Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 498 & 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324 & 34---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention---Pre-arrest bail, confirmation of---Further inquiry---Allegations against the accused-petitioners were that they caused injures to the complainant by firing---Complainant allegedly sustained an injury to a non-vital part of the body---Additionally, the FIR did not specifically identify any of the applicants/accused as the individual responsible for firing the bullets that caused the injury---Lack of clear attribution casted doubt on the direct involvement of the applicants/accused in the shooting incident---Furthermore, there was no allegation that the applicants/accused continued to fire shots, even though they had ample opportunity to do so---Absence of repeated gunfire may have indicated a lack of intent to commit murder---Given these factors, the essential elements required to establish an offence under S.324, P.P.C appeared to be prima facie absent---First Information Report itself mentioned on-going clash between the parties, particularly referencing FIR lodged under S.302, P.P.C---Said fact suggested that the current incident might be part of a broader conflict, which required further inquiry, thus case fell within the ambit of S.497(2), Cr.P.C, which allows the grant of bail if further inquiry is needed---Pre-arrest bail granted to the applicants earlier was confirmed, in circumstances. Jamaluddin and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 1243 and Muhammad Umar v. The State and another PLD 2004 SC 477 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 497 & 498---Bail order---Observations of Court---Scope---Observations recorded in bail orders are solely for the purpose of bail and should not prejudice or infringe upon the rights of the parties concerning the merits of the case. Hashmat Khalid for Applicants/accused. Naeem Mehmood for the Complainant. Muhammad Raza, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh along with P.I. Bilal Ahmed, PS Taimuria for the State. Date of hearing: 20th February, 2025. Order Jan Ali Junejo, J .--- The present Criminal Bail Application has been filed on behalf of the Applicants/Accused, who are seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with a case stemming from FIR No. 184 of 2024, registered at P.S. Haidry Market, Karachi, under Sections 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.). The Applicants/Accused initially approached the learned Sessions Court by filing Bail Application No. 1060 of 2024, which was dismissed by the Court of the learned IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi-Central, vide Order dated 10-07-2024. 2. The facts relevant to the present criminal bail application are as follows: The complainant, Syed Mirza Ismail Baig, owner of a beef and mutton Shop in North Nazimabad, reported that on May 9, 2024, at around 5:30 PM, three individuals arrived on two motorcycles and opened fire, injuring him in the right leg and grazing the left knee of sweeper, Ajmal John. The assailants fled, and the complainant was treated at multiple hospitals, with the bullet surgically removed and retained as evidence. He identified the attackers as Irfan Khan, Raziq Khan, and Noman Khan, sons of Naseer Khan Bangash, who had previously harassed him and were allegedly linked to a prior conflict involving his brother and a fatal altercation over extortion demands in July 2023. The complainant believes the attack was retaliation for the ongoing case (FIR No. 196/2023) related to the earlier incident. 3. The learned counsel for the Applicants/accused argued that the current FIR is a counterblast to FIR No. 196 of 2023, registered under Section 302, P.P.C., against the Complainant party. It is further contended that the present case is a result of mala fide intent and vendetta, aimed at harassing the Applicants/accused rather than seeking genuine justice. The timing and circumstances of the FIR suggest it was filed as a retaliatory measure. The counsel emphasized that the alleged bullet injury sustained by the Complainant was not on any vital part of the body, which indicates that the offense does not meet the necessary ingredients of Section 324, P.P.C. (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means). He further argued that the injury was minor and not life-threatening, thereby reducing the gravity of the alleged offense. The counsel contended that the case is based on weak evidence and requires further inquiry. The learned counsel highlighted that the allegations are vague, and no prima facie case is made out against the Applicants/accused. The lack of concrete evidence and the presence of ulterior motives on the part of the Complainant warrant a deeper inquiry into the guilt of the Applicants/accused. The counsel concluded by praying for the grant of pre-arrest bail, arguing that the Applicants/accused are law-abiding citizens with no prior criminal record. 4. The learned Additional Prosecutor General and counsel for the Complainant argued that a prima facie case is clearly established against the Applicants/accused. The FIR nominates them specifically, and the allegations, supported by medical evidence, indicate their involvement in the commission of the offense. The nature of the injury, even if not on a vital part of the body, still constitutes an offense under Section 324, P.P.C. They emphasized that the use of firearms in the commission of the crime is a serious matter, and the injury caused to the Complainant, regardless of its location, demonstrates the violent intent of the Applicants/accused. The counsel for the Complainant refuted the argument that the FIR is retaliatory, stating that the two cases (FIR No. 196 of 2023 and the present FIR) are distinct and based on separate incidents. They argued that the Applicants/accused cannot use the existence of another FIR as a shield to evade accountability in the present case. The Additional Prosecutor General stressed the necessity of custodial interrogation to uncover the full extent of the Applicants/accused's involvement in the crime. They argued that pre-arrest bail at this stage would hinder the investigation, as the accused may attempt to destroy evidence or intimidate witnesses. The counsel for the Complainant highlighted that granting pre-arrest bail in such cases would set a dangerous precedent, undermining the rule of law and public confidence in the justice system. They prayed the court to dismiss the bail application in the interest of justice and to ensure a fair and thorough investigation. 5. I have carefully considered the arguments presented by the learned counsel for the applicants/accused, the learned Additional Prosecutor General, and the learned counsel for the complainant. Additionally, I have meticulously examined the material available on record with the utmost care and caution. Upon a careful examination of the record, it appears that the complainant allegedly sustained an injury to a non-vital part of the body. Additionally, the FIR does not specifically identify any of the applicants/accused as the individual responsible for firing the bullet that caused the injury. This lack of clear attribution casts doubt on their direct involvement in the shooting incident. Furthermore, there is no allegation that the applicants/accused continued to fire shots, even though they had ample opportunity to do so. This absence of repeated gunfire may indicate a lack of intent to commit murder. Given these factors, the essential elements required to establish an offense under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) appear to be prima facie absent. The FIR itself mentions on-going clash between the parties, particularly referencing FIR No. 196 of 2023 under Section 302, P.P.C. This suggests that the current incident may be part of a broader conflict, which requires further inquiry. The case falls within the ambit of Section 497(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), which allows for the grant of bail if further inquiry is needed. Considering the prevailing circumstances, it is deemed appropriate to confirm the ad-interim pre-arrest bail previously granted by this Court to the applicants/accused in view of the legal principle established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Jamaluddin and another v. The State (2023 SCMR 1243), wherein the Court held that: "The complainant and the injured PW received injuries on the non-vital parts of the body and the petitioners did not repeat the fire despite having ample opportunity to do so. In this view of the matter, the question whether section 324, P.P.C. would be applicable in the case or not would be determined by the learned Trial Court after recording of evidence. As far as the question which requires the attention of this Court is that petitioner Jamaluddin has been granted ad interim pre-arrest bail by this Court whereas the other petitioner Rabail has filed petition claiming post-arrest bail. As far as the principle enunciated by this Court regarding the consideration for grant of pre-arrest bail and post-arrest bail are entirely on different footings is concerned, we have noticed that in this case both the petitioners are ascribed the same role. For the sake of arguments if it is assumed that the petitioner enjoying ad interim pre-arrest bail is declined the relief on the ground that the considerations for pre-arrest bail are different and the other is granted post-arrest bail on merits, then the same would be only limited upto the arrest of the petitioner Jamaluddin because of the reason that soon after his arrest he would be entitled for the concession of post-arrest bail on the plea of consistency". 6. In a similar case concerning the same nature, Muhammad Umar v. The State and another (PLD 2004 SC 477), the Apex Court ruled that: "A perusal whereof indicates that allegedly the petitioner fired upon the outer side of the right leg's middle part of the injured Shahid Iqbal, therefore, prima facie, We are of the opinion that he had no intention to fire upon the vital part of the injured Shahid-Iqbal for the purpose of launching murderous assault". 7. For the reasons outlined above, the interim pre-arrest bail granted to the Applicants/Accused vide Order dated 12.07.2024 is hereby confirmed on the same terms and conditions. The observations made herein are solely for the purpose of this Order and shall not prejudice or infringe upon the rights of the parties concerning the merits of the case. N-18/Sindh Bail confirmed.

Summary: Securities Act (III of 2015)--- ----Ss. 64 (2) & 65 (2)---Securities Brokers (Licensing and Operations) Regulations, 2016, Cl. 60(2)(k)---Brokerage House---Terms of license, violations of---Brokerage House accepting deposits from its customers on pre-determined rate of return---Legality---Appellant (Brokerage House) assailed order passed by the Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan---Submission of the appellant was that the transactions entered into by it pre-date the promulgation of Securities Brokers (Licensing and Operations) Regulations, 2016 ('the Regulations 2016') and as such it could not be penalized for violation thereof---Validity---The fact that the appellant sought deposits from its customers on pre-determined rate of return was not in dispute---It was also an admitted fact that the licence of brokerage granted to the appellant did not allow it to indulge in receiving such deposits from its customers---The activities which the appellant could lawfully pursue were mentioned in the certificate of registration as broker---Section 64(2) of the Securities Act, 2015, clearly stipulates that the licence shall specify the regulated activities that a broker is committed to undertake---It was not in dispute that the appellant accepted deposits from its customers on pre-determined rate of return which activity was not mentioned in the brokerage certificate issued to it---Thus, the appellant violated the terms of its brokerage certificate and was in violation of Ss. 64(2) & 65(2) of Securities Act, 2015---The fact that the Regulations, 2016 were introduced subsequently and had no retrospective application to the activities the appellant indulged in was beside the point---Appellant , admittedly, was in violation of the terms of its brokerage license and Ss. 64(2) & 65(2) of the Securities Act, 2015 thus, the impugned order was lawfully passed against it---No interference by the High Court in the order passed by the Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan was made out---Appeal, filed by Brokerage House, being merit-less was dismissed. Usman Nasir Awan for Appellant. Hafiz Talha for Respondent/SECP.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Limited scope of constitutional jurisdiction in rent matters---Ejectment application based on bona fide personal need of landlord / landlady---Eviction ordered by Rent Controller---Scope---Requirement for eviction under personal use---Establishing landlord's need is genuine and in good faith---Unshaken and consistent testimony of landlord sufficient to prove bona fide need---Payment of goodwill ("Pagri") not recognized as a defense under Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---The petitioner (tenant) filed a constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenging concurrent findings of two courts which ordered eviction on the ground of personal bona fide need---Respondent No. 1 (land lady) filed ejectment application under S. 15(2)(vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 for eviction of the petitioner from shop No. 1 claiming personal bona fide need for the use of her son---The petitioner claimed the eviction was based on mala fide intention and lacked genuine bona fide need---The key legal issue was whether Respondent No. 1 (land lady) required the premises for the bona fide personal use of her son---The Rent Controller allowed the eviction directing the petitioner to vacate the premises within 60 day---Petitioner filed appeal which was dismissed and aggrieved by the concurrent judgments, filed the present constitutional petition---Held: Section 15 of the Ordinance, 1979 empowered a landlord / landlady to seek eviction of tenant on the grounds mentioned therein including the ground of personal bona fide need for his / her own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children---The only requirement in this provision for landlord / landlady was to show that he / she required the premises in good faith---The respondent No. 3 (land lady) in her rent application had specifically stated that the demised premises was required by her for the use and occupation of her son who also stepped in witness box and deposed in the same line as stated and deposed by his mother---If the statement