Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) [as amended by Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act (XX of 2022)]--- ----Ss. 6 & 9(2), Sr. No.(6)---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Vehicle not produced before the Court---Prosecution case was that 2000-grams Ice (Methamphetamine) was recovered from the vehicle driven by accused---Alleged bus/coach had not been produced before the Trial Court at the time of recording evidence of witnesses--- Investigating Officer visited the place of incident on the pointation of complainant and prepared such memo. but he did not bother to inspect the coach in order to verify as to whether there was sufficient space under the driver seat to keep the alleged recovered Ice ---Non-production of alleged coach at the time of examination of witnesses casted serious doubts in prosecution case---As per prosecution claim, the alleged coach reached the pointed place from “T” without any passenger, co-driver and conductor---In his cross-examination, Investigating Officer showed unawareness about any other driver and conductor in the coach---Investigating Officer did not remember if the appellant being single driver had driven the coach from “T” to “K”---Said fact did not appeal to a prudent mind that a passenger carriage would start its travel from “T” to “K” without boarding any passenger and having no other co-driver or conductor and did not stop at any police, customs and excise posts in its route of more than 650 kilometer for checking purpose---Said facts of the case led to inference that the entire exercise of arrest of appellant and recovery of the Ice from his possession in the instant case was highly doubtful---Appeal was allowed and conviction and sentence of accused were set-aside. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, then accused would be entitled to such benefit not as a matter of grace and concession, but as a matter of right. Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel. Hafeezullah Khan for Appellant. Abrar Ali Khichi, Additional Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 17th February, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 31.01.2018 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench in Crl.A. No. 132-A of 2013 with Murder Reference No. 87-A of 2013). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(ii) & 452---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 237, 342 & 537---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, ghayr-jaifah damiyah, ghayr-jaifah badi'ah and house-trespass---Re-appraisal of evidence---Right to a fair trial---Defective charge---Fact not confronted to accused---Grave procedural irregularity---Effect---Sentence reduced---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for committing three murders and was sentenced to death on three counts---Validity---Omission to frame a charge for a distinct offence is a substantial illegality, rendering the trial a nullity--- Such omission is not a mere irregularity, that can be cured under section 537, Cr.P.C. rather, is a defect, that strikes at the root of proceedings, necessitating intervention to prevent miscarriage of justice---Procedural safeguard under section 342, Cr.P.C. ensures that accused is confronted with all incriminating evidence to afford him opportunity to explain circumstances against him---Omission to "frame a charge", coupled with failure to put a material accusation to accused under section 342, Cr.P.C., was a grave procedural irregularity that could not be remedied under section 537, Cr.P.C., as it resulted in a fundamental breach of the right to a fair trial---In such mitigating circumstances imposition of maximum penalty was not warranted---Absence of a proven motive, coupled with circumstances indicating absence of premeditation, necessitated reconsideration of quantum of punishment---Accused was entitled to a lesser sentence, as Courts are obligated to ensure that punishment awarded is proportionate to facts and circumstances of case---Supreme Court maintained conviction of accused but converted sentence of death into imprisonment for life---Appeal was allowed. M. Younus Habib v. The State PLD 2006 SC 153; Arbab Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 755; Khan Zado v. The State 2015 PCr.LJ 1561; Noor Muhammad Khatti v. The State 2005 PCr.LJ 1889; Md. Mosaddar Hoque v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131; Zahid Shahzad v. The State 1981 PCr.LJ 844; Nemai Adak v. The State AIR 1965 Cal 89; Istahar Khondkar v. Emperor AIR 1936 Cal 796; Muhammad Akram alias Akrai v. The State 2019 SCMR 610 and Ghulam Rasool v. The State 2025 SCMR 74 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Sentence, quantum of---Death sentence, commuted to imprisonment for life---Principle---If offence resulted from a spontaneous altercation rather than a premeditated act, death sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment. Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Kausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General for the State. Complainant in person. Date of hearing: 20th February, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 31.01.2022 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No. 13-P of 2021). Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5---Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, Rr. 8, 10, 11, 12 & Form II, columns Nos. 13 & 16---Suit for recovery of jewelry and share in house--- Form of Nikahnama---Absence of entry---Petitioner / ex-wife was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court declining her jewelry allegedly snatched by respondent / ex-husband from her and her Shari share in ancestral house---Held, that petitioner / ex-wife admitted before Trial Court that she had given jewelry to respondent / ex-husband herself on his demand, therefore, there was no question of either snatching or taking away the same forcefully from her---Findings of Trial Court and High Court did not warrant any interference as allegation of snatching away of gold from her had remained unproved---High Court had rightly observed that columns Nos. 13 and 16 of Nikahnama entitled petitioner / ex-wife to have her Shari share in ancestral property, which respondent / ex-husband was bound to provide her, without any exception---Supreme Court maintained the judgment passed by High Court, as the same did not suffer from any misreading or non-reading of evidence or facts on record---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Ijaz Ahmed Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with Petitioner (video link from Peshawar). Nemo for the Respondents. Date of hearing: 7th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S. 9(2), Sr. No. (5)---Possession of ICE-methamphetamine---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the accused-applicant was that 810-gram methamphetamine was recovered from his possession---Record showed that the applicant was not present at the time of the alleged recovery of the parcel containing contraband ICE (Methamphetamine) and there was no evidence of his exclusive possession of the substance---Prosecution had neither alleged that the contraband was recovered pursuant to any disclosure, identification or involvement of the applicant nor adduced credible proof to establish the applicant's conscious knowledge or intentional possession of the narcotic substance---Such failure to substantiate a direct nexus between the applicant and the contraband critically eroded the foundational linkage necessary to implicate him in the alleged offence---Possibility existed that the applicant's identity was misused or that an impersonation occurred, warranting further inquiry---Prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case strong enough to justify the denial of bail---While narcotics-related offences were indeed serious, the gravity of the offence alone could not be the sole ground for refusing bail---Thus, based on the prosecution's material in its present form, the case fell within the scope of further inquiry as envisaged under S.497(2), Cr.P.C.---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Abdul Manan v. The State 2021 SCMR 1804 and Hussainullah v. The State and another 2019 SCMR 1651 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in the bail order are solely for the purpose of deciding the bail application and should not influence the merits of the case during the trial proceedings. Shafique Ahmed for Applicant. Sarfraz Ahmed Mangi, Special Prosecutor ANF for the State. Order Jan Ali Junejo, J .--- The present Criminal Bail Application has been filed on behalf of the Applicant/Accused, who is seeking post-arrest bail in connection with a case stemming from FIR No.45 of 2024, registered at P.S. ANF-II, Karachi, under Section 9(2) Sr. Nos. 5, 14, 15, Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Applicant/Accused initially approached the learned Court of Special Judge, CNS-I, Karachi by filing Bail Application in Special Case No.132 of 2024, which was subsequently dismissed by the learned Special Court, CNS-I vide its Order dated 14-01-2025. 2. The facts relevant to the present criminal bail application are as follows: "On July 13, 2024, at 0010 hours, SI Muhammad Saleem of PS ANF Korangi received information from DHL Operations Manager Asad Muqeem regarding a suspicious parcel booked by ACHME Logistic Karachi for Bahrain. Accompanied by ANF staff, SI Saleem inspected the parcel at DHL's JIAP office, finding sender and receiver details both under Muhammad Asif. The parcel contained nine grease guns concealing methamphetamine within piston-like cups, totaling 810 grams. Samples (10 grams each) were extracted, sealed, and labeled for analysis, while remaining items were secured as evidence. DHL staff declined to witness the process, so ANF personnel served as witnesses. The FIR, registered under CNSA 1997 Sections 9(2), 14, and 15, implicates the un-arrested sender and receiver". 