Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D, 337-F(i) & 337-F(ii)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342, 382-B & 544—Sentence of death—Commutation—Subsequent mental illness—Schizophrenia—Supervening and mitigating circumstance—The appellant was convicted for the murder of three minor sons of the complainant, who was his real brother, and for causing knife injuries to the complainant’s wife. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution case stood proved beyond doubt through the natural and confidence-inspiring ocular account of the injured mother, corroborated by the complainant and other witnesses as well as by medical evidence. The Court observed that, in the circumstances of the case, false implication was wholly improbable, particularly where the bereaved parents themselves were witnesses to the murder of their own children. The conviction on merits was, therefore, maintained. However, on the question of sentence, the Court held that although nothing had been brought on record to establish that at the time of commission of the offence the appellant was suffering from such mental infirmity as would impair his criminal responsibility, the subsequent medical evaluation ordered by the Court conclusively established that he was suffering from schizophrenia and was under treatment requiring regular follow-up. In these circumstances, the appellant’s diagnosed mental illness constituted a supervening and mitigating circumstance warranting commutation of the sentence of death to imprisonment for life on all three counts of murder. Criminal law—Mental illness—Execution of mentally ill convict—Humanity and conscience of law—The Supreme Court held that execution of a person suffering from profound mental illness offends the dictates of humanity and the settled conscience of law. The Court emphasized that the death penalty is premised on retribution and deterrence, both of which assume the offender’s rational capacity to comprehend the nature and wrongfulness of conduct and to be influenced by punishment. A person afflicted with severe mental illness, particularly one suffering from delusion or psychosis, stands outside these assumptions. Therefore, while such illness may not necessarily erase criminal liability for the past act in the absence of proof regarding the accused’s condition at the time of occurrence, it may nevertheless operate as a supervening factor rendering execution inhumane and unjust. The Court observed that when the State executes a person whose mental illness has eroded his capacity for reason, the punishment ceases to reflect the majesty of justice and instead becomes an exhibition of cruelty inconsistent with law. Evidence and procedure—Medical Board constituted by Supreme Court—Psychiatric evaluation—Schizophrenia established—The Court took note of the appellant’s assertion in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C. that the occurrence was linked to “mental health disorder” and, acting on that plea, directed constitution of a Medical Board. Pursuant to the Court’s order, the Punjab Institute of Mental Health, Lahore constituted a Board of Certification, admitted the appellant for comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, and reported that according to history and psychological assessment he was suffering from schizophrenia, was under treatment, and required regular follow-up for maintenance treatment. The Court treated this medical opinion as sufficient to establish the appellant’s present mental condition for purposes of sentence, though not for negating criminal responsibility at the time of the offence. Sentence—Concurrent running of sentences—Benefit under S. 382-B, Cr.P.C.—Directions for treatment in custody—While partially allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts, maintained all other sentences awarded by the courts below, and directed that all sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was also extended to the appellant. The jail authorities were further directed to ensure provision of necessary medical treatment in accordance with the appellant’s diagnosed mental condition, including referral to the concerned medical facility where specialized care may be required, and to adopt suitable precautionary and supervisory measures so that the appellant does not pose a threat to other inmates and his custody and treatment remain consistent with prison regulations and medical advice. Case references—The Court referred to and relied upon the following authorities and materials: Sir Edward Coke’s statement in The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1797); Ford v. Wainwright (477 U.S. 399, 1986); Panetti v. Quarterman (551 U.S. 930, 2007); Madison v. Alabama (586 U.S. ___, 2019); and Safia Bano’s case (PLD 2021 SC 488). These authorities were cited to affirm the settled principle that execution of a person who is insane or mentally incompetent is contrary to law, humanity, and fundamental human dignity, and that mental unsoundness may constitute a supervening circumstance justifying commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Appeal partially allowed—Death sentence commuted to imprisonment for life—Conviction and remaining sentences maintained—The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder and allied offences, but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts on account of his established schizophrenia as a supervening and mitigating circumstance. All remaining sentences were maintained, to run concurrently, with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and with further directions for continued psychiatric treatment and custodial supervision.