Summary: The judgment discusses various aspects of the case, including the facts, evidence presented, contradictions in witness testimonies, the reliability of identification parades, and other legal arguments. The judge ultimately arrives at the conclusion that there are enough doubts and inconsistencies in the case to warrant the acquittal of the appellant. As a result, the judgment concludes by acquitting Ayaz Ahmed Siddiqui of the charges and ordering his release.

Summary: In this legal case, the petitioner challenged the inclusion of their name in the Electronic Credit Information Bureau (eCIB) by Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), alleging that SCB violated the terms of a Settlement Agreement. The petitioner had settled a financial dispute with SCB, and the agreement required SCB to clear the petitioner's name from eCIB. However, the petitioner claimed that SCB reported their name to eCIB without justification, hindering their ability to obtain financial assistance. The court found in favor of the petitioner, stating that the State Bank of Pakistan's action in placing the petitioner's name on eCIB without proper notice and verification was without lawful authority and had no legal effect. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to settlement agreements and ensuring fairness in financial reporting.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S. 9(c)---Recovery of narcoticsubstance---Bail, refusal of---Driver of vehicle---Chars weighing 2 kilograms and heroinweighing 100 grams were recovered from beneath the driving seat of vehicle which wasbeing driven by accused---Effect---Driver could not be absolved from the liability, ifcontraband was transported in the vehicle being driven by him---High Court declined to grantbail on merit lest it could cause prejudice to other side---On tentative assessment of recordthere existed prima facie case against accused---Bail was refused, in circumstances.Haroon Khan v. The State 2017 PCr.LJ 438 rel.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497(2)---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S. 9(c)---Recovery ofnarcotic substance---Bail, grant of---Passenger of vehicle---Case of further inquiry---Charasweighing 2 kilograms and heroin weighing 100 grams were recovered from beneath thedriving seat of vehicle in which accused was sitting on front---Effect---When accused wasarrested he was not driving the car nor any narcotics was recovered from his exclusivepossession rather he was sitting on the front seat of the car---Case of accused was one offurther inquiry---Bail was allowed, in circumstances.Hussain Ullah v. The State 2019 SCMR 1651 rel.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 161---Statement of witness---Unexplained delay---Effect---Delay of even one or twodays without explanation, in recording statements of witnesses is fatal for prosecution caseand such statements were not worthy of reliance.Muhammad Asif v. The State 2017 SCMR 486; Muhammad Sadiq v. The State PLD1960 SC 223; Tariq Gul v. Ziarat Gul 1976 SCMR 236; Muhammad Iqbal v. The State 1984SCMR 930; Haroon alias Harooni v. The State and another 1995 SCMR 1627 andMuhammad Khan v. Maula Bakhshah 1998 SCMR 570 rel.(b) Criminal trial-------Evidence---Corroborative evidence---Scope---Where direct evidence fails, thecorroborative piece of evidence is of no avail.Ghulam Akbar and another v. The State 2008 SCMR 1064 rel.(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 302(b), 147, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-Amd,rioting armed with deadly weapons---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Defective investigation---Injured prosecution witness, evidence of---Scope---Accusedpersons were alleged to have made indiscriminate firing, set ablaze 6-7 vehicles and shopsresultantly one person was murdered and others were injured---Prosecution failed to establishthat the vehicles and shops belonged to complainant party and Investigation officer also didnot inquire about from any independent witness despite the fact that alleged occurrence hadtaken place at a thickly populated area---Neither statements of owners of vehicles nor ofshops which were set on fire were recorded by investigation officer---Crime empties werenot sent to Forensic Science Laboratory and it could not be determined as to how manyaccused persons made firing---Investigation was not conducted diligently and investigation officer failed to associate any independent person from the locality other than the relativesand tribesmen of the complainant to dig out the truth---Witnesses of ocular account thoughhad a stamp of injuries on their persons yet they failed to prove their truthfulness duringtrial---Complainant took sufficient time in lodging crime report after going through thereports of postmortem examination as well as medico-legal reports of injured witnesses andalso after consultation and deliberation---Dead body and injured witnesses were examinedprior to registration of FIR---Prosecution had managed eye-witnesses as well as prosecutionstory---Prosecution failed to prove charge against accused persons beyond shadow of doubtand benefit of doubt favoured accused persons---High Court set aside conviction andsentence awarded by Trial Court and both the accused persons were acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed in circum-stances.Muhammad Khan and another v. The State 1999 SCMR 1220; Bashir Ahmed v. TheState 2019 SCMR 1417; Munir Ahmed v. The State 2019 SCMR 2006; Allahyar v. The State1990 SCMR 1134; Mahmood Ahmad and 3 others v. The State and another 1995 SCMR 127;Imran Hussain v. Amir Arshad and 2 others 1997 SCMR 438; Muhammad Rafique v. TheState 2014 SCMR 1698 and Altaf Hussain v. The State 2019 SCMR 274 ref.Shahidullah v. Eid Marjan and 2 others 2014 PCr.LJ 1684 and Amin Ali and anotherv. The State 2011 SCMR 323 rel.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 161---Police Rules 1934, R.25.2 (3)---Recording of statements of witnesses---Mode---Investigation officer is not supposed to record statements of prosecution witnesses whileacting as 'stenographer' rather he is obliged, as required under S.161, Cr.P.C., to 'examine'the person whose evidence / statement he is going to record.(e) Criminal trial-------Abscondence--- Relevance--- Scope---Abscondence of accused is a relevant fact and canbe used as corroborative piece of evidence but such fact cannot be read in isolation, as thesame had to be read along with substantive piece of evidence.Asad Ullah v. Muhammad Ali PLD 1971 SC 541; Rasool Muhammad v. AsalMuhammad 1995 SCMR 1373; Muhammad Sadiq v. Najeeb Ali 1995 SCMR 1632;Muhammad Khan v. The State 1999 SCMR 1220; Gul Khan v. State 1999 SCMR 3004;Muhammad Arshad v. Qasim Ali 1992 SCMR 814; Pir Badshah v. State 1985 SCMR 2070and Amir Gul v. State 1981 SCMR 182 rel.(f) Criminal trial-------Court, duty of---Scope---Mere heinous or gruesome nature of crime should not detractCourt of law in any manner from the due course to judge and make appraisal of evidence in alaid down manner and to extend benefit of reasonable doubt to accused person beingindefeasible and inalienable right of an accused. (g) Criminal trial-------Benefit of doubt---Principle---Even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt issufficient for acquittal of accused.Sahibzada v. The State and 2 others 2015 PCr.LJ 554 rel.

Summary: Background:The petitioners, including Sana Khan and his sons, along with Mir Amal Khan, filed a civil revision petition against the judgment dated June 24, 2019, passed by the District Judge Gilgit. The District Judge had set aside the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a decision on merits. The trial court had earlier dismissed the suit under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), stating that the plaintiff, Iqbal, had not exhausted the necessary revenue forums.----Issues:Whether the trial court was correct in rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.Whether the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities or the civil court.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the judgment of the District Judge. The key points considered were:Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Remedies:The respondent/plaintiff (Iqbal) had filed a suit for declaration, perpetual injunction, and cancellation of certain land mutations.The trial court dismissed the suit under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, asserting that the plaintiff had not exhausted the revenue forum, necessary for matters involving land mutations.However, the appellate court found that the trial court had prematurely rejected the suit without proper examination of the merits or framing of issues.Improper Rejection of the Suit:The trial court's rejection was found improper as it was based on an application under Order 39 Rule 1, 2 CPC (temporary injunction), rather than a proper hearing on the maintainability of the suit.The appellate court held that the suit involved substantial questions that required examination through evidence and proper framing of issues.----Legal Precedents:The Chief Court referenced a judgment of the Lahore High Court (2003 MLD 109), emphasizing that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC if it requires examining the merits of the case.Order Summary:

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)- -Ss. 4B, 122(5A), 122(9) & 137(1) & Chaps. X & XI-Super tax for rehabilitation of temporarily displaced persons-Scope-Charge/levy of super tax under S.4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 appeared to be an independent provision-However, subsections (3), (4) & (5) of S.4B needed to be read in consonance with each other along with the other provisions of the Ordinance as specified in those sections-Provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance') mentioned in S.4B of the Ordinance were applicable while interpreting said section i.e. S. 4B-Section 4B of the Ordinance did not preclude the scope of Ss.122(5A) & 122(9) of the Ordinance as express reference had been made to them in S. 4B. Following the principles of interpretation, said provisions had to be read in consonance with each other. Legislature had envisaged application of provisions of assessment and recovery as contained in Chapter X of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, ('the Ordinance') i.e. inter alia Sections 120 and 122 of the Ordinance to Section 4B by employing the term "all"in Section 4B subsection (3). Further Section 4B also found specific reference to Section 137(1) of the Ordinance with regard to payment, collection and deposit. Similarly subsection (5) of Section 4B imported the provisions of Part IV, X, XI and XII of Chap. X and Part 1 of Chap.XI with regard to recovery of super tax and found mention of the following words,"so far as may be, apply to the collection of super tax as these apply to the collection of tax under the Ordinance". Thus, section 4B encapsulated and made direct reference to provisions of the Ordinance suggesting their applicability while interpreting section 4B of the Ordinance. Maple Leaf Cement Factory v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and others Writ Petition No.10477 of 2017 not agreed with. Section 4B of the Ordinance did not preclude the scope of sections 122(5A) and 122(9) of the Ordinance as express reference had been made to them in section 4B. Following the principles of interpretation, they had to be read in consonance with each other. Hence the Commissioner (Inland Revenue) could very well invoke and utilize the provisions of section 4B read with sections 122(5A) and 122(9) of the Ordinance. Super tax, by its very nature, related to an additional duty of income tax and such charge had been recognized to exist independent of income tax. Hence, in so far as the charge/levy of super tax was concerned, section 4B appeared to be an independent provision. However, its subsections (3), (4) and (5) needed to be read in consonance with each other along with the other provisions of the Ordinance as specified in those sections. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance 1992 SCMR 891; D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2018 PTD 287 and D.G. Khan Cement v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2020 LHC 1066 ref. (b) Interpretation of statutes- -Self-executory provision-Scope-Provision in a statute could not be taken to be self-executing if framing of Rules was directed in the said provision. Nestle Pakistan Ltd. and others v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2017 PTD 686 ref. (c) Interpretation of statutes- -Fiscal statute-Survey of case law providing principles of construction and rules of interpretation of fiscal statutes. Partnership Concern v. The Deputy Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore and 3 others PLD 1989 Lah. 337; Messrs Multan Electric Power Co. Limited (MEPCO) through Chief Executive v. Commissioner, Inland Revenue (WHT), Regional Tax Officer, Multan and another 2016 PTD 2567; Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2016 PTD 596; Allied Motors Ltd. through Manager Finance v. Commissioner of Income Tax and another 2004 PTD 1173; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messsrs Kamran Model Factory 2002 PTD 14; Mustafa Prestressed R.C.C. Pipe Works Ltd. Karachi v. Commissioner of Sales Tax Karachi 1990 PTD 974; Hirjana and Co. (Pak) Ltd. Karachi v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Central Karachi 1971 PTD 200; CIT v. Nagina Talkies (Property) Karachi PLD 1974 Kar. 6 and Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan Dacca v. Messrs Hoosen Kasam Dada Karachi 1960 PTD 574 ref. (d) Interpretation of statutes- -Fiscal/taxing statute-Harmonious construction of provisions-Provisions in a taxing statute must be harmoniously reconciled instead of picking out any inconsistency between the different provisions-All provisions of a statute had to be read together and harmonious construction was to be placed on such provisions so that no provision was rendered nugatory. (e) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)- -Ss. 4B, 122(5A), 122(9) & 210-Super tax for rehabilitation of temporarily displaced persons-Delegation of power by Commissioner Inland Revenue to Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue-Power to assess and determine liability for the purposes of super tax under S.4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance), which vested exclusively with the Commissioner Inland Revenue, could be delegated to the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue for invoking the machinery provisions i.e. S.122(5A) read with S.122(9) of the Ordinance-Conditions for valid delegation of such powers in terms of S.210(1) of the Ordinance stated. In terms of section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance), the Commissioner (Inland Revenue) could delegate his powers and functions. Further section 210 (1A) revealed that the power in terms of section 122(5A) regarding amendment of assessment could not be delegated below the rank of the Additional Commissioner. Pak Telecom Mobile Ltd. and others v. Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman, Islamabad and others 2013 PTD 2151 and Messrs Ocean Pakistan Ltd. v. Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others 2012 PTD 1374 ref. Section 210 of the Ordinance applied to section 4B of the Ordinance as well. In other words, all those sections in the Ordinance which dealt with the powers and responsibilities of the Commissioner, the said powers could very well be delegated by the Commissioner as per the mandate of Section 210 of the Ordinance. Section 4B was indeed part of the Ordinance being one of the sections so the applicability of section 210 to section 4B of the Ordinance could not be excluded. Pak Telecom Mobile Ltd. and others v. Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman, Islamabad and others 2013 PTD 2151 ref. For constituting a valid delegation of powers under section 210(1) of the Ordinance, the following conditions must be satisfied: (i) The delegation must be in writing; (ii) The delegation order must specify precisely the powers and functions of the Commissioner Inland Revenue that have been delegated to the delegate; and (iii) The delegation order must specify the persons in respect to whom the powers and functions of the Commissioner Inland Revenue have been delegated. Jahangir Khan Tareen v. Federation of Pakistan and others W.P. No.27535 of 2016 ref. (f) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199-Show cause notice-Constitutional petition filed against a show cause notice-Maintainability-Mere show cause notice was not an"adverse order"-However, the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction could take up writs to challenge a show cause notice if it was found that the show cause notice was totally non est i.e. suffered from want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or had been issued malafidely i.e. merely to harass the subject-Issuance of a show cause notice was in itself a complete act and decision which could be subject to judicial review if inter alia, the show cause notice was not lawfully issued by the competent authority, or, if the issuance of the show cause notice was ultra vires the relevant law and/or if issuance of the show cause notice was without jurisdiction or with mala fide. Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex through Managing Partner v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary 2011 PTD 2260; Messrs Siemens Aktiengesellschaft ("Siemens AG") through Authorized Person v. Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division and 3 others 2016 PTD 1158; Dr. Seema Irfan and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 Sindh 519; Khalid Mahmood Ch. v. Government of Punjab 2002 SCMR 805; Karachi Bulk Storage and Terminals (Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs 2011 PTD 2103; Union of India (UOI) and others v. Vicco Laboratories (2007) 13 SCC 270; SBQ Steels Limited v. The Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax, Guntur Commissionerate 2013 (2) ALD 158; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahma Datt Sharma (1987) 2 SCC 179; The Special Director and others v. Muhammad Ghulam Ghouse and others AIR 2004 SC 1467; Union of India and others v. Kunisetty Satyanarana and AIR 2007 SC 906; Messrs Kirlosar Computer Service Limited Bangalore v. Union of India and others 1997 (73) ECR 651 (Karnataka); Mari Petroleum Company Limited through General Manager Finance, Islamabad v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue, Islamabad and 3 others 2019 PTD 1774; Messrs Attok Gen. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner (AUDIT), Largetaxpayer Unit, Islamabad and 3 others 2019 MLD 870; Collector of Sales Tax v. Khurshid Spinning Mills Limited and another 2017 PTD 196; Zaver Petroleum Corporation v. Federal Board of Revenue and another 2016 PTD 2332; Chaudhary Sugar Mills Limited v. Chief Commissioner and 2 others 2016 PTD 527; Oil and Gas Development Company Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue and 2 others 2016 PTD 1675; KK Oil and Ghee Mills (Private) Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2016 PTD 2601; Messrs J.K. Brothers Pakistan (Private) Limited v. The Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and another 2016 PTD 461; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Eli Lilly Pakistan Limited and others 2009 SCMR 1279; Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and others 2004 PTD 1901; Al Ahram Builders (Private) Limited v. Income Tax Tribunal 1993 SCMR 29; Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan Works Division and 2 others PLD 1972 SC 279 and Ocean Pakistan Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2012 PTD 1374 ref. Malik Zafar Ali Thaheem for FBR. Dates of hearing: 4th, 10th and 17th March, 2020.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending