Summary: Bail Dismissed---The complainant is a businessman who alleges that the applicant, (who is not present), acted as a middleman and sold paddy worth over ninety lakh rupees on deferred payment. When the complainant asked for payment, he received a dishonored cheque of Rs.9,50,000 from the account of applicant Shahjehan Laghari. The arguments of the applicants' learned counsel highlight their claim of innocence, lack of evidence, and delay in filing the F.I.R. They assert that the offense doesn't fall under the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Cr.P.C (Code of Criminal Procedure), suggesting that pre-arrest bail is warranted. These arguments are countered by counsel for the complainant and the A.P.G., along with the Investigating Officer. Justice Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro concludes that the Investigating Officer's findings suggest that the applicants may have jointly engaged in fraudulent activity. The evidence shows that the applicants forwarded a dishonored cheque to the complainant, indicating their potential involvement in the alleged offense. Given the prima facie evidence, the court dismisses the bail applications, recalling the ad-interim pre-arrest bail previously granted to the applicants. The court rejected the applicants' requests for pre-arrest bail due to the presence of prima facie evidence suggesting their involvement in fraudulent activity related to a dishonored cheque.

Summary: The petitioners herein considering themselves to be eligible for the post of constable in Punjab Police Department applied on a printed application form in pursuance to the advertisement published in prominent newspapers in this behalf. The candidature of the petitioners was, however, rejected solely on the ground that they have concealed the factum of their involvement in criminal case. It is an admitted position on all ends that both the petitioners have remained involved in criminal case though they ultimately earned acquittal therefrom. The Police Department is a law enforcement agency performing very pivotal role in multiple characters in the society. The police have an obligation and duty to function according to the Constitution, law and democratic aspirations of the people. Such functioning of the police requires it to be professional, service-oriented and accountable to the people. It is, thus, necessary to maintain high standards for making appointments in the police. Volume II Chapter XII of the Police Rules, 1934 deals with the appointment and enrollments. Rule 12.12 of the Rules ibid ordains that the standard of performance and the reputation of the whole police force depend above all-upon the quality of its constables. For ready reference and convenience, Rule 12.12. In furtherance to the above, Rule 12.14 makes its incumbent that recruits shall be of good character and great care shall be taken in selecting men of a type suitable for police service from the candidates presenting themselves for enrollment. In order to reconstruct the police for efficient prevention and detection of crime and maintenance of public order, the Police Order, 2002 was promulgated. Chapter III deals with the constitution and organization of the police. Article 7 lays down the mechanism for the constitution of police. Article 10 deals with the administration of police and in terms of sub-article 3 of Article 10, the police officer mentioned in clause (1) may for direction and control issue standing orders not inconsistent with the Order or Rules made thereunder for the efficient functioning of the police. We feel no hesitation to reiterate that the petitioners at the time of submission of their application forms have admittedly concealed their previous involvement in criminal cases. Disclosure of involvement in some offence was a material fact and it was not expected from the petitioners, who were to join the police department to hide such material fact. A police official should always be honest and law abiding. It is not expected from a police man to get himself recruited in the department through misrepresentation, misstatement or false statement. To this effect, we are also fortified with the unreported judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Petitions No.1668-L and 1852-L of 2012. The relevant extract from the same is reproduced below: - "6. Admittedly when the Respondent/Petitioner Jabir Ali gave his application to the department for recruitment into police service, three FIRs were pending against him and hence he falsely stated in such application that he was not involved in any criminal case. A police official should be honest, and law abiding himself and subject to discipline. Where, at the inception of his career, Respondent/ Petitioner had made a false statement for the purpose of recruitment into the force, he cannot be expected to perform his duties honestly and diligently. Hence he was correctly dismissed from service by the departmental authorities.

