does not necessarily extinguish the rights of another; that payment of hissa batai was not necessarily consistent with complete divestment of ownership; and that transactions having the effect of excluding female heirs from inheritance must be examined with the utmost degree of scrutiny. Habib Ur Rehman v. Abdul Karim 2025 SCMR 1262; United Bank Limited v. Jamil Ahmed 2024 SCMR 164; Muhammad Nawaz v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue 2014 SCMR 914; Abdul Hameed v. Khalid 2007 SCMR 938; Mst. Saadat Sultan v. Muhammad Zahur Khan 2006 SCMR 193; Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi PLD 2001 SC 213 and Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna 2001 SCMR 1700 ref. (f) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.2A, 23, 24, 25, 35 & 227---Islamic law---Inheritance rights of women---Public policy---Right of inheritance is not a bounty to be bestowed at the pleasure of male family members nor a concession dependent upon custom, convenience or familial goodwill---It is a vested Shari and legal right which devolves upon the heirs immediately upon the death of the predecessor-in-interest and cannot be defeated through private arrangements, social pressures, dubious revenue entries or procedural stratagems---Protection and enforcement of inheritance rights of women is a matter of public policy of the highest importance---Female heirs are often deprived of inheritance through arrangements which cannot withstand judicial scrutiny, and purported relinquishment of inheritance rights by women is to be viewed with extreme caution---Courts must not permit procedural technicalities to perpetuate such deprivation---Art.2A incorporates the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam; Art.25 guarantees equality before law; Arts.23 and 24 recognize and protect the right to acquire, hold and enjoy property; Art.35 obligates the State to protect the family, the mother and the child; and Art.227 mandates that all laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam---Constitution imposes a positive obligation upon all organs of the State, including the courts and revenue authorities, to ensure that female heirs are able to obtain, retain and enjoy their lawful inheritance in a practical and effective manner---Any custom, practice, arrangement or device which has the effect of excluding a female heir from her lawful share offends the injunctions of Islam and is inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to equality, dignity, social justice and protection of property rights---All courts and revenue authorities dealing with inheritance disputes must remain mindful that the law leans in favour of protecting, rather than defeating, the inheritance rights of women, and any transaction having the effect of excluding a female heir from succession must be examined with the utmost care, caution and judicial scrutiny. Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1; Mirza Abid Baig v. Zahid Sabir 2020 SCMR 601; Mst. Aksar Jan v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar 2025 SCMR 88 and Tanvir Sarfraz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCMR 98 ref. Cited Cases: • Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85 • Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276 • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 • Ghulam Sarwar (deceased) through LRs v. Ghulam Sakina 2019 SCMR 567 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim (deceased) through LRs. 2025 SCMR 955 • Noor Ud Din (Deceased) through LRs. v. Pervaiz Akhtar 2023 SCMR 1928 • Mst. Barikhna v. Faiz Ullah Khan 2020 SCMR 1618 • Zohra Bibi v. Haji Sultan Mahmood 2018 SCMR 762 • Khan Muhammad through L.Rs. v. Mst. Khatoon Bibi 2017 SCMR 1476 • Muhammad Munir v. Muhammad Saleem 2004 SCMR 1530 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Noor Ahmad v. Mst. Zeba 1991 SCMR 1990 • Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 • Abrar Hussain v. Mst. Bibi Shahida and others PLD 2026 SC 42 • Haji Muhammad Yunis (deceased) through legal heirs v. Mst. Farukh Sultan 2022 SCMR 1282 • Habib Ur Rehman v. Abdul Karim (deceased) through L.Rs. 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited v. Jamil Ahmed 2024 SCMR 164 • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed v. Khalid 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan v. Muhammad Zahur Khan 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna 2001 SCMR 1700 • Mirza Abid Baig v. Zahid Sabir (deceased) through legal representatives 2020 SCMR 601 • Mst. Aksar Jan v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar 2025 SCMR 88 • Tanvir Sarfraz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCMR 98 Disposition: Petition converted into an appeal and allowed; judgments and decrees of Trial Court, Appellate Court and Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, set aside; Mutation No.75 dated 17.04.1955 and all subsequent transactions founded thereupon declared illegal, void and ineffective against the inheritance rights of the petitioners; petitioners entitled to their respective shares in the estate of Roshan son of Bora in accordance with the applicable law of inheritance; Revenue Authorities directed to undertake all consequential corrections in the revenue record and take steps for determination and separation of shares in accordance with law; no order as to costs. (C.P.L.A. No.1103-L of 2016, announced in open court at Lahore on 30.06.2026, by Shahid Bilal Hassan, J. (Shakeel Ahmad, J. on the Bench); Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----Ss. 4C(3), 137(1), 168 & 170---Super tax---Adjustability of tax credit against super tax payable under S. 4C---Whether income tax in general and super tax in particular paid pursuant to S. 4C is adjustable where there is tax credit within the meaning of S. 168---Petitioner company, part of a Chinese multinational enterprise in the telecommunications sector, claimed excess taxes deducted at source of Rs. 2,212,433,254 relating to tax year 2022 as adjustable against super tax payable under FBR's notice; FBR declined and Islamabad High Court dismissed Writ Petitions No.1125 and 1126 of 2026 by judgment dated 25.03.2026---Held, S. 4C(3) provides that super tax shall be "paid, collected and deposited on the date and in the manner as specified in sub-section (1) of section 137" and separately that "all provisions of Chapter X of the Ordinance shall apply"---Reference to S. 137(1) already governs date and manner of payment; subsequent incorporation of all provisions of Chapter X (including S. 168) cannot be reduced to the same procedural function as that would render the latter phrase redundant---Expression "paid, collected and deposited" is itself indicative of the entire statutory mechanism governing discharge of tax liability, including payment, collection, adjustment, credit and deposit---By employing the expansive phrase "all provisions of Chapter X", which includes S. 168 delineating credit for tax collected or deducted, legislature intended to incorporate the complete statutory regime under Chapter X, including the tax credit regime, and not merely its procedural aspects---Had Parliament intended otherwise it could have expressly limited incorporation to procedural provisions, and the Court cannot read such a limitation into the statute where none exists---Question answered in the affirmative; no justification for holding that super tax paid under S. 4C is incapable of adjustment where there is tax credit under S. 168, thereby compelling the taxpayer to pursue only the refund mechanism under S. 170---Interpreting application of Chapter X to the S. 4C scheme in a constrained way unwarranted; no principled basis offered for selective incorporation and restrictive interpretation. Cited Cases: • PLD 2026 FCC 62 (vires of S. 4C earlier upheld) (b) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----Ss. 168 & 170---Tax credit distinguished from refund---Fiscal statute construed in favour of taxpayer---Scope of Court's determination---Tax credit under S. 168 is conceptually and statutorily distinct from refund claimed under S. 170; S. 170 establishes a self-contained statutory mechanism for claiming refund, which necessarily requires an application before the Commissioner under S. 170(1)---Fiscal statutes ought to be construed in favour of the taxpayer---Court was not concerned with whether the tax was, in fact, adjustable in the circumstances of the case and if so how much, which determination falls within the jurisdiction of the competent tax authority; Court's task was confined to answering the legal question framed. Cited Cases: • Hamid Ashraf v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore 2020 SCMR 843 • Messers Rajby Industries Karachi v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 1407 Disposition: Petitions converted into appeals and allowed; impugned judgment dated 25.03.2026 of the Islamabad High Court in Writ Petitions No.1125 and 1126 of 2026 set aside; writ petitions disposed of with declaration and direction that petitioner shall be at liberty to seek adjustment, if any, before the competent taxing authority, which shall determine such claim in accordance with the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the observations made in the judgment; pending applications disposed of. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Muhammadan Law----Hiba---Oral gift---Essential ingredients---Burden of proof---Exclusion of female heirs from inheritance---Where beneficiaries relied upon an alleged oral gift to exclude widow and daughters of deceased from inherited property, burden rested squarely upon beneficiaries to prove transaction through cogent and reliable evidence---Valid gift required proof of declaration by donor, acceptance by donee and delivery of possession---Beneficiary was required to prove gift itself and not merely mutation recording it---Courts were bound to scrutinize alleged gift with particular care where its effect was to bypass or artificially block inheritance rights of female heirs. Cited Cases: • Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85 • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 • Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276 (b) Muhammadan Law----Hiba by female heirs of inherited property---Knowledge and voluntary relinquishment---Proof---Inheritance rights of widow and daughters had already vested by operation of law upon death of predecessor---Beneficiaries of alleged gift were required to prove not only declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession but also that female heirs fully understood nature, extent and consequences of transaction and consciously and voluntarily elected to abandon their vested proprietary rights---No evidence established that female heirs had