Summary: Scope of repatriation orders under Punjab Local Government Act, 2019---The document pertained to the dissolution of existing local governments under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2019. It specified the constitution of succeeding local governments, including Metropolitan Corporations, Municipal Corporations, Municipal Committees, Town Committees, and Tehsil Councils. The petitioner challenged the alleged illegal transfers/repatriation orders of local government employees, arguing that they are entitled to work until new local governments are constituted. The court rejected the petitioner's claims, stating that there is no apparent violation of the relevant sections of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2019. It emphasized that the defunct Union Councils are temporarily discharging public functions until new local governments are constituted. The court noted that the deployment plan and transfer orders were carried out lawfully by the duly constituted successive local governments. The petitioners' claim of a violation of their legal rights is dismissed, and they are directed to report to the duly constituted successive local governments against their substantive posts. The court concluded that the petitions are incompetent and dismissed them.

Summary: The case involves a petitioner, a transporter, who owns a bus allegedly involved in a road accident. The petitioner claimed that the bus was unlawfully seized by the police after the accident, and despite their efforts to retrieve it, the authorities have refused to return the vehicle. The petitioner argued that the police exceeded their authority by detaining the bus and cites Section 95 of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, which limits the detention of a motor vehicle involved in an accident to 48 hours. The court examined the maintainability of the petition, emphasizing that alternative remedies should be considered but can be set aside if they prove inadequate or ineffective. The court interpreted Section 95 of the Ordinance, concluding that it is mandatory and limits the detention of a vehicle involved in an accident to 48 hours. The court rejected the reliance on Rule 22.16 of the Police Rules, 1934, stating that the Ordinance takes precedence over general laws. Additionally, it clarified that Section 516-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) is not applicable since the bus does not fall under the category of property used for the commission of an offense. Ultimately, the court rules in favor of the petitioner, declaring the continued detention of the bus as unlawful and orders its immediate return.

Summary: The appellant denied the execution of an agreement to sell, which was claimed by the respondent No.1. The trial court decreed the claim of respondent No.1, but the appellant challenged this decision in the first appellate court, and subsequently, in this second appeal. The revision petitioner (respondent No.2) claimed rights to the same land based on a separate agreement to sell which the appellant admitted to executing. However, the appellant alleged default in the payment of the balance consideration. The judgment criticized the lower courts for not adhering to proper legal procedures, specifically the failure to confront the appellant with the disputed agreement and signatures, as required by Article 140 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984. It also points out the absence of crucial evidence, emphasized that the endorsement at the back of the agreement was not shown or confronted to the appellant. The judgment concluded by allowing the second appeal and the civil revision, setting aside the previous judgments and decrees, dismissing the suit of respondent No.1, and decreeing the suit of respondent No.2.

Summary: (a) Criminal trial-------Witness---Hearsay---Witness who did not see the occurrence and had raised fingerstowards accused on the basis of information conveyed to them by a third person, suchwitness had merely deposed about crime without reference to real culprit.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Unnatural death ofwife---Husband failed to explain---Wife of accused was murdered in house and accusedcould not explain her death---Unnatural death of deceased inside the house of accused andhis failure to discharge such onus, was intriguing---Such failure could not be equated toqualify as evidentiary certainty, essentially required in order to saddle accused withformidable corporal consequences after discarding remaining pieces of evidence relied uponby prosecution---Accused could not be convicted for alleged murder simply on the basis ofsupposition---Prosecution failed to prove charge against accused persons beyond reasonabledoubt---High Court extended benefit of doubt to the accused husband, set aside convictionand sentence awarded by Trial Court and acquitted him of the charge---Appeal was allowed,in circumstances.(c) Criminal trial-------Abscondance--- Scope--- Mere absconsion of accused is not sufficient to sustainconviction---People avoid facing the process of law or their adversaries for a variety ofreasons, not essentially inclusive of guilt.Nasrullah alias Nasro v. State 2017 SCMR 724 and Asad Khan v. State PLD 2017 SC681 rel.

