Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (SRPO) ----S. 15-A—Restoration of possession—Personal use—Failure to occupy premises within one year—Effect—Standard of landlord’s conduct—Scope of penalty and tenant's right Where a landlord secures possession under S.15(2)(vii) SRPO for personal bona fide use but fails to occupy the premises within one year, S.15-A becomes operative—In the present case, landlord obtained possession on grounds of personal need, but instead of using the premises personally, inducted an employee and his family—Landlord’s plea of unfit condition due to tenant’s damage was unsupported by repair evidence—Employee's occupation was held not equivalent to personal use—Held, under S.15-A, such conduct constitutes misuse triggering both penal consequences and tenant’s right to restoration—Application by tenant within a reasonable time after one year satisfies the requirement; limitation under Art. 181 of the Limitation Act does not apply—Doctrine of laches governs timeliness—Restoration of possession directed. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ----S. 29(2), Art. 181—Application under special tenancy law—Applicability of general limitation—Scope—SRPO as special law Held, SRPO is a special law, and its internal provisions govern limitation—General limitation under Art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, does not apply—Tenant’s application for restoration under S.15-A is not barred if filed within a reasonable period—Determination of laches is to be made by Rent Controller based on facts—Tenant’s effort to seek direction from District Judge within time was sufficient to rebut allegation of delay—Courts below erred in mechanically applying limitation principles without due regard to special law framework. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ghaffar v. Mst. Mumtaz PLD 1976 SC 572 • Ali Muhammad v. Fazal Hussain 1983 SCMR 1239 • Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah 2001 SCMR 286 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 • Rahim Jan v. SECP 2002 SCMR 1303 • Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 265 • Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 923 (c) Interpretation of Statutes ----Principles—Penal statutes—Special law vs. general law—Purposeful interpretation—Ejusdem generis—Expressio unius est exclusio alterius Court emphasized that S.15-A SRPO must be construed in its intended penal and remedial framework—Literal interpretation rejected in favour of purposive construction to give effect to legislative intent—Reliance placed on principles such as ut res magis valeat quam pereat, generalia specialibus non derogant, and ex visceribus actus—Personal need of landlord cannot be diluted by attributing occupation to servants or third parties—Law must be enforced to prevent false eviction on mala fide grounds—Judiciary’s role is to ensure remedial provisions remain effective and not merely symbolic. (d) Landlord & Tenant ----Personal bona fide need—Definition—Good faith—Requirement of actual use—Employee’s occupation not valid substitute Held, "personal use" under S.2(g) SRPO means occupation by landlord, spouse, or children—Standard of “good faith” requires honest and diligent intention to occupy—Merely placing employee in premises violates the intent—Reliance on Section 182 of the Contract Act, 1872 (agent definition) was misplaced—Court held that landlord’s actions were not in good faith and inconsistent with the purpose of eviction. Disposition: Appeal allowed—Judgments of Appellate Court and High Court set aside—Order of Rent Controller restoring possession to tenant reinstated for execution—Directions issued to inspect premises under S.20 SRPO for verification before execution.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10-A---Right to fair trial---Minor penalty of ‘censure’---Violation of due process---Principles of natural justice---Scope---Appellant, a member of the Lahore High Court establishment, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings and awarded minor penalty of censure for allegedly disobeying a verbal order of transfer, threatening a supervisory officer, and displaying insubordination---Held, proceedings suffered from multiple procedural defects---No final show-cause notice was issued to the appellant before passing of the impugned order---Violation of the principles of natural justice was apparent, as guaranteed under Art. 10-A of the Constitution---Disciplinary actions, whether judicial or administrative, must comply with due process---Absence of a written show-cause notice before awarding penalty rendered the proceedings coram non judice---Impugned order was passed in violation of legal and constitutional safeguards and was not sustainable in law. Cited Cases: • Messrs Faridsons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1961 SC 537 • Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 • Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 129(g)---Adverse presumption---Non-appearance of complainant---Effect---Appellant was accused of threatening a senior officer---Complainant failed to appear in the witness box---No plausible explanation was offered for his absence---Held, an adverse inference was to be drawn under Art. 129(g) that had the complainant appeared, he would not have supported the allegations---Without complainant’s testimony, the foundation of the disciplinary case stood unproven---Evidence of prosecution witnesses failed to corroborate the allegations; one witness denied any clash, and another admitted being absent on the day of incident---Inquiry was thus inconclusive and lacked evidentiary support. Cited Cases: • Sher Ayaz Khan v. Gul Nakeeb Khan 2025 SCMR 380 • Ahmed Ali v. The State 2023 SCMR 781 • Jahangir v. Mst. Shams Sultanan 2022 SCMR 309 • Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi 2020 SCMR 276 • Manzoor Hussain v. The State 2016 SCMR 1426 (c) Service Laws ----Verbal orders---Lack of written directive---Legal sanctity---Scope---Allegation of insubordination was based on violation of an alleged verbal transfer order---Held, no written order by competent authority was produced---Verbal directions lack legal force and cannot form basis of disciplinary penalty---Only written orders undergo judicial scrutiny and serve as valid instruments of command under service jurisprudence---No statutory basis shown under which verbal orders of supervisory officer could be binding---Initiation of proceedings on such basis held to be illegal. Cited Cases: • District Education Officer v. Hafiz Muhammad Alam PLD 2000 SC 50 • Messrs Hudabiya Paper Mills Ltd. v. NAB PLD 2012 Lahore 515 (d) Administration of Justice ----Principles of natural justice---Requirement of hearing---Audi alteram partem---Scope---Where adverse civil consequence flows from an order, the affected party must be granted proper opportunity of hearing---Absence of a final show-cause notice prior to penalization constituted a breach of procedural fairness---Held, such omission was fatal to the proceedings---Natural justice is an implied safeguard even where not expressly stated in law---Imposition of penalty without hearing violates both law and equity. Cited Cases: • Abdus Saboor Khan v. Karachi University PLD 1966 SC 536 • Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi v. ADSJ Noushero Feroze 1994 SCMR 1299 • Christian Educational Endowment Trust v. DC Lahore PLJ 1987 SC 473 • Hazara (Hill Tract) Improvement Trust v. Mst. Qaisra Elahi 2005 SCMR 678 • Pakistan v. Public at Large PLD 1987 SC 304 Disposition: Appeal allowed; impugned order dated 21.04.2022 set aside.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure – Pre-Arrest Bail – Personal Appearance of Accused – Mandatory Requirement under Section 498-A Cr.P.C. – Effect of Absence: Pre-arrest bail cannot be maintained in the absence of the accused. In terms of Section 498-A Cr.P.C., personal appearance before the court is a mandatory condition for seeking pre-arrest bail. Failure to attend hearings, even after grant of ad-interim bail, results in dismissal of the petition and recall of interim relief. Reference made to Shazaib v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 886), where the Supreme Court clarified that continuous presence is required throughout bail proceedings. (b) Statutory Compliance – Procedural Rigour – Principle of Mandatory Performance in Prescribed Manner: When the law prescribes a specific procedure for an act, it must be followed strictly. Deviation renders the act invalid. In this context, the Court relied on Attaullah Khan v. Ali Azam Afridi (2021 SCMR 1979), reiterating that procedural requirements under special statutes like Section 498-A Cr.P.C. cannot be bypassed for convenience. (c) Pre-Arrest Bail – Ad-Interim Bail – Nature and Limits: Ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted on first hearing is conditional and does not mitigate the statutory requirement of presence. Such bail is intended only to ensure appearance at subsequent hearings. Non-compliance leads to immediate recall of the interim relief. ----Disposition: Pre-arrest bail petition dismissed due to non-appearance of petitioner. Ad-interim bail granted on 26.02.2025 recalled.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): –––Ss. 496, 497 & 498–––Bailable offence–––Pre-arrest bail–––Scope–––Distinction between bailable and non-bailable offences–––Petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Ss. 420, 170 PPC (bailable offences)–––Multiple bail petitions were dismissed for non-prosecution due to petitioner’s failure to appear, including one occasion citing a public protest (PTI Jalsa)–––Learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed third petition on grounds of non-appearance without appreciating the mandatory nature of bail in bailable offences–––Held, under S.496 Cr.P.C, bail in bailable offence is a statutory right and cannot be refused by the Court on discretionary or procedural grounds–––Court's refusal to confirm bail due to non-appearance in a bailable offence constitutes a legal error–––Bail granted–––Order of Sessions Court set aside. Cited Cases: • Alam Zeb v. The State, PLD 2014 SC 760 • Mumtaz alias Bhutto v. The State, 2021 P Cr. L J 1300 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): –––S. 498–––Pre-arrest bail in bailable offence–––Judicial discretion–––Held, pre-arrest bail under S.498 Cr.P.C for a bailable offence does not involve judicial discretion–––Court must confirm bail upon surrender or appearance of the accused–––Judicial refusal to confirm such bail constitutes miscarriage of justice–––Procedural default (non-appearance) does not extinguish an accused’s right to bail in bailable cases. (c) Administration of justice––– –––Procedural technicalities–––Effect on rights of accused–––Courts are duty-bound to safeguard statutory rights of accused and not to let procedural lapses defeat substantive entitlements–––Held, where an accused provides a plausible explanation for absence and is charged with a bailable offence, relief cannot be denied on mere procedural irregularities–––Order of Sessions Court was arbitrary and unsustainable in law.