Summary: The matter in controversy interse parties is an offshoot of agreement to sell dated 26th March, 2002 wherein the appellant being owner/allottee of "suit plot" agreed to sell the same to "respondent" with sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/-, which was received in lump sum. As per claim of "respondent" the deal was the outcome of the desire of the appellant, who was in dire need of money at that time. The possession was, however, not delivered to the "respondent" as it was to be handed over by respondent No.2. It would not be out of context to mention here that the agreement to sell was also coupled with a deed of attorney. Suit was, however, resisted by the appellant on the ground that due to close relationship the "respondent" through misrepresentation got executed the agreement to sell, which has been revoked by the appellant on 27th March, 2002 in view of penalty clause available in the same. From the perusal of written statement of the appellant it clearly reveals that he has taken self-contradictory stances to controvert the agreement to sell. The only resistance to the suit was rested on the fact that since there was a penalty clause in the agreement to sell that in case of failure by the appellant to abide the terms of the agreement, he will pay the double of the amount received at the market value to the "respondent", so the "respondent" is precluded to ask for specific performance of agreement to sell. This plea has found due favour before the court of first instance and suit was decreed to the extent of Rs.12,00,000/- i.e. double of received amount as mentioned in the agreement to sell. The "respondent" however feeling aggrieved preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi which was allowed through impugned judgment and she was held entitled to the decree for specific performance of agreement. There is no cavil that relief of specific performance is a discretionary relief in terms of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 but such discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily and the court while exercising the discretion is bound to follow the well settled principles that a discretion shall always be structured on reasoning and fairness. Guidance in this respect can be sought from Mrs. MUSSARAT SHAUKAT ALI versus Mrs. SAFIA KHATOON and others (1994 SCMR 2189). This is a regular second appeal which has a very limited scope as provided under Section 100 of "CPC". There is though divergence of views in both the courts below but ordinarily preference should be given to the judgment of first appellate court unless it offends any law. The judgment of learned first appellate court cannot be interfered with unless some procedural defect materially affecting such findings is pointed out by the appellant. There is a mark distinction between the revisional jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction in terms of Section 100 of "CPC". Reference BASHIR AHMED vs Mst. TAJA BEGUM and others (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 906).

Summary: Background: The appellants, National Engineering Services Pakistan (NESPAK) and others, challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court’s Single Bench, which had ruled in favor of the respondents (employees) who had been terminated from NESPAK. The employees had joined NESPAK on various dates, but their services were terminated on 11.01.2022, citing clause 11 of the employment terms. They were paid three months' salary in lieu of notice. The employees filed constitutional petitions challenging the termination, which were accepted by the Single Bench, prompting NESPAK to file an Intra Court Appeal (ICA). -----Issues: 1- Statutory vs. Non-Statutory Service Rules: Whether NESPAK’s service rules have statutory authority, making the employees’ termination challengeable under constitutional jurisdiction. 2- Applicability of Constitutional Jurisdiction: Can the respondents invoke Article 199 of the Constitution for alleged violations of terms of service if NESPAK is governed by non-statutory service rules? 3- Master and Servant Relationship: Whether the relationship between NESPAK and its employees is governed by the principle of "Master and Servant," which limits the employees' legal recourse in terms of constitutional remedies. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Statutory vs. Non-Statutory Rules: The court held that NESPAK is a private limited company, and its service rules, framed by the Board of Directors, do not have statutory backing. The court ruled that NESPAK’s service rules are non-statutory and merely regulate internal management, which does not grant employees the right to challenge termination under constitutional jurisdiction. Master and Servant Relationship: The court reiterated the legal principle that in cases where an organization’s service rules are non-statutory, the relationship between the employer and employee is governed by the "Master and Servant" doctrine. In such cases, employees cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 for disputes arising from terms of service. Applicability of Constitutional Jurisdiction: The court found that the employees of NESPAK cannot seek constitutional remedies as their employment is not governed by statutory rules. The judgment relied on previous rulings, including Pakistan Electric Power Company vs. Syed Salahuddin (2022 SCMR 991) and Sui Southern Gas Company Limited vs. Saeed Ahmed Khoso (2022 SCMR 1256), which held that employees of non-statutory companies cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction. -----Citations/Precedents: The Principal, Cadet College, Kohat vs. Muhammad Shoaib Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170) Pakistan Airline Pilots Association vs. Pakistan International Airline (2019 SCMR 278) Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd vs. Iqbal Nasir (PLD 2011 SC 132) Pakistan International Airline Corporation vs. Tanweer-ur-Rehman (PLD 2010 SC 676) Umer Atta-ur-Rehman Khan vs. Ministry of Energy (2021 PLC (C.S.) 1126) Ali Mehtab vs. Government of Pakistan (WP No. 249942 of 2018) Pakistan Defence Officers’ Housing Authority vs. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed (2013 SCMR 1707) Pakistan Electric Power Company vs. Syed Salahuddin (2022 SCMR 991) Sui Southern Gas Company Limited vs. Saeed Ahmed Khoso (2022 SCMR 1256)