been apprised that alleged gift would permanently divest them of inherited estate---Transaction was in favour of male heirs who directly benefited from exclusion of women and therefore demanded closest judicial scrutiny---Mere mutation entry or long possession could not substitute proof of knowing and voluntary relinquishment. (c) Revenue record----Mutation---Evidentiary value---Oral gift---Mutation was maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and neither created nor extinguished title---Where ownership was claimed through oral gift, title flowed from gift itself and not from revenue entry recording it---Mutation could at most corroborate a transaction independently proved but could not establish declaration, acceptance or delivery of possession---Courts below committed error of law by treating Gift Mutation No.75 as substantive proof of title. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Sarwar deceased through LRs and others v. Ghulam Sakina 2019 SCMR 567 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim deceased through LRs and others 2025 SCMR 955 • Noor Ud Din deceased through LRs v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others 2023 SCMR 1928 • Mst. Barikhna and others v. Faiz Ullah Khan and others 2020 SCMR 1618 • Zohra Bibi and another v. Haji Sultan Mahmood and others 2018 SCMR 762 • Khan Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others 2017 SCMR 1476 • Muhammad Munir v. Muhammad Saleem and others 2004 SCMR 1530 • Muhammad Younus Khan and 12 others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Forest and Agriculture, Peshawar and others 1993 SCMR 618 • Noor Ahmad and 20 others v. Mst. Zeba and 12 others 1991 SCMR 1990 (d) Muhammadan Law----Oral gift---Subsequent consolidation proceedings, private partition and later revenue transactions---Evidentiary effect---Real controversy was whether valid oral gift had taken place in year 1955---Consolidation proceedings of 1968, preparation of Wanda Jaat, private arrangements amongst alleged donees and subsequent dealings could not relieve beneficiaries of burden to prove original transaction---Events occurring years later were incapable of retrospectively proving declaration, acceptance or delivery of possession at time of alleged gift. (e) Evidence---Oral gift---Witness not present at mutation proceedings---Hearsay testimony---Witness relied upon by beneficiaries was neither present before Revenue Officer at attestation of gift mutation nor participant in proceedings and could not identify persons who appeared or circumstances in which mutation was sanctioned---His testimony represented only what he subsequently learnt and was not evidence of transaction itself---Such testimony could not establish essential ingredients of valid gift. (f) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Knowledge of mutation---Proof of underlying transaction---Distinct questions---Knowledge of revenue mutation might be relevant to limitation but did not prove transaction entered therein---Even if female heirs knew of mutation years earlier, such knowledge did not dispense with beneficiaries’ obligation to independently prove valid gift---Courts below erred by conflating knowledge of mutation with proof of oral gift. (g) Muhammadan Law----Oral gift---Continued payment of share in produce to female heirs---Effect---Evidence indicated that female heirs continued to receive hissa batai from land after alleged gift---Such conduct cast doubt upon claim that they had completely and irrevocably divested themselves of all proprietary rights---Continued recognition of their entitlement in produce was inconsistent with assertion of absolute gift in favour of male heirs and was material evidence ignored by Courts below. (h) Muhammadan Law----Hiba---Delivery of possession---Co-heir already in possession---Proof---Delivery of possession was indispensable ingredient of valid gift---No witness identified act, date or manner by which donors allegedly relinquished dominion and delivered possession to donees---Male heirs were already cultivating property as co-heirs and their continued possession was not necessarily referable to alleged gift---Possession already held in capacity of heir could not, without independent evidence, establish delivery of possession pursuant to gift. (i) Muslim inheritance----Co-heirs---Possession of one heir---Constructive possession of all heirs---Possession of one co-heir was ordinarily deemed possession on behalf of all heirs unless rights of others were clearly and unequivocally repudiated---Exclusive physical possession by brothers did not by itself extinguish inheritance rights of sisters---Doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment and adverse possession generally did not operate amongst co-heirs in absence of express repudiation brought to their knowledge. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 • Abrar Hussain v. Mst. Bibi Shahida and others PLD 2026 SC 42 (j) Muslim inheritance----Female heirs---Protection of vested inheritance rights---Public policy---Inheritance rights vested immediately upon death of predecessor and were neither bounty of male relatives nor concession dependent upon family custom, convenience or goodwill---Purported relinquishment by women required extreme caution because female heirs were frequently deprived through fabricated gifts, manipulated revenue entries, coercive arrangements and fraudulent documentation---Courts were duty-bound to protect inheritance rights of women and prevent procedural technicalities from perpetuating deprivation. Cited Cases: • Mirza Abid Baig v. Zahid Sabir deceased through legal representatives and others 2020 SCMR 601 • Mst. Aksar Jan and others v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2025 SCMR 88 • Tanvir Sarfraz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCMR 98 • Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 (k) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Inheritance rights---Old mutation---Subsequent exchange and gift transactions---Fresh assertions of exclusive title---Limitation could not be examined in isolation from nature of right and validity of transaction forming foundation of title---Before relying upon delay, Court was required first to determine whether alleged gift had been proved---Subsequent exchange and gift transactions founded upon disputed mutation constituted independent assertions of exclusive ownership and furnished fresh causes for judicial scrutiny---Claim could not be dismissed merely by counting years from original mutation while ignoring failure to establish foundational gift. Cited Case: • Haji Muhammad Yunis deceased through legal heirs v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others 2022 SCMR 1282 (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.2-A, 23, 24, 25, 35 & 227---Inheritance rights of women---Equality, property and Islamic injunctions---Constitution did not permit deprivation of women from lawful inheritance---Equality before law and protection of property would become illusory if rights vested through succession could be defeated by coercion, fraud, social pressure, manipulated revenue entries or dubious family arrangements---State, Courts and revenue authorities bore positive obligation to ensure that female heirs obtained, retained and enjoyed inheritance in practical and effective manner---Any custom, practice, arrangement or device excluding female heir from lawful share offended injunctions of Islam and constitutional commitments to equality, dignity, social justice and property rights. (m) Courts and revenue authorities---Inheritance disputes involving women---Duty of heightened scrutiny---Law leaned in favour of protecting rather than defeating inheritance rights of women and vulnerable members of society---Every transaction having effect of excluding female heir from succession was required to be examined with utmost care, caution and judicial scrutiny---Courts could not permit artificial devices, dubious gifts, manipulated entries or prolonged litigation to defeat Divine and statutory scheme of inheritance. (n) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---Interference by Supreme Court---Concurrent findings ordinarily commanded respect but lost sanctity where founded upon misconception of law, misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Courts below failed to require proof of gift independent of mutation, ignored legal character of possession amongst co-heirs, overlooked continued payment of produce to female heirs and treated delay and revenue entries as substitutes for proof---Such findings were infected by misapplication of settled legal principles and warranted interference. Cited Cases: • Habib Ur Rehman and others v. Abdul Karim deceased through L.Rs. and others 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited through its President and others v. Jamil Ahmed and others 2024 SCMR 164 • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed and others v. Khalid and others 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed---Judgments and decrees of Trial Court, Appellate Court and High Court set aside---Gift Mutation No.75 dated 17.04.1955 and all subsequent transactions founded thereon declared illegal, void and ineffective against inheritance rights of petitioners---Petitioners declared entitled to their respective shares in estate of Roshan son of Bora according to applicable law of inheritance---Revenue authorities directed to make consequential corrections and determine and separate shares in accordance with law---No order as to costs. Noor Muhammad and others v. Ghulam Haider and others, C.P.L.A. No.1103-L of 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 04.06.2026 and announced on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Threatened cancellation of No Objection Certificate and allied development approvals---Maintainability---Petitioner had obtained NOC for access to proposed service areas, planning approval, land-use conversion, sanctioned building plans and petrol-pump NOCs, deposited substantial government dues and commenced development work---Subsequent stoppage of access-road construction, interference with project and threats to withdraw approvals created real and immediate prejudice sufficient to invoke constitutional jurisdiction notwithstanding absence of a formally notified cancellation order. (b) Punjab Land Use Plan (Classification, Reclassification and Redevelopment) Rules, 2020---Service areas along Rawalpindi Ring Road---Approval process---Proposal was processed through Rawalpindi Development Authority, NESPAK, Pre-District Planning and Design Committee, District Planning and Design Committee, District Council and other competent authorities---Land-use conversion, commercialization, commercial building plans and petrol-pump sites were approved after scrutiny and payment of prescribed charges---Admissions of statutory authorities established that approvals had been granted through lawful institutional process and remained operative. (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4 & 10-A---Administrative approvals---Withdrawal or cancellation---Due process---No show-cause notice, speaking order or proceedings under any applicable law had been initiated for cancellation, recall or withdrawal of NOC or allied approvals---Threatening, obstructive or coercive action without notice and opportunity of hearing violated right to lawful treatment and due process---Competent authorities could withdraw or modify approvals only through procedure prescribed by law. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.18, 23 & 24---Lawful business, investment and property---Petitioner acquired land, obtained statutory permissions, deposited government dues and invested substantial sums in development, infrastructure and joint ventures---Lawful commercial activity and investment made in reliance upon official approvals were entitled to constitutional protection---State authorities could not arbitrarily frustrate an approved project or interfere with property and business interests except in accordance with law. Cited Cases: • M.C.R. (Pvt.) Ltd., franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority and others 2021 CLD 639 • Muhammad Khalid Javed v. Lahore Development Authority and others PLD 2021 Lahore 211 (e) Ease of doing business---Government representations through eBiz Punjab Portal---Protection of investment---State had invited and facilitated private investment through a one-window digital mechanism and its authorities thereafter granted NOC, planning permissions, commercialization and building approvals---Once investment was induced and undertaken on strength of such official acts, authorities were obligated to preserve investor confidence and could not disregard their own approvals without lawful proceedings. (f) Administrative law---Vested rights and legitimate expectation---NOC and consequential approvals acted upon---Petitioner had deposited prescribed charges, undertaken extensive development, obtained electricity demand notices and created contractual and third-party commitments---Such conduct generated accrued interests and legitimate expectation that project would be allowed to proceed in accordance with approved framework---Approvals could not be rendered ineffective through informal threats or administrative obstruction. (g) Administrative law---Promissory estoppel---Public authority---Where authorities themselves processed applications, issued NOC, sanctioned land use and construction, accepted government dues and commenced access-road works, they could not subsequently resile from their representations to detriment of person who had materially altered his position in reliance thereon---Official commitments were required to be honoured unless lawfully withdrawn after due process. Cited Cases: • Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 1652 • Pakistan Railways through Chief Executive Officer/Senior General Manager, Lahore and another v. Muhammad Aslam 2024 SCMR 97 • Mst. Fatima Faryad and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2020 CLC 836 • Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others 2015 PTD 2304 (h) Administrative law---Judicial estoppel---Approbation and reprobation---Public authorities could not take a position inconsistent with their earlier official acts after petitioner and other authorities had acted upon same factual and legal foundation---Integrity of governmental and judicial processes required that authority which granted and implemented approvals should not frustrate them through contradictory conduct without lawful basis. Cited Cases: • JDW Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2017 Lahore 68 • Mubashar Javed and others v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lahore 817 (i) Administrative law---Government commitments---Doctrine of sovereignty---Official representations and approvals made by duly constituted governmental authorities were not to be lightly disregarded or deliberately ignored---Orderly development and investor confidence required State functionaries to honour commitments in letter and spirit unless altered through lawful statutory process. (j) Constitutional law---Public authority---Duty to assist Court---Rawalpindi Development Authority failed to file report and parawise comments despite specific judicial direction and instead sought further time without justification---Such casual conduct was deprecated, particularly where allegations involved threatened cancellation of approvals and interference with substantial private investment---Statutory authority was required to place complete factual and legal position before Court. (k) Rawalpindi Ring Road---Access to approved service areas---Right of Way---NOC contemplated access through approach road within ROW and construction had already commenced---Authorities were bound to honour and implement approvals and facilitate completion of approved access road, subject to payment by petitioner of any lawful charges assessed under applicable rules and regulations. Cited Case: • Mirza Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Government of Sindh and another 1992 MLD 1119 (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.15 & 18---Service areas along public road---Public interest---Privately developed service areas could facilitate commuters without burdening public exchequer by providing fuel, rest, worship, parking, drinking water, sanitation, emergency and other facilities---Protection of approved project served both lawful commercial activity and convenience and safety of travelling public. Cited Case: • Muhammad Tahir Jamal, Advocate v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2020 Lahore 407 (m) Development approval---Commercial risk---Petitioner’s investment did not guarantee commercial success and profitability remained dependent upon market conditions and travellers’ choice---Such business risk, however, did not authorize public authorities to obstruct or invalidate approvals already lawfully issued---Regulatory authorities remained bound by their official acts unless approvals were withdrawn in accordance with law. (n) Constitutional jurisdiction---Relief against threatened administrative action---Court was not required to declare approvals absolutely incapable of lawful review or cancellation---Proper relief was to restrain authorities from threatening, cancelling, withdrawing, reviewing or frustrating approvals without due process and to require them to implement subsisting approvals in accordance with law. (o) Service-area development---Obligations of project proponent---Judicial protection of approvals remained subject to petitioner developing project strictly according to sanctioned plans and applicable laws---Petitioner was required to provide adequate plantation, landscaping, parking, public conveniences, drinking water, mosque, electric-vehicle charging facilities, environmental safeguards and other amenities for safety and convenience of travellers. Disposition---Constitutional petition disposed of---Respondents restrained from threatening, cancelling, withdrawing, reviewing or frustrating NOC dated 28.01.2026 and allied approvals without following due process of law---Respondents further restrained from causing obstruction, demolition or interference in petitioner’s lawful development activities except in accordance with law---Rawalpindi Development Authority and concerned authorities directed to honour and implement approvals, facilitate completion of approved project and proceed with construction and completion of access road/right of way subject to payment of lawful charges---Petitioner directed to develop service areas strictly according to approved plans and provide prescribed public amenities. Mazhar Rahim Awan v. Rawalpindi Development Authority and 6 others, Writ Petition No.2335 of 2026, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, heard on 30.06.2026.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Demarcation of land---Suppression of material facts---Petitioner failed to disclose that demarcation dated 08.12.2010 had previously been challenged through a civil suit, appeal and civil revision, with suit and appeal dismissed and revision later withdrawn---Such proceedings directly concerned validity of disputed demarcation and constituted material facts---Litigant seeking equitable and discretionary relief was under bounden duty to make full, fair and candid disclosure---Concealment designed to mislead judicial and revenue forums disentitled petitioner to constitutional relief. (b) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----Ss.116, 117, 161 & 164---Demarcation of boundaries---Statutory remedies---Revenue Officer was empowered to define and determine boundaries of estates, holdings and divisions of land---Person affected by demarcation could participate, raise objections, seek correction of measurements or boundary marks and thereafter avail appeal under S.161 and revision under S.164---Demarcation made by competent revenue authority possessed legal sanctity unless successfully challenged through prescribed statutory hierarchy. (c) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----Ss.161 & 164---Demarcation dated 08.12.2010---Finality---Demarcation had been jointly conducted by Survey of Pakistan, Revenue Department, Forest Department and WWF in compliance with an earlier order of High Court and report had been submitted before Court---Petitioner did not challenge it through statutory appeal or revision under Land Revenue Act---Earlier demarcation consequently attained finality and remained binding upon parties. (d) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----S.172---Civil Court’s jurisdiction---Boundary demarcation---Bar---Matters concerning demarcation and determination of boundaries fell within exclusive domain of Revenue Authorities---Civil suit for declaration and injunction challenging demarcation was legally misconceived due to express statutory bar---Resort to a forum lacking jurisdiction could not confer legitimacy upon challenge or substitute remedies provided under revenue law. (e) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----Ss.117, 161, 164 & 172---Choice of remedy---Petitioner, instead of pursuing statutory remedies against demarcation of 2010, instituted civil proceedings which were dismissed and subsequently withdrew civil revision---Failure to invoke competent revenue hierarchy within lawful framework could not be overcome through subsequent constitutional proceedings seeking reopening of settled demarcation. (f) Constitutional jurisdiction---Interpretation of earlier judicial order---Petitioner asserted that fresh demarcation of 2023 had been conducted pursuant to direction in W.P. No.1965 of 2022---Earlier order merely directed competent authority to decide petitioner’s pending application through a speaking order after hearing concerned parties and expressly made no observation on merits---No direction for fresh demarcation was issued---Petitioner’s attempt to attribute such mandate to order was based on clear misreading and could not validate subsequent demarcation. (g) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----Demarcation reports dated 08.12.2010 and 17.02.2023---Successive demarcation---Where earlier demarcation had attained finality, subsequent demarcation prepared without lawful basis possessed no independent legal sanctity---Assistant Commissioner rightly set aside later report on appeal and revisional authorities lawfully maintained such determination. (h) Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968----R.67-A(7)---Encroachment map---Challenge to earlier demarcation---Petitioner alleged that demarcation of 2010 was invalid for absence of prescribed encroachment map and non-compliance with statutory procedure---Such challenge could not be entertained after earlier demarcation had attained finality, petitioner had failed to invoke statutory revenue remedies and material prior litigation had been concealed---Revenue authorities committed no illegality in declining to reopen settled proceedings. (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Alternative statutory remedy---Connected petition sought preventive directions against removal of existing permanent demarcation points and installation of fresh points---Petitioners had neither approached competent Revenue Authorities nor availed appeal or revision under Land Revenue Act---Constitutional jurisdiction could not ordinarily be invoked at threshold to obtain preventive relief before statutory forum had examined grievance. (j) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Revisional orders of revenue authorities---Scope of judicial review---High Court would exercise restraint in interfering with concurrent orders passed by revenue forums, particularly an order rendered in revisional jurisdiction---Interference was justified only where perversity, patent illegality, jurisdictional defect or material irregularity was apparent on face of record and had resulted in miscarriage of justice---Mere disagreement with factual or procedural conclusions was insufficient. (k) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Discretionary relief---Demarcation dispute---Revenue authorities had considered earlier final demarcation, subsequent proceedings and statutory record and passed concurrent reasoned orders---Petitioners failed to demonstrate any illegality, material irregularity or perversity warranting constitutional interference---Findings of forums below were in consonance with law. Disposition---Writ Petition No.161 of 2026 and connected Writ Petition No.4185 of 2025 dismissed---Order dated 09.10.2025 passed by Member (Judicial-VI), Board of Revenue, Punjab, maintaining orders of Assistant Commissioner and Additional Commissioner (Revenue), upheld---No constitutional interference warranted. Raja Hafeez-ur-Rehman v. Member (Judicial-VI) and others, Writ Petition No.161 of 2026 along with Writ Petition No.4185 of 2025, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, heard on 30.06.2026.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act, 1877---Specific performance of agreement to sell---Proof of agreement---Plaintiff produced original agreement and examined both attesting witnesses, who consistently proved its execution, identified signatures and thumb impressions and confirmed payment of Rs.700,000 as earnest money out of total consideration of Rs.900,000---Scribe had died before institution of suit and his death was proved through certificate---Agreement stood established through legally admissible evidence and concurrent appreciation thereof disclosed no material infirmity. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Agreement to sell---Attesting witnesses---Where both attesting witnesses appeared and gave consistent evidence regarding execution, consideration and signatures of parties, written transaction stood duly proved---Death of scribe did not defeat proof where statutory evidentiary requirements were otherwise satisfied. (c) Power of attorney---Registered general power of attorney---Authority to sell immovable property---Principal admitted execution of registered instrument appointing his brother as general attorney---Document expressly authorized attorney to alienate property and receive sale consideration and contained no cutting, interpolation or overwriting---Bare allegation that power of sale had been fraudulently inserted, without supporting evidence, was insufficient to displace registered instrument. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---O.VI, R.4---Fraud---Pleading and proof---Fraud was a serious allegation required to be specifically pleaded with full particulars and strictly proved through cogent evidence---General, vague or emphatic allegations did not amount to legal proof---Petitioner neither pleaded particulars of alleged fraudulent insertion nor produced documentary or oral evidence in support thereof---Concurrent rejection of plea was lawful. Cited Case: • Aamir Afzal and another v. S. Akmal (deceased) through legal representatives and others 2024 SCMR 1649 (e) Contract Act, 1872---S.226---Agency---Acts of agent binding on principal---Agreement to sell was executed on 26.08.2011, whereas deed cancelling general power of attorney was executed on 25.06.2012---Authority of attorney therefore subsisted on date of transaction---Acts lawfully performed by agent within scope of authority bound principal as if personally performed by him---Subsequent revocation could not invalidate transaction already concluded during subsistence of agency. Cited Case: • Concentrate Manufacturing Company of Ireland and others v. Seven-Up Bottling Company (Private) Limited and others 2002 CLD 77 (f) Contract Act, 1872---Agency---Subsequent revocation---Effect on prior transaction---Revocation of power of attorney operated prospectively and did not retrospectively annul agreement lawfully executed by attorney while authority remained valid---Principal remained bound by sale transaction entered into before cancellation of agency. (g) Agreement to sell---Allegation of ante-dating and collusion---Burden of proof---Petitioner neither identified any definite date of alleged fabrication nor produced evidence impeaching date appearing on agreement---Mere relationship between plaintiff and attorney or general allegation of collusion could not displace a written transaction proved by both attesting witnesses and attorney who executed it. (h) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Best evidence---Failure of party to enter witness box---Petitioner alleged fraud, absence of consent and want of authority but did not himself appear as witness---Instead, his wife appeared as special attorney and admitted that her knowledge of disputed transaction was derived from what petitioner had told her---Her testimony concerning material facts was hearsay---Adverse inference against petitioner for withholding his own testimony was justified. Cited Case: • Mrs. Zakia Hussain and another v. Syed Farooq Hussain PLD 2020 SC 401 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---O.III, Rr.1 & 2---Attorney as witness---Attorney could act and depose only regarding matters within his first-hand and direct knowledge---Where attorney lacked personal knowledge of material transaction and merely repeated information supplied by principal, such testimony could not substitute direct evidence of principal. (j) Evidence---Admission by attorney executing agreement---General attorney who had executed agreement filed conceding written statement, entered witness box and affirmed execution and receipt of earnest money---His testimony corroborated plaintiff’s case and further strengthened proof of transaction. (k) Specific Relief Act, 1877---Specific performance---Discretionary and equitable relief---Relief could not be claimed as of right and discretion had to be exercised judicially, reasonably and according to settled principles---Plaintiff proved execution, payment of substantial consideration, continuous readiness and willingness and subsisting authority of attorney---No inequitable conduct or circumstance existed to justify refusal of specific performance---Concurrent decree was proper. Cited Case: • Mrs. Zakia Hussain and another v. Syed Farooq Hussain PLD 2020 SC 401 (l) Specific performance---Readiness and willingness---Plaintiff’s conduct and evidence established continued readiness and willingness to perform contractual obligations---Payment of substantial earnest money and pursuit of decree supported equitable claim---Petitioner failed to establish any circumstance disentitling plaintiff to relief. (m) Civil revision---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope---Revisional Court could not undertake fresh appraisal of evidence merely because another view was possible---Interference was warranted only where findings suffered from jurisdictional defect, material illegality, perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence---General assertions that judgments were contrary to law or based on weak evidence, without identifying ignored or misconstrued material, were insufficient. Cited Case: • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 (n) Civil revision---Clerical discrepancy---Appellate judgment contained minor discrepancy regarding recital of area of property---Such error was clerical and did not affect identity of transaction, proof of agreement or merits of decree---No revisional interference was called for on that basis. (o) Specific performance---Registered power of attorney---Alleged misuse by close relative---Relationship between attorney and purchaser, without proof of fraud or collusion, did not invalidate transaction lawfully executed under subsisting registered authority---Principal’s unsubstantiated suspicion could not override documentary and oral evidence accepted by both Courts below. Distinguished Case: • Allah Bakhsh through legal representatives and others v. Muhammad Riaz and others PLD 2025 SC 63 Disposition---Civil revision dismissed---Concurrent judgments and decrees dated 09.12.2019 and 30.09.2021 decreeing suit for specific performance and permanent injunction maintained---No order as to costs. Muhammad Dilshad v. Muhammad Khaleel and another, Civil Revision No.81422 of 2021, Lahore High Court, Lahore, heard on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.