Summary: The view that a family court may transfer execution proceedings under section 39 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 elaborated in facts and circumstances of the case.

Summary: Writ Petition Held: (1) Section 151 CPC grants inherent power to civil Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. These powers are not expressly mentioned in the CPC but are recognized as essential for the Court to function effectively e.g. (i) The Court can pass any order to meet the end of justice it can prevent misuse of procedure. (ii) It is exercised when no specific provision exist in CPC for particular situation if a remedy is already provided elsewhere in CPC section 151 cannot override it. (iii) The Court can take action against vexatious or fraudulent litigation it can recall or modify orders obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. (iv) The Court can stay proceedings to prevent injustice however it cannot override express provision of CPC. (v) If the case dismissed due to procedural lapses the Court can restore it under section 151 CPC the Court can pass necessary order in situation where CPC is silent. (2) This provision cannot be used to override express provision of Civil Procedure Code 1908 and it shall not contradict specific statutory remedies and it cannot be used to reopen decided matters. Section 151 CPC ensures that the Court has residual authority to act in the interest of justice and prevent abuse of process but it cannot be used to contradict or override express provision of the Civil Procedure Code 1908. (3) A Court has the power to "strike off"" a defendant's defence meaning to essentially dismiss their defence in a case if they repeatedly fail to comply with Court orders demonstrate blatant disregard for the proceedings or do not actively participate in the case despite being given reasonable opportunities to do so this is typically considered a harsh action and should only be taken in extreme circumstances where the defendant is clearly abusing the legal process. (Writ petition dismissed)"

Summary: Petitioners Israr and Farid Ullah arrested in FIR No.15/2025 under Sections 392 387 400 401 and 411 PPC were denied bail by the Sessions Judge. The Court found no prima facie evidence linking them to a habitual dacoity gang and noted that the alleged recovery of mobile phones did not by itself establish robbery. Citing Supreme Court precedents the Court emphasized that bail should be granted when an offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.PC. With no previous criminal record and the investigation complete the Court held that continued detention would serve no useful purpose. (Bail was allowed).