of landlord / landlady came on oath and remained consistent with application for ejectment and was not shaken in cross-examination, it was sufficient to prove that requirement of landlord / landlady was bona fide---As to the contention that during subsistence of tenancy, the petitioner had paid huge amount towards goodwill ("Pagri") in respect of the rented shop, the term goodwill ("Pagri") was not recognized by Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, however, the superior Courts had equalized it with term "Pagri"---The plea of a tenant that he paid goodwill ("Pagri") for premises, in no manner could succeed as a ground of defence when eviction of tenant was being sought by the landlord, however, if for the sake of arguments it was presumed that goodwill ("Pagri") amount was paid in respect of demised shop, even then it would not have debarred the respondent No. 1 from seeking eviction of the petitioner on the ground of personal bona fide need or any other ground as defined in Sec. 15 of the Ordinance---Under constitutional jurisdiction, the High Court avoided giving contrary findings until and unless the same were proved to be perverse and contrary to record---Besides, the powers of the High Court in rent matters under its constitutional jurisdiction were limited and confined only to ascertain whether the Courts below had flouted the statute or failed to follow the law relating thereto---In the case in hand, neither there was any jurisdictional error nor any perversity, illegality and infirmity in the order / judgment impugned---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Akhtar Qureshi v. Nisar Ahmed 2000 SCMR 1292 and Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh and others 2010 SCMR 1925 rel. Zahid Hussain for Petitioner. Ms. Erum for Respondent No. 1. Date of hearing: 20th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Medical Commission Act, 2020--- ----S. 37---Alternate remedy---Maintainability of writ petition---Respondent, claiming to be a 1st Class State Subject residing abroad, challenged exclusion from MBBS merit list under the Overseas Pakistani quota---Held, that if aggrieved by the policy or order of the Pakistan Medical Commission (PMC), respondent had a statutory alternate remedy of appeal before the Medical Tribunal under S.37 of the Pakistan Medical Commission Act, 2020---High Court, therefore, erred in exercising writ jurisdiction without directing recourse to the prescribed appellate forum. (b) Pakistan Medical & Dental Council Regulations--- ----Medical and Dental Undergraduate Education (Admissions, Curriculum and Conduct) Policy and Regulations, 2023---Eligibility for Overseas Quota---Interpretation---PMC’s letter dated 23.12.2022 mandated that candidates seeking admission under the 10% Overseas Pakistani quota must possess dual or permanent foreign nationality and have completed HSSC or equivalent from abroad while residing abroad on a permanent residence permit---First merit list issued by the Joint Admission Committee was not in conformity with PMC’s criteria---Final merit list prepared in compliance with PMC’s instructions was valid and binding---Respondent having admitted his ineligibility and failure to meet the prescribed criteria could not claim a vested right to admission merely based on a provisional list. Cited Case: • Pakistan Medical Commission through President v. Huma Anwar (2020 SCR 348) (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction--- ----Estoppel and acquiescence---Doctrine applied---Respondent, having participated in the admission process without objecting to PMC’s policy, was estopped from subsequently challenging the same---Held, that the High Court’s direction to grant admission on the basis of the first merit list was contrary to law and not sustainable. (d) Academic policy--- ----Future applicability---The Medical and Dental Undergraduate Education (Admissions, Curriculum and Conduct) Policy and Regulations, 2023 now govern all future admissions, and the Joint Admission Committee is bound to adhere to them till any change by competent authority. Disposition: ---Appeal allowed. ---Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside; directions issued that future admissions be governed by the 2023 Regulations.

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 --- Ss. 2 & 2‑A; Shariat Application Act, 1948— Limited life‑estates under Punjab custom—retrospective abolition—Section 2‑A (inserted 1983) declares that male heirs who took agricultural land under custom before 15‑3‑1948 are deemed absolute owners as if inheritance had opened under Islamic law; conversely, a female donee holding a “limited” estate under earlier custom becomes full owner and the property thereafter devolves according to Sharia. Held, mutation No. 1616 (20‑05‑1990) in favour of Mst. Ghulam Zohra’s husband and children was lawful; appellants, claiming through the collateral Mohammad Yousaf, acquired no share. Cited cases: Haider v. Murad PLD 2012 SC 501; Mst. Farida Khatoon v. Dr. Masood Ahmed Butt 2009 SCMR 464. (b) Islamic Law—Wills (waṣiyyat)—Power of testamentary disposition— (i) A Muslim may bequeath only up to one‑third of his estate without heirs’ consent (Hadaya; Fatawa‑e‑Alamgiri). (ii) A condition that the legatee shall hold merely for life “until death” derogates from absolute ownership and is void; the bequest operates as an outright transfer. Applying these principles, Kala Khan’s 1934 will in favour of his daughter Mst. Ghulam Zohra, though couched as a life interest, vested absolute title in her; she could validly alienate the property inter vivos and, on death in 1988, it devolved exclusively upon her heirs (respondents Nos. 2‑5). (c) Customary succession—Ancestral versus acquired land—Onus— Custom applies only to ancestral property. Appellants neither pleaded nor proved that the land was ancestral; documentary record showed it was self‑acquired by the testator. Customary reversionary rights, therefore, could not be invoked. (d) Law of Evidence—Pedigree‑table—Probative value— A pedigree table (Exh. P‑16, Exh. D‑6) is at best a weak piece of evidence and must be corroborated. Failure to adduce independent proof that “Faqeer son of Qasim” (the nearer collateral) pre‑deceased the propositus fatally undermined appellants’ claim that Muhammad Yousaf was the last surviving male heir. (e) Civil litigation—Appellate and revisional review—Scope— Concurrent findings of the first appellate court and High Court that appellants had no title were based on correct appreciation of evidence and law; Supreme Court will not disturb such findings absent a jurisdictional defect or miscarriage of justice. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; High Court judgment dated 17‑05‑2012 and appellate decree dated 22‑10‑2001 affirmed; trial‑court decree set aside.

Summary: (a) Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890) — Ss. 17 & 25 — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199 Custody of minor — Welfare of the child — Biological parents as natural guardians — No substitution by extended family in absence of extraordinary circumstances. Petitioners, being maternal uncle and aunt, challenged the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Kasur, whereby custody of minor girl Midhat Azhar was handed over to her real parents (respondents). Petitioners contended that they were caring for the child in a well-off environment since her infancy and adoption had occurred with the consent of biological parents—Held, however, that biological parentage is a legally and naturally recognized guardianship; petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of welfare being with real parents—Court reiterated that in ordinary circumstances, foster parents, even if close relatives, cannot claim preferential rights over natural parents—Principles of Islamic law and settled jurisprudence reinforced that adoptive or foster relations are not legally equivalent to natural parenthood—Appellate court rightly applied parameters under Ss. 17 & 25 of the Act—Findings of appellate court being well-reasoned and in accordance with law do not call for interference in constitutional jurisdiction. ----Cited Cases: • Mst. Nur Jehan Begum v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi (1991 SCMR 2300) • Mst. Rehmat v. Mst. Zubaida Begum (2021 SCMR 1534) • Shabana Naz v. Muhammad Saleem (2014 SCMR 343) • Mst. Beena v. Raja Muhammad (PLD 2020 SC 508) • Mrs. Shaukat Khalid v. Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi (1991 SCMR 19) • Rahimullah Choudhury v. Sayeda Helali Begum (1974 SCMR 305) • Miss Nancy Ruth Baney v. District Judge, Islamabad (PLD 2011 Islamabad 6) • Jamshed v. Saleemuddin (PLD 2014 Sindh 120) • Mst. Farah Mehnaz v. Safeer Hussain Jaffar (2013 CLC 235) • Shahida Adnan v. Additional District Judge (2021 YLR 1915) • Muhammad Hafeez v. District Judge, Karachi East (2008 SCMR 398) • Rao Abdul Rehman v. Muhammad Afzal (2023 SCMR 815) ----Disposition: Writ petition dismissed. Custody of the minor girl to remain with her biological parents. Judgment of the appellate court upheld. "Writ Petition under Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?section 17 and 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890--- Mutual voluntarily handing over custody of minor to adoptive parents---" After six years real parents seek restoration of the custody--- Held that in the presence of biological real parents of the minor, the custody of the minor girl cannot be handed over to adopted parents as the welfare of the minor best lies with the real parents. Writ Petition of adoptive parents for custody of minor is dismissed.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908 ----S. 5---Condonation of delay---Delay in filing appeal by government department---No plausible explanation---Mandatory requirement to explain delay of each day---Held, mere reference to procedural formalities or inter-departmental delays cannot constitute "sufficient cause"---Application for condonation of 50-day delay in filing Regular First Appeal was based on generalized assertions of delayed issuance of certified copy and obtaining departmental sanctions, without mentioning specific dates---Such vague and mechanical justifications reflect administrative inefficiency, not a valid ground for condonation---Consistent judicial view discourages routine condonation of delays by government departments without strict adherence to statutory requirements---Application rightly dismissed. Cited Cases: • Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari (2024 SCMR 1021) • M/s Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. v. M/s Bhatti Fabrics (2024 LHC 3160) • Government of Balochistan v. Muhammad Ali (2007 SCMR 1574) • Muhammad Bashir v. Province of Punjab (2003 SCMR 83) (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 151---Exercise of inherent jurisdiction---Condonation of delay---Government as litigant---No preferential treatment---Held, government functionaries are not entitled to leniency in observing statutory limitation---Presence of internal legal departments and access to Advocate General's Office mandates prompt action upon receipt of impugned judgment---Failure to take timely steps illustrates indifference and poor administration---Courts are not to condone delays where sufficient cause is absent, regardless of the party being a state entity. **(c) Appeal---Dismissal in limine---Failure to explain delay---Regular First Appeal filed 50 days beyond limitation without sufficient justification---Application for condonation dismissed---Appeal dismissed in limine as barred by time. Disposition: Application for condonation of delay dismissed---Regular First Appeal dismissed in limine for being time-barred.

Summary: 1. Where the Seizing Officer despite having prior information about narcotics neither conducts test purchase from the accused nor makes any efforts in this regard such recovery is not free of doubt. 2. If the Seizing Officer gets information about narcotics in a dwelling house then he/she by virtue of section 27 of The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act 2019 was required to obtain warrant for searching of that house otherwise to show valid reason(s) for not doing so and if he fails to do so the same would create about conduct of the Seizing Officer. 3. If sample of the recovered contraband is not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for analysis within prescribed time i.e. 72 hours then report thereof even if is found positive becomes inconsequential.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 12(2)---Fraud and misrepresentation---Scope and standard of proof---Application under S. 12(2), CPC challenging judgment on the ground of alleged fraud due to non-disclosure of legal heirs---Maintainability---Respondent/petitioner sought declaration of ownership based on a gift mutation in his favor by deceased donor Muhammad Aameen---Applicants (daughters of deceased) claimed they were deprived of inheritance due to non-disclosure of their existence during the litigation---Held, that for an application under S. 12(2), CPC to succeed, applicants must establish that (i) there was deliberate suppression of material facts; and (ii) such suppression led to an erroneous judgment prejudicing their rights---In the present case, deceased donor actively contested the suit and subsequently acknowledged the validity of the gift mutation before the Appellate Court---Legal heirs cannot challenge the gift transaction executed during the donor’s lifetime on grounds of inheritance, as the property ceased to be part of his estate at the time of his demise---Mere non-mentioning of some legal heirs does not constitute fraud unless it demonstrably alters the fundamental basis of judicial decision---Doctrine of Allegans Contraria Non Est Audiendus applied; the donor’s later affidavit contradicting prior judicial statements was of no legal effect.Cited Cases:• Mst. Rabia Gula v. Muhammad Janan 2022 SCMR 1009(b) Gift under Islamic Law----Transfer of ownership through gift---Effect on inheritance claims---Gift of property by a living person is a valid transaction and precludes inheritance claims upon donor’s demise---Applicants contended that deceased donor intended to distribute property among all legal heirs but failed to contest the gift mutation during his lifetime---Held, that under Islamic law, a valid gift transfers ownership immediately, and once completed, donor cannot reclaim the property or modify its legal consequences---Applicants, as legal heirs, could not claim inheritance in property already gifted away---Applicants’ claim was, therefore, misconceived as the gifted property did not form part of the donor’s estate at the time of his death.(c) Estoppel and Locus Standi----Judicial estoppel---Locus standi of legal heirs to challenge a concluded gift transaction---Donor actively participated in litigation, acknowledged execution of gift, and did not challenge adverse judicial findings during his lifetime---Held, that where a donor himself contests and later concedes the validity of a gift, his legal heirs cannot subsequently challenge the transaction under the pretext of inheritance or fraud---Applicants could only step into the donor’s shoes, and as he did not challenge the decree, they lacked locus standi to do so.Cited Cases:• Mst. Rabia Gula v. Muhammad Janan 2022 SCMR 1009(d) Civil Procedure---Judicial Integrity----Presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings---Scope of challenge---Affidavit contradicting prior judicial testimony---Evidentiary value---Held, that judicial proceedings are presumed to be conducted fairly and with due process---Mere allegation of fraud or collusion without cogent, unimpeachable evidence cannot vitiate court findings---Affidavit sworn by deceased donor after several years did not override prior judicial admissions acknowledging the gift---No grounds existed to invoke S. 12(2), CPC to set aside the decree.---- Disposition: Application under S. 12(2), CPC dismissed as not maintainable; claim of fraud not substantiated by evidence; inheritance claim not applicable to property validly gifted before donor’s demise.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 34---Discretion of the Court in awarding interest---Scope---Distinction between interest under S.34, C.P.C. and compensatory increase on equitable grounds---Principles of unjust enrichment and restitutio in integrum---Petitioner, as general attorney of vendors, executed sale deed in favor of respondent but concealed the fact that one vendor had passed away prior to execution---Legal heirs of deceased vendor successfully challenged the transaction, compelling the respondent to pay additional consideration to perfect title---Trial Court awarded Rs.5,766,000/- to respondent with 5% annual increase from the date of sale deed (11.08.2005)---Held, that interest under S.34, C.P.C. is compensatory and generally applies to an ascertained debt or delayed obligation---However, the 5% increase granted by the Courts below was not in the nature of interest under S.34, C.P.C., but rather a compensatory adjustment based on equitable grounds to neutralize inflation and depreciation suffered by respondent due to petitioner’s fraudulent conduct---Doctrine of restitutio in integrum required restoration of respondent’s financial position as if the wrongful act had not occurred---However, applying the increase from 11.08.2005 constituted unjust enrichment---Modification made to calculate the increase from 28.02.2018, the date of compromise with legal heirs of the deceased vendor.Cited Cases:• Raja Muhammad Sadiq v. WAPDA PLD 2003 SC 290• Ghulam Abbas v. Trustee of Port of Karachi PLD 1987 SC 393• Terni S.P.A v. PECO Ltd. 1992 SCMR 2238• Sui Northern Gas Pipelines v. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue 2014 PTD 1939(b) Contract Law---Agency----Fiduciary duty of an agent---Breach of duty by concealment of material facts---Effect---Petitioner, acting as attorney of multiple vendors, failed to disclose the prior demise of one vendor, rendering power of attorney void ab initio---Sale transaction held fraudulent due to non-disclosure, leading to cancellation by Court---Agent’s conduct found to be in breach of fiduciary obligations owed to principal and vendee, resulting in liability for consequential losses suffered by respondent---Petitioner’s failure to contest adverse findings in previous litigation amounted to implicit admission of liability.Cited Cases:• Ghulam Abbas v. Trustee of Port of Karachi PLD 1987 SC 393(c) Civil Procedure---Approbation and Reprobation----Doctrine of approbation and reprobation---Scope---Principle not applicable where change in stance is necessitated by judicial findings---Respondent initially supported petitioner’s claim that deceased vendor had received his share but later sought recovery after judicial determination to the contrary---Held, that respondent’s change in position was not a case of approbation and reprobation but a necessary correction in light of subsequent findings---Doctrine does not apply where a party’s adjustment is based on adjudicated facts rather than self-contradictory assertions.Disposition: Revision petition dismissed with modification; 5% annual increase to be calculated from 28.02.2018 instead of 11.08.2005.