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—S. 382-B—Double murder case—Appraisal of ocular and medical evidence—Partial acceptance of prosecution case—Conviction of one accused maintained, co-accused acquitted on benefit of doubt—The Supreme Court held that where the ocular account against one accused was straightforward, confidence-inspiring and fully corroborated by medical evidence, his conviction under S. 302(b), P.P.C. was rightly maintained. In the present case, the role of effective firing upon both deceased was consistently attributed to petitioner-convict Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu, and the post-mortem evidence supported the prosecution version regarding the firearm injuries caused by him. The Court, therefore, found that the prosecution had successfully established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, as regards co-accused Rab Nawaz, although a role of a single effective fire shot with a .30-bore pistol was attributed to him qua one deceased, the medical evidence did not support that version: the relevant injury was not shown to have been caused by a .30-bore pistol, no bullet was recovered from the body, pellets were recovered instead, and the prosecution failed to produce any forensic material connecting the alleged recovered pistol with the crime. In these circumstances, the evidence against Rab Nawaz was held to be shaky, deficient and insufficient to sustain conviction, entitling him to acquittal on the principle that benefit of doubt, however slight, must go to the accused. Criminal evidence—Ocular account and medical evidence—Extent of corroboration—Rule of cautious scrutiny—The Supreme Court observed that the testimony of the complainant and ocular witnesses had to be examined separately with regard to the specific role assigned to each accused. The ocular account was accepted to the extent that it matched the medical evidence concerning the fatal injuries caused to the deceased. In relation to Muhammad Sarwar deceased, the role of effective firing was specifically attributed to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu and co-accused Shoukat Ali, and the post-mortem findings fully supported that account. In relation to Muhammad Ashraf deceased, the fatal injuries affecting the brain and left lung were likewise attributed to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu and co-accused Shoukat Ali, whereas the alleged injury assigned to Rab Nawaz was neither shown by medical evidence to have been caused by a .30-bore pistol nor found to be the cause of death. The Court thus applied the settled principle of sifting the grain from the chaff and accepted the prosecution case only to the extent it was supported by independent medical evidence. Criminal law—Recovery of weapon—Inconsequential recovery—Mitigating circumstance—The Supreme Court endorsed the view of the Lahore High Court that the alleged recoveries did not materially strengthen the prosecution case for purposes of sentence enhancement. The recovery of the .30-bore pistol allegedly on the pointation of Rab Nawaz was held inconsequential because the Punjab Forensic Science Agency report merely showed that the weapon was in working condition and did not connect it with any crime empty. Likewise, the High Court had rightly treated the recovery of the alleged 12-bore rifle as inconsequential in the matter of sentence. The Court held that inconsequential recovery, particularly when not forensically linked to the occurrence, cannot by itself justify maintaining or enhancing the extreme penalty. Sentence—Death sentence—Commutation to imprisonment for life—Non-proof of motive—Inconsequential recovery as mitigating circumstance—The Supreme Court held that the Lahore High Court had rightly commuted the sentence of death awarded to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu to imprisonment for life on two counts. It was observed that the motive set up by the prosecution had not been proved, and the alleged weapon recovery had also remained inconsequential. Both factors constituted mitigating circumstances in terms of the settled principles governing capital punishment, and no legal infirmity was found in the High Court’s view that these circumstances warranted commutation. Accordingly, the complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence from life imprisonment to death was dismissed on merits. Case references—No specific reported precedent was expressly named or cited in the text of the judgment provided. The Court only referred generally to the “settled principle” of sifting the grain from the chaff, the rule that benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused, and the settled principle that non-proof of motive and inconsequential recovery are mitigating circumstances warranting commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Since no case names or citations were mentioned in the judgment text, none can properly be added as judicially cited authorities. Jail Petition No. 448 of 2023 dismissed—Leave refused—The conviction and sentence of petitioner-convict Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu were maintained. Jail Petition No. 557 of 2023 converted into appeal and allowed—The conviction and sentence of Rab Nawaz were set aside and he was acquitted of the charge, with direction for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No. 1080-L of 2023 dismissed—The complainant’s request for enhancement of Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu’s sentence from imprisonment for life to death was refused on merits, while the petition against Rab Nawaz was dismissed as infructuous owing to his acquittal.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—S. 302(b)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342 & 544-A—Murder case—Appraisal of ocular account—Chance witnesses—Benefit of doubt—Acquittal—The Supreme Court held that where the prosecution case rests upon the testimony of alleged eyewitnesses who, in the ordinary course of events, would not be expected to be present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time, such witnesses fall within the category of chance witnesses and their evidence must be scrutinized with greater caution. In the present case, the complainant and his brother, both sons of the deceased, claimed to have witnessed the occurrence at 11:30 a.m., despite the fact that one was a mechanic at Pirmahal and the other a labourer working in village lands. The Court held that they failed to furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation for their presence at the spot, and their conduct during and after the occurrence was highly unnatural. Their silence while their mother was fired at, failure to make any meaningful resistance, omission to take immediate steps for her removal, and the unexplained delay of about two hours in reporting the matter materially impaired the credibility of their testimony. The ocular account was, therefore, held to be doubtful and unsafe for sustaining conviction without independent corroboration. Criminal evidence—Chance witness—Test of credibility—The Supreme Court elaborated that a chance witness is one who, in the normal pursuit of life, would not ordinarily be present at the place of occurrence but claims such presence by chance. The Court held that testimony of such a witness is admissible, yet it cannot be accepted as a matter of course and must be assessed in the light of natural conduct, surrounding circumstances, and available corroboration. A satisfactory, probable, and natural explanation of presence is indispensable; failing that, the testimony becomes unsafe to rely upon, especially in cases involving severe punishment. The Court reaffirmed that criminal liability cannot be founded upon doubtful or inherently improbable evidence and that, in case of doubt, benefit must accrue to the accused. Investigation—Successive inquiries declaring accused innocent—Evidentiary value of consistent investigative findings—The Supreme Court held that although courts are not bound by the mere opinion of the investigating agency and must independently appraise the evidence, consistent findings recorded through successive investigations by different officers and verified by senior supervisory authorities cannot be brushed aside without cogent reasons. In the present case, the petitioner-convict had repeatedly been found innocent during investigation, and it had surfaced that the actual assailant was his father, Akhtar Ali, while the petitioner himself was present in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court noted that this conclusion had been successively scrutinized and verified at various levels, including by officers of the Investigation Branch and the office of the I.G. Punjab. In the absence of any evidence of mala fide, collusion, or extraneous influence on the part of the investigating officers, such consistent investigative findings were held to carry persuasive value and to lend support to the defence plea. Defence plea—Presence of accused elsewhere at the relevant time—Support from investigative material—The Supreme Court observed that in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C., the petitioner-convict admitted the occurrence but stated that his aunt, the deceased, had been killed by his father Akhtar Ali and that he himself was on duty in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court held that this plea was not a bald denial but found support from investigative material, including statements recorded by the investigating officers from the owner of the hotel in Lahore, who confirmed the petitioner’s presence there on the date and time of occurrence. This circumstance, when read with the doubtful ocular account and other infirmities in the prosecution case, further strengthened the entitlement of the petitioner to benefit of doubt. Benefit of doubt—Right of accused—The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of petitioner-convict Muhammad Nadeem through cogent, reliable, and confidence-inspiring evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The doubtful testimony of chance witnesses, contradictions in their account, unnatural conduct, absence of independent corroboration, and the consistent investigative material affirming the petitioner’s absence from the place of occurrence created serious doubt regarding his involvement. In such circumstances, the Court held that benefit of doubt was to be extended to the accused as a matter of right and not of grace. Case references—No specific reported precedent was expressly cited by name in the judgment text provided. The Court discussed and applied settled principles relating to chance witnesses, cautious appraisal of ocular account, non-binding yet persuasive value of consistent investigative findings, and the rule that benefit of doubt must go to the accused; however, no reported case law was specifically mentioned in the text, and none should therefore be added as cited authority. Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 converted into appeal and allowed—Conviction and sentence set aside—Acquittal—The Supreme Court converted Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 into an appeal, allowed the same, set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner-convict recorded by the courts below, and acquitted him of the charge, with direction for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No. 305-L of 2018 dismissed as infructuous—Leave refused—In view of the acquittal of the respondent-convict, the complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence became infructuous and was dismissed, with leave refused.

Summary: Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010—Ss. 3, 4, 21(1)(a), 22, 2(xxvi), 2(xxviii) & Schedule-I, Entry XIIA—Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Ss. 192, 192A & 199—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 173 & 498—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Art. 185(3)—Pre-arrest bail—Money laundering prosecution founded on alleged tax evasion—Need for prior determination of tax liability—Predicate offence—The Supreme Court held that where an FIR under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 is founded on allegations of concealment of income, tax evasion, and non-reconciliation of wealth statement with bank entries, but no prior determination of tax liability has been made through the process of assessment or adjudication under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, initiation of criminal proceedings is prima facie illegal. The Court observed that, in the present case, the FIR alleged concealment of income during Tax Years 2017 and 2018 and tax sought to be evaded on that basis, yet the prosecution had proceeded straightaway under AMLA, 2010 without first establishing the tax liability through the legally prescribed fiscal process. It was further held that, unless the amount allegedly evaded is first determined and it is thereafter shown that any asset acquired therefrom constitutes “proceeds of crime” relatable to a predicate offence under the Schedule to AMLA, the ingredients necessary to attract Ss. 3 and 4 of AMLA, 2010 are not prima facie made out. The Court, therefore, found that the very basis of the FIR and initiation of criminal proceedings stood substantially impaired. Taxation and criminal liability—Assessment proceedings under tax law distinguished from criminal prosecution—Direct resort to criminal process deprecated—The Supreme Court held that matters pertaining to concealment of income and evasion of tax are, in the first instance, to be addressed through the assessment, adjudicatory, and recovery mechanisms provided under the tax laws and before the specialized forums constituted thereunder. Although a fiscal dispute may, in a proper case, also attract criminal liability where dishonest conduct and statutory ingredients are established, the criminal process cannot be invoked in disregard of the foundational requirement of prior determination of liability where the alleged money laundering claim itself depends upon tax evasion as the predicate offence. In the present case, the Court found that no such pre-trial legal exercise had been properly exhausted before resort was made to registration of the FIR under AMLA, 2010. Pre-arrest bail—Documentary prosecution case—Custodial interrogation unnecessary—Further inquiry—The Supreme Court held that where the prosecution case rests primarily on documentary material such as tax record, bank accounts, and bank statements, no useful purpose is ordinarily served by taking the accused into custody, particularly when there is no real likelihood of tampering with such evidence. The Court reiterated that criminal law should not be used as a tool of harassment or as a substitute for lawful recovery proceedings in matters essentially grounded in documentary fiscal disputes. In the circumstances of the case, the allegations required deeper examination, the case called for further inquiry, and the possibility of false implication and mala fide on the part of the prosecution could not be ruled out at the bail stage. The petitioner was, therefore, held entitled to the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail. Effect of subsequent tax adjudication—Foundation of prosecution shaken—Annulment by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue—The Supreme Court took note of the admitted position that, subsequent to registration of the FIR, the tax liability determined by the tax authorities against the petitioner had been annulled by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue through order dated 30.06.2025. The Court held that where the criminal case is premised upon alleged tax liability, annulment of that liability by the competent fiscal forum materially weakens, at least for the time being, the foundation of the criminal proceedings. This circumstance constituted a strong consideration in favour of grant of pre-arrest bail. Investigation—Earlier placement in column No. 2—Subsequent change of stance by prosecution—Relevance at bail stage—The Supreme Court further noted that, after registration of the FIR, the first Investigating Officer had not found the petitioner guilty and had mentioned his name in column No. 2 of the report under S. 173, Cr.P.C., but in a subsequent investigation the petitioner had been found guilty on the same allegations. The Court treated this shift in investigative position as a relevant circumstance, which, when read with the documentary nature of the case and the unsettled state of the alleged tax liability, reinforced the conclusion that the matter called for further inquiry