Summary: Crl Appeal: Life Imprisonment: Offences U/s 302/34 PPC

Summary: Bail Cancellation in Case FIR No. 240/19 dated 30.07.2019 offence U/s 365/493/494 PPC, PS Aabpara, Islamaabad

Summary: This legal document filed by the petitioner against Respondents No. 1 to 6, who are allegedly attempting to forcibly recover a disputed investment/concealed amount. The petitioner argued that the matter was already resolved through a Settlement Agreement in October 2019, but the Respondents are persisting in their actions. The petitioner's counsel contended that the jurisdiction of the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission, invoked by Respondent No. 7, should first determine whether he qualifies as an Overseas Pakistani under the law. The legal officer representing Respondents No. 1 to 4 argued against the maintainability of the writ petition, citing a prior disposed writ petition on similar grounds. The Assistant Advocate General questions the petitioner's locus standi and argued that the Commission has the competence to handle such matters. The court emphasized the importance of determining the Overseas Pakistani status of Respondent No. 7 under the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act, 2014. It criticized the actions of the Government Agencies, stating they exceeded their authority in addressing a civil dispute and emphasized that the determination of third-party rights is a judicial function. The court concluded that the Commission should decide the matter within four weeks, ensuring a fair hearing and adherence to the law. It directed the Commission to determine the Overseas Pakistani status of Respondent No. 7 and whether the dispute involved third-party rights or concerns Government Agencies. During this period, no adverse action is to be taken against the petitioner.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320, 337-A (i) (ii) (iii), 337-F, 337-G & 279---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898),S.342---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120---Qatl-i-Khata, Shajjah-i-Khafifa,Shajjah-i-Hashimah, Shajjah-i-Mudihah, Ghayr-Jaifah, rash and negligent driving---Appreciation of evidence---Rash and negligent driving---Onus to prove---Plea of accused---Effect---Accused while driving a vehicle caused accident which resulted into death of threepersons---Trial Court convicted the accused for Qatl-i-Khata and causing injuries by drivingrash and negligently---Trial Court did not discuss statements of prosecution witnesses andconvicted accused on the basis of his reply to a question put to him under S. 342 Cr.P.C.---Prosecution was to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt---Judgment of TrialCourt was based on statement of accused recorded under S.342 Cr.P.C. and that on physicalexamination of the vehicle of which tie-rod was not found broken---First Information Reportwas registered on 6.1.2016 while vehicle was produced by prosecution witness in Court on3.10.2016, which remained parked with concerned police station---No report of Motormechanic was produced to prove that vehicle was checked after accident---High Courtobserved that when law had provided a thing to be done the same had to be done in thatparticular manner---Trial Court was to first discuss the case in order to come to anindependent conclusion with regard to truthfulness of prosecution witnesses then to examinestatement of accused under S. 342 Cr.P.C.---If the Court had disbelieved prosecutionevidence then it should have accepted the statement of accused as a whole with certainty---None of the ocular witnesses supported prosecution case---Mere driving in high speed didnot constitute the offence where element of negligence was lacking---High Court set asideconviction and sentence awarded to accused by Trial Court and he was acquitted of thecharge---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Summary: Acquittal ---- Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 182, 211, 409, 380 & 454---False information with intent to cause public servant touse his lawful power to the injury of another person, false charge of offence made with intentto injure, criminal breach of trust by public servant, theft in dwelling house, lurking housetrespass or house-breaking in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment---Appreciation of evidence---Absence of mens rea---Effect---Complainant/police constable gotlodged FIR that his official Kalashnikov was stolen from his house---Prosecution case wasthat the complainant had failed to deposit the Kalashnikov with the department; that he hadembezzled the official Kalashnikov; that he got lodged a false FIR and that duringinvestigation no signs of theft were observed---Prosecution case was based uponpresumptions and assumptions---Complainant himself had reported to police station withregard to missing of official Kalashnikov from his house, thus, he discharged his liability andapparently no mens rea existed on this part---Petition was accepted, judgments passed byMagistrate and Sessions Judge were set aside and the complainant, was acquitted of thecharge.

Summary: Background:Mohammad Saleem Khan (appellant) filed a Civil First Appeal against the judgment/order dated 23-08-2019 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Gilgit. The trial court dismissed his application under Section 12(2) CPC, which challenges judgments and decrees obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. The case involves a property dispute where respondent No. 6, Tahir Ashraf, filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against respondents No. 1 to 5, which was initially dismissed. However, during the appeal, a compromise was reached and made a rule of the court.----Issues:Whether the learned Additional District Judge Gilgit erred in dismissing the application under Section 12(2) CPC as time-barred without giving the appellant an opportunity to prove his case.Whether the compromise decree was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Civil First Appeal was allowed.The court held that the learned Additional District Judge Gilgit should have admitted the application under Section 12(2) CPC and framed issues, including the issue of limitation, before making a decision.The court reasoned that limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, requiring the production of evidence. It referenced Section 18 of the Limitation Act, which states that if a decree is obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, the limitation period starts from the date the decree became known to the appellant.The case was remanded back to the learned Additional District Judge Gilgit with instructions to frame issues and record evidence to decide the matter on its merits.Citations/Precedents:1986 SCMR 1496: Discusses the principle that limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, which requires evidence.2001 MLD 1265: Supports the principle that if a decree is obtained by fraud, the limitation period begins when the fraud is discovered.