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed two suits for declaration based on a registered sale deed, which were initially dismissed. Upon appeal, a compromise decree was entered on 29.02.1994, based on statements by two of the respondents, without the involvement of their sister contending that the compromise was fraudulently entered to deprive her of her rightful inheritance, filed applications under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), which were initially dismissed. She then filed civil revisions, which led to the setting aside of the compromise decree by the Lahore High Court. This judgment was further challenged by the petitioners. -----Issues: 1- Jurisdiction of the Court: Whether the Lahore High Court had the jurisdiction to dismiss the original suits while allowing the revision petitions related to the Section 12(2) C.P.C. applications. 2- Right to a Fair Hearing: Whether the petitioners were denied the opportunity to present their defense, violating the principle of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard). 3- Legal Consequence of Accepting Applications under Section 12(2) C.P.C.: Should the case be restored for trial on the merits instead of dismissing the suit outright? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the original suits after setting aside the compromise decree. Once the compromise was nullified under Section 12(2) C.P.C., the appropriate action would have been to restore the appeals and decide the case on its merits, rather than dismissing the suits outright. The dismissal deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to defend themselves and seek a decision on the merits of the appeals. The Court recognized that the petitioners were not given a fair hearing, as they were not present or represented when the decision was made, and the principle of audi alteram partem was violated. This warranted a reconsideration of the case. In line with the precedent established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-ur-Rehman (2015 SCMR 1708), the Court ruled that upon setting aside the compromise decree, the proper course of action was to restore the appeals and include Mst. Mumtaz Mai as a necessary party. The appeals should be decided on their merits, not dismissed summarily. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Mumtaz Mai v. Sajjad Hussain (PLJ 2015 Lahore 581) Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-ur-Rehman (2015 SCMR 1708)

Summary: Bail allowed---The bail applicant, Muhammad Ibrahim, sought post-arrest bail in connection with two cases. The first case concerned the alleged murder of a woman named Mst. Reshma, and the second case, F.I.R. related to the recovery of a firearm used in the aforementioned murder. The court heard arguments from the applicant's counsel and the Assistant Prosecutor General (A.P.G.). The applicant's counsel argued that the applicant was innocent, and the evidence against him was insufficient. They also pointed out inconsistencies in the case and questioned the recovery of the firearm. The applicant's counsel additionally cited the bail granted to a co-accused, Muhammad Ismail, as a basis for similar treatment. The A.P.G. contested the bail applications, stating that the applicant was involved in a serious offense and had not shown any intention to file a report about the incident. However, the A.P.G. did not contest the bail granted to the co-accused, Muhammad Ismail. The court considered the evidence and arguments presented. It noted that the incident was not witnessed, and the direct involvement of the applicant was not established. The court also pointed out the delay in filing the F.I.R. and the uncertainties regarding the recovery of the firearm. The court referred to precedent cases and observed that co-accused Muhammad Ismail had already been granted bail, leading to the decision that the applicant should be granted bail in both cases. The court allowed both bail applications.

Summary: Acquittal---The appellant filed an appeal against this conviction, claiming his innocence and alleging false implication by the police. The appeal raised concerns about various aspects of the case, including the lack of independent witnesses during the recovery of the charas, inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence, discrepancies in the description of the rickshaw involved, and the handling of evidence such as the delay in sending the seized substance for chemical analysis. The appeal also highlighted the importance of maintaining an unbroken chain of custody for seized substances. After thoroughly examining the evidence and arguments presented by both the appellant and the state, the High Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court pointed out several shortcomings in the prosecution's case, including the lack of independent witnesses during the recovery, discrepancies in the evidence provided by prosecution witnesses, failure to ascertain the ownership of the rickshaw, and concerns regarding the safe custody and transit of the seized charas. The Court acquitted Nazir Ahmed of the charges, set aside the trial court's judgment, and ordered his immediate release if not required in any other case.

Summary: Criminal After Arrest Bail (Sindh Prohibition, Preparation, Manufacturing, Storage, Sale and use of Gutka and Manpuri Act, 2019)

Summary: Case dismissed---The High Court of Sindh, Karachi, reviewed a petition filed by Mr. Zaheer-ul-Hassan on behalf of the petitioner, Habib, against the Government of Sindh and others. The petitioner sought a writ declaring an order passed by respondent No.1, which allowed an appeal by respondents No.2 to 5, as illegal and without lawful authority. The petitioner's eligibility to file the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution was questioned, as the petitioner didn't seem to be directly affected by the matter. The court found that the petitioner lacked the standing to challenge the order issued by the Secretary, Mines & Minerals Development Department, which acted as an appellate authority in the case involving third parties. The court stated that a stranger to the proceedings couldn't challenge the order and dismissed the petition with a fine of Rs. 10,000 to be deposited in the High Court Clinic's account. The court's decision didn't impact proceedings initiated by aggrieved parties against the same order, and if any illegality was found, appropriate actions would be taken according to the law. The court dismissed the petitioner's claim due to lack of standing, emphasized that outsiders couldn't challenge the order of the appellate authority, imposed a fine, and clarified that the dismissal wouldn't affect proceedings by legitimate aggrieved parties against the same order.

Summary: Background: The appellants, a government entity involved in electricity distribution, challenged the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which directed them to release pay orders to the respondent company regarding Tenders No.116/21 and No.118/21. The dispute arose over the extension of bid validity periods for the tenders, where the appellants requested an extension after the expiry of the original validity period, and the respondents did not agree to this extension. Despite this, the appellants issued Letters of Intent, which the respondents successfully contested in a writ petition. -----Issues: 1- Was the issuance of Letters of Intent valid after the expiry of the bid validity period? ----2- Did the respondent company’s refusal to extend the bid validity period prevent the appellants from issuing the Letters of Intent? ----3- Could the appellants rely on an alleged extension of the bid validity period by the respondent? Was the writ petition maintainable despite the availability of alternate remedies, such as arbitration? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Invalid Issuance of Letters of Intent: The Court held that the Letters of Intent were issued after the expiry of the bid validity period, which had expired on 24.09.2021. Rule 26(2) of the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, mandates that bids are only valid for the period specified in the bidding document, and any extension of bid validity must occur within this period. Therefore, the issuance of the Letters of Intent on 06.10.2021 was invalid. --Refusal of Extension: The respondent company had clearly refused to extend the bid validity period in its letter dated 04.10.2021, citing price escalations and foreign exchange rate changes. The Court found that the respondent had not agreed to any extension of the bid validity, and therefore, the appellants had no right to issue the Letters of Intent. --Alleged Extension of Bid Validity: The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the respondent had extended the bid validity through prior correspondence. The respondent’s letter proposing conditional terms for an extension did not amount to a valid extension of the bid validity period, and no agreement to an extension was reached between the parties. --Writ Petition and Alternate Remedies: The appellants argued that the writ petition should not have been entertained due to the availability of arbitration under Rule 49 of the Procurement Rules. However, the Court dismissed this argument, noting that arbitration only applies when a contract exists between the parties. In this case, no contract was formed due to the expiration of the bid validity period, making the writ petition valid. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the order of the learned Single Judge directing the release of pay orders to the respondent company. The Letters of Intent issued by the appellants after the expiry of the bid validity period were deemed invalid, and the writ petition was found to be appropriately filed. -----Citations/Precedents: Aziz Khan v. Maiz Muhammad Khan (PLD 1980 Peshawar 227) Muhammad Anwar v. Abdul Haq (1985 SCMR 1228) Nargis Latif v. Feroz Afaq Ahmed Khan (2001 SCMR 99) Muhammad Nawaz v. Amir Sultan (2013 CLD 1174) Iftikhar Ahmed Qureshi v. Muhammad Abrar Ahmed Qureshi (2020 CLC 1857)