and that arrest of the petitioner was not warranted at that stage. Case references—The Court expressly referred to and relied upon Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director and others v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. & others (PLD 2025 SC 633), holding that in the absence of determination of tax liability through assessment or adjudication, registration of FIR or initiation of criminal proceedings is illegal; Muhammad Asif v. The State etc. (2016 PTD 2393), wherein pre-arrest bail was granted in a tax-related prosecution after the underlying fiscal determination had been set aside; Aqeel Ahmed Khan v. The State (2025 SCMR 1955); Ali Anwar Paracha v. The State (2024 SCMR 1596); Noman Khaliq v. The State (2023 SCMR 2122); and Abdul Rasheed v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 1948), all cited in support of the proposition that where a case is primarily based on documents and custodial interrogation serves no useful purpose, relief in bail jurisdiction may be justified. Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Impugned order set aside—Pre-arrest bail confirmed—The Supreme Court converted the criminal petition into an appeal, allowed the same, set aside the impugned order of the Lahore High Court refusing pre-arrest bail, and confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to the petitioner, subject to furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs.500,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.

Summary: (a) Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006--- ----Ss. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21 & 27---Punjab Emergency Service---Legal character after Punjab Emergency Service (Amendment) Act, 2021---Body corporate changed into independent administrative department of Government---Effect---Emergency Service was originally established as a body corporate with perpetual succession and power to sue and be sued, and was listed as an autonomous body under the Rules of Business---By virtue of 2021 Amendment, S.4(2) of the Act of 2006 was amended and Emergency Service was declared an independent administrative department of Government---Corresponding amendments in Rules of Business omitted Emergency Service from First and Second Schedules, with result that it was no longer shown as autonomous body under any secretariat---Held, that 2021 Amendment took away corporate entity status of Emergency Service and made it an independent statutory department of Government---However, said amendment did not alter its internal statutory framework for administration, management and regulation of its employees. (b) Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006--- ----S. 21---Public servants---Employees of Punjab Emergency Service---Status---Effect of statutory declaration---Employees of Emergency Service were declared under S.21 of Act of 2006 to be public servants within meaning of S.21 of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860---Such provision was not changed by 2021 Amendment---Held, that statutory declaration of employees as public servants recognizes public character of functions performed by them and ensures accountability under law, but does not convert them into civil servants---Employees of Emergency Service remained public servants and not civil servants. (c) Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974--- ----S. 2(b)---Civil servant and public servant---Distinction---Civil servant means person who is member of civil service of Province or holds civil post in connection with affairs of Province, subject to statutory exclusions---Public servant is a broader concept under S.21, P.P.C., covering persons performing public duties, exercising public authority or entrusted with functions connected with public administration---Held, that primary distinction is that civil servant’s terms and conditions of service are governed by relevant civil service law and rules framed thereunder, whereas public servant may perform public duties under statutory authority without being part of civil service framework---All civil servants may be public servants, but all public servants are not civil servants. Cited Case: • Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority v. Government of Sindh 2022 SCMR 595 (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 240 & 260---Service of Pakistan---Civil servant---Statutory bodies and instrumentalities of Government---Scope---Service of Pakistan includes any service, post or office in connection with affairs of Federation or Province and any other service declared by law to be service of Pakistan---Held, that expression “service of Pakistan” and expression “civil servant” are not synonymous---Civil servant is one whose appointment and terms and conditions are regulated under civil service legal framework, while public servant may serve through an instrumentality of Government created by statute to perform specialized public functions with operational autonomy---Mere performance of