Summary: The backdrop of the case involves a habeas corpus petition filed under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) by Fahad Saleem for the recovery of his brother, Mohsin Saleem, allegedly held in illegal custody. The original petition lacked specific details, notably the name of the police station involved, leading to procedural complications.The petitioner contended that all legal protocols, including the detainee's transfer and obligatory presentation before a magistrate within 24 hours, were adhered to, arguing that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace's order overlooked these legal compliances.The Lahore High Court, upon examination of the case, underscored several constitutional and legal frameworks pertinent to personal liberty and arrest procedures in Pakistan. The court invoked Article 10(2) of the Constitution and Section 61 of the Cr.P.C., emphasizing the paramount importance of personal liberty and the legal safeguards against arbitrary detention, including the mandate that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within a specified 24-hour period, excluding the time required for travel.The court meticulously analyzed the sequence of events, including the issuance of police records (Rapts) and the conduct of the bailiff appointed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore. It was noted that there were inconsistencies and procedural lapses in the bailiff's reporting and in the actions taken by the petitioner, Muhammad Waqas, regarding the custody and subsequent presentation of the detainee before the court.Conclusively, the High Court determined that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace exceeded his jurisdiction by issuing the contested order without proper regard for the constitutional and statutory provisions that regulate police custody and judicial remand procedures. As a result, the court annulled the impugned order, declaring it null and void ab initio, and without any lawful basis. This ruling, delivered by Justice Aalia Neelum on 17.01.2024, reiterates the judiciary's imperative to uphold legal and constitutional mandates concerning arrest and detention processes, ensuring adherence to due process and safeguarding individual liberties against unlawful state actions.

Summary: ''Deposition of a disbelieved witness in a subsequent trial can be relied upon.'' --- Facts: The appellants, Ihsan Ullah alias Munshi and Saleem alias Seemu, were convicted for the murder of Arshad and injuring Zaheer in an incident that took place on November 29, 2000. The incident was registered under sections 302/324/148/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) at Police Station Satrah, District Sialkot. The trial concluded with the acquittal of co-accused Muhammad Saleem son of Ahmad Din, while the appellants were sentenced to life imprisonment and fined Rs. 5,00,000 each as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased, Muhammad Arshad.--- Issue: The central issues in this case include the credibility of witness testimonies, the sufficiency and reliability of evidence, and the appropriateness of the sentences given the nature of the crime and evidence presented. ---Decision: The Lahore High Court dismissed the criminal appeal, affirming the convictions and sentences of the appellants. The court found the witness testimonies to be credible and the medical evidence consistent with the narratives of the occurrence. It also dismissed the criminal revision seeking sentence enhancement, considering the imposed sentence appropriate given the evidence and the crime's nature.

Summary: Issues:Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the respondent under Article 212(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan, given that matters relating to civil servants typically fall under the purview of Service Tribunals.Whether the respondent's promotion to a selection post (BPS-19) could be considered based solely on seniority, ignoring merit.----Judgment:The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment could not be sustained because the post in question was a selection post, requiring consideration of merit rather than mere seniority.The Court also noted that Article 212 of the Constitution ousts the jurisdiction of High Courts and Civil Courts in matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants, making the bar in the Constitution absolute.The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, overturning the High Court's decision.----Principle:This judgment reaffirms the principle that promotions to selection posts within the civil service must be based on merit rather than seniority alone. It also underscores the constitutional provision that matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants are exclusively within the domain of Service Tribunals, thereby limiting the jurisdiction of High Courts in such matters.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Judgment passed by the Election Tribunal, assailing of---Judicial review---Scope of the judicial review of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution in election matters is confined to the extent of an order passed by election authority unlawfully or when it is coram non judice or mala fide, and such scope cannot be enlarged to the cases relating to factual inquiry or in the cases in which another view of the matter is also possible and if such view would have been taken it would not be illegal or unconstitutional. Let. Gen. (R) Salahuddin Tirmizi v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2008 SC 735 ref. (b) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----S. 62(9)---Nomination papers of a candidate, rejection / acceptance of---Returning Officer powers of---Candidate remaining un-heard---Effect---Candidate filed constitutional petition against the judgment passed by the Election Appellate Tribunal ('the Tribunal') whereby appeal filed by the Respondent (candidate/lady) against rejection of her nomination papers was allowed---Validity---Record revealed that the candidature of the respondent was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground of non-payment of government dues (token tax on three vehicles) and non-mentioning of certain assets at the time of submission of