3. The learned counsel for the Applicant has argued that there are no reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed the offence, as the case requires further inquiry and the applicant is innocent, falsely implicated by the police for ulterior motives. He further contends that the FIR's narrative is fabricated, uncorroborated, and improbable, noting the applicant's absence from the crime scene, the complainant's failure to provide the alleged caller's phone number, and the lack of DHL staff witnesses. He argues that the applicant's arrest away from the scene and the absence of independent mashirs during recovery-relying solely on police officers-violate Section 103 Cr.P.C, rendering the recovery process suspect. He further asserts that this procedural flaw underscores a risk of manipulation and false implication, given the potential for police misconduct. He contends that the case warrants deeper scrutiny, as the applicant is neither a dangerous criminal nor previously convicted, and all prosecution witnesses are police officials subordinate to the complainant, creating a conflict of interest. He emphasizes that the charges do not attract death, life imprisonment, or a ten-year sentence, and nothing was recovered from the applicant's possession, highlighting the prosecution's failure to involve private mashirs and exposing mala fide intent. He further argues that bail cannot be denied even if the accused absconded, as legal ambiguities must favor the accused in cases requiring further inquiry. Lastly, the learned counsel for the Applicant has prayed for grant of bail to the Applicant. 4. The learned Special Prosecutor for the ANF opposes the bail application, advancing the following contra arguments: He contends that the Applicant is prima facie connected to the commission of the offence, as evidenced by credible material on record, including the FIR, witness statements, and recovery proceedings, which collectively establish a strong likelihood of guilt. He asserts that the gravity of the offence under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA) - which prescribes stringent punishments, including life imprisonment - necessitates strict adherence to the legal presumption against bail in narcotics cases. He argues that the FIR's narrative is neither fabricated nor improbable, as the prosecution has corroborated the applicant's involvement through technical evidence (e.g., call records) and witness testimonies, even if the caller's number or DHL staff witnesses were not explicitly disclosed at this stage. He emphasizes that the absence of the Applicant at the scene of the crime does not absolve liability, as the CNSA criminalizes conspiracy, abetment, and indirect involvement in narcotics trafficking. He further contends that the recovery process, though involving police mashirs, complied with procedural safeguards under Section 103 Cr.P.C., as the law permits official witnesses in exigent circumstances where independent witnesses are unavailable or reluctant to participate, particularly in high-risk narcotics cases. He refutes claims of procedural mala fides, stating that the prosecution's reliance on police witnesses is justified given the specialized nature of ANF operations and the inherent risks of tampering or intimidation by accused persons in drug-related crimes. He highlights that the Applicant's alleged role as a key conspirator in a transnational narcotics network renders him a flight risk, given the severe penalties involved and the possibility of influencing witnesses or destroying evidence if released. He counters the assertion of the Applicant's "law-abiding" character by citing intelligence reports and prior surveillance indicating his links to organized crime, even if no prior convictions are recorded. He stresses that the statutory bar under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C applies, as the offence involves a sentence of life imprisonment, and the Applicant has failed to rebut the statutory presumption against bail under Section 497(3) Cr.P.C. He disputes the claim of "further inquiry," arguing that the prosecution has already presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, and further investigation is underway to uncover the full extent of the Applicant's involvement. He warns that granting bail in such cases undermines public confidence in the justice system and risks perpetuating the narcotics trade, which has devastating societal consequences. Lastly, the learned Special Prosecutor requests the Court to dismiss the bail application to ensure the integrity of the trial and public safety. 5. I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant/accused as well as the learned Special Prosecutor for ANF. Furthermore, I have meticulously examined the material available on record with utmost care and judicial prudence. A review of the case record reveals that the prosecution's case is based entirely on circumstantial evidence rather than direct proof. The Applicant was not present at the time of the alleged recovery of the parcel containing contraband ICE (Methamphetamine), and there is no evidence of his exclusive possession of the substance. The prosecution has neither alleged that the contraband narcotics were recovered pursuant to any disclosure, identification, or involvement of the Applicant nor adduced credible proof to establish the Applicant's conscious knowledge or intentional possession of the narcotic substance. This failure to substantiate a direct nexus between the Applicant and the contraband critically erodes the foundational linkage necessary to implicate him in the alleged offence. Additionally, the lack of corroborative evidence and the absence of statements from DHL officials leave critical questions about the Applicant's involvement unanswered. There also exists a possibility that the Applicant's identity was misused or that an impersonation occurred, warranting further inquiry. The legal principle of "requiring further inquiry" applies when evidence is inconclusive or contradictory. In this case, the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case strong enough to justify the denial of bail. While narcotics-related offences are indeed serious, the gravity of the offence alone cannot be the sole ground for refusing bail. In case of Abdul Manan v. The State (2021 SCMR 1804), it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan that: "Learned counsel appearing on behalf of State after going through the file confirms that there is no connection of the petitioner with the said vehicle and even nothing was recovered from his personal possession or on his pointation. He, however, contends that petitioner was in the vehicle and in the circumstances it can be safely presumed that he had conscious knowledge of the narcotics concealed in that vehicle. and even he attempted to run away from the spot, when the police signalled the vehicle to stop. The question, the petitioner who was not a driver of the vehicle had conscious knowledge of narcotics concealed in the vehicle needs serious consideration, which shall be determined by the learned trial Court after recording evidence. In the circumstances, case against the petitioner calls for further inquiry falling within the ambit of section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure". In a comparable factual matrix, the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan granted post-arrest bail to the accused person in Hussainullah v. The State and another (2019 SCMR 1651), wherein the Court underscored the principle that the absence of exclusive possession of the narcotic substance, coupled with inconclusive evidence linking the accused to the contraband, constitutes sufficient grounds for bail. 6. Given these circumstances, I am of the considered view that, based on the prosecution's material in its present form, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry as envisaged under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). In light of the foregoing discussion, I am convinced that the Applicant has successfully established a prima facie case for the grant of bail. 7. In light of the foregoing analysis and reasoning, the bail application filed on behalf of the Applicant (accused) is hereby allowed. Consequently, post-arrest bail is granted to the Applicant, subject to the submission of a solvent surety in the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Hundred Thousand), to the satisfaction of the trial Court. This shall be accompanied by the execution of a personal recognizance (P.R.) bond in the corresponding sum. It is further emphasized that the observations made in this order are solely for the purpose of deciding this bail application and shall not influence the merits of the case during the trial proceedings. These are the reasons for the Short Order dated: 05-03-2025. JK/M-80/Sindh Bail granted.

Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 15-A---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 181---Restoration of possession---Limitation---Principle of laches---Applicability---Grievance of appellant/tenant was that after seeking her ejectment from the premises on basis of personal need, the respondent/landlord did not utilize it for his bona fide personal need---Rent Controller allowed the application of appellant/tenant and ordered to restore possession to her but Lower Appellate Court and High Court declined to interfere in the ejectment order---Validity---Tenant cannot be given an unlimited period of time to apply under section 15-A of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Period of one year cannot be construed as a period of limitation for tenant to apply but such right cannot be extended indefinitely at the leisure of tenant---Such application should be preferred within a reasonable period of time and it is for Rent Controller to decide whether the application is hit by laches rather than applying limitation period as provided under residuary Article 181 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908---Supreme Court directed to restore possession of premises to appellant/tenant and set aside the orders passed by High Court and Lower Appellate Court---Appeal was allowed. Words and Phrases (West Publishing Co.) Vol. 18A, (Permanent Edition, Pages 84-85); Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, John S. James, (Volume 2, page 1172); Law Terms and Phrases (Judicially Interpreted, Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Khan Mokal) Page 416; Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon and Legal Maxims [2nd Edition, Page 942 (1986)]; Oxford. Dictionary of Law [Elizabeth A. martin 2022 Ed.], Page 328; Merriam Webster. Merriam Webster. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/good%20faith]; Legal Information Institute [Cornell Law School] [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/good faith]; Abdul Ghaffar and others v. Mst. Mumtaz PLD 1976 SC 572; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239; Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah 2001 SCMR 286; The Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1935 Bombay 35; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239; Collector of Customs (Appraisement) v. Messrs Saleem Adaya, Karachi PLD 1999 Karachi 76; Haji Muhammad Ashraf v. The State and 3 others 1999 MLD 330; Haji Hussain Haji Dawood through LRs and others v. M.Y. Kherati 2002 SCMR 343; Abdul Ghaffar v Mumtaz PLD 1982 SC 88; Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540; Rahim Jan v. Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 1303; The Rule of Law. (2010 Edition); Dr. Mobashir Hassan and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 265; Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 923; Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. v. Mrs. Nasreen Irshad 85 others 1989 SCMR 1892 and Abdus Sattar Molla v. Crown PLD 1958 FC 145 ref. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----General and special law---Scope---Specific or detailed provisions of a legal instrument should prevail over more general or conflicting provisions---When provision of a general law and special law addresses same issue or matter, the general law is impliedly repealed to the extent that the special law applies---In determining whether a statute is special or general, the focal point of consideration should principally and fundamentally be the subject matter---In the exigency of deciphering the Legislative intent or in case of conflict, the rule of harmonious construction can be adopted to interpret both co-existing provisions in a manner that gives effect to both without rendering either ineffectual or out of order. (c) Maxim--- ----Fiat justitia ruat caelum---Meaning---Let justice be done though heavens fall. (d) Maxim--- ----Ex debito justitiae---Meaning---Doctrine of ex debito justitiae refers to remedies to which a person is entitled to as of right, as opposed to a remedy which is discretionary---Such maxim applies to remedies that a Court is bound to give when they are claimed, as distinct from those that it has discretion to grant, where it is the foremost duty of Court to do complete justice. (e) Administration of justice--- ----Continuing wrong, doctrine of---Scope---If law is violated, the wrongdoer is continuously liable for penalty envisioned under law---Quintessence of continuing wrong is an act which triggers a continuing source of injury but the Courts should not be fervent or zealous to hold continuing wrong or default unless the language of statute or its provision clearly expresses such intention of legislature, or the nature of such injury is considered continuing, or it is based on a recurring cause of action. (f) Maxim--- ----Expressio unius est exlusio alterius---Connotation---Expressio unius est exlusio alterius denotes that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other or of the alternative, keeping in mind that if a law or contract explicitly mentions one thing it is assumed that other things are not included. (g) Maxim--- ----Ex visceribus actus----Connotation---Phrase ex visceribus actus deciphers the principle that every section/clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject matter. (h) Maxim--- ----Ut res magis valeat quam pereat---Connotation---Principle of giving effect to the matter rather than having it fail. Appellant in person. Badar Alam, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Kashif Badar, Advocate for Respondents Nos. 1-3. Iftikhar Javed Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court Amicus Curiae. Date of hearing: 24th December, 2024.

Summary: Sindh Industrial Relations Act (XXIX of 2013)--- ----S.34---Termination from service---Grievance petition before the Labour Court---Non-service of grievance notice on the employer before filing of grievance petition---Effect---Such an omission would be fatal to the competency of grievance petition---The petitioner establishment (employer) through the present Constitutional petition challenged the judgment passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, whereby, respondent No.1 (employee) was reinstated into the petitioner establishment with back benefits after setting aside the Labour Court's order---Petitioner establishment argued that the Appellate Tribunal overlooked undisputed facts and legal provisions, wrongly concluding that respondent No.1 was a permanent worker, despite no convincing evidence and non-service of grievance notice as required under S. 34 of the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013 (SIRA)---Held: It was undisputed (admitted in cross-examination by respondent No.1) that the grievance notice was not served at the address of the petitioner establishment (employer) but at the premises of CEO of the petitioner establishment, in spite of the fact that respondent No.1 was doing duty at the official premises of the petitioner establishment---This was fatal to the case of respondent Employee---Impugned judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was set aside because grievance notice before the Labour Court was incompetently filed and this basic aspect of the case was overlooked by the Labour Appellate Court---Constitutional petition was disposed of, in circumstances. Khushal Khan v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2002 SCMR 943 rel. Sufiyan Zaman for Petitioner. S. Inayat Hussain Shah Bukhari for Respondent No.1. Nemo. for Respondent No.2. Dates of hearing: 17th and 24th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Islamic law--- ----Right of pre-emption---Whether inheritable or not---Right of preemption will run with the land and is not personal for the purposes of its enforceability in a Court of law---In other words, the right of pre-emption is to be personal to a preemptor until a decree is passed in his favour and, during that interregnum, said right is neither transferable nor in heritable---In such a situation if the preemptor dies before obtaining a decree in his favour in the Trial Court or the appellate or Revisional Court, his right of preemption shall remain exclusively personal and shall not survive to his heirs---But no sooner a decree is passed in favour of the pre-emptor than the right becomes a proprietary one and is capable of not only being transferred but also inheritable as well. Muhammad Yousaf alias Yousaf Ali v. Talib Hussain 2012 SCMR 1185 Noor and others v.Mst. Sattan through Legal Representatives and others PLD 2013 Lah. 30; Maqsood Ahmed and others v. Member Board of Revenue Punjab Lahore and others 2007 SCMR 399 and Fateh Khan v. Boze Mir PLD 1991 SC 782 rel. (b) Islamic law--- ----Pre-emption suit---Possession through pre-emption---Sale price, determination of--- Appellants had acquired the subject property against whom and the other respondents, the respondent No. 1, initiated proceedings for claiming his right of pre-emption---Said proceedings were decreed by the Trial Court which was upheld by the first appellate Court---Validity---In the present case, record showed that the Trial Court had preferred to keep the price as was up in 1987 which could never be entertained as inflation was an ever visible element and the amount required to be deposited in year 2013 could not by any stretch of imagination be considered as adjustable amount that was paid in 1987---Revision was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Islamic Law--- ----Pre-emption suit---Possession through pre-emption---Right of pre-emption---Talb-i-Muwathibat not proved---Appellants had acquired the subject property against whom and the other respondents, the respondent No. 1, initiated proceedings for claiming his right of pre-emption---Said proceedings were decreed by the Trial Court which was upheld by the first appellate Court---Validity---Record showed that a witness said to have been present at the time of first Talb though had died, but the claimant of the pre-emption preferred never to bring any secondary evidence in that regard---In the cross-examination, the appellant and the seller both had stated that no first Talab was made and irrespective of the contentions raised in the written statement, which were apparently never confronted to the witness, the material in record did not show that the respondent No.1 was able to prove that the first Talb was ever made---In the said circumstances the decree of preemption was not available---Revision was allowed, in circumstances. Imdad Ali Memon for Applicants. Barrister Jawad Ahmed Qureshi for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Date of hearing: 7th March, 2025. Judgment Mahmood A. Khan, J .--- In this revision application, the last judgment passed by the appellate Court as well as trial Court has been impugned in the proceedings of Civil Appeal No.59 of 2013 and F.C Suit No.31 of 1983, wherein the applicants are the persons who have acquired the subject property against whom and the other respondents, the respondent No.1 initiated proceedings for claiming his right of preemption. The said proceedings were decreed by the learned trial Court which was up-held where-after approach at the appellate stage as well as to this Court was made and thereafter to the Honourable Supreme Court leave was granted by order dated 02.04.2010. The matter was finally heard on 16.05.2013, when it was remanded and apparently the remand order required apart from the questions of grant of leave referred above (as the Honourable Supreme Court had preferred not to reply to the same) along with the points i.e. the decree is to be passed in terms of Order XXII Rule 14 C.P.C and to question whether the right of preemptor after his death survived or not to be decided by the trial Court as well as appellate Court. 2. It also bears from the record that the original decree in the matter had not provided the date of deposit of the amount after the matter having been remanded the learned trial Court decreed the suit at the same amount as earlier considering that the appellant has enjoyed the benefit of availing possession although discussed the inflation of prices and the original price not being available. Whereas the learned appellate Court had preferred not to discuss the forgiving points as referred above nor discussed the element of price. It also bears from the record that the amount required by the decree was deposited on 17.08.2013. It has also come on record that the persons claiming preemption right had expired on 22.07.2002. 3. On the earlier date, I had specifically called upon the learned counsel(s) for the assistance as to the preemption right liable for inheritance as under Muslim Law such right is not open to inheritance. Learned counsel for the applicants had relied upon the following authorities in this regard and has further contended that the question of witness at the first call is also left to be answered which has not been considered by the Courts below, whereas in respect of inheritable right learned counsel has contended that such right not being open is not available. Learned counsel in this regard has relied upon the case of Muhammad Yousaf alias Yousaf Ali v. Talib Hussain reported as [2012 SCMR page 1185). 4. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 however, contended that the right of inheritance is available and in this regard he has referred to the case of Noor and others v. Mst. Sattan through Legal Representatives and others reported as [PLD 2013 Lahore 30), Maqsood Ahmed and others v. Member Board of Revenue Punjab Lahore and others reported as [2007 SCMR 399] and Fateh Khan v. Boze Mir reported as [PLD 1991 SC 782) and contended that once the decree has been obtained the right is to continue. In respect of the quoted authority of Noor and others v. Sattan through Legal Representatives and others, perhaps the typo has occurred as the case of Arshad Iqbal through LRs v. Abdul Qayyum Khan Babar is written as 1990 CLC page 1883 which ought to have been 1183, wherein it has been held that once a decree has been obtained the legal heirs are liable to obtain benefit. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon Para 239 of Muhammad Law by Mullahi, claiming that in some conditions it is available. He has also contended that the trial Court in the original has considered that the admission of the seller as to offer made in his written statement Para 5 thereof the cross-examination and evidence irrespective to the statement in deviation thereof coming in the chief no cross-examination was required along with evidence to prove otherwise. 5. Having heard the learned counsel(s) for the parties and gone through the record. As such there are three (03) questions to be answered in the present matter. (1) Whether and in what conditions the inheritable right under a decree of preemption is available? (2) Whether the date of payment of amount as determined by the trial Court is liable to be considered along with the price as given therein? (3) Whether the plaintiff in the matter was able to prove his two required Talbs for the right of preemption. As to the question No.1, the judgment of Arshad Iqbal through LRs v. Abdul Qayyum Khan Babar (mentioned supra) relied upon by learned counsel has held that the right of pre-emption runs with the land and is not personal for the purposes of its enforceability in a Court of law. In other words, the right opmtomies to be personal to a preemptor until a decree is passed in his favour and, during this interregnum, this right is neither transferable nor heritable. In such a situation if the preemptor dies before obtaining a decree in his favour in the trial Court or as the case may be, the appellate or Revisional Court, his right of preemption shall remain exclusively personal and shall not survive to his heirs. But no sooner is a decree passed in favour of the pre-emptor than the right becomes a proprietary one and capable not only to be transferred but to be inherited as well. As such, once a decree has been obtained the determination of right has been made by the Court of law, the same crystallizes to the position that the same can be transferred by a further process, as such, the assignment of decree available under the C.P.C. However, the matter is not limited to the same in the present case the reason being that this right cannot go on indefinite, there has to be a restriction of enforceability accompanying the same. In the present case, where though after the decree the existence of the right to be further processed by the legal heirs cannot be found denied, however, the indefinite element cannot be allowed. The limitation of filing of first execution being three years from the date of a decrec along with the requirement seems to be not required and fulfilled. In the present case, it is as such held that in case the amount of decree that was awarded for the first time in 31.03.1987, had the respondent No.1 preferred to deposit the amount as determined or at least make an approach to the Court within a period of three years, the right that could have existed may have continued; failing which, the right though may be available may not have any force of enforcement which is otherwise the law of limitation in respect of claims that the right exists but the remedy is lost. 6. In the present case it bears from the record that the trial Court has preferred to keep the price as earlier coming up in 1987 which can never be entertained as the inflation is an ever visible element and the amount required to be deposited in year 2013 cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as adjustable amount that was paid in 1987. The stand that the other party was enjoying the same is not found favourable as the other side never out pocket the price amount and both the parties cannot be provided any benefit or for that matter any law on account of the acts / process of the Courts. 7. In respect to the third question, I have gone through the evidence with the assistance of learned counsel(s) wherein the witness Muhammad Yaqoob said to have being present at the first talb though have died, the claimant of the preemption preferred never to bring any secondary evidence in this regard. In the cross-examination, the appellant and the seller both have stated that no first talab was made and irrespective to the contentions raised in the written statement which were apparently never confronted to the witness the material in record does not show that the respondent No.1 was able to prove that the first talab was ever made and in the said circumstances the decree of pre-emption is not found available also. 8. For the forgiving reasons, this Revision Application stands allowed and consequently both the judgments of the trial Court as well as appellate Court are set-aside. JK/A-49/Sindh Revision allowed

Summary: (a) Constitutional petition—Maintainability—Availability of alternate statutory remedy ––AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, Art. 44; AJ&K Board of Revenue Act, 1993, S. 7(2); AJ&K Board of Revenue (Conduct of Appeals and Revisions) Rules, 1993, R. 6. A writ petition under Art. 44 of the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974 is not maintainable where an alternate and efficacious statutory remedy exists. Under S.7(2) of the AJ&K Board of Revenue Act, 1993 read with R.6 of the AJ&K Board of Revenue (Conduct of Appeals and Revisions) Rules, 1993, a revision before the Full Board of Revenue lies against an order of a Member Board of Revenue who has reversed or modified an order of a subordinate revenue authority. The petitioner, whose appeal had been reversed by the Member Board of Revenue (Judicial), ought to have invoked this revisional jurisdiction instead of directly approaching the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction. (b) Writ jurisdiction—Principles governing its exercise—Doctrine of alternate remedy ––Writ jurisdiction is discretionary and not to be invoked where the petitioner has a specific, adequate, and efficacious remedy provided by statute. The High Court rightly declined to entertain the petition where revision before the Full Board was competent and unavailed. Judicial review under Art. 44 may only be invoked when no alternate forum exists or where exceptional circumstances such as mala fides, coram non judice action, or violation of natural justice are established—which was not the case here. (Muhammad Munir v. Chairman/Chairperson AJ&K BISE, 2006 SCR 29; Forest Department v. Mst. Saleem Akhtar & others, 2024 SCR 17; Ch. Muhammad Yunas Arvi v. Abdul Aziz Chaudhary, 2011 SCR 50, rel.) (c) Revenue jurisdiction—Scope of revisional powers under the Board of Revenue Act ––S.7(2) AJ&K Board of Revenue Act, 1993—Revision before Full Board. The statutory framework clearly envisages a two-tier structure: orders of Commissioners appealable to a Member Board of Revenue, and orders of Members on appeal revisable by the Full Board. This hierarchical scheme precludes direct recourse to constitutional jurisdiction when the statute itself prescribes a complete remedy. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Awais v. Full Board of Revenue & others, 2023 SCR 745 • Muhammad Munir v. Chairman/Chairperson AJ&K Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education & others, 2006 SCR 29 • Forest Department v. Mst. Saleem Akhtar & others, 2024 SCR 17 • Ch. Muhammad Yunas Arvi v. Abdul Aziz Chaudhary & others, 2011 SCR 50 Disposition: Writ petition dismissed in limine as not maintainable due to availability of an alternate and efficacious statutory remedy by way of revision before the Full Board of Revenue under S.7(2) of the AJ&K Board of Revenue Act, 1993 read with R.6 of the 1993 Rules.