functions connected with affairs of Government does not by itself make employees civil servants. Cited Cases: • Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills & Distillery Ltd. PLD 1975 SC 244 • Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 (e) Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006--- ----Punjab Emergency Service Leave, Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 2007---Punjab Emergency Service (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2022---Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974---Employees of Emergency Service---Terms and conditions governed by separate statutory framework---Effect---Emergency Service was established under Act of 2006 and employment of its employees was regulated by 2007 Rules and 2022 Regulations---Employees were not governed by Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 or rules framed thereunder---Held, that where appointment and terms and conditions of employees are governed by separate statutory framework and not by civil service law, such employees cannot be treated as civil servants---Employees of Emergency Service, therefore, did not fall within jurisdiction of Service Tribunal. (f) Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974--- ----Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal---Appeal by civil servant only---Employees of Punjab Emergency Service---Maintainability---Respondent, a rescue driver, challenged disciplinary action before Punjab Service Tribunal---Tribunal assumed jurisdiction on basis that after 2021 Amendment Emergency Service had become independent department of Government and its employees had become civil servants---Held, that Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 confers jurisdiction upon Tribunal in respect of civil servants and appeal is to be filed by a civil servant---Respondent, being employee of Emergency Service governed by separate statutory regime and declared public servant, was not a civil servant---Tribunal had no jurisdiction over matters relating to his terms and conditions of service. (g) Service law--- ----Jurisdiction---Foundational issue---Duty of Tribunal---Interim orders on jurisdiction---Merger into final judgment---Service Tribunal held that earlier interim orders on jurisdiction had attained finality because they were not challenged---Held, that finding was erroneous---Interim orders merged into final judgment where Tribunal again addressed issue of jurisdiction---Jurisdiction being foundational issue was required to be examined with care and circumspection before assuming authority over matter---In absence of jurisdiction, proceedings before Service Tribunal were without lawful basis. (h) Statutory bodies--- ----Employees of autonomous/statutory/corporate bodies---Government funding, statutory creation or administrative supervision---Effect on status of employees---Held, that mere fact that a body is created by statute, funded by Government, or subject to administrative supervision does not render its employees civil servants---Applicable test is whether employee holds a civil post and whether appointment and terms and conditions of service are governed by civil service legal framework---Employees of statutory bodies governed by their own service rules or regulations are not civil servants merely because their employer performs public functions. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 • Executive Council Allama Iqbal Open University v. M. Tufail Hashmi 2010 SCMR 1484 • Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 301 Disposition: Civil petition was converted into appeal and allowed. Order dated 07.06.2023 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal was set aside. It was held that employees of Punjab Emergency Service are not civil servants and Punjab Service Tribunal has no jurisdiction in matters relating to their terms and conditions of service. ---- "Civil servants are those whose appointment and service are regulated under the Civil Servants Act and its framework, or by express statutory declaration, whereas public servants broadly include persons performing public duties or exercising authority under law. Through the 2021 Amendment, the Punjab Emergency Service (Rescue 1122) ceased to be a corporate entity and became an independent administrative department of Government, operating outside the conventional Rules of Business framework, due to the specialized nature of its services. Therefore, employees of the Punjab Emergency Service (Rescue 1122) are governed by their own statutory framework, remain public servants and the Service Tribunal lacks jurisdiction."

Summary: Registration of criminal cases against a person per se cannot be made basis for issuance of a detention order under the Wets Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 when there is no material to show that he has acted, is acting or is about to act in a manner which is prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Scope of section 47-B of Insurance Act, 1938.

Summary: When a petitioner failed in displaying his bonafides in a writ of quo warranto, a Constitutional Law court may exercise restraint and refuse to issue writ of quo warranto.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance of agreement to sell---Discretionary and equitable relief---Continuous readiness and willingness---Petitions arose out of three interconnected civil proceedings concerning same immovable property and two competing agreements to sell dated 16.04.2014 and 03.06.2016---Supreme Court held that relief of specific performance, though statutorily recognized, was not granted as a matter of right but rested in equity and judicial discretion---Person seeking such relief was required to plead and prove that he had been continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract---Readiness and willingness was not a mere formal requirement but foundational to equitable relief, as the Court could not compel performance of reciprocal obligations unless satisfied that the claimant himself had adhered to the discipline of the contract---Held, plaintiff seeking specific performance must establish continuous readiness and willingness through pleadings, conduct and reliable evidence, failing which the foundation for equitable relief becomes unsustainable. Cited Cases: • Messrs DW Pakistan (Private) Limited, Lahore v. Begum Anisa Fazl-I-Mahmood and others 2023 SCMR 555 • Ijaz Ul Haq v. Mrs. Maroof Begum Ahmed and others PLD 2023 SC 653 • Muhammad Yaqub v. Muhammad Nasrullah Khan and others PLD 1986 SC 497 • Narinjan v. Muhammad Yunus AIR 1932 Lah 265 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----First Sched., Appendix “A”, Form 47---Suit for specific performance---Pleading readiness and willingness---Requirement not an empty technicality---Supreme Court held that plaint in a suit for specific performance must conform to Form 47 of Appendix “A” to the First Schedule of C.P.C. and must contain a clear assertion that plaintiff “has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement” on his part---Plaintiff must plead readiness and willingness in clear and specific terms and then prove the same by convincing evidence---Readiness must relate to contract as actually executed, including timelines and conditions, and must continue from inception of obligation until institution of suit---In the present case, plaint did not contain the categorical averment mandated by Form 47 and absence of clear continuous assertion weakened the very foundation of the claim for specific performance. Cited Cases: • Messrs DW Pakistan (Private) Limited, Lahore v. Begum Anisa Fazl-I-Mahmood and others 2023 SCMR 555 • Ijaz Ul Haq v. Mrs. Maroof Begum Ahmed and others PLD 2023 SC 653 • Muhammad Yaqub v. Muhammad Nasrullah Khan and others PLD 1986 SC 497 (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance of agreement to sell---Balance sale consideration---Tender, deposit or proof of financial capacity---Buyer’s primary obligation---Supreme Court held that in a contract for sale of immovable property the vendee’s core reciprocal obligation is payment of balance sale consideration---Readiness and willingness cannot be established in abstraction or by mere assertion; it must be reflected through objective acts showing financial capacity and preparedness to perform---Preparation of pay order, cashier cheque, segregation of funds, bank guarantee, bank statement, or prompt deposit in Court are evidentiary indicators of bona fide readiness---Though deposit of sale consideration at the time of filing suit is not an inflexible statutory precondition, failure to tender or otherwise demonstrate availability of funds materially affects the plaintiff’s claim---Where no credible material shows that buyer secured or tendered consideration in terms of agreement, Court may draw adverse inference regarding bona fides. Cited Cases: • Nazar Hussain and another v. Syed Iqbal Ahmad Qadri 2022 SCMR 1216 • Inayatullah Khan and others v. Shabir Ahmad Khan 2021 SCMR 686 • Muhammad Yousaf v. Allah Ditta and others 2021 SCMR 1241 • Mst. Noor Jehan and another v. Saleem Shahadat 2022 SCMR 918 • Muhammad Jamil and others v. Muhammad Arif 2021 SCMR 1108 • Hamood Mehmood v. Mst. Shabana Ishaque and others 2017 SCMR 2022 • Muhammad Shafiq Ullah and others v. Allah Bakhsh through LRs 2021 SCMR 763 (d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---- ----S. 51---Reciprocal promises---Agreement to sell immovable property---Vendor’s obligation to execute sale deed dependent upon vendee’s readiness to pay balance sale consideration---Supreme Court held that obligations of vendor and vendee in sale of immovable property are ordinarily reciprocal and interdependent---Vendor cannot be compelled to execute and register sale deed unless vendee first establishes through pleadings and proof that he was ready and willing to perform his corresponding obligation to pay balance sale consideration---Court while exercising jurisdiction in suit for specific performance must examine mutuality of obligations and determine whether claimant has satisfied pre-requisite of demonstrating his own readiness to perform. Cited Case: • Mst. Samina Riffat and others v. Rohail Asghar and others 2021 SCMR 7 (e) Contract Act (IX of 1872) / Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Time as essence of contract---Sale of immovable property---Express contractual stipulation---Effect---Although time is not ordinarily treated as essence in transactions of immovable property, parties are competent to expressly stipulate otherwise---Where agreement prescribes definite time for payment and provides consequence for default, Court must give effect to contractual terms settled between parties---Equitable jurisdiction of Court does not extend to rewriting bargain or diluting express stipulations relating to timelines and forfeiture---In present case, agreement dated 03.06.2016 specifically required balance sale consideration to be paid on or before 15.01.2017; obligation was neither contingent nor deferred but formed core reciprocal promise of vendees---No tender of balance amount was made within stipulated time, no pay order, bank guarantee, bank statement or segregated funds were shown, and no immediate deposit was made in Court upon institution of suit---Deposit made only after Court direction and substantially beyond contractual deadline could not retrospectively cure absence of readiness and willingness at material time. Cited Cases: • Fazal Ur Rehman v. Ahmed Saeed Mughal and others 2004 SCMR 436 • Muhammad Jamil v. Muhammad Arif 2021 SCMR 1108 (f) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance---Belated deposit of balance consideration---Effect---Courts below treated subsequent deposit of balance sale consideration, made pursuant to Court direction after expiry of stipulated period, as sufficient to cure earlier default---Supreme Court held that such approach was contrary to settled principles---Jurisprudence did not equate belated compliance with continuous readiness and willingness---Court was required to examine whether plaintiff had secured, tendered or demonstrated availability of consideration on the due date fixed by contract and whether such readiness continued thereafter without interruption---Failure to conduct such inquiry amounted to overlooking a material legal requirement governing grant of specific performance---Record did not satisfactorily establish that respondents fulfilled essential precondition of continuous readiness and willingness; therefore decree for specific performance could not be sustained. (g) Administration of justice---- ----Concurrent findings of fact---Interference by Supreme Court---Misreading/non-reading of evidence and violation of settled principles---Although concurrent findings are not ordinarily disturbed, interference is warranted where findings result from misreading or non-reading of material evidence or are contrary to settled principles governing equitable relief---Courts below failed to properly examine absence of timely tender, absence of financial proof, absence of immediate deposit in Court, defective pleadings under Form 47 C.P.C., and contractual stipulation making time material for payment---Concurrent judgments therefore could not be maintained. Cited Cases: • Habib Ur Rehman and others v. Abdul Karim through LRs 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited through its President and others v. Jamil Ahmed and others 2024 SCMR 164 / 2024 PLC 50 SC • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed and others v. Khalid and others 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 (h) Specific performance---- ----Earlier agreement dated 16.04.2014---Agreement already cancelled by competent Court---Finality of judgment---No decree for specific performance sustainable---Petitioner Muhammad Imran sought possession through specific performance of agreement dated 16.04.2014---Courts below dismissed his suit, appeal and Regular Second Appeal---Supreme Court held that agreement sought to be specifically performed had already been cancelled by Court of competent jurisdiction due to non-payment of balance sale consideration within stipulated time, in terms of contractual conditions---Such determination was not assailed further and had attained finality---No decree for specific performance could legally be sustained on basis of such cancelled agreement---Petition was devoid of merit and leave was refused. Disposition: Petitions for leave to appeal in C.P.L.A. Nos. 3649 and 3650 of 2025 were converted into appeals and allowed; impugned judgments of courts below were set aside; suit for specific performance filed by respondents No.3 and 4 on basis of agreement dated 03.06.2016 was dismissed; suit for cancellation of agreement filed by petitioners/respondents was decreed; suit instituted by Muhammad Imran in C.P.L.A. No.3639 of 2025 for specific performance on basis of agreement dated 16.04.2014 was dismissed and leave refused; earnest money paid under agreements dated 16.04.2014 and 03.06.2016 was ordered to be returned by respective recipients to concerned payers within thirty days from date of judgment.