Summary: (a) Family Law —West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964—Ss. 5, 14 & Schedule—Dower—Dowry articles—Maintenance allowance—Shari share in ancestral property—Burden of proof—Allegation of snatching of gold ornaments—Scope— Petitioner filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights and recovery of dower, dowry articles, 25 tolas of gold ornaments, Shari share in ancestral property, maintenance allowance, and a loan amount—Trial Court granted relief to the petitioner, directing the respondent to provide a constructed house as per the Nikahnama, pay Rs.200,000, return specific dowry articles, and pay maintenance allowance at Rs.5,000 per month until the period of Iddat—Appeals were filed by both parties—Appellate Court dismissed respondents’ appeals but allowed petitioner’s appeal to the extent of granting recovery of 25 tolas of gold ornaments as dower and Shari share in ancestral property—High Court set aside the Appellate Court’s findings regarding gold ornaments, holding that the allegation of snatching remained unproven—Orders regarding maintenance and dowry articles upheld—Petition before Supreme Court challenging High Court’s judgment—Held, that claim regarding gold ornaments was not substantiated by evidence, and entry in the Nikahnama regarding Shari share in ancestral property was vague—Petition dismissed accordingly. (b) Dower—Gold Ornaments—Burden of Proof —West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964—S. 17—Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984—Arts. 117 & 119—Failure to establish claim—Effect— Petitioner alleged that 25 tolas of gold given as dower were later snatched by the respondent—Trial Court observed that petitioner admitted she did not weigh the jewelry at the time of Rukhsati but received a gold set and six bangles—Held, that no cogent material was produced to prove snatching—Appellate Court reversed this finding, allowing recovery of gold ornaments—High Court overturned Appellate Court’s ruling, relying on petitioner’s deposition stating she voluntarily handed over the jewelry to respondent—Supreme Court held that burden of proof lay on petitioner under Arts. 117 & 119 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, which she failed to discharge—Petition dismissed accordingly. (c) Dower—Shari Share in Ancestral Property —West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964—S. 5 & Schedule—Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984—Arts. 117 & 119—Interpretation of Column No.16 of Nikahnama—Claim of specific property—Scope— Petitioner claimed entitlement to a specific property based on an entry in Nikahnama—Trial Court, after examining evidence, observed that Column No.16 mentioned only a general commitment to providing Shari share in ancestral property without specifying any particular property—Held, that petitioner neither raised an objection to the vagueness of the entry at the time of Nikah nor inquired about the respondent’s share in ancestral property—High Court held that the respondent was bound to provide Shari share in ancestral property, but no specific claim on a particular property could be entertained—Supreme Court upheld these findings, observing that no misreading or non-reading of evidence had occurred—Petition dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Petition dismissed, leave to appeal refused. Cited Cases: Mst. Kaneez Fatima v. Abdul Qayyum PLD 1998 SC 388 Mst. Razia Begum v. Saeed Ahmad 1999 SCMR 1009 Nusrat Bibi v. Muhammad Tariq PLD 2003 SC 590

Summary: (a) Criminal Law: --- Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(ii), 452 --- Murder, attempted murder, trespass --- Commutation of death sentence --- The appellant was convicted for Qatl-e-Amd (murder) under Section 302(b) PPC on three counts for the murder of two women and an unborn child and was sentenced to death on all three counts. Additionally, he was convicted under Sections 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(ii), and 452 PPC for causing injuries to two other individuals and for trespassing. The trial court's conviction was upheld by the High Court. Held, while the prosecution proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the two murders and the injuries, the conviction for the death of the unborn child was set aside due to the non-framing of a charge for this distinct offence. The omission to frame a charge under Section 233 Cr.P.C. rendered the trial defective for this count, violating the fundamental right to a fair trial. Consequently, the conviction for the unborn child's death was set aside. Further, considering mitigating factors, including the absence of premeditation and the failure to prove motive, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. (b) Criminal Procedure: --- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898), Ss. 221-240, 342 --- Right to fair trial --- Defective charge framing --- Impact on conviction --- A separate charge must be framed for each distinct offence under Sections 221-240 Cr.P.C.. The failure to frame a charge for the alleged murder of the unborn child deprived the accused of a proper opportunity to defend himself, constituting a substantial illegality that vitiated the trial in respect of that count. Held, a person cannot be convicted for an offence for which they were not charged. The prosecution's failure to frame a charge violated the principles of natural justice and the procedural safeguards enshrined in Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, necessitating the setting aside of the conviction for the unborn child’s death. (c) Constitutional Law: --- Art. 10-A --- Right to a fair trial --- Due process in criminal trials --- The right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, requires that an accused be made fully aware of the charges against them and be given an opportunity to present a defense. Held, failing to frame a charge for the unborn child's death and not confronting the accused with the specific allegation under Section 342 Cr.P.C. amounted to a denial of this constitutional guarantee, rendering the conviction unsustainable. (d) Sentencing: --- Murder trial --- Commutation of death sentence --- Consideration of mitigating factors --- The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to the presence of mitigating factors, including the absence of premeditation, the failure to prove motive, and the circumstances suggesting a sudden altercation rather than a planned murder. Held, courts must ensure that the punishment is proportionate to the circumstances of the offence, and where reasonable doubt exists regarding premeditation, capital punishment should not be imposed. The principle that an unsubstantiated motive benefits the accused was reaffirmed. (e) Disposition: Appeal partly allowed. Death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. Conviction for the unborn child’s death set aside. Other sentences remain unchanged.

Summary: ----Ss.11 & 115 & O.VII, R.11---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.2, 3, 17 & 79---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10-A---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Agreement to sell attested by one witness---Trial Court rejecting plaint due to defective attestation---Legality---Respondent No.1 (through LRs) filed suit for specific performance and injunction based on an alleged agreement for purchase of suit land; the Trial Court rejected the plaint under O.VII R.11(d), C.P.C. for want of two attesting witnesses, but the Appellate Court set aside that rejection and remanded the suit, which order was under challenge in the present revision petition---Legal question requiring determination in the present matter was as to “whether a suit could be dismissed without recording evidence by invoking Art.17 or 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984?”---Held: Trial Court adopted a preemptive measure and it had rejected the plaint which was contrary to the language of Art.79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 which did not declare a suit would be barred or in other words it did not preclude the party from filing a suit and whenever a party file a suit while lacking attesting witnesses of the agreement, it could not fall under R.11(d), C.P.C.---Without arriving at evidence stage and without crossing the different stages of evidence, dependent upon the requirements of Arts.2 and 3 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat, 1984, the provision of Art.79 could not be invoked---It was not permissible for the Trial Court to jump straightaway over Art.79 while bypassing the whole scheme of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Views of Trial Court about the infirmity of agreement which led to decision to reject the plaint was based on surmises, assumptions and conjectures---Stage as required under Art.79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 i.e. “it shall not be used as evidence until two attesting witnesses at least have been called for the purpose of proving its execution” had not arrived or in other words the Trial Court had not afforded opportunity to the plaintiff to come into witness box, adduce evidence, produce document or agreement on oath, undergo the test of cross-examination and prove of the execution of agreement as per assertiveness and aspiration of doctrine of fair trial as embodied under Art.10-A of the Constitution---Trial Court was directed to proceed with the suit by recording evidence---Order passed by the Appellate Court was maintained---Present revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Nazir Ahmed v. Muzaffar Hussain 2008 SCMR 1639; Sheikh Muhammad Muneer v. Mst. Feezan PLD 2021 SC 538; Farid Bakhsh v. Jind Wadda 2015 SCMR 1044; State v. Farman Hussain PLD 1995 SC 1 and Khan Mir Daud Khan and others v. Mahrullah and others PLD 2001 SC 67 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VII, R.11---“Rejection of plaint in suit” and “dismissal of suit”---Distinction---Scope---Order VII, R.11, C.P.C. refer only words the “rejection of plaint in suit” which ought to be applied by Trial Court having power and jurisdiction to adjudicate the lis and whenever any of the basic ingredients mentioned at (a) to (d) in O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. are available on examination of plaint including documents attached thereto---In contrast, the “dismissal of suit” connotes that it is a final determination of controversy between the parties---The power and jurisdiction to dismiss the suit can only apply by Trial Court when the parties have adduced evidence, produced documents on oath and undergone with the test of cross-examination by opposite party and finally fails to clear the test of “prove”---Another key difference between the “rejection of plaint in suit” and “dismissal of suit” is that the former keep opens the door for the plaintiff to re-try or re-file or re-institute a fresh suit or, in other words, the plaintiff cannot be precluded to file afresh suit on same cause of action or joinder of new cause of actions, against same parties or include other parties or on same subject-matter or with addition or subtraction of subject-matter where it is possible for him according to situation---In contrast, the later strictly prohibit the plaintiff to institute fresh suit---The plaintiff cannot file fresh suit against the same parties (including legitimate successor in interest or successor in office) or in respect of same subject-matter---The legal position is further tightened on the point of cause of action---In former case, the cause of action may be kept same for the plaintiff or he may join more cause of action to re-agitate or institute suit whilst the later omitted the point of cause of action and paved out another way to tackle the cases on examination of earlier subject matter decided either directly or indirectly in previous suit (case) and it can only be invoked when the evidence is recorded, the documents have been produced on oath and such document could be read as admissible evidence by Trial Court or otherwise while delivering the judgment---However, in both situations law provides statutory remedies against either Order of rejection of plaint in suit or dismissal of suit by way of judgment. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.11---Res judicata, doctrine of---Concept and scope---The doctrine of res judicata isbased on the three maxims: (i.) ‘Nemo debet bis vaxari pro una et eadem cansa’which means none should be vexed twice for thesame cause; (ii.) ‘Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ which meansthat it is in the interest of the state that there should bean end to litigation; (iii.) ‘Res judicata pro veritate accipitur’ which means that a judicial decision must be accepted as correct---The doctrine of res judicata prohibits the re-litigation of matters which is otherwise already decided by a court---The theory of res judicata is the culmination of the public purpose embodied in the three maxims, and it applies to all judicial processes, civil or criminal---The theory of res judicata is based on justice, equity, and moral conscience---This concept and its provision serves as a strong deterrent to re-try or re-agitate any lawsuits or disputes that were previously and conclusively resolved between the same parties under the same title or on same subject-matter---The main goal of "res judicata" is to provide court decisions a sense of finality and certainty in order to prevent protracted litigation and protect parties from being harassed---Furthermore, the "res judicata" has more connotations than just its literal translation---It is not limited to literally meanings but it is also used in modern legal discourse to refer to "claim preclusion", a robust and firm concept that guaranteeing that a judgment's binding or settled disputes. Lal Chand v. Radhakrishnan 1 (1977) 2 SCC 88 and Duchess of Kingston Case (1776) 20 Howell's State Trials 355 ref. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts.17, 79 & 81---Execution of a document---Proof---Production of two attesting witnesses, requirement of---Exception to the general requirement---Where the execution of a document is admitted by the executant himself, the examination of attesting witness is not necessary. (e) Administration of justice--- ----Each case has to be decided on its own facts---The Court cannot force or knock out someone’s suit having variegated style and nature of lis. Sajjad Ahmad Khan v. Mohammad Saleem Alvi and others Civil Petition No. 84 of 2016 ref. (f) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.12 & 39---Agreement to sell---Defendant’s bare denial of execution in written statement---Requirement to challenge the agreement through separate proceedings---Scope---Even where the defendant in his written statement alleges the agreement and his signatures over the same as fake and fictitious but has not specifically challenged the agreement in question either by way of criminal proceedings or through a civil suit, a simple denial of a document being fake and fictitious is not legally sufficient unless the same facts are proved and established on the record. Muhammad Sattar v. Tariq Javaid 2017 SCMR 98 and Abdul Hameed v. Jahangir Khan Civil Petition No. 3097 of 2015 and Civil Appeal No. 1074 of 2015 rel. (g) Administration of justice--- ----When law requires a thing to be done in particular manner then, it should be done in that manner and anything done in conflict of the command of law shall be unlawful being prohibited or not permissible. The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons 2017 SCMR 1427; Zia ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed Hussain 2014 SCMR 1015 and Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi and others PLD 2018 SC 189 rel. (h) Administration of justice--- ----It is indispensable and imperative sense of the duty of a Court in application of law and its interpreting to essentially delve into and realistically discover the intention of the legislature about the statutes---It is not possible for Trial Court to take departure from the amplitude of evidential rules by importing a particular rule in order to decide the matter summarily. (i) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts.17 & 79---Whether a scribe of a document can be an attesting witness---Permissibility and legality---A scribe is not an attesting witness in terms of Arts.17 & 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 though he has written the agreement or signed in some manners except as an attesting witness---The scribe of a document can only be a competent witness in terms of Arts.17 & 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 if he has put his signature as an attesting witness of the document and not otherwise---The signing of the document in the capacity of a writer or scribe does not fulfill and meet the mandatory requirement of attestation, however, he may be examined by the concerned party for the corroboration of the evidence of the marginal witnesses. Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din through Legal Heirs and others PLD 2011 SC 241; N. Kamalam and another v. Ayyasamy and another (2001) 7 SC cases 507 and Khudadad v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah @ S. Inaam Hussain and others Civil Appeals Nos. 39-K to 40-K of 2021 rel. Khirpal Chetan Dev for Applicants (called absent). Kanji Mal Meghwar for Respondent No. 1. Ayaz Ali Rajpar, Assistant A.A.G Sindh for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.