Summary: Acquittal granted---Background:Malik Safeer was stabbed to death on 16.8.2005 near Police Headquarters Garden Karachi.The incident was reported by the victim's brother after midnight, naming Muhammad Imran and others as assailants.Imran was convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to life imprisonment.---Issues:Whether the prosecution's evidence established the guilt of the petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt.Whether discrepancies in witness testimonies and the presence of alternative explanations warranted acquittal.Whether the delay in reporting the incident and discrepancies in witness statements undermined the prosecution's case.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:Witness testimonies were found inconsistent and improbable, casting doubt on their credibility.Discrepancies in witness statements, coupled with alternative explanations, undermined the prosecution's case.The medical examination of the petitioner's mother revealed injuries inconsistent with the prosecution's narrative.The recovery of the weapon and the acquittal of co-accused further weakened the prosecution's case.The benefit of the doubt was extended to the petitioner, resulting in acquittal.The criminal petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, leading to the petitioner's immediate release.---Citations/Precedents:Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (specifically section 302 and section 34)

Summary: COMMANDER (A&Q) CHOLISTAN RANGERS, RAHIM YAR KHAN and others-Respondents Pakistan Rangers Ordinance (XIV of 1959)- -S. 15(1)-Member of Pakistan Rangers-Absence from duty for 12 days without a valid reason and authorization-Misconduct-Dismissal from service converted into removal from service-Plea of petitioner that he had a genuine reason for his absence, namely, the involvement of his mother in an accident and therefore, he had to leave his post in an emergency-Held, that admittedly leave was not obtained by the petitioner nor was any written application submitted by him for seeking such leave-During the period of his absence his mobile phone remained switched off-When the petitioner's Sector Commander received a SMS message from the petitioner, he wanted to contact him but the petitioner was not available-Petitioner's mother was admittedly advised rest for a few days after her thigh injury had been attended to-In the circumstances, the petitioner could have returned immediately thereafter, which he did not-Petitioner did not have a valid reason to remain absent from duty for 12 days-Petitioner belonged to a disciplined force/service and his absence from duty without authorization was a serious misconduct-Service record of petitioner showed that it was the third time during his service span that he remained absent without authorization-Action taken against the petitioner was justified, however the severity of the punishment of dismissal was the consequence that the petitioner could not seek government employment in any other department or office-Petitioner was an able bodied young man and may qualify for government employment where strict discipline was not enforced-Consequently, petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and partly allowed converting the petitioner's penalty of dismissal into removal from service.

Summary: (a) Words and phrases- -'Emigration' and 'immigration'-Distinction. Black's Law Dictionary 11th Edition ref. (b) Words and phrases- -'Emigrant' and 'immigrant'-Definition and distinction-'Emigrant' meant a person who left his/her own country in order to settle permanently in a foreign country, while 'immigrant' meant a person who came to live permanently in a foreign country. Words and Phrases Volume 14-A and 20 Permanent Edition ref. (c) Words and phrases- -'Overseas'-Definition. Oxford Advanced Learner Dictionary New 8th Edition ref. (d) Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act (XX of 2014)- -Ss. 2(g) & 2(i)-Complaint filed by 'Overseas Pakistani' before the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission ('the Commission')-Pre-requisites-Commission, had to firstly, ensure that the person preferring a complaint to it, fell under the definition of "Overseas Pakistani", before taking any step, under the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act, 2014 ('the Act') or proceeding with his complaint-For a complainant, this was the necessary foundational touchstone, which was required to be met, for putting in place the extraordinary forum to seek redressal of his grievance, against a Government Agency, and it was this very quintessential part, which was required to be determined, in the first instance by the Commission, before proceeding with the complaint, and adopting the mechanism of transmitting the same to the Government Agency, while recommending initiation of disciplinary actions against the delinquent. (e) Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act (XX of 2014)- -S. 2(i)-Complaint filed by 'Overseas Pakistani' before the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission ('the Commission')-'Overseas Pakistani'-Scope-Person merely having nationality of another country but living in Pakistan permanently could not be termed as an Overseas Pakistani [for purposes of the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act, 2014 ('the Act')]-Said Act provided mechanism for redressal of grievance and protection for Overseas Pakistani only and not for every dual national-In order to invoke jurisdiction of the Commission, a person had to show that he was an Overseas Pakistani with Pakistani origin and he/she either permanently or temporarily resided outside Pakistan for employment, business or any other purpose as defined in the Act with intention to stay there for an unspecified period. (f) Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act (XX of 2014)- -S. 7-Overseas Pakistanis Commissioner ('the Commissioner'), powers of-Scope-Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act, 2014 ('the Act') did not authorize the Commissioner or the Government Agencies to either register a case or file a suit against a private person either on the complaint so filed, or on behalf of an Overseas Pakistani in any manner-Commissioner was empowered to only transmit a complaint received from an Overseas Pakistani to a Government Agency for redressal, or to refer any complaint of an Overseas Pakistani to the Ombudsman for further necessary action in accordance with law. Shahid Idrees v. Government of the Punjab and others PLD 2018 Lah. 284 ref. (g) Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act (XX of 2014) - -Ss. 4 & 7-Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission ('the Commission'), the Overseas Pakistanis Commissioner ('the Commissioner') and 'Government Agencies', powers of-Scope-Civil dispute between private persons relating to transaction of money-Government Agencies on the behest and directive of the Commissioner could not initiate proceedings against such private persons by issuing them summons/notices in order to resolve a civil dispute. Determination of third-party rights was unequivocally a judicial function and could only be carried out by a court of law i.e., the judicature, and not by the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission ('the Commission') or the Government Agencies, which formed executive organs of the State. Government Agency had no authority to summon a private person in excess of its powers particularly when the law it operated under, did not expressly or by necessary implication find mention of such powers. No law could authorize an executive Government Agency to determine rights of private parties, as it was the sole prerogative of the courts of law. When the Government Agency began to exercise judicial power in order to determine private rights, the proceedings became unconstitutional and illegal. Commission or the Government Agencies were not the Courts and, therefore, any assumption of judicial power by the Commission or the Government Agencies on the behest of the Commission was also unconstitutional and illegal. Private parties having a dispute over transaction of money, may avail remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 before the Civil Court which was court of ultimate jurisdiction and was empowered to deal with such like matters. Sh. Riaz-ul-Haq and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and others PLD 2013 SC 501; Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 1445; and Sh. Liaquat Hussain and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Islamabad and others PLD 1999 SC 504 ref. (h) Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act (XX of 2014)- -S. 2(i)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 4(1)-'Overseas Pakistani'-No preferential treatment for resolution of disputes-Overseas Pakistanis, no matter wherever they may be, were subject to the same protection of law as every other Pakistani without any discrimination-Equal was not preferential and thus Overseas Pakistanis were not given any preference for resolutions of disputes by the Government Agencies. Tahir Mirza v. Saleha Mehmood, DCO and others (2019 YLR 2852 ref. (i) Constitution of Pakistan - -Arts. 184(3) & 199-Judicial review by the superior Courts-Scope-Executive organ/functionary-Every executive organ was obliged to perform his duties and to exercise only those powers which law had conferred upon it; otherwise same would be subject to the judicial review of superior Courts. (j) Constitution of Pakistan - -Arts. 184(3) & 199-Executive, legislative and administrative actions-Judicial review by superior Courts-Meaning and scope-"Judicial review"meant a court's power to judicially review the legislative and executive actions in order to maintain and sustain the rule of law. Courts by means of writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto controlled the administrative actions. Under the dominion of judicial review, the superior Courts reviewed the lawfulness of a decision or action made by a public body. In fact this was a process under which executive or legislative actions may be subject to review by the judiciary. Judicial review could be sought on the grounds that a decision-maker misdirected itself in law, exercised a power wrongly, or improperly purported to exercise a power that it did not have, which was known as acting ultra vires. The court's function, in exercising such power, was to ensure that the public functionaries did not act unjustly by overstepping their proper sphere. Thus when an administrative authority took an action under a law, the question could be whether he had exceeded or abused the power conferred by the law and had therefore acted ultra vires. In the field of judicial review, the word"lawful"had acquired a technical meaning. When it was said that a person had acted unlawfully, it meant that he had acted outside the powers conferred on him by law; and when the question was of the validity of an administrative action, the only question the court asked was, has the decision maker exceeded his statutory powers, thus acting ultra vires and therefore unlawfully?. Further power of"judicial review"as compared to"jurisdiction" was available to the superior Courts enshrined by the Constitution which by no stretch of imagination either could be curtailed or abridged. Bank of Punjab's case PLD 2014 Lah. 92 ref. In exercise of powers of judicial review of administrative action the High Court always had the jurisdiction to examine whether any order passed by any executive or administrative authority was with or without jurisdiction. Since every order passed without jurisdiction was always void ab initio and nullity in law, therefore, the High Court shall always have jurisdiction to consider such point. Furthermore, if the action or decision was perverse or was such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed could come to or had been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach or had been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters, the Court would be justified in interfering with the same. Corruption in Hajj Arrangements in 2010's case PLD 2011 SC 963 ref. Azhar Saleem Kamlana, A.A.G. (on Court call).

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 497(5)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-B, 493-A, 494 & 34-Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979), S. 10 [since omitted]-Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage, marrying again during life time of husband or wife and common intention-Zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir-Bail cancellation, refusal of-Scope-Complainant sought cancellation of bail granted to accused persons-FIR was registered against accused with the allegation that he along with another had abducted complainant's younger daughter-Complainant, after arrest of accused, filed an application to the police stating therein that the accused was his son-in-law, who, during subsistence of nikah with his elder daughter, had entered into nikah with his younger daughter and thus, he was committing zina-Held; accused had contracted second marriage with the younger daughter of complainant after pronouncement of talaq to his first wife-Younger daughter of complainant had stated before the Investigating Officer that she had contracted marriage with the accused of her free will-Prima facie, the element of abduction was not proved-Husband marrying during iddat period could not be made liable for consensual zina under S.10(2) of Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, along with his marriage partner-Marriage of accused with younger daughter of complainant might be irregular but the same could not be treated as void-No evidence was available on record to show that the accused persons had tampered with the prosecution evidence or misused the concession of bail-Petitions for cancellation of bails were dismissed, in circumstances. Section 242 of Principles of Mahommedan Law by D.F. Mulla; Section 253 of Principles of Mahommedan Law by D.F. Mulla; Section 253(3)(e) of Principles of Mahommedan Law by D.F. Mulla and Section 756 of Principles of Mahommedan Law by D.F. Mulla ref. (b) Islamic law- -Marriage with wife's sister during the subsistence of the previous marriage is only "Fasid"(invalid) and not"Batil" (void). (c) Islamic law- -Marriage-Iddat period-Scope-Unlawful conjunction by way of marriage during iddat period renders the marriage irregular and not void and an irregular marriage becomes regular the moment the bottleneck is removed i.e. iddat period expires. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 497(5)-Bail, cancellation of-Scope-Bail can only be cancelled if the order on the face of it is perverse and has been passed in violation of the principles for the grant of bail. Muhammad Karam v. Zahid Iqbal and others 2008 SCMR 1715; Muzaffar Iqbal v. Muhammad Imran Aziz and others 2004 SCMR 231; The State v. Khalid Mehmood 2006 SCMR 1265; Shahneel Gul and 2 others v. The State 2018 YLR 999 and Ahsan Akbar v. The State 2007 SCMR 482 ref. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 497(5)-Bail, cancellation of-Scope-Considerations for the grant of bail are quite different from the considerations for cancellation of bail-Once bail has been granted by a competent court of law, strong and exceptional grounds are required for cancelling the same-Court in such cases, has to see as to whether order granting bail is patently illegal, erroneous, factually incorrect and has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Respondent No.1 in person. Malik Mazhar Javaid and Zohaib Hassan Gondal, State Counsel with Tahir Khan Niazi, Inspector, along with record for the State. Mst. Adina Arif in person

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Civil Revision Petition against interim order dated: 03.05.2017, where application for leave to appear and defend has been dismissed.