Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Mehr (dower) must be paid when demanded by the wife. Compensatory costs imposed on failure to pay it ----- The petitioner argued that since the marriage was still ongoing, the mehr was not payable. However, the court, led by Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa, rejected this argument, citing Islamic principles and relevant legal provisions.The court highlighted the significance of mehr as an Islamic concept and pointed to Section 10 of The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, which stipulates that the entire amount of the dower shall be payable on demand if no details are specified in the nikahnama. The judgment emphasized that mehr can be demanded during the marriage, and the husband is obligated to pay it.The court found that the impugned judgment aligns with the law, and the petitioner's defense was untenable. It criticized the petitioner for involving the respondent in litigation and causing unnecessary delays in reaching the Supreme Court. The court expressed concern about frivolous litigation hindering the judicial system.Leave to appeal was declined, and the petition was dismissed. The court imposed costs on the petitioner, including compensatory costs of one hundred thousand rupees, emphasizing the importance of making the petitioner act reasonably. The court warned that if the mehr and costs were not paid within one month, the Family Court could execute the order, potentially involving the attachment of the petitioner's properties.

Summary: After passing the order, learned Ex.Officio Justice of Peace becomes functus officio and he cannot recall his earlier order at the time of its implementation --- The Doctrine Of "Functus Officio" Signifies That Once A Decision Is Made, The Authority Ceases To Have Further Legal Authority. --- The petitioner sought relief against an order dated, in which the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, disposed of the petitioner's request for the implementation of an earlier order to record her statement regarding the alleged poisoning of her daughter --- The petitioner argued that the impugned order was illegal and contrary to law and facts. The respondents countered, asserting that the allegations were refuted by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency (PFSA) report. The key legal question addressed was whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace could pass a subsequent order conflicting with his earlier order in the same case. --- The court examined the nature of the functions of an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, concluding that they are quasi-judicial. The petitioner had initially approached the court for a directive to register an FIR against the accused, and the court, after verifying the police report and PFSA findings, had issued an order on 30.01.2020. However, when the petitioner sought implementation of the order, the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace passed the impugned order on 19.03.2020, refusing the petitioner's plea. --- The court emphasized that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace became "functus officio" after the issuance of the initial order and could not review it without legal backing. The doctrine of "functus officio" signifies that once a decision is made, the authority ceases to have further legal authority. The court set aside the impugned order, declaring it of no legal effect, and directed the petitioner to approach the concerned SHO for the recording of her statement in accordance with the law. The judgment emphasized that the discussion was limited to the exercise of powers of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and would not prejudice police proceedings, which should proceed in accordance with the law.

Summary: The case involved the respondent, who had initially been appointed as an Assistant Station Master in Pakistan Railways in 1981. He subsequently obtained an L.L.B. (Legum Baccalaureus/Bachelors in Law) qualification in 1999. The respondent sought four advance increments based on this higher qualification, invoking an incentive scheme of 1966. However, his application for these increments was rejected by the competent authority, citing that it did not fall under the relevant rules.The respondent then filed an appeal in the Federal Service Tribunal, seeking the same benefit granted in a previous tribunal judgment from 2011, which had allowed advance increments upon obtaining a higher qualification. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider this matter.The appellant's counsel argued that the respondent's representation was time-barred, making the appeal before the Tribunal time-barred as well. Additionally, it was contended that the respondent had already received advance increments for previous qualifications, and the policy regarding advance increments had been discontinued through a notification in 2001.On the other hand, the respondent's counsel argued that the respondent was entitled to the same benefit extended to other employees in similar circumstances, and the appellant-department should not act discriminatorily. It was also contended that the decision to deny the respondent advance increments was discriminatory and violated equal protection under the law.The Supreme Court examined the relevant policies and instructions governing the grant of advance increments based on higher qualifications. The Court noted that the policy for granting advance increments on acquiring an L.L.B. degree was introduced with the condition that if advance increments had already been granted for obtaining an M.A. or M.Sc. degree, no further increment would be allowed for obtaining an L.L.B. degree. The Court found that the respondent had already received advance increments for obtaining an M.A. degree, and thus, his claim for additional increments based on the L.L.B. degree was not justified.The Court emphasized the purpose of such policies, which was to encourage individuals to gain more knowledge and expertise for themselves and enhance their performance in their duties. It also noted that the policy was not discriminatory and applied uniformly to all eligible employees.In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 17th September 2018.In summary, the Supreme Court upheld the policy regarding advance increments based on higher qualifications and found that the respondent was not entitled to additional increments due to the conditions outlined in the policy. The Court's decision was based on the interpretation of the policy and the absence of discrimination in its application.

Summary: Bail granted ---Background:This case involves two criminal petitions (Nos. 1174 and 1202 of 2023) filed by Faheem Ullah against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, dated 25.09.2023, which denied post-arrest bail. The petitions arose from separate FIRs (Nos. 691/2022 and 693/2022) registered at Police Station Badber, District Peshawar, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.), including 452, 427, 354, 506, 148, and 149, among others.??Issues:Whether the offenses listed in the FIRs fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which would generally restrict the granting of bail.Whether there is potential enmity that might have led to the wrongful implication of Faheem Ullah in the alleged crimes due to familial disputes related to another criminal case.?Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court observed that the offenses mentioned in both FIRs do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., which means that bail cannot be automatically denied based solely on the nature of the offenses. The Court also considered potential motives for the petitioner?s implication arising from family disputes and previous criminal proceedings involving relatives. Notably, the petitioner?s mother is an eyewitness in a related murder case, suggesting possible motives for retaliation or wrongful implication.Both petitions were converted into appeals and allowed. The Supreme Court granted bail to Faheem Ullah in both cases, subject to him furnishing a bail bond of Rs. 200,000 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court.?Citations/Precedents:Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.): Sections 452 (house-trespass), 427 (mischief causing damage), 354 (assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty), 506 (criminal intimidation), 148 (rioting, armed with deadly weapon), and 149 (every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offense committed in prosecution of common object).Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.): Discusses the conditions under which bail may be granted or denied, particularly noting cases that fall under the prohibitory clause where bail is generally more restricted.

Summary: Background:The petitioner, Khalid Pervaiz, married respondent No.1, Samina, on February 10, 2017, with a mehr (dower) of five hundred thousand rupees mentioned in the Nikahnama. However, the petitioner failed to pay the mehr, leading respondent No.1 to file a suit on January 8, 2018. The Family Court ruled in her favor on February 23, 2019, directing the petitioner to pay the mehr and maintenance. The petitioner appealed, but the High Court restored the Family Court's judgment. The petitioner, still married to respondent No.1, has not paid the mehr, citing the pendency of the petition.---Issues:Whether the petitioner is obligated to pay the mehr despite the marriage subsisting.Whether the High Court's decision regarding the payment of mehr is lawful.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court affirmed that mehr is an Islamic concept recognized by Pakistani law. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, and the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, mandate the payment of mehr on demand by the wife. The Supreme Court precedent in Syed Muhammad v Mst. Zeenat (PLD 2001 SC 128) established that mehr can be demanded during the marriage, and the husband is obliged to pay it. The petitioner's failure to pay the mehr despite demand led to unnecessary litigation, burdening the judicial system. The petitioner's defense was untenable, and the High Court's decision aligns with the law. Leave to appeal was declined, and the petition was dismissed. The Court imposed costs and compensatory costs of one hundred thousand rupees on the petitioner, to be paid along with the mehr within one month. Failure to comply would lead to the Family Court executing the order, possibly by attaching the petitioner's properties.---Citations/Precedents:Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961Syed Muhammad v Mst. Zeenat (PLD 2001 SC 128)---Quote:Mehr (dower) must be paid when demanded by the wife. Compensatory costs imposed on. Failure to pay it.

Summary: Background:In Civil Petition No. 3465-L of 2022 before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the petitioners challenged the order dated 25.11.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court in Civil Revision No. 4911 of 2016. The petitioners' predecessor had purchased land through sale mutation No. 727, attested on 13 June 1994. However, the respondent filed a suit on 6 November 2008 challenging the sale.---Issues:Whether the respondent's suit was time-barred.Whether the thumb impression on the sale mutation belonged to the respondent.Whether the petitioners were illegally possessing the land.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court found that the respondent's suit was decreed on 16 October 2014, and the petitioners' subsequent appeal and revision petitions were dismissed. Despite three court decisions against them, the petitioners continued to possess the land illegally.The burden of proving the sale lay on the beneficiary, which was not discharged. The Finger Print Bureau's report conclusively established that the thumb impression on the sale mutation did not belong to the respondent.The Court dismissed the petition with costs throughout and imposed compensatory costs of one hundred thousand rupees. The petitioners were directed to immediately hand over the land to the respondent, with revenue authorities instructed to ensure compliance.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Acquittal --- Failure to adhere to the prescribed protocols during the chemical analysis of the contraband at the FSL disqualifies it to be called as a report under section 36 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. --- the respondent was acquitted of charges under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The appeal points out significant flaws in the prosecution's case, including the failure to follow necessary protocols during the chemical analysis of the contraband at the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL). The document emphasizes the importance of Rule-6 in the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, stating that non-compliance with this rule affects the reliability of the report and disqualifies it as conclusive proof. Additionally, the delayed dispatch of samples to the FSL and concerns about the safe custody of the case property are highlighted. The absence of private witnesses during the recovery process is also noted, and the document concludes that the prosecution has failed to substantiate the charges against the respondent. As a result, the appeal is dismissed, upholding the acquittal.