Summary: THE QUEEN-Respondent [2020] HCA 11 Decided on 18th March, 2020. Criminal trial- -Murder-Chain of causation-'Novus actus interveniens'-'Substantial or significant cause of death'-Scope-Accused assaulted victim causing serious injuries and severe deterioration in quality of life of victim-Victim subsequently suffered a fracture which required possible life saving surgery-Decision was made not to perform life-saving surgery due to the poor quality of victim's life and as a result the victim died-Question was whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the accused for the murder of victim on basis that victim's low quality of life resulting from assault caused the decision not to undergo surgery, and whether conduct of accused was a "substantial or significant cause of death"- Held, that it was sufficient (for conviction) that the effects of the assault substantially or significantly contributed to the decision which, in turn, prevented the surgery that was reasonably expected to save victim's life-Decision not to perform surgery and only continue palliative treatment was based substantially or significantly upon the persistent, long-term, and catastrophic effects of the assault-Victim's severe cognitive decline as a result of the assault was operative at the time of his death-Assault by accused upon the victim was a sufficiently substantial or significant cause of the death to justify a conviction for murder. The victim, was an active, independent and relatively healthy 78-year-old man. In April 2013, the accused and his accomplice broke into victim's apartment and severely attacked him with a machete. Victim suffered severe, traumatic, life-threatening injuries to his brain, face, kidneys and his chest and spent four months in hospital, where after he was transferred to a nursing care facility where his condition was so poor that he was unable to undertake any daily living activities. Victim lacked any real capacity to understand what was happening around him, or even to recognise people and was unable to feed himself and suffered from double incontinence. In July 2013, the victim developed serious pneumonia, which was treated aggressively and successfully. After this treatment, his son signed a directive that his father was not to be resuscitated in the event of a similar life-threatening event. Between September and December 2013, victim's condition in the nursing home was so poor that he was unable to physically or mentally engage in any daily living activities. In December 2013, eight months after the attack on him, victim fell at the nursing home, which caused a fracture of the neck of his femur (a broken hip). He was transferred to a hospital where a decision was made in consultation between the doctors and his son that no operation to repair the fracture was to be performed. Rather, the victim was to be treated with palliative care, knowing that he would probably die. This decision was based upon the singularly poor quality of victim's life since the attack upon him. There was evidence that operations on hip fractures have a high success rate. Victim died five days later and a post-mortem examination of his body disclosed that the cause of death was fatty deposits in the blood vessels and heart that were a direct and frequent result of a fracture of the femur. At trial the defence argued that the two accused men were not responsible for the death because of intervening events that they were not responsible for; namely, the fall at the nursing home and the subsequent decision not to provide the victim with life-saving surgery. The prosecution argued that the fall was a direct result of the poor physical and mental condition that victim was in as a result of the attack, and that the decision not to operate on him was also a direct result of his poor physical and mental condition for which the two accused were responsible. Accused and his accomplice were convicted by the jury of murder. Court of appeal also took the view that it was open to the jury to reason that the low quality of life caused by the assault was the reason that when he was hospitalized with a fractured hip a decision was made not to undertake surgery that would reasonably have been expected to save his life, which, in turn, resulted in death. Section 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provided for the circumstances in which murder shall be taken to have been committed. Those circumstances relevantly included"where the act of the accused,... causing the death charged, was done... with intent to... inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person". In the present case there was no dispute that the requirement that the act of the accused cause the death charged required the jury to be satisfied that the act of the accused was"a substantial or significant cause of death"or a"sufficiently substantial"cause. Such formulation, recognised that boundaries must be drawn for legal responsibility; not every act that was necessary for death to occur was sufficient for the imposition of legal responsibility for the death. (1991) 172 CLR 378 at 411-412, see also at 398, 423, 442; Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316 at 325 [16]; Patel v The Queen (2012) 247 CLR 531 at 553 [75]; Gillard v The Queen (2014) 88 ALJR 606 at 612 [24]; 308 ALR 190 at 197; Timbu Kolian v The Queen (1968) 119 CLR 47 at 68-69; quoting Pollock, The Law of Torts, 6th ed (1901) at 36 and Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378 at 411, 423, 440, 448 ref. There are cases where an accused would be legally responsible for a death even if the act of the accused was not, by itself, necessary for the victim's death but was instead one of the conditions which were jointly necessary to produce the event. [p. 949] B For the prosecution to succeed on the ground of causation it was necessary for there to be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the three facts: first, surgery upon the victim was available and would reasonably have been expected to save his life; second, that the victim or his son had made a decision that such available surgery should not be undertaken; and third, that the decision to refuse surgery was motivated by victim's low quality of life due to the assault rather than due to other, unrelated considerations. [p. 952] C Regarding the first fact, there was expert evidence of doctors available on record to suggest that surgical treatment would usually be successful for a person of the victim's age and such surgery would reasonably have been expected to be successful. With regard to the second fact, hospital notes available on record suggested that a positive decision not to operate but provide palliative care was made by the victim's son in consultation with doctors, who gave weightage to such decision. Finally for purposes of establishing the third fact it was sufficient that the effects of the assault substantially or significantly contributed to the decision which, in turn, prevented the surgery that was reasonably expected to save victim's life. The inference was irresistible that the decision was taken to treat palliatively rather than surgically based substantially or significantly upon the persistent, long-term, and catastrophic effects of the assault. Even putting to one side the persistent physical effects of the assault, the cognitive decline suffered by the victim, leading to his inability to communicate properly, to express himself, and to relate to people, was described by his doctor as the"most important thing". Victim's severe cognitive decline as a result of the assault was operative at the time of his death. Appeal filed by accused was dismissed accordingly.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending