Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Ss. 144, 260, 262, 561-A — Encroachment on State land — Violation of prohibitory order — Summary trial — Quashment petition — Scope — Petitioners convicted by Executive Magistrate under S. 144, Cr.P.C. for unauthorized construction on State (Khalisa) land in violation of a prohibitory order — Conviction maintained by Sessions Judge with sentence reduced from 20 to 3 days — Petition under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. filed before High Court seeking acquittal — Held, Executive Magistrate conducted trial in accordance with S. 262, Cr.P.C. and no illegality or jurisdictional defect found — Petitioners failed to produce any lawful title or allotment — No exceptional ground made out for interference — Quashment petition dismissed. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 561-A — Invocation of inherent jurisdiction — Principles — Inherent powers of High Court under S. 561-A can only be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances such as where proceedings are shown to be wholly without jurisdiction, abuse of process, or where no offence is made out — Mere dissatisfaction with findings of courts below or mitigation of sentence not sufficient ground — Petitioners failed to demonstrate miscarriage of justice or abuse of process — No illegality found in trial procedure — Petition dismissed. (c) Summary trial — Magistrate’s power — Validity — Executive Magistrate was empowered under S. 260, Cr.P.C. to try offence in summary manner — Procedure adopted for trial was in accordance with law — Petitioners did not point out any procedural violation or prejudice suffered — Conviction held to be valid. Disposition: Petition under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. dismissed — Conviction and sentence of three days’ imprisonment upheld — No abuse of process or legal infirmity found in summary trial or appellate proceedings.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 144, 260, 262 & 561-A: —Violation of prohibitory order—Encroachment on State land—Summary trial—Scope of High Court’s powers— Petitioners, caught red-handed while constructing on Khalisa-e-Sarkar (State land), were convicted by the Executive Magistrate 1st Class under S.144, Cr.P.C., and sentenced to 20 days’ imprisonment, later reduced to 3 days by the Sessions Judge—Petitioners invoked S.561-A, Cr.P.C. before High Court seeking quashment of proceedings and acquittal—Held, Executive Magistrate was duly authorized to conduct summary trial under Ss.260 & 262, Cr.P.C., and followed due process—High Court found no jurisdictional defect, illegality, or abuse of process of law—Petitioners failed to annex lower court records, suggesting concealment—S.561-A Cr.P.C. could not be invoked in absence of any exceptional circumstances such as abuse of process or patent illegality—Petition dismissed. Cited Provision: Summary trial powers under S.260 Cr.P.C. and conditions for quashment under S.561-A Cr.P.C. clarified. (b) Criminal Law—State land—Construction without authority—Effect— Petitioners failed to produce any mutation or allotment document in their favour despite being caught in the act of constructing on State land in violation of prohibitory orders—Held, conviction was lawfully recorded after summary trial and based on direct complaint by police in presence of clear violation—Mere status of being government employees did not entitle petitioners to leniency in cases of defiance of lawful orders—Offences involving encroachment on government land undermine public interest and must be addressed through strict legal action—Reduction of sentence by Sessions Court from 20 to 3 days was a lenient but lawful approach. Principle: Violation of public orders, particularly by government employees, calls for enforcement rather than relaxation of penal consequences. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A—Quashment of proceedings—Principles— High Court may invoke inherent powers under S.561-A only in limited cases such as patent illegality, want of jurisdiction, or abuse of process—Held, petitioners failed to show existence of any such ground—All proceedings were in accordance with law and backed by factual record—Quashment not a remedy to bypass lawful conviction—High Court declined to exercise discretion in absence of exceptional circumstances. Held, no miscarriage of justice or abuse of process made out—Petition dismissed. (d) Summary Trials—Procedure—Requirements— Executive Magistrate conducted summary proceedings under Ss.260 & 262, Cr.P.C. after receiving complaint from SHO—Held, such trials must ensure due process and opportunity of defence—Perusal of trial record showed no procedural irregularity—Petitioners failed to rebut the evidence or point out flaws in the trial—Conviction upheld. Held, summary trial procedure lawfully followed; no interference warranted. Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 19, 20, 25, 260(3), and Ordinance XX of 1984Challenge to the Constitutionality of Ordinance XX of 1984 – Whether Ordinance XX of 1984, which imposed restrictions on the religious practices of Ahmadis, was ultra vires the Constitution – Petitioners contended that the Ordinance violated their fundamental rights under Arts. 19 (freedom of speech), 20 (freedom of religion), and 25 (equality before the law) – The Supreme Court examined whether the Ordinance contradicted constitutional guarantees and whether the State had the power to restrict religious expression of a minority group – Court held that Article 20 was "subject to law," meaning the State could legislate to maintain public order and morality – Held, that restrictions imposed by Ordinance XX of 1984 were valid as they aligned with the constitutional definition of a "Muslim" under Art. 260(3) – Ordinance XX was not in derogation of fundamental rights but rather an enforcement of constitutional provisions defining religious identity – Petitions dismissed.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) & Ordinance XX of 1984----S. 298-B & S. 298-CCriminalization of Ahmadis’ Religious Practices – Petitioners were convicted under S. 298-C, PPC for wearing badges with Kalma Tayyaba and referring to their places of worship as ‘Masjid’ – Whether such actions constituted "posing as a Muslim" under the law – Court observed that Ahmadis, by referring to themselves as Muslims or using Islamic expressions, violated Ordinance XX of 1984 – Held, that provisions of S. 298-B and S. 298-C, PPC were not vague or oppressive and were constitutionally justified – However, clauses (c) and (d) of S. 298-C, which restricted Ahmadis from preaching or propagating their faith, were declared ultra vires to fundamental rights.(c) Fundamental Rights & Religious Freedom----Arts. 19, 20 & 25Limits on Religious Expression – Petitioners argued that their right to profess and propagate religion was being curtailed – Court examined whether the restrictions imposed by Ordinance XX of 1984 were justified – Held, that the State had the power to regulate religious practices to prevent public disorder and protect the sentiments of the majority – Further held, that religious expression could not be allowed to "deceive or mislead" the public regarding religious identity – Ordinance XX was upheld, except for portions of S. 298-C that restricted peaceful propagation of religious beliefs.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 144Prohibition on Public Celebrations by Ahmadis – The Punjab Government issued orders under S. 144, CrPC, preventing Ahmadis in Jhang from public religious celebrations – Whether such a prohibition was legally justified – Court held that prohibitions were necessary to maintain public order and prevent potential unrest – The order extending the restrictions indefinitely was struck down as lacking legal authority – However, temporary restrictions to maintain peace were deemed lawful.Cited Cases:• Mujibur Rehman v. Federal Government of Pakistan PLD 1985 FSC 8• Capt. (Retd.) Abdul Wajid v. Federal Government of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 167• Jibendra Kishore Achharyya Chowdhury v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1957 SC 9• Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416• Abdur Rahman Mobashir v. Syed Amir Ali Shah Bokhari PLD 1978 Lahore 113

Summary: (a) Administrative law—Use of Section 144, Cr.P.C. to regulate private school fees—Scope and limitations: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 144----Azad Jammu and Kashmir Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Act (XIII of 2007), S. 6 Regulation of private school fees—Legality of ban imposed under S. 144, Cr.P.C.—District Magistrate, Mirpur, imposed an indefinite ban on fee increases by private educational institutions—Held, S. 144, Cr.P.C. confers extraordinary but temporary powers to prevent obstruction, nuisance, or danger to public safety—Such orders cannot remain in force for more than two months unless extended by the government under exceptional circumstances—Indefinite fee regulation through S. 144, Cr.P.C. was beyond the Magistrate’s authority—Regulation of private schools falls under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Act, 2007, which provides mechanisms for fee control through the Registering Authority—Use of executive powers under S. 144, Cr.P.C. to regulate private institutions was illegal—Impugned order quashed. (b) Regulation of private educational institutions—Jurisdiction of the Registering Authority: ----Azad Jammu and Kashmir Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Act (XIII of 2007), Ss. 3, 4, 6 Private schools cannot operate without registration—Authority to regulate fees, infrastructure, and staff qualifications rests with the Registering Authority under S. 6 of the Act—Law mandates that tuition fees and other charges levied by private institutions must not exceed reasonable limits—Government-issued notification designated the Director Public Instruction (Schools) as the competent authority to regulate private schools—Where complaints of excessive fee increases exist, they must be addressed by the Registering Authority, not through executive orders under S. 144, Cr.P.C.—Divisional Commissioners and District Magistrates are bound to assist the Registering Authority in enforcing the Act but cannot assume independent regulatory powers—High Court directed immediate enforcement of registration requirements and closure of unregistered schools. (c) Writ jurisdiction—Quashment of executive orders beyond jurisdiction: ----Constitutional law----High Court’s supervisory powers District Magistrates lack inherent power to regulate private school fees outside the framework of the Private Educational Institutions Act, 2007—Orders restricting fee increases and mandating refunds were passed without lawful authority and had no legal effect—High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, has the power to quash such orders and direct implementation of proper legal mechanisms—Indefinite use of executive orders to control private education is a violation of due process—Impugned orders quashed. (d) Enforcement of education laws—Closure of unregistered private schools: ----Azad Jammu and Kashmir Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Act (XIII of 2007), Ss. 3, 4 Private schools must obtain registration from the designated authority before commencing operations—Education Department directed to take immediate action against unregistered institutions—All Divisional Commissioners, District Magistrates, and Sub-Divisional Magistrates instructed to assist in enforcing registration requirements—Failure to comply may lead to legal consequences—Judgment ordered strict enforcement of the Act and submission of a compliance report within three months. ----Disposition: Writ Petitions Nos. 2287-A & 2289/2015 accepted. Impugned order dated 22nd October 2015, quashed as without lawful authority. Writ Petition No. 2297/2015 dismissed as infructuous. Education authorities directed to enforce the Private Educational Institutions Act, 2007, and shut down unregistered institutions.