Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) ----Ss. 164(2), 364 & 173 --- Confessional/statement under S. 164—Magistrate’s duty to promptly forward to the trial Court—Failure to do so is a procedural irregularity that cannot prejudice the complainant or foreclose recording of the Magistrate’s testimony—Trial Court erred in refusing to examine PW-18 (then SDM who recorded S. 164 statement) solely because the statement was not before the Court prior to S. 242 proceedings—High Court also erred in upholding that refusal. Court directed that an inquiry be initiated into non-compliance with S. 164(2) and recurrence of such lapses by Magistrates; High Court to issue system-level directions and training to ensure timely compliance. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) ----S. 540 --- Summoning material witness—Scope and duty—Court’s powers under S. 540 are wide and two-fold (“may” and “shall”); if evidence appears essential to a just decision, the Court must summon/examine or re-call the witness even at a late stage—Trial Court ought to have summoned PW-18 notwithstanding earlier procedural orders; adherence to technicalities cannot defeat the quest for truth in a murder trial. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) ----S. 242 --- Accused’s examination—Where earlier proceedings overlooked an essential prosecution statement, the Trial Court may consider re-recording the S. 242 Cr.PC statement, if necessary to secure the ends of justice. (d) Constitution / Administration of Justice --- ----Right to fair trial (principles reaffirmed) Fair trial is a foundational guarantee; Courts must ensure all relevant evidence is brought on record and that parties receive a meaningful opportunity to examine and cross-examine—Procedural lapses by public functionaries (e.g., delayed forwarding of a S. 164 statement) cannot be visited upon a victim/complainant—Justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. (e) High Court—Inherent Powers ----S. 561-A, Cr.PC --- Inherent jurisdiction—Not contingent on a party’s application; may be exercised suo motu to prevent abuse of process and to secure substantial justice—High Court’s dismissal of revision on the ground that the Trial Court’s order dated 23-06-2023 had attained “finality” reflected non-exercise of the inherent power where intervention was warranted. (f) Practice & Procedure ----Non-communication of order; reconsideration Order dated 23-06-2023 was passed in the complainant’s absence and not communicated; such circumstances furnished cogent grounds for reconsideration rather than rigid adherence to the prior order. Cited Cases: — Disposition: Revision accepted; orders of the High Court (22-04-2024) and District Criminal Court, Haveli/Kahutta (including orders dated 23-06-2023 and 20-12-2023 to the relevant extent) set aside; Trial Court directed to summon and record the statement of PW-18 (Syed Asif Gardezi). Trial Court may also consider re-recording the accused’s S. 242 statement if needed to meet the ends of justice. Copy of the judgment to the learned Chief Justice of the High Court through Registrar for action in terms of paras 8–9 (inquiry and systemic directions).

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure—Registration of FIR on complaint—Duty under S. 154 Cr.P.C.; supervisory role of Justice of Peace ---- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 154, 22-A, 173, Complainant’s application disclosed cognizable offences; police failed to act under S.154. Justice of Peace rightly directed registration of FIR and further proceedings per law. Where more than one FIR/version surfaces, investigation must proceed and, upon report under S.173, the trial Court determines which version to try and whether any redundant FIR requires quashment; premature interference is unwarranted. (b) Inherent jurisdiction—Quashing/halting investigation—Exceptional grounds only ----Cr.P.C.—S. 561-A, Invocation of S.561-A to set aside a direction for FIR registration or to stifle investigation is impermissible save in exceptional circumstances. Investigation is the prerogative of the police and should not be judicially interdicted in routine. (c) Public servants—Police officials—No blanket immunity for acts done under colour of office, Official status does not confer immunity from criminal liability. Allegations against police officials performing “official duties” do not bar registration of a case; all persons are equally amenable to law, and accountability cannot be avoided by uniform or office. Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal refused; High Court judgment dated 09-07-2024 affirmed; order of Justice of Peace directing registration of FIR to stand; investigation to proceed in accordance with law. Cited Provisions: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 154, 22-A, 173, 561-A.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Ss. 144, 260, 262, 561-A — Encroachment on State land — Violation of prohibitory order — Summary trial — Quashment petition — Scope — Petitioners convicted by Executive Magistrate under S. 144, Cr.P.C. for unauthorized construction on State (Khalisa) land in violation of a prohibitory order — Conviction maintained by Sessions Judge with sentence reduced from 20 to 3 days — Petition under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. filed before High Court seeking acquittal — Held, Executive Magistrate conducted trial in accordance with S. 262, Cr.P.C. and no illegality or jurisdictional defect found — Petitioners failed to produce any lawful title or allotment — No exceptional ground made out for interference — Quashment petition dismissed. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 561-A — Invocation of inherent jurisdiction — Principles — Inherent powers of High Court under S. 561-A can only be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances such as where proceedings are shown to be wholly without jurisdiction, abuse of process, or where no offence is made out — Mere dissatisfaction with findings of courts below or mitigation of sentence not sufficient ground — Petitioners failed to demonstrate miscarriage of justice or abuse of process — No illegality found in trial procedure — Petition dismissed. (c) Summary trial — Magistrate’s power — Validity — Executive Magistrate was empowered under S. 260, Cr.P.C. to try offence in summary manner — Procedure adopted for trial was in accordance with law — Petitioners did not point out any procedural violation or prejudice suffered — Conviction held to be valid. Disposition: Petition under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. dismissed — Conviction and sentence of three days’ imprisonment upheld — No abuse of process or legal infirmity found in summary trial or appellate proceedings.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 144, 260, 262 & 561-A: —Violation of prohibitory order—Encroachment on State land—Summary trial—Scope of High Court’s powers— Petitioners, caught red-handed while constructing on Khalisa-e-Sarkar (State land), were convicted by the Executive Magistrate 1st Class under S.144, Cr.P.C., and sentenced to 20 days’ imprisonment, later reduced to 3 days by the Sessions Judge—Petitioners invoked S.561-A, Cr.P.C. before High Court seeking quashment of proceedings and acquittal—Held, Executive Magistrate was duly authorized to conduct summary trial under Ss.260 & 262, Cr.P.C., and followed due process—High Court found no jurisdictional defect, illegality, or abuse of process of law—Petitioners failed to annex lower court records, suggesting concealment—S.561-A Cr.P.C. could not be invoked in absence of any exceptional circumstances such as abuse of process or patent illegality—Petition dismissed. Cited Provision: Summary trial powers under S.260 Cr.P.C. and conditions for quashment under S.561-A Cr.P.C. clarified. (b) Criminal Law—State land—Construction without authority—Effect— Petitioners failed to produce any mutation or allotment document in their favour despite being caught in the act of constructing on State land in violation of prohibitory orders—Held, conviction was lawfully recorded after summary trial and based on direct complaint by police in presence of clear violation—Mere status of being government employees did not entitle petitioners to leniency in cases of defiance of lawful orders—Offences involving encroachment on government land undermine public interest and must be addressed through strict legal action—Reduction of sentence by Sessions Court from 20 to 3 days was a lenient but lawful approach. Principle: Violation of public orders, particularly by government employees, calls for enforcement rather than relaxation of penal consequences. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A—Quashment of proceedings—Principles— High Court may invoke inherent powers under S.561-A only in limited cases such as patent illegality, want of jurisdiction, or abuse of process—Held, petitioners failed to show existence of any such ground—All proceedings were in accordance with law and backed by factual record—Quashment not a remedy to bypass lawful conviction—High Court declined to exercise discretion in absence of exceptional circumstances. Held, no miscarriage of justice or abuse of process made out—Petition dismissed. (d) Summary Trials—Procedure—Requirements— Executive Magistrate conducted summary proceedings under Ss.260 & 262, Cr.P.C. after receiving complaint from SHO—Held, such trials must ensure due process and opportunity of defence—Perusal of trial record showed no procedural irregularity—Petitioners failed to rebut the evidence or point out flaws in the trial—Conviction upheld. Held, summary trial procedure lawfully followed; no interference warranted. Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Maintainability---Alternative remedy---Petitions under Art. 199 for quashment of FIRs and orders under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Scope---Where statutory remedy of revision existed and no constitutional right was infringed, extraordinary jurisdiction could not be invoked merely to circumvent the regular criminal process—However, Court examined legality as petitions were consolidated and involved identical legal questions. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 403—Quashment of FIRs—Double jeopardy—Dishonoured cheques issued on different dates---Distinct transactions---Held, each dishonour arising from separate cheque constitutes a separate cause of action and distinct offence; multiple FIRs, each based on an independently dishonoured cheque, do not attract the bar of S. 403, Cr.P.C. or Art. 13 of the Constitution---Petitioner’s plea that subsequent FIRs were hit by double jeopardy was misconceived—No illegality in dismissal of S. 249-A applications by trial and revisional courts. Cited Cases: • *Saira Fatima v. The State* (2024 P Cr.LJ 1289) • *State v. Saeed Khan* (2021 P Cr.LJ 608) (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 234—Joinder of charges—Dishonour of cheques within twelve months—Discretion of trial court---Where several offences of the same kind are alleged within one year, trial court may, on request, join them in a single trial to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 503 & 539-B—Recording of complainant’s statement through local commission---Legality---Where complainant’s physical appearance before court was impracticable due to health or security concerns, trial court may appoint an advocate-commissioner to record evidence at residence—No prejudice caused to accused if attendance is already dispensed with—Order modifying mode of recording evidence held lawful and within discretion of trial court. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 489-F—Dishonoured cheque—Successive prosecutions---Separate FIRs for distinct cheques dishonoured on different dates do not offend double jeopardy principles; each dishonour gives rise to a fresh and independent offence. (f) Criminal Justice—Quashment proceedings ----Jurisdiction under S. 561-A Cr.P.C.—Parameters—Only exercisable where continuation of proceedings is manifestly illegal, oppressive, or amounts to abuse of process—Mere existence of multiple FIRs for separate transactions or pendency of trial does not justify quashment. Disposition --- All petitions dismissed. Orders dated 20-07-2022 (refusing acquittal under S. 249-A), 15-10-2022 (revisional order), 10-06-2023 (appointment of local commission), and 26-08-2023 (revisional confirmation) upheld. Trial court directed to ensure police security during recording of complainant’s statement at his residence. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 265-K---Quashment of FIR---Scope and limitations---Availability of alternate remedy---Effect. The petitioner sought quashment of an FIR registered against him, claiming that it was without lawful authority and jurisdiction. The High Court, however, held that quashing an FIR under its constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised routinely, especially when alternate remedies under Ss. 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C., were available. The court reiterated that once an FIR is registered, a challan is submitted, and cognizance is taken by the trial court, the matter should be decided by the trial court itself. An accused who claims innocence or wrongful implication has the remedy to seek premature acquittal under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., rather than approaching the High Court for quashment of proceedings. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction of High Court: ----Art. 199 of the Constitution---Quashment of FIR under constitutional jurisdiction---Judicial review of investigation---Principles. The High Court emphasized that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 should not be exercised to quash an FIR where alternate remedies exist under the ordinary criminal procedure. The petitioner had directly approached the High Court without first availing the remedy before the trial court. The court held that such an approach was not appreciated, as judicial review in criminal matters is limited to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist. The accused should instead challenge the proceedings before the trial court under the relevant provisions of Cr.P.C. (c) Quashment of Criminal Proceedings: ----Judicial reluctance in interfering with pending trials---Role of trial court in assessing guilt or innocence. The court held that determining the guilt or innocence of an accused is the exclusive domain of the trial court, which examines the entire evidence. The High Court does not act as a substitute for the trial court in deciding criminal liability. Once cognizance has been taken, the accused must contest the case on its merits before the trial court. The general legal principle is that a criminal case should not be quashed in a routine manner, and courts should avoid interfering with the investigative and judicial process unless compelling circumstances necessitate intervention. (d) Abuse of Legal Process: ----Misuse of constitutional jurisdiction to evade trial---Legal consequences. The High Court noted that the petitioner initially obtained an ad-interim bail but subsequently failed to appear before the court for extended periods, which indicated an attempt to evade trial. The court reiterated that constitutional remedies should not be exploited as a substitute for trial procedures, and mere allegations of unlawful registration of FIR do not justify bypassing statutory remedies. The proper course of action for an accused seeking relief from prosecution is to approach the trial court under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., rather than seeking quashment of an FIR under Article 199. ----Disposition: Petition dismissed as misconceived. Petitioner directed to avail remedy before the trial court under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----Ss. 319, 322 & 34 Criminal Negligence—Medical Malpractice—Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts—Expert Opinion—Role of Regulatory Authorities (IHRA & PM&DC) The prosecution of medical negligence cases under Sections 319 (Qatl-i-Khata) and 322 (Qatl-bis-Sabab) of the Pakistan Penal Code cannot proceed without an expert medical opinion from relevant regulatory bodies such as the Islamabad Healthcare Regulatory Authority (IHRA) and the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PM&DC). The determination of medical negligence requires technical analysis by professional experts and cannot be conclusively determined through police investigation or judicial assessment alone. IHRA is the designated authority under the Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018, to assess complaints of malpractice, maladministration, and failure in healthcare services. Similarly, PM&DC holds statutory jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Act, 2022, to evaluate allegations of professional misconduct and negligence. In cases of alleged medical negligence, police must first seek expert opinion from IHRA or PM&DC before registering an FIR or initiating criminal proceedings. The absence of such expert opinion renders the prosecution untenable. ----Cited Cases: Shifa International Hospitals Ltd. v. Pakistan Medical and Dental Council, 2011 CLC 463 Riaz Ahmed v. ADJ/EX-officio Justice of Peace Rojhan District Rajanpur, 2022 PCr.LJ 1067 Muhammad Saleem v. The State, 2002 PCr.LJ 216 Syed Mushahid Shah v. Federal Investment Agency, 2017 CLD 1198 Dr. Riaz Qadeer Khan v. Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, PLD 2019 Lahore 429 Dr. Sheraz-ur-Rehman v. Province of Sindh, 2020 CLC 2037 Dr. Khair Muhammad Sahowal v. Province of Sindh, 2022 YLR 63 ----Disposition: The FIR No.823/23, dated 16.09.2023, registered under Sections 322/34, P.P.C. at Police Station Kohsar, Islamabad, was quashed. The pending private complaint under Section 319, P.P.C. was stayed until the receipt of a conclusive expert report from IHRA or PM&DC. (b) Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018 (IHRA) ----Ss. 33 & 34 Medical Negligence—Jurisdiction of IHRA—Complaint Mechanism—Mandatory Expert Opinion Under the Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018, allegations of medical negligence must first be assessed by the Islamabad Healthcare Regulatory Authority (IHRA). The law mandates that complaints concerning medical negligence, malpractice, and maladministration be lodged directly with IHRA, which then conducts an inquiry and issues an expert opinion. The findings of IHRA carry authoritative weight in determining whether criminal negligence occurred. Criminal proceedings cannot be initiated or sustained without the support of an expert opinion from IHRA. ----Disposition: Police authorities must seek an expert report from IHRA before registering an FIR or proceeding with criminal prosecution in cases involving allegations of medical negligence. (c) Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Act, 2022 (PM&DC): ----S. 44 Disciplinary Jurisdiction—Professional Negligence—Licensing Authority—Expert Assessment The Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PM&DC) is the statutory authority responsible for investigating and deciding cases of professional negligence involving healthcare professionals. Under Section 44, PM&DC has the power to remove or suspend the license of a healthcare professional found guilty of professional negligence or misconduct. No criminal proceedings can proceed without an expert report from PM&DC, confirming negligence or professional misconduct on the part of the accused healthcare professional. ----Disposition: The police must seek expert opinion from PM&DC in cases involving professional negligence before initiating any criminal action. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 561-A Inherent Powers of the Court—Quashing of FIR—Absence of Expert Opinion The court, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., quashed the FIR due to the absence of a conclusive expert opinion from IHRA or PM&DC. It was held that police investigation and judicial proceedings in cases of medical negligence must be backed by technical expert analysis. ----Cited Cases: Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq, 2006 SCMR 276 Rana Shahid Ahmad Khan v. Tanveer Ahmed, 2011 SCMR 1937 Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed, 2000 SCMR 122 Director General FIA v. Kamran Iqbal, 2016 SCMR 447 Pervez Ellahi v. Federation of Pakistan, 1995 MLD 615 Mian Muhammad Abbas Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan, 1995 PCr.LJ 1224 Muhammad Aslam v. DPO, Rawalpindi, 2009 SCMR 141 Zulfiqar Ali v. SHO PS Model Town Gujranwala, 2014 PCr.LJ 487 Muhammad Nawaz v. SHO PS Sabzi Mandi Islamabad, 2017 PCr.LJ 133 ---Disposition: The FIR was quashed, and criminal proceedings were halted pending expert opinions from IHRA and PM&DC. The private complaint under Section 319, P.P.C. was stayed until expert reports were furnished.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (S.561-A) – Quashing of FIR – Medical Negligence – Applicability of Special Laws: ----Jurisdiction of Police and Courts in Cases of Alleged Medical Negligence – Role of IHRA and PM&DC. In cases involving allegations of medical negligence, the Islamabad Healthcare Regulatory Authority (IHRA) under the Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018, and the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC) under the PMDC Act, 2022, are the competent forums to investigate and determine negligence by healthcare professionals. FIRs related to medical negligence cannot be directly registered without an expert opinion or report from IHRA or PMDC. Criminal proceedings cannot proceed without an authoritative determination of professional negligence by the relevant regulatory authorities. Held: Police must first seek an expert report from IHRA or PMDC before proceeding under criminal law. FIRs registered without expert input are liable to be quashed. ----Cited Cases: Shifa International Hospitals Ltd. v. PMDC (2011 CLC 463) Riaz Ahmed v. ADJ Rajanpur (2022 PCr.LJ 1067) (b) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (S.322, 319) – Qatl-bis-Sabab vs. Qatl-i-Khata – Distinction and Applicability: ----Medical Negligence – Interpretation of Sections 322 and 319 PPC. Under Section 322 PPC (Qatl-bis-Sabab) and Section 319 PPC (Qatl-i-Khata), intent plays a crucial role in differentiating the offences. Qatl-bis-Sabab involves an unlawful act without intent, while Qatl-i-Khata arises from mistake of act or fact without intent to harm or kill. In allegations of medical negligence, expert reports from IHRA or PMDC are mandatory to determine whether the act constitutes negligence or falls within the scope of Sections 322 or 319 PPC. Held: Without a clear determination by medical regulatory authorities, courts cannot conclusively determine whether the alleged act constitutes Qatl-bis-Sabab or Qatl-i-Khata. ----Cited Cases: Dr. Riaz Qadeer Khan v. Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court (PLD 2019 Lahore 429) Dr. Sheraz-ur-Rehman v. Province of Sindh (2020 CLC 2037) (c) Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018 (S.33, S.34) – Investigation of Medical Negligence: ----Role of IHRA in Determining Medical Negligence – Procedural Requirements. Under Section 33 of the IHRA Act, 2018, allegations of medical negligence must first be investigated by IHRA. Only after IHRA concludes its inquiry and determines negligence can the matter proceed under criminal law. Police and courts lack the technical expertise to determine medical negligence independently. Held: IHRA is the primary authority to investigate medical negligence claims in Islamabad. Police must refer such matters to IHRA before registering FIRs under PPC. ----Cited Cases: Riaz Ahmed v. ADJ Rajanpur (2022 PCr.LJ 1067) Muhammad Saleem v. State (2002 PCr.LJ 216) (d) Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Act, 2022 (S.44) – Disciplinary Committee – Removal of Medical Practitioners: ----Professional Negligence – Jurisdiction of PMDC in Disciplinary Actions. Under Section 44 of the PMDC Act, 2022, the Disciplinary Committee of PMDC is authorized to hear complaints of professional negligence against medical practitioners and take disciplinary action, including cancellation of licenses. Criminal prosecution should not commence unless PMDC has concluded that professional negligence occurred. Held: PMDC is the primary regulatory authority for professional negligence allegations against doctors. Criminal prosecution should only follow after disciplinary proceedings conclude. ----Cited Cases: Director General FIA v. Kamran Iqbal (2016 SCMR 447) Muhammad Saleem v. State (2002 PCr.LJ 216) (e) Special Law vs. General Law – Prevalence of IHRA Act, 2018 over PPC: ----Conflict Between Special and General Laws – Applicability of IHRA Act. In cases where special law (IHRA Act, 2018) and general law (PPC) conflict, the special law prevails over general law. IHRA is specifically enacted to address medical negligence, while PPC generally deals with bodily harm and criminal liability. Held: IHRA Act, 2018 prevails over PPC in matters of medical negligence. Police cannot bypass IHRA procedures by directly registering FIRs without obtaining expert reports. ----Cited Cases: Syed Mushahid Shah v. Federal Investment Agency (2017 CLD 1198) Muhammad Saleem v. State (2002 PCr.LJ 216) (f) Inherent Jurisdiction (S.561-A Cr.P.C) – Quashing of FIR in Medical Negligence Cases ----Powers of High Court to Quash FIR in Exceptional Circumstances. The High Court has inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash FIRs in extraordinary circumstances, particularly where proceedings are initiated without following the due process outlined in special statutes like IHRA Act or PMDC Act. In the present case, FIR No.823/23 was quashed as it lacked the prerequisite expert opinion from IHRA or PMDC. Held: FIRs alleging medical negligence cannot proceed without expert verification. High Courts can quash FIRs in such cases under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. ----Cited Cases: Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq (2006 SCMR 276) Rana Shahid Ahmad Khan v. Tanveer Ahmed (2011 SCMR 1937) (g) Stay of Proceedings in Private Complaint Pending Expert Report: ----Role of Private Complaints in Medical Negligence Cases. In cases where a private complaint alleging medical negligence has been filed, proceedings must remain stayed until expert reports from IHRA or PMDC are obtained. Without technical validation of negligence, courts cannot proceed with private complaints under criminal statutes. Held: Proceedings on private complaints alleging medical negligence must await expert determination by IHRA or PMDC. ----Cited Cases: Dr. Khair Muhammad Sahowal v. Province of Sindh (2022 YLR 63) Dr. Sheraz-ur-Rehman v. Province of Sindh (2020 CLC 2037) -----Disposition: The FIR No.823/23 registered under Sections 322/34 PPC was quashed. The private complaint under Section 319 PPC remains stayed until an expert report from IHRA or PMDC is submitted. The police and complainant must approach IHRA and PMDC for expert determination. No order as to costs.

Summary: Inquiry not compulsory before filing FIR --- Abduction, legal procedure, appeal against High Court order---Petitioner, Syed Qamber Ali Shah, challenges High Court's dismissal of a lower court order concerning the alleged abduction of Salman Shah---Lower court had directed SHO, Police Station Ghotki, to register FIR against alleged abductors under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C., after determining the presence of a cognizable offence---High Court overturned this, citing procedural issues and questioning merits of the case, leading petitioner to appeal for reinstatement of the lower court?s directive---Supreme Court notes missteps by High Court in adopting an investigatory stance outside its jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C.---Reiterates the procedural necessity for SHO to register FIR upon finding of a cognizable case without conducting prior independent verification of claims---Judgment reinstates the lower court's order, directing immediate compliance and strict adherence to legal standards by police officials. Relevant cases include Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan (PLD 1967 SC 317), highlighting the non-investigative role of police in FIR registration.-------1) Power & function of Justice of peace under Section 22-A of Cr.P.C (2) Section 154, 155, 169 & 173 Cr.P.C. (3) Responsibilities of Investigating Officer. (4) Jurisdiction of High Court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C.--------Issues:Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Justice of Peace's order directing the Station House Officer (S.H.O.) to register an FIR based on the petitioner's application?Whether the Justice of Peace exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the registration of the FIR without detailed scrutiny of the evidence presented?Whether the Justice of Peace?s directive was a necessary intervention in light of the police's refusal to register the petitioner?s complaint?----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the criminal petition, converting it into an appeal, and overturned the High Court's decision. The Court held:The Justice of Peace did not exceed his jurisdiction by directing the S.H.O. to record the petitioner?s statement and register an FIR if a cognizable offence was made out. The role of the Justice of Peace is primarily to ensure that complaints which are refused registration by police are given due process.The High Court improperly assumed the role of an investigator and inappropriately touched on the merits of the case, which led to an erroneous setting aside of the Justice of Peace's order.The Supreme Court emphasized that the Justice of Peace?s function is to facilitate the administration of criminal justice and not to conduct a detailed investigation, which remains the prerogative of the police.----Citations/Precedents:Sughra Bibi vs. State [PLD 2018 SC 595]Babubhai v. State of Gujrat and others [(2010) 12 SCC 254]Ghulam Muhammad vs. Muzammal Khan [PLD 1967 SC 317]Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt [PLD 2007 SC 539]Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmad vs. Government of Pakistan [1994 SCMR 2142]Norwest Holst Ltd. v. Department of Trade and others [(1978) 3 All ER 280]Wiseman vs. Borneman [(1971) AC 297]Younas Abbas vs. Additional Sessions Judge, Chakwal [PLD 2016 Supreme Court 581]

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash FIR No. 17/2023 dated 19.12.2023, registered under sections 467/468, 471/477-A, 34/409-APC and 5(2) PCA at Police Station Anti Corruption Muzaffarabad. The petitioner argued that an earlier FIR No. 153/2020 had already been registered regarding the same occurrence and facts, making the subsequent FIR unjustified. ----Issues: 1- Whether the registration of a subsequent FIR No. 17/2023 for the same occurrence is justified. 2- Whether local police have jurisdiction to investigate public servants involved in scheduled offences. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome --Justification for Subsequent FIR: The court found that the two FIRs were distinct in nature and scope. The first FIR No. 153/2020 was registered against private persons by local police, while the second FIR No. 17/2023 was registered by the Anti-Corruption Establishment against public servants after an inquiry revealed their involvement in fraud and corruption. The court held that the Anti-Corruption Establishment is competent to investigate public servants in scheduled offences, which local police cannot do. The second FIR was thus justified and necessary for the proper investigation of the offences involving public servants. --Jurisdiction of Local Police: The court reiterated that local police do not have jurisdiction to register or investigate cases against public servants in scheduled offences. Such investigations fall within the exclusive purview of the Anti-Corruption Establishment. Citing precedents (PLJ 1998 Lahore 1651, PLJ 2018 AJK 105, and 2000 UC 580), the court emphasized that the Anti-Corruption Establishment was the appropriate authority to handle the investigation against the public servants involved in this case. The petition to quash FIR No. 17/2023 was dismissed, upholding the registration of the FIR by the Anti-Corruption Establishment. The court found that there was no illegality in the registration of the second FIR as it was necessary to investigate the involvement of public servants in the alleged offences. ----Citations/Precedents: PLJ 1998 Lahore 1651 PLJ 2018 AJK 105 2000 UC 580