nomination papers---Section 62(9) of the Elections Act, 2017 ('the Act') demonstrates that the Returning Officer may conduct summary inquiry for the purpose of accepting or rejecting the nomination papers on the grounds mentioned in sub-sections of S. 62(9) of the Act---However, in the present case, neither any notice was issued to the respondent by the Returning Officer nor she was provided any opportunity to defend the allegations levelled in the objection petition in terms of S. 62(9) of the Act---When an adverse action is contemplated to be taken against the person/persons, he/they have a right to defend such action, notwithstanding the fact that the statute governing their rights does not contain provision of the principle of natural justice and even in absence thereof it is to be read/ considered as a part of such statute in the interest of justice---While the respondent later paid said government dues, the Tribunal had rightly allowed appeal filed by the respondent (lady / candidate)---No illegality or perversity had been found in the Impugned Judgment, passed by the Elections Appellate Tribunal warranting any interference by the High Court---Constitutional petition being merit-less, was dismissed. Hazara (Hill Tract) Improvement Trust through Chairman and others v. Mst. Qaisra Elahi and others 2005 SCMR 678; Board of Governors Cadet College through ?Chairman and 3 others v. Naveed Ahmed and others 2006 PLC (C.S.) 313; Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through MD, Karachi v. Nadeem Murtaza Khan 2007 PLC (C.S.) 334 and Ali Muhammad v. The State PLD 2010 SC 623 ref. (c) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----S. 62(9), proviso (ii)--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 62(1)(f)---Mis-declaration, allegation of---Nomination papers, rejection of---Disqualification, declaring of--- Returning officer; powers of--- Candidate filed constitu-tional petition against the judgment passed by the Election Appellate Tribunal ('the Tribunal') whereby appeal filed by the respondent (candidate/lady) against rejection of her nomination papers was allowed---Validity---Under S. 62(9)(b) of Elections Act, 2017 ('the Act'), the Returning Officer is empowered to reject nomination paper of a candidate on his own motion or upon an objection raised and found substantiated before him---In the present case, the Returning Officer declared the respondent ineligible to contest the elections under Art. 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, which was beyond the prerogative in summary proceedings---Mere misdeclaration does not constitute disqualification in terms of Art. 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and it can not be termed an error of such a nature which could be remedied by the Returning Officer under proviso (ii) of S. 62(9) of the Act---No illegality or perversity had been found in the impugned judgment, passed by the Elections Appellate Tribunal warranting any interference by the High Court---Constitutional petition being merit-less, was dismissed. Ch. Muhammad Ashraf v. Malik Muhammad Muzaffar Khan and others 2022 CLC 2045 ref. (d) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----Ss. 62(5) & 62(9)---Mis-declaration, allegation of---Nomination papers, rejection / acceptance of---Returning officer, powers of---Candidate filed constitutional petition against the judgment passed by the Election Appellate Tribunal ('the Tribunal') whereby appeal filed by the respondent (candidate/lady) against rejection of her nomination papers was allowed---Validity--- Section 62(5) of Elections Act 2017 ('the Act ') empowers a Returning Officer to require any authority or organization including a financial institution to produce any document or record or to furnish any information as may be necessary to determine facts relating to an objection to the candidature of a candidate ,but in the present case, the Returning officer instead of complying with said requirement straightaway rejected the nomination papers of the candidate/ Respondent, which was not warranted by law---When law requires an act to be done in a particular manner and after fulfillment of certain requirements then it must be done in the very same manner and after fulfillment of the very conditions as imposed by the law---No illegality or perversity had been found in the impugned judgment, passed by the Elections Appellate Tribunal not warranting any interference by the High Court---Constitutional petition being merit-less, was dismissed. Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi and others PLD 2018 SC 189 ref. Muhammad Ramzan Ch., Senior Advocate Supreme Court with Barrister Abdul Qudoos Sohal for Petitioner. Mudassar Iqbal for Respondent No. 2. Imran Arif Ranjha with Ms. Bushra Rasheed, Deputy Director Law and Hafiz Adeel Ashraf, A.D for Election Commission of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 16th January, 2024.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) — Ss. 42 & 54 — Declaration and Permanent Injunction — Fraudulent Mutation — Burden of Proof — Secondary Evidence — Doctrine of Res Judicata. Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, asserting ownership of agricultural land through an oral sale allegedly recorded by an Assistant Mukhtiarkar and later transferred via a registered sale deed—Revenue entries in favor of the plaintiffs were challenged by the defendant, claiming fraud and forgery in collusion with revenue officials—Trial Court decreed the suit, but the Appellate Court, after reassessment of oral and documentary evidence, found the mutation entries fraudulent, irregular, and manipulated—The plaintiffs failed to produce primary evidence, including attesting witnesses, mutation fee receipts, and credible supporting documentation—The Appellate Court relied on the testimony of revenue officials, scrutiny of mutation registers, and evidence of prior fraudulent transactions by the plaintiffs—Doctrine of Res Judicata applied, as prior judicial verdicts favored the defendants regarding possession and ownership—The Appellate Court's findings were upheld, confirming fraud and invalidating the plaintiffs' claim to ownership of the suit property. -----Cited Cases: Rao Abdul Rehman (Deceased) through legal heirs v. Muhammad Afzal (Deceased) through legal heirs (2023 SCMR 815) Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar (2015 SCMR 1) Madan Gopal v. Maran Bepari (PLD 1969 SC 617) Muhammad Nawaz v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan (2013 SCMR 1300) -----Disposition: Suit dismissed—Findings of fraud upheld—Doctrine of Res Judicata applied—Costs reduced in line with statutory limits. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) — Ss. 35 & 35-A — Costs — Jurisdiction of Appellate Court — Compensatory Costs in Appeal. The appellate Court imposed compensatory costs of Rs.500,000 on the plaintiffs for pursuing a fraudulent and vexatious claim—Held, under Section 35-A of the CPC, compensatory costs cannot exceed Rs.25,000, and appellate courts are not empowered to award such costs—The power to award compensatory costs under Section 35-A lies solely with the trial court—The costs imposed by the appellate Court were set aside while maintaining the findings of fraud. -----Cited Cases: SITE v. Mst. Qamar Hilal (2002 MLD 1569) 2001 SCMR 1680 Disposition: Compensatory costs of Rs.500,000 set aside—Appellate Court's authority under S.35-A CPC clarified. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) — S.193 — Criminal Proceedings for Perjury — Initiation by Appellate Court — Judicial Discretion. Appellate Court initiated criminal proceedings under Section 193, PPC against the plaintiffs for presenting false evidence and committing perjury during judicial proceedings—Held, such proceedings are justified when expedient in the public interest and not as a tool for private vengeance—The appellate Court’s direction to initiate criminal proceedings was upheld, as the plaintiffs’ actions demonstrated deliberate fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation. -----Cited Cases: Rao Abdul Rehman v. Muhammad Afzal (2023 SCMR 815) -----Disposition: Initiation of criminal proceedings upheld—Judicial discretion correctly exercised by the appellate Court.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Article 199: --- Maintainability of writ petition—Relief against Bar Councils and Associations. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution, holding that writ petitions against Bar Councils and Bar Associations are not maintainable, as per the precedent established in Syed Iqbal Hussain Shah Gillani vs. Pakistan Bar Council (2021 SCMR 425). Bar Councils and Associations are private autonomous bodies and not State institutions, thus fundamental rights are not enforceable against them under Article 199. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction – Requirements for Maintainability: --- Existence of legal or constitutional right—Violation of law or rules required. The Court reiterated that a writ petition under Article 199 can only be entertained if the petitioner demonstrates a personal legal or constitutional right that has been violated. Mere inconvenience or personal grievances without a corresponding legal right are insufficient to invoke constitutional jurisdiction, as held in N.W.F.P Public Service Commission vs. Muhammad Arif (2011 SCMR 848). (c) Fundamental Rights – Applicability Against Private Entities: --- Fundamental rights enforceable primarily against the State. The Court emphasized that fundamental rights are generally enforceable against the State and not private entities. Exceptions to this rule require compelling circumstances and are subject to judicial discretion. (d) Bar on Parking Facilities – Absence of Statutory Duty: --- No statutory obligation on State or Bar Associations to provide parking facilities. The petitioner failed to establish a statutory duty on the respondents to provide parking facilities for lawyers or litigants, rendering the petition meritless. Reliance was placed on Owais Shams Durrani vs. Vice-Chancellor, Bacha Khan University (2020 SCMR 1041). (e) Disposition: --- Petition dismissed in limine. The writ petition was dismissed for being meritless and non-maintainable, as no violation of law, rule, or regulation was established by the petitioner.

Summary: ''The court must exercise vigilance and refrain from granting adjournments so liberally and without any compelling reasons.'' ---- The petitioners argued that the trial court had disregarded their request to summon official witnesses first and had hastily passed the impugned order without considering their legitimate request. They contended that the order suffered from illegality, misapplication of the law, and mis-appreciation of facts.On the other hand, the respondents supported the trial court's decision, claiming that the petitioners had deliberately prolonged the proceedings with various pretexts and that the impugned judgment was legally sound.The Supreme Court examined the trial court's proceedings and observed a concerning trend of frequent adjournments that contributed to a backlog in lower courts. The court emphasized the need to discourage this behavior to ensure the timely delivery of justice. The record revealed that the petitioners had been granted numerous adjournments over two years to produce their evidence. Despite clear warnings and costs imposed by the trial court, the petitioners failed to comply.The court referenced Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which allows the court to proceed to decide a suit if a party fails to produce evidence after being granted time. The court cited the precedent set in the case of Moon Enterpriser CNG Station, Rawalpindi, versus Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (2020 SCMR 300), which established the conditions for invoking this penal provision.The court found that both conditions were satisfied in this case, as the petitioners had repeatedly been warned, but they still failed to produce evidence. Therefore, the trial court's decision to strike off their right to produce oral evidence was justified. The High Court's dismissal of the F.A.O was also upheld. --- Supreme Court in its recent judgment held that taking too many adjournments is abuse of the process of law, the petitioner took 43 adjournment over a span of 2 years only for their evidence which was eventually closed due to non production --- The court further held that ''once the order sheet reflect last opportunity it must be given effect on the upcoming date''.