Summary: Acquittal ---- Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 182, 211, 409, 380 & 454---False information with intent to cause public servant touse his lawful power to the injury of another person, false charge of offence made with intentto injure, criminal breach of trust by public servant, theft in dwelling house, lurking housetrespass or house-breaking in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment---Appreciation of evidence---Absence of mens rea---Effect---Complainant/police constable gotlodged FIR that his official Kalashnikov was stolen from his house---Prosecution case wasthat the complainant had failed to deposit the Kalashnikov with the department; that he hadembezzled the official Kalashnikov; that he got lodged a false FIR and that duringinvestigation no signs of theft were observed---Prosecution case was based uponpresumptions and assumptions---Complainant himself had reported to police station withregard to missing of official Kalashnikov from his house, thus, he discharged his liability andapparently no mens rea existed on this part---Petition was accepted, judgments passed byMagistrate and Sessions Judge were set aside and the complainant, was acquitted of thecharge.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)- -Ss. 302, 34 & 109-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 337, 338 & 339-Qatl-i-amd, common intention, abetment-Tender of pardon to accomplice-Power to grant or tender pardon-Commitment of person to whom pardon has been tendered-Scope-Accused assailed order passed by Trial Court whereby her application under S.338, Cr.P.C. for grant of pardon was dismissed-Prosecution evidence primarily consisted of extra-judicial confession of petitioner, wajtakar evidence and recovery of crime empty from the place of occurrence which the complainant handed over to the Investigating Officer after three days of the incident-Circumstances showed that the petitioner, who had undertaken to make full disclosure if she was made an approver, could help in bringing additional material on record which would advance the interest of justice-State as well as heirs of the deceased were supporting the petition, there was all the more reason that it should be accepted-Co-accused had no right to object the tender of pardon to their cohort because they would have full opportunity to cross-examine her when she would appear in the witness box as an approver-Officer-in-charge of the prosecution was directed to tender pardon to the petitioner subject to the condition that she would make full and true disclosure of all the circumstances within her knowledge relating to the qatl-i-amd of the deceased and every other person concerned with the commission of the offence in any capacity whether as principal or abettor and in the event of breach of such condition, the consequences stipulated in S.339, Cr.P.C. would follow-Impugned order was set aside and the petition was accepted. Muhammad Iqbal v. The State 1984 PCr.LJ 1197 and Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi and others AIR 2001 SC 2734 ref. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)- -Art. 16-Accomplice as witness-Scope-High Court observed that at time there were cases in which criminals commit an offence in such an organized or sophisticated manner that it becomes difficult for the prosecution to track them down or secure the quality of evidence that is required in the court of law to prove charge, therefore, prosecution was constrained to seek the help of an accomplice-Article 16 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 expressly declares that an accomplice is a competent witness. (c) Words and phrases- -Accomplice-Defined. Black's Law Dictionary (Tenth Edn.); Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol 23 p. 1349 at p.323 and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v. The State PLD 1979 SC 53 rel. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 337-Tender of pardon to accomplice-Scope-Accomplice is one of the accused persons but he ceases to be so and becomes an approver when granted pardon. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -Ss. 337 & 338-Tender of pardon to accomplice-Power to grant or tender pardon-Scope-Section 337, Cr.P.C. stipulates that in the case of any offence triable exclusively by the High Court or the Court of Sessions, or where the offence is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 10 years, or when the offence is punishable under S.211, P.P.C. with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, or where the offence falls within the ambit of Ss.216-A, 369, 401, 435 or 477-A, P.P.C., the officer-in-charge of the prosecution in the district may tender pardon to any person supposed to be directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence on the condition that he would make a full and true disclosure of all the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and the persons involved in it-Such pardon may be tendered at any stage of the investigation or trial-Such power cannot be exercised in offences of hurt or qatl without the permission of the victim or, as the case may be, of the heirs of the victim and in every instance reasons must be recorded-Section 338, Cr.P.C. empowers the High Court and the Sessions Court trying a case to exercise similar powers during the trial before the judgment is passed-Primary purpose of both the provisions (Ss.337 & 338 Cr.P.C) is to obtain more evidence in connection with the offence. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -Ss. 338 & 540-Power to grant or tender pardon-Power to summon material witness or examine person present-Scope-Section 338, Cr.P.C. has its own sway and powers conferred on the court thereunder are not circumscribed by the considerations that underlie S.540, Cr.P.C. Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes v. State of Maharashtra and others AIR 1968 SC 594 rel. (g) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)- -Arts. 16 & 129(b)-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.337-High Court (Lahore) Rules & Orders, Chap. 14, Vol. III, R.5-Accomplice-Tender of pardon to accomplice-Corroboration-Scope-Albiet Art. 16 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, makes an accomplice a competent witness, Art.129(b) provides a sort of rider thereto when it enacts that the Court may presume "that an accomplice is unworthy of the credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars."-Rule 5 of Chap. 14, Vol. III, High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, also stipulates that since the evidence of an approver being that of an accomplice is prima facie of a tainted character, it should be scrutinized with utmost care and accepted with caution-Rule 5 adds that as a matter of law, pure and simple, a conviction is not bad merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice but it has become almost a universal rule that conviction cannot be based on the testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material particulars-As to the amount of corroboration which is necessary, no hard and fast rule can be laid down; it will depend upon various factors, such as the nature of the crime, the nature of the approver's evidence, the extent of his complicity and so forth-Corroboration is considered not only in respect of the general story of the approver but also in respect of facts establishing the accused's identity and his participation in the crime-No strait jacket formula can be laid down as to the amount of corroboration but it must be in material particulars. The King v. Baskerville [(1916) 2KB 658]; Mahadeo v. Emperor (40 CWN 1164); Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab PLD 1957 SC (Ind.) 555; Rafiq Ahmad v. The State PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 317; Ramzan Ali v. The State PLD 1967 SC 545; Hassu v. The Crown 1969 SCMR 621; Dr. Muhammad Bashir v. The State PLD 1971 SC 447; Abdul Sattar v. The State PLD 1976 SC 404; Ali Muhammad v. The State 1985 SCMR 1834; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. The State PLD 2009 SC 814; Ishaq v. The Crown PLD 1954 FC 335; Fazal Dad v. The Crown PLD 1955 FC 152; Ghulam Qadir and another v. The State PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 377; Abdul Khaliq v. The State PLD 1970 SC 166; Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada v. Sohbat Khan and 3 others PLD 1972 SC 363 and Abdul Majid and another v. The State PLD 1973 SC 595 ref. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -Ss. 337 & 339-High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Chap. 14, Vol. III, R.7-Tender of pardon to accomplice-Commitment of person to whom pardon has been tendered-If the approver gives false evidence he can be tried for the offence and also for perjury-Scope-Pardon is tendered on the condition that he would make a full disclosure, the approver is bound to keep his promise-If he fails to do so and the Public Prosecutor certifies that he has given false evidence or willfully concealed something essential, as per S.339 Cr.P.C., he may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was tendered and also for perjury subject to the sanction of the High Court under R.7 of Chap.14, Vol. III of the High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders. (i) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -Ss. 337 & 338-Tender of pardon to accomplice-Power to grant or tender pardon before the judgment is passed-Scope-Mere fact that the trial has concluded is no ground to reject the application for tender of pardon-Section 338, Cr.P.C. unequivocally states that pardon can be tendered by High Court or the Sessions Court trying a case at any time before the judgment is passed-Powers of the Court under S.338, Cr.P.C. are circumscribed by two conditions: firstly, that the action must be with a view to obtain the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in an offence or is privy to it; secondly, pardon cannot be tendered to a person in an offence relating to hurt or qatl without the permission of the victim or, as the case may be, his heirs. (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 337-Tender of pardon to accomplice-Scope-Accomplice does not have any vested right to be tendered a pardon and made an approver. Mushtaq Ahmad alias Shaqi v. The State and another 2003 MLD 1627 ref. (k) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 338-Power to grant or tender pardon-Scope-Situations, the conditions, the offences and the requirements justifying reception of approver's testimony are all exceptional, bordering on necessity and demands of public policy-Powers under S.338, Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great care and caution and only to advance the interest of justice-Court should always bear in mind that in every pardon there is a risk that an offender would escape just at the expense of other accused-In order to determine whether in a particular case pardon should be tendered to an accused or not, consideration would be the quality of evidence available on the record, the nature of additional evidence he is likely to give, the nature of his complicity and the degree of his culpability in relation to the offence and to his co-accused. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. The State PLD 2009 SC 814 fol. (l) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -Ss. 337 & 338-Tender of pardon to accomplice-Power to grant or tender pardon-Right of co-accused to object-Scope-Co-accused has no right to object the tender of pardon to their cohort because co-accused would have full opportunity to cross-examine him when he appears in the witness box as an approver. Malik Mushtaq alias Black Prince v. The State and 11 others 2005 YLR 1728 and Force Commander, Regional Directorate ANF, Rawalpindi v. Judge Special Court (CNS) and others 2013 PCr.LJ 279 ref. Syed Nadeem Haider Rizvi, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199--- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.417---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Alternate remedy---Petitioner assailed judgment passed by Trial Court,whereby respondent was acquitted of the charges---Validity---Remedy of appeal wasprovided under S.417, Cr.P.C. to an aggrieved person, against finding of acquittal---TrialCourt, through order in question, acquitted respondent but petitioner did not file appealagainst it, therefore, constitutional petition to the extent of acquittal of respondent was notcompetent in presence of alternate remedy.(b) Administration of justice-------Non-following of the procedure---Effect---When statute prescribes an act to be done in amanner, then it must be done as directed so, and its deviation vitiate entire proceedings. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 182 & 211---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 155, 195 & 561-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---False information to publicservant and false charge---Quashing of proceedings---Taking of cognizance---Earlier, a casewas registered by petitioner against respondent and Trial Court acquitted respondent on theground that case was false---Subsequently, on the direction of Sessions Judge, case underS.182, P.P.C. was registered against petitioner---Validity---Registration of F.I.R. by police onletter issued by District Attorney on behalf of Sessions Judge followed by investigation bypolice, at his own were not permitted by law---Such act of police was void, unlawful and trialon the basis of the same was coram non judice---Proceedings under S.182, P.P.C. could onlybe initiated on a written complaint of police officer but the section was inserted in F.I.R. on aletter from District Attorney---Offence having not been included on a written complaint ofpolice officer concerned, proceedings under S.182, P.P.C. were unlawfully initiated againstpetitioner---Proceedings under S.211, P.P.C. could only be initiated on a written complaint ofa court or by any other court to which such court was subordinate but there was no complaintin writing from Trial Court or any other court---Provisions of sections 155 and 195, Cr.P.C.were mandatory in nature, therefore, its non-compliance vitiated entire proceedings---F.I.R. registered against petitioner on the direction of Trial Court was void and illegal, henceproceedings initiated against petitioner were without jurisdiction---Order passed by SessionsJudge for registration of case was set aside and F.I.R. registered against petitioner wasquashed---Petition was allowed accordingly.

Summary: Acquittal granted --- Background Muhammad Hassan and co-accused Muhammad Ibrahim faced trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Chunian, for offenses under sections 302, 324, 211, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) related to a murder and assault case (FIR No. 154/2008). Hassan was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, while Ibrahim was sentenced for causing hurt. Both filed appeals: Hassan sought acquittal and Ibrahim sought the reinstatement of the death sentence. The Lahore High Court altered Hassan's sentence from death to life imprisonment but upheld the conviction. Hassan and Ibrahim then filed petitions in the Supreme Court. ----Issues: 1. Whether the conviction and sentencing of Muhammad Hassan for murder were justified. 2. Whether the delayed FIR affects the credibility of the prosecution's case. 3. Whether the presence of the prosecution's eyewitnesses at the scene was justified. 4. Whether the recovery of the weapon and other evidence was sufficient to uphold the conviction. 5. Whether the motive alleged by the prosecution was credible. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court of Pakistan overturned the Lahore High Court's judgment and acquitted Muhammad Hassan. The Court provided the following key points in its reasoning: ----Delayed FIR: The FIR was lodged more than sixteen hours after the incident, with no explanation for the delay. This delay indicated possible fabrication and consultation, which compromised the credibility of the prosecution's case. ----Eyewitness Testimony: The prosecution's key witnesses were deemed "chance witnesses" as their presence at the crime scene was not convincingly justified. Their statements lacked corroboration, and their reasons for being at the scene were questionable. ----Recovery of Evidence: The recovery of the weapon (single barrel gun) on Hassan’s pointation was not supported by a positive report from the firearm expert. This lack of corroborative evidence further weakened the prosecution's case. ----Medical Evidence: The Court reiterated that medical evidence is corroborative in nature and cannot independently sustain a conviction if the direct evidence (eyewitness testimony) is unreliable. ----Motive: The alleged motive for the crime was found to be double-edged and insufficiently substantiated. The Court noted that the complainant's active pursuit of the case, despite having no direct relation to the victim, raised doubts about the genuineness of the motive. ----Conclusion: The Supreme Court converted the Jail Petition for Leave to Appeal into an appeal, allowed it, and acquitted Muhammad Hassan of the charges, ordering his release. The Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal filed by the complainant seeking the death sentence for Hassan was dismissed. The Court emphasized the importance of credible eyewitness testimony, timely FIR reporting, and the corroborative nature of medical and recovery evidence in criminal proceedings. -----Citations/Precedents: Amir Muhammad Khan vs. The State (2023 SCMR 566): Delay in reporting the matter to the police indicates possible fabrication. Mst. Sughra Begum vs. Qaiser Pervez and others (2015 SCMR 1142): Testimony of chance witnesses requires justifiable reasons for their presence at the crime scene. Muhammad Irshad vs. Allah Ditta and others (2017 SCMR 142): Presence of chance witnesses at the crime scene must be convincingly established. Sufyan Nawaz vs. The State and others (2020 SCMR 192): Testimony of chance witnesses is suspect without clear reasons for their presence. Salamat Mansha Masih vs. The State and another (PLD 2022 SC 751): Medical evidence is corroborative and cannot replace unreliable direct evidence. Hayatullah vs. The State (2018 SCMR 2092): Conviction cannot be sustained solely on the basis of medical evidence. Nasir Javaid vs. The State (2016 SCMR 1144): Recovery evidence is corroborative and relevant only when primary evidence is reliable. Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu vs. The State (2019 SCMR 652): Once a loophole in the prosecution case is observed, the benefit goes to the accused. Abdul Jabbar vs. The State (2019 SCMR 129): Prosecution case must be free of reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction.