Summary: Testimony of a child witness and its admissibility after conducting vior dire; Explanation of Locard's Principle of Exchange and importance of Deoxyribonucleic Asset ("DNA"); Effects of non-submission of buccal swabs of suspect with the PFSA for subsequent DNA comparison with the samples of the victim/deceased as well as non-conducting of DNA comparison of the crime weapon with buccal swabs of the victim/deceased to connect the same with the crime;(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860):----Ss. 302(b), 324 & 337-F(ii)---Qatl-e-amd---Injured eyewitness---Death sentence converted to imprisonment for life---Ocular account of incident was corroborated by medical evidence and remained unimpeached despite cross-examination---Injured child witness (PW-10) passed rationality test under Art. 3 & 17 of QSO, and competently deposed regarding murder of his mother by the accused---Prosecution proved its case beyond shadow of doubt---However, omission by investigating agency to submit buccal swabs of accused for DNA comparison and failure to link murder weapon with victim through DNA were considered extenuating circumstances warranting lesser sentence---Held, even a single mitigating circumstance suffices to justify conversion of death sentence to life imprisonment---Appeal dismissed with modification in sentence; Murder Reference answered in negative.----Cited Cases:• Dilawar Hussain v. The State 2013 SCMR 1582• Ali Taj v. The State 2023 SCMR 900• Ansar v. The State 2023 SCMR 929• Aqil v. The State 2023 SCMR 831• Imran Mehmood v. The State 2023 SCMR 795• Muhammad Ijaz v. The State 2023 SCMR 1375(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898):----S. 374---Death sentence---Confirmation reference---Scope---Where mitigating circumstances exist, including forensic lapses, the court may refrain from confirming death sentence---Failure of police to connect accused with scene of crime through DNA or properly explain discrepancy regarding firearm evidence undermined completeness of prosecution’s case for capital punishment---Held, conviction maintained but sentence modified to life imprisonment---Reference for confirmation of death sentence declined.(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984):----Arts. 3 & 17---Competency of child witness---Voir dire---Rationality test---Eight-year-old injured child witness found competent based on trial court’s questioning---Held, testimony of child witness found natural, consistent, and independently corroborated by complainant and another eyewitness---Such testimony can form valid basis for conviction when found trustworthy.----Cited Case:• Raja Khurram Ali Khan v. Tayyaba Bibi PLD 2020 SC 146**(d) Evidence---Ocular versus medical evidence---Discrepancy in injury count---Effect---Minor inconsistencies in number or location of injuries not fatal to prosecution case when ocular testimony is credible and corroborated---Medical evidence held to be corroborative, not conclusive, and cannot override trustworthy eyewitness account.----Cited Cases:• Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460• Naeem Akhtar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 396• Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2010 SCMR 1025**(e) Criminal trial---Prompt FIR---Presumption of truthfulness---Occurrence reported within 90 minutes of incident---Held, promptness in lodging FIR supports presence of complainant and injured witness at the scene, rules out fabrication or mistaken identity.----Cited Cases:• Shaheen Ijaz v. The State 2021 SCMR 500• Sheraz Asghar v. The State 1995 SCMR 1365• Zar Bahadur v. The State 1978 SCMR 136**(f) Forensic science---DNA evidence---Locard’s Principle of Exchange---Failure to collect or submit buccal swabs of accused for DNA matching with samples from crime scene---Held, such omission did not exonerate accused but constituted a mitigating factor affecting quantum of sentence---Court emphasized future need for rigorous adherence to forensic procedures by police and investigation teams.----Directive:Investigating agencies directed to ensure proper documentation, collection, and preservation of forensic evidence from crime scenes and suspects to strengthen judicial process.----Cited Reference:• Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain PLD 2021 SC 362• District Attorney’s Office v. William Osborne 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4536----Disposition:Appeal dismissed to extent of conviction but allowed to extent of sentence; Death sentence converted to life imprisonment. Murder Reference answered in negative.

Summary: Acquittal granted----The prosecution case is hinges upon the circumstantial evidence and DNA report. It is well settled by now that in such like cases, prosecution is required to link each circumstance to the other in a manner that it must form a complete, continuous and unbroken chain of circumstances, firmly connecting the accused with the alleged offence and if any link is missing then obviously benefit is to be given to the accused. DNA report is not reliable if safe transmission of sealed parcels in the office of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency has not been proved. Accused acquitted of the charge. (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) & Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Benefit of doubt — Circumstantial evidence — Standard of proof in criminal cases ----S. 302(b), S. 376, S. 338-C(c), PPC; S. 544-A, S. 382-B, Cr.P.C.—Conviction based on circumstantial evidence—Chain of evidence must be complete, continuous, and unbroken to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt—Prosecution relied on last-seen evidence, medical findings, and forensic reports to prove the case against the accused—However, inconsistencies, contradictions in witness testimonies, and missing links in evidence rendered the prosecution case doubtful—Accused was acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt—Reliance placed on Rehmat Ullah & 2 others v. The State & others (2024 SCMR 1782). (b) Evidence Act (I of 1872) & Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984— Last seen evidence—Weak type of evidence—Requirement of corroboration ----S. 161, Cr.P.C.; Art. 40, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984—Prosecution relied on statements of last-seen witnesses (PW.5 and PW.6), who allegedly saw the deceased in the company of the accused—Material contradictions in their testimonies, delayed disclosure of information to the complainant, and absence of their names in the FIR raised serious doubts—Court held that last-seen evidence alone, without independent corroboration, cannot form the basis of conviction—Reliance placed on Fayyaz Ahmad v. The State (2017 SCMR 2026) and Muhammad Abid v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 813). (c) Forensic Evidence—Admissibility and reliability of DNA reports—Standard of proof in criminal cases ----S. 510, Cr.P.C.—DNA report confirming biological parentage of deceased’s fetus was challenged due to lack of safe custody and chain of transmission—Investigating Officer (PW.4) failed to prove secure handling of forensic samples—Court held that forensic evidence, even if admissible under S. 510, Cr.P.C., is only corroborative and cannot serve as primary evidence to establish guilt—Reliance placed on Muhammad Hassan & another v. The State & another (2024 SCMR 1427). (d) Criminal Law—Recovery of weapon—Evidentiary value: ----Recovery of Churri (knife) was claimed to have been made at the accused’s instance; however, evidence showed that the same was already in police custody before the alleged recovery—Court held that recovery of a weapon under these circumstances was highly doubtful and could not be relied upon for conviction—Reliance placed on Muhammad Asif v. The State (2017 SCMR 486). (e) Criminal Trial—Principle of benefit of doubt—Standard of proof in capital cases: ----Supreme Court of Pakistan has consistently held that benefit of doubt must be given to the accused as a matter of right, not grace—Material contradictions, discrepancies in witness statements, and unreliable circumstantial evidence created sufficient doubt—Court acquitted the accused on this ground—Reliance placed on Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shahzad and another (2024 SCMR 51) and Muhammad Nawaz & another v. The State & others (2024 SCMR 1731). ----Disposition: Criminal Appeal No. 175 of 2021 accepted—Accused acquitted by granting benefit of doubt—Criminal Revision No. 66 of 2020 for enhancement of sentence dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Law – Confession to Police – Admissibility – Circumstantial Evidence — Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b) – Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 38, 40, 46, 140 & 153 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), S. 173 – Murder charge – Confession before police – Effect – Circumstantial evidence – Failure to establish chain of evidence – Acquittal – Petitioner was convicted under S. 302(b), PPC for the murder of his wife and sentenced to death as Ta’azir, along with compensation under S. 544-A, Cr.P.C. – Conviction was primarily based on an alleged confession made by the petitioner to a police officer and the recovery of the deceased’s body from an iron box inside his residence – Held, confession made before a police officer is inadmissible under Art. 38 of the QSO, 1984 and cannot be used as substantive evidence – FIR alone does not constitute proof unless affirmed on oath by its maker (Arts. 140 & 153, QSO, 1984) – No direct evidence of the murder was available – Recovery of the deceased’s body lacked independent corroboration as no local witnesses were associated with the recovery memo (Art. 129(g), QSO, 1984) – The prosecution failed to produce the landlord of the rented premises, drawing an adverse inference under Art. 129(g), QSO, 1984 – Failure to recover intoxicating tablets or wrappers, allegedly used by the petitioner to drug the deceased, created further doubts in the prosecution’s case – Motive of the crime, stated to be the deceased’s alleged immoral character, was not established with substantive evidence – In the absence of direct or conclusive circumstantial evidence, mere medical evidence of strangulation could not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Petitioner acquitted, and conviction set aside. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Saleh v. The State (PLD 1965 SC 366) – Statement made by an accused to police is inadmissible as evidence. Nasar Ali’s Case (AIR 1957 SC 366) – FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence and cannot be used against its maker unless duly proven. Ghaus Muhammad alias Ghaus v. The State (1979 SCMR 155) – A deceased’s FIR can only be treated as a dying declaration under Art. 46, QSO, 1984 but cannot corroborate another witness. Muhammad Ismail v. The State (2017 SCMR 898) – Recovery of evidence without independent corroboration cannot be relied upon. Afzal Saima Noreen v. The State (2024 SCMR 1310) – Adverse inference may be drawn under Art. 129(g), QSO, 1984 for failure to produce key witnesses. Muhammad Ijaz v. The State (2024 SCMR 1507) – Motive must be proven through substantive evidence to support the prosecution’s case. Muhammad Hassan & another v. The State (2024 SCMR 1427) – Medical evidence alone cannot establish the identity of the assailant. Iftikhar Hussain alias Kharoo v. The State (2024 SCMR 1449) – Circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain to establish guilt.

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition & Compensation: --- Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Ss. 18 & 23 --- Enhanced compensation claim --- Equal treatment for similarly situated landowners --- The respondents sought enhanced compensation for land acquired under Award No.155 (1995), arguing that similarly situated landowners under Award No.290 (2011) received higher compensation. Held, the principle of equal compensation for land of the same vicinity and nature applies if proven. However, due to the time gap (16+ years) between the two acquisitions, further investigation is required to determine whether the market value of the land was the same at the relevant times. Reliance placed on Saddadat Ali Khan v. Collector Land Acquisition (PLD 2010 SC 878). (b) Estoppel & Waiver of Right to Challenge Compensation: --- Effect of accepting compensation without filing reference --- Whether respondents are estopped from claiming enhancement --- The respondents accepted the compensation fixed in 1995 without objection and did not file a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Held, the doctrine of estoppel may apply, preventing them from seeking enhanced compensation after 16 years. The key issue is whether their inaction at the relevant time bars their claim now. (c) Limitations on Filing Fresh Execution Applications: --- Whether a new execution application is maintainable after decree satisfaction --- The respondents’ initial execution application was satisfied and consigned to the record room. Held, it must be determined whether a fresh execution application is maintainable after the decree has been executed and closed, particularly in light of the long delay. (d) Limitation Period for Seeking Enhanced Compensation: --- Delay of 16+ years --- Maintainability of delayed claims --- The respondents’ claim was raised more than a decade after receiving their compensation. Held, a crucial issue is whether such a claim is time-barred under the applicable limitation provisions, and whether the judgment in Award No.290 (2011) can be retrospectively applied to claims from 1995. (e) Disposition: Appeal disposed of. Case remanded to Executing Court for further investigation on market value, estoppel, and limitation issues. To be decided expeditiously.

Summary: Acquittal granted ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 449, 148 & 149 Murder case—Conviction and sentence—Benefit of the doubt—Principles—The prosecution alleged that the accused, along with co-accused, trespassed into the complainant’s house and attacked his son, causing fatal injuries—The trial court convicted the accused under Section 302(b) PPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 14 years with compensation to the legal heirs—The High Court, on appeal, noted that the FIR was lodged with an unexplained delay of eight days despite the presence of police soon after the incident—The complainant’s conduct in not reporting the matter promptly raised serious doubts about the prosecution's case—The investigating officer failed to record statements of medical professionals treating the deceased, and no conclusive forensic evidence was produced to support the prosecution's version—Held, that in criminal cases, the benefit of the doubt must always be given to the accused—Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt—Conviction set aside and accused acquitted. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Ashgar and others (2003 SCMR 477) (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 342, 340(2) Right of accused to defend—Failure of prosecution to establish guilt—The accused neither opted to appear as his own witness under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. nor produced any defence evidence—His statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. asserted false implication due to previous enmity—Prosecution’s failure to present independent evidence and reliance on contradictory witness statements led to acquittal—Held, the accused is not required to prove his innocence; the burden remains on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ----Admissibility of delayed FIR and inconsistencies in prosecution evidence Delay in lodging FIR—Contradictions in witness testimonies—Effect—FIR was registered after an unexplained delay despite police presence at the scene—Medical evidence and postmortem reports contradicted witness statements—No proper record of police inquiries or 1122 emergency reports was produced—High Court observed that such inconsistencies undermined the credibility of the prosecution's case—Held, delay in lodging FIR without plausible explanation, coupled with contradictions in evidence, raises serious doubts about the prosecution’s version and entitles the accused to acquittal. (d) Criminal Law—Acquittal of co-accused ----Double presumption of innocence—Interference by appellate court The complainant sought enhancement of the sentence and conviction of co-accused—Trial court acquitted co-accused due to lack of independent evidence connecting them to the crime—High Court reaffirmed the acquittal, noting that appellate courts should not interfere unless the lower court’s judgment is perverse, illegal, or results in a miscarriage of justice—Held, an acquittal grants the accused a double presumption of innocence, and in the absence of strong incriminating evidence, the trial court’s decision must be upheld—Appeal against acquittal dismissed. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Ashgar and others (2003 SCMR 477) Disposition: Criminal Appeal No. 27878-J of 2022 (filed by accused): Allowed, conviction and sentence set aside, and accused acquitted. Criminal Revision No. 27876 of 2022 (filed by complainant for enhancement of sentence): Dismissed. Criminal Appeal No. 27874 of 2022 (filed by complainant against acquittal of co-accused): Dismissed.

Summary: The pivotal issues for determination before this Court are as under: i. Whether the respondents who are employees of the petitioner-Parks & Horticulture Authority ("PHA"), on daily wages mostly for more than 10 years, fall under the definition of ?workman'? ii. If the answer to the above question is in affirmative, what is the distinction between the regularization of service and the declaration as a permanent workman and whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal was justified in directing the regularization of services of the respondents? Held that based on the legislative definitions under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 ("PIRA"), the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ("Ordinance") and the judicial pronouncement of Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of Province of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works Department and others v. Ahmad Hussain (2013 SCMR 1547), I am of the opinion that for the purposes of the Ordinance, the petitioner-PHA is a commercial establishment and the respondents are workmen. Further held that as permanent workmen, the employees of Petitioner-PHA are entitled to certain statutory rights, as held in case of Ahmad Hussain, supra. These rights include job security, fair wages, gratuity and the ability to form or join trade unions whereas Labour Courts do not have the authority to introduce the regularization, which applies to the contractual, ad-hoc, or daily wage employees in public authorities under the civil service rules and/or a specific government policy. Courts cannot lose sight of the fact that the workmen engaged in non-administrative roles, are covered by the Ordinance and the PIRA. (a) Industrial & Labour Law—Status of Daily Wagers as Permanent Workmen: ----Entitlement under Labour Laws—Respondents, employed as gardeners, plumbers, and drivers on daily wages for over ten years, filed grievance petitions seeking permanent status and regularization—Labour Court declared them permanent workmen under the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, but declined regularization—Labour Appellate Tribunal upheld permanent workman status and further ordered regularization—Held, respondents fall within workman definition under PIRA, 2010, performing manual labour essential to PHA’s functions—Mere existence of statutory rules does not exclude PHA from the ambit of labour laws—Reliance placed on Province of Punjab v. Ahmad Hussain (2013 SCMR 1547). (b) Regularization vs. Permanent Workman Status—Legal Distinction: ----Scope of Labour Laws & Public Sector Regulations—Regularization is distinct from being declared a permanent workman—Labour laws grant workmen job security, fair wages, and benefits upon completing prescribed service tenure, but do not mandate regularization—Regularization falls under civil service rules and government policies, not within Labour Courts’ jurisdiction—Tribunal erred in ordering regularization, as it is an administrative decision requiring sanctioned posts and policy framework—Reliance placed on Vice Chancellor Agriculture University, Peshawar v. Muhammad Shafiq (2024 SCMR 527). (c) Government Notification & Estoppel: ----Punjab Government Policy for Daily Wagers—Government of Punjab explicitly classified daily wagers, work-charged, and contingent-paid staff as ‘workmen’ under Notification No.SO(ERB)5-44/2019/WC-DW-Policy dated 29.01.2021—Respondents, having completed 9+ months of service, qualify as permanent workmen under this policy—PHA estopped from denying their workman status—Policy directive aligns with Ahmad Hussain case (2013 SCMR 1547), ensuring compliance with labour protections. (d) Disposition: ----Labour Appellate Tribunal’s Order Partially Set Aside—Status of permanent workman upheld—Direction for regularization set aside, as it falls outside Tribunal’s jurisdiction—Judgments of Labour Court maintained—Petition partially allowed.

Summary: Bail denied---(a) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860): ----Ss. 328, 328A---Cruelty to a child---Abandonment or neglect of a minor---Scope and applicability. Petitioner, father of the minor, was accused of using his child for transporting narcotics, resulting in the child’s recovery and subsequent custody under the Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act, 2004 (PDNCA 2004). FIR was registered under Ss. 328A PPC (Cruelty to a child) read with S. 38 PDNCA 2004 (permitting a child to enter places where narcotics are sold). The Court held that S. 328 PPC applies only to children under 12 years of age, while S. 328A PPC applies to children under 18 years of age and covers broader offenses, including assault, ill-treatment, and neglect. The Court distinguished between S. 328 PPC, which criminalizes intentional abandonment, and S. 328A PPC, which includes acts of omission or commission that cause physical or psychological harm to a child. ----Cited Cases: Raja Khurram Ali Khan v. Tayyaba Bibi (PLD 2020 SC 146) (b) Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act, 2004 (PDNCA 2004): ----Ss. 3(1)(k), 24, 26, 38, 42---Protection of children---Use of children for illegal activities---Custody of minor---Scope. The minor was legally placed under the custody of the Child Protection Bureau under Ss. 24 & 26 PDNCA 2004. The Court emphasized that S. 38 PDNCA 2004 criminalizes taking or permitting a child to enter places where narcotics are sold, punishable with imprisonment up to five years. Additionally, S. 36 PDNCA 2004 penalizes employing a child for begging, and S. 3(1)(k) PDNCA 2004 defines a “destitute and neglected child”, including those used for illegal activities or abandoned by guardians. The Court noted that child exploitation, including using children in narcotics transportation, falls within the broader ambit of child neglect and cruelty under the PDNCA 2004. ----Cited Cases: Nehal v. The State (2020 SCMR 2053) (c) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898): ----S. 497(2)---Bail in non-prohibitory offenses---Scope---Exceptions. Petitioner argued that both offenses did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497 Cr.P.C., making bail a matter of right. However, the Court held that bail cannot be granted in cases where an exception applies, particularly in crimes against vulnerable persons like children. The gravity of the offense, societal impact, and legislative intent behind child protection laws justified the denial of bail. ----Cited Cases: Abdul Rehman v. The State (2022 SCMR 526) Umer Khan v. The State (2022 SCMR 216) Haji Muhammad Nazir v. The State (2008 SCMR 807) Muhammad Siddique v. Imtiaz Begum (2002 SCMR 442) (d) Islamic Perspective on Child Protection: ----Parental responsibility under Islamic law---Neglect and cruelty towards children---Moral and legal obligations. The Court observed that Islamic teachings emphasize love, compassion, and the protection of children. Quranic injunctions and Hadith reinforce the duty of parents to protect their children from harm, including exposure to illegal activities. Reference was made to Surah At-Tahrim (66:6), which commands believers to protect their families from harm. ----Disposition: Bail denied as no reasonable grounds existed under S. 497(2) Cr.P.C. for its concession. The Child Protection Court will conduct the trial, ensuring compliance with child protection laws.

Summary: Bail denied --- (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (XXV of 1997): ----Ss. 9(1)-6(c), 21, 22, 23, 37(2), 38---Powers of Pakistan Rangers---Arrest and detention of accused---Jurisdiction---Legality of arrest---Validity. Accused was arrested following a tip-off received by Pakistan Rangers regarding the presence of narcotics near the Pakistan-India border. A raid was conducted, and the accused was apprehended with 1060 grams of heroin in his possession, while two other suspects fled the scene. The petitioner sought post-arrest bail, contending that Pakistan Rangers had no legal authority under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA) to conduct such operations or make arrests. Perusal of S.R.O. 656(1)/2004, dated 2.8.2004, issued by the Federal Government, revealed that officers of Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) not below the rank of Inspector were authorized to exercise powers under Ss. 21, 22, 23, 37(2), and 38 of CNSA 1997 within their respective jurisdiction. However, the raiding party in this case was led by a Sub-Inspector, which the petitioner claimed rendered the proceedings unlawful. The Court rejected this argument, noting that officers of different categories of Pakistan Rangers were also authorized to exercise powers under the Customs Act, 1969, per S.R.O. 1090(1)/2010, and that the accused was handed over to the local police for further proceedings, an act permissible even to private individuals under S. 59 of Cr.P.C. The Court held that there was no illegality in the arrest and subsequent investigation by the police, and the petitioner failed to establish any mala fide intent or ulterior motive behind his arrest. ----Cited Cases: Mst. FURSAN v. The STATE (2022 SCMR 1950) NOOR KHAN v. The STATE (2021 SCMR 1212) (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 59---Arrest by private individuals---Transfer of accused to police---Validity. Pakistan Rangers, after conducting the search and seizure, handed over the accused to the local police, which was in accordance with S. 59, Cr.P.C., allowing private individuals to detain offenders and hand them over to law enforcement. The Court upheld the legitimacy of the process, noting that subsequent police investigation reinforced the prosecution's case. (c) Criminal Law---Narcotics Possession---Burden of Proof---Presumption of Guilt: ----Recovery of narcotics from accused’s possession---Burden to disprove possession---Scope. The accused was found in possession of a significant quantity of heroin, which could not be considered an innocent mistake. The burden shifted onto the accused to provide a reasonable explanation for possession, which he failed to do. No evidence suggested any ill-will or malicious intent by the Pakistan Rangers to falsely implicate the petitioner. The presence of sufficient incriminating material on record justified the rejection of bail. ----Disposition: Petition for post-arrest bail was dismissed.

Summary: Intra Court Appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1973--- Section 230 of the Election Act, 2017, Functions of Federal Caretaker Government ?The Federal Care Taker Government inserted Rule 7A in the Rule 2020 framed under National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 and under Section 3(3) & 3(5) of the NADRA Ordinance ibid appointed Chairman, NADRA which was assailed through constitutional petition. Thereafter, incumbent elected Federal Government affirmed the amendment in the Rule 7-A in terms of Rule 17(1)(b) read with Rule 19 (1) of the Rules of Business, 1973 and, issued a fresh notification of appointment of Chairman, NADRA. The subsequent notification of appointment of Chairman were not assailed through making any amendment in the writ petition. But High Court annulled appointment of Chairman NADRA through suo moto resumption of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 whereas High Court does not enjoy suo moto jurisdiction to issue quo warranto writ and annul the appointments as such appeal (ICA) is accepted and judgment of learned Single Bench set aside.

Summary: Summary pending