Summary: The suit filed by SSGC was hopelessly time-barred. Gas Utility Court is not obliged to decide the question of maintainability after its decision on the leave to defend application. Gas Company's allegation that the Defendant-Customer was involved in the theft of gas, no ground to condone limitation..

Summary: Limitation period within the context of an insurance claim --- The discussion extensively delves into the insurer's conduct, drawing insights from specific legal precedents, notably "Muhammad Asif and others v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another," "Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd., Karachi v. Ravi Steel Company, Lahore," and "State Life Insurance Corporation and others v. Mst. Syeda Muzhara Fatima."The primary points of contention include the commencement of the limitation period, the potential time-bar status of the respondent's case, the applicability of the doctrine of merger, the permissibility of condoning delay, and the legal standing of interest awarded on the claim. The court underscores the substantive nature of the Limitation Act and the foundational principles of uberrimae fidei (utmost good faith) inherent in insurance contracts.An intricate examination is conducted regarding Article 86(a) of the Limitation Act, specifying the period within which claims on insurance policies become time-barred. The judgment reflects on the insurer's role in the repudiation of claims, emphasizing the significance of timely responses and transparent communication.The court opines that the appellant cannot successfully invoke the defense of limitation, particularly in instances where the insurer itself has caused delays in repudiating a claim, citing pertinent legal authorities such as "Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd., Karachi" and "State Life Insurance Corporation and others v. Mst. Syeda Muzhara Fatima."The legal analysis extends to the respondent's procedural choices, acknowledging the complexities surrounding jurisdictional ambiguities and the intricacies of choosing the proper legal forum for the claim.Furthermore, the judgment critically examines the merits of the case, addressing contentions related to eligibility criteria for the insurance scheme, and concludes that the respondent's claim was unjustly rejected, mandating the appellant to fulfill its contractual obligations.Lastly, the court, while setting aside the award of compound interest due to legal constraints, upholds the compensatory costs for the respondent, seeking to restore a semblance of justice in light of the insurer's delayed and contentious repudiation of a genuine claim.

Summary: (a) Inheritance Law – Right of Heirs ----Inheritance rights in the estate of a deceased Muslim----Constructive possession----Limitation Act, 1908----Scope. The estate of a Muslim, upon his death, devolves upon his legal heirs by operation of law. Each heir retains constructive possession of their share in the estate until partition or lawful transfer. If an heir is deprived of their share in an inheritance mutation, the cause of action arises when they seek their share and it is denied. However, where third-party rights have been created in the inherited property, the limitation period becomes applicable, requiring the claimant heir to establish fraud or ignorance of their rights to invoke an exception under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Cited Cases: Mohammad Boota (decd) v. Mst. Fatima (2023 SCMR 1901) Mst. Parveen (decd) v. Muhammad Pervaiz (2022 SCMR 64) Noor Din (decd) v. Pervaiz Akhtar (2023 SCMR 1928) Ghulam Qasim v. Mst. Razia Begum (PLD 2021 SC 812) Tahsinullah v. Mst. Parveen (decd) (2022 SCMR 346) Lal Din v. Muhammad Ibrahim (1993 SCMR 710) Bashir Ahmad Anjum v. Muhammad Raffique (2021 SCMR 772) Nazir Ahmad v. Abdullah (1997 SCMR 281) (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ----S. 18----Effect of fraud in inheritance disputes----Exceptions to limitation period----Scope. Under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a claimant heir alleging fraud must demonstrate that they were kept from knowledge of their right to sue due to fraudulent concealment. The limitation period begins from the date the fraud first became known to the “injuriously affected person.” However, if the affected heir does not initiate legal proceedings within the prescribed limitation period upon discovering the fraud, no fresh period of limitation is available to their legal successors. Cited Case: Mst. Rabia Gula v. Muhammad Janan (2022 SCMR 1009) (c) Limitation in Cases of Third-Party Rights in Inherited Property ----Applicability of limitation where third-party interests have been created----Doctrine of actual vs. constructive denial----Scope. A distinction is made between: (i) cases where an heir is deprived of their rightful share in inheritance at the time of mutation; and (ii) cases where third-party rights have been created in the inherited property. In the former, the limitation period starts when the heir is denied their share. In the latter, where land has been sold to third parties, the limitation period applies, barring claims after its expiration. In the present case, transactions affecting the disputed property took place decades ago, with sales occurring in 1994 and 1997, barring the claimants from seeking redress under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Cited Cases: Haji Muhammad Yunis v. Mst. Farukh Sultan (2022 SCMR 1282) Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2022 SC 353) (d) Civil Procedure – Obligation of Courts to Consider Limitation ----S. 3, Limitation Act, 1908----Duty of courts to dismiss time-barred claims regardless of whether limitation is pleaded as a defense----Scope. Courts are bound to dismiss suits, appeals, and applications filed beyond the prescribed limitation period, even if the issue of limitation is not raised by the parties. The appellants’ claim, filed in 2007, was time-barred given that transactions creating third-party interests took place as early as 1994 and 1997. Disposition Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the appellants’ claim was barred by limitation. The Court reaffirmed that where concurrent findings of fact and law exist, it will not interfere unless exceptional circumstances warrant intervention, which were absent in this case.

Summary: Section 29(2) of Limitation Act excludes the application of section 5 for condonation of delay in filing appeal against acquittal under section 48 of CNSA, 1997. --- ''The contention of learned DPG that limitation does not run against a void order is repelled because it is now settled that law of limitation being lex fori creates a right in favour of the parties, therefore, cannot be ignored by treating it mere a technicality.'' --- it was claimed that the period of limitation for filing of appeal against acquittal by the State is six months as per Article 157 of the Limitation Act. The court examined that this appeal against acquittal is not being regulated under section 417 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1897, rather was filed under section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 which is a special law and is to be read for the period of limitation provided therein --- The court dismisses the application for condonation of delay.Section 5 of the Limitation Act is specifically mentioned as inapplicable to proceedings under special laws. --- The law of limitation requires that a person must approach the Court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence, without dilatoriness and negligence and within the time provided by law. --- The court affirms the principle that once an acquittal is recorded, the accused enjoys a presumption of innocence.Any challenge to the acquittal must be made within the specified time frame.

Summary: Validity of gift transaction ---- effect of non-challenging of gift by the donor and ---- limitation. Adverting to the first limb of controversy it is noticed that to this effect issue No.7 was framed. Being the plaintiffs, it is the claim of the petitioners that gift mutation is a product of fraud. Contrary to this the "respondents" pleaded that gift transaction was valid one. In terms of Order VI Rule 4 of the "C.P.C." a party pleading any misrepresentation or fraud is obliged to narrate particulars to that effect. When plaint is examined in this context it is clearly lacking any details or particulars that how the transaction was tainted with fraud. There can be no cavil that mutation by itself is not a document of title and it is only an acknowledgment of the original transaction, which has taken place prior to the incorporating/sanctioning of mutation and a person relying upon mutation has to establish the original transaction in the first instance. Article 113 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ordains that no fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings. Now attending the last point for determination, which relates to limitation, it is observed that a suit for declaration of any right as to any property, the person claiming such right has to institute the suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and the limitation of such suit is to be regulated and governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Suit was instituted by the petitioners on 30th July, 2003 challenging the validity of gift mutation on the ground of fraud asserting that the cause of action accrued to them six months before institution of the suit on claim of the respondents' that they are exclusive owners of the "suit land". Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 ordains that any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled. ---- Case Details:Abdul Rehman, a landlord, had two sons (Muhammad Afsar and Muhammad Khan) and a daughter (Aksar Jan). He purportedly gifted 101 Kanal 19 Marla of land to Muhammad Khan, which was contested by Muhammad Afsar's successors (the petitioners).The petitioners claimed the gift mutation was fraudulent. The respondents (legal heirs of Muhammad Khan) defended the gift's validity. ---- Validity of Gift Transaction:The court examined whether the gift transaction was valid, considering evidence and the plea of fraud. The principle that mutation itself is not a title document but an acknowledgment of a transaction was applied, similar to the findings in ?Faqir Ali vs. Sakina Bibi? (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 85) and ?Noor Din (Deceased) vs. Pervaiz Akhtar? (2023 SCMR 1928).Non-challenging of Gift by the Donor:The court noted that the donor, Abdul Rehman, and Muhammad Afsar did not challenge the gift in their lifetimes. Citing ?Ghulam Abbas vs. Mohammad Shafi? (2016 SCMR 1403) and ?Muhammad Rustam vs. Mst. Makhan Jan? (2013 SCMR 299), the court held that successors are precluded from disputing the gift based on estoppel.Limitation:The suit?s timeliness was questioned, with the court applying Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The right to sue was deemed to start from the date of the donor?s knowledge, not the petitioners, based on principles from ?Salamat Ali vs. Muhammad Din? (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 353).Appellate Court?s Findings Preferred:In revisional jurisdiction, preference is given to the appellate court's findings unless proven legally infirm or materially irregular, as established in ?Muhammad Nawaz vs. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan? (2013 SCMR 1300) and ?Amjad Ikram vs. Mst. Asiya Kausar? (2015 SCMR 1).Conclusion:The court found no illegality or material irregularity in the appellate court?s judgment. The petitioners failed to establish their claim of fraud and the suit was deemed time-barred. The civil revision petition was thus dismissed.

Summary: The case pertains to a dispute over the payment of Rs.31,65,640 for building material supplied by the respondent, Misri Khan & Company, to Pakistan Railways. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, and the appellate court affirmed the decision. The petitioners, dissatisfied with the judgments, filed a revision petition.The petitioner's argument centered around the contention that the respondent's claim was time-barred, and both lower courts did not properly address this issue. The petitioner relied on Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1908, asserting that the respondent should have filed the suit within three years from the date of the work done. The petitioner cited precedent cases to support their position.Conversely, the respondent argued that the suit was filed within the stipulated time, considering the time spent in proceedings before the Federal Ombudsman. They contended that Article 115 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied to the case. The respondent emphasized that there were concurrent findings of fact, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate any misreading or non-reading of evidence by the lower courts.The court, after hearing the arguments, focused on the core issue of determining which provision of the Limitation Act, 1908 applied to the case. The court highlighted Articles 56 and 115 of the Act, stating that Article 56 governed claims for the price of work done, while Article 115 applied to compensation for breach of contract not otherwise provided for in the Act.The court noted that the contract was awarded in 1999, and the respondent approached the Federal Ombudsman in 2000. The crucial question was whether the time spent before the Federal Ombudsman could be excluded from the limitation period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The court concluded that Section 14 did not apply to proceedings before the Federal Ombudsman and cited relevant case law to support this interpretation.In light of the above, the court allowed the petition, set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts, and dismissed the respondent's suit. The court emphasized that its decision was based on correcting legal errors and irregularities in the lower court's findings.--- ''The moot point thus before this Court is as to "which provision of the "Act, 1908" would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case". Articles 56 & 115 of the "Act, 1908. From the bare reading of the above referred provisions of law it is manifestly clear that for the claim relating to the price of work done, suit is to be governed by Article 56 of the "Act, 1908" whereas Article 115 of the Act ibid caters the suit for compensation for the breech of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not therein specially provided for in the Act. Admittedly the contract was awarded in the year 1999. The respondent in the first instance laid his grievance before the Federal Ombudsman on 12th January, 2000 in the shape of complaint, who allowed the complaint and directed the petitioners to make immediate payment by way of order dated 06th March, 2000. The petitioners being aggrieved challenged the order of the Federal Ombudsman before the President of Pakistan, who allowed the representation by way of order dated 26th October, 2000 and the respondent was directed to approach the Civil Court. Suit was then instituted on 16th March, 2006. The question which now emanates is as to "whether time consumed before the Federal Ombudsman can be excluded from being counted towards the limitation for instituting the suit under Section 14 of the "Act, 1908"."

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2), & O. VI, R.4---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 181---Suit for declaration---Revenue entries, correction of Application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Limitation---Consent decree passed on the basis of compromise arrived at between the predecessors of the petitioners and respondents---Failure of the predecessors-in-interest of the respondents to challenge the consent decree in their life time---Estoppel---Petitioners filed a time barred application under S.12(2), C.P.C., after more than 04 decades, which was dismissed by the Trial Court, whereafter civil revision was filed by the respondent, which was accepted while remanding the application back to the Trial Court for decision afresh on merits after framing of issues---Validity---Once consent judgment/decree/order, as the case may be, has been passed by a competent court of law, then the parties cannot resile from it without any cogent and valid reasons---Consent decree operates as estoppel by judgment---When a person raises the ground of fraud or concealment to allege his claim or defend his stance, the same has to be specifically pleaded with clear particulars, which in the present case were not detailed by the respondents in their application---Framing of issues in an application under S.12(2), C.P.C., depends on the circumstances of each case, nature of alleged fraud and the decree so, obtained---Framing of issues in every case to examine the merits of the application would certainly frustrate the very purpose and object of S.12(2), C.P.C., which is to avoid protracted and time consuming litigation in order to save the genuine decree holder from grave hardships, ordeal of further litigation, extra burden on their exchequer and simultaneously to reduce unnecessary burden on the courts below---Respondents had filed the application under S.12(2), CPC, after more than four long decades and that too without mentioning any specific date of knowledge therein, which was not maintainable being barred by law in terms of Art.181 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Sailendra Narayan v. State of Orissa AIR 1956 SC 346; Warriach Zarai Corporation v. F.M.C. United (Pvt) Ltd 2006 SCMR 531 and Basher Ahmad through LRs and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others PLD 2109 SC 504 rel. Asghar Ali for Petitioners. Rashid Rauf Swati for Respondents. Date of hearing: 23rd November, 2023.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----S. 12(2)---Consent decree---Challenge on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation---Delay of over four decades---Framing of issues---Bar of limitation---Scope---Respondents challenged a consent decree dated 15.05.1975, passed in Civil Suit No.306/1, through an application under S.12(2), C.P.C., alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and concealment of facts---Learned Revisional Court set aside the dismissal of said application by the Trial Court and remanded the matter for decision on merits after framing of issues and recording of evidence---Held, that the consent decree was passed after compromise between parties duly recorded and acknowledged in court and had attained finality, having never been challenged during the lifetime of the respondents’ predecessors---Once a consent decree is passed by a competent court, it operates as estoppel by judgment unless cogent reasons to the contrary are pleaded and established---Framing of issues is not mandatory in every case under S.12(2), especially where the application is barred by limitation or devoid of specific particulars of fraud---Respondents failed to mention any definite date of knowledge or plead fraud with the necessary specificity---Application filed after more than forty years held to be hopelessly time-barred under Art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Revisional Court’s interference was based on misreading of law and facts and suffered from material irregularity. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Art. 181---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. filed after inordinate delay of over forty years without explaining the date of knowledge---Held, barred by time and liable to be dismissed without need for detailed inquiry or framing of issues. Cited Cases: • Sailendra Narayan v. State of Orissa AIR 1956 SC 346 • Warriach Zarai Corporation v. F.M.C. United (Pvt) Ltd. 2006 SCMR 531 • Bashir Ahmad through LRs v. Muhammad Hussain PLD 2019 SC 504 Disposition: Petition allowed. Judgment of Revisional Court dated 02.12.2021 set aside; Trial Court’s dismissal of S.12(2), C.P.C. application restored.

Summary: The case involved the respondent, who had initially been appointed as an Assistant Station Master in Pakistan Railways in 1981. He subsequently obtained an L.L.B. (Legum Baccalaureus/Bachelors in Law) qualification in 1999. The respondent sought four advance increments based on this higher qualification, invoking an incentive scheme of 1966. However, his application for these increments was rejected by the competent authority, citing that it did not fall under the relevant rules.The respondent then filed an appeal in the Federal Service Tribunal, seeking the same benefit granted in a previous tribunal judgment from 2011, which had allowed advance increments upon obtaining a higher qualification. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider this matter.The appellant's counsel argued that the respondent's representation was time-barred, making the appeal before the Tribunal time-barred as well. Additionally, it was contended that the respondent had already received advance increments for previous qualifications, and the policy regarding advance increments had been discontinued through a notification in 2001.On the other hand, the respondent's counsel argued that the respondent was entitled to the same benefit extended to other employees in similar circumstances, and the appellant-department should not act discriminatorily. It was also contended that the decision to deny the respondent advance increments was discriminatory and violated equal protection under the law.The Supreme Court examined the relevant policies and instructions governing the grant of advance increments based on higher qualifications. The Court noted that the policy for granting advance increments on acquiring an L.L.B. degree was introduced with the condition that if advance increments had already been granted for obtaining an M.A. or M.Sc. degree, no further increment would be allowed for obtaining an L.L.B. degree. The Court found that the respondent had already received advance increments for obtaining an M.A. degree, and thus, his claim for additional increments based on the L.L.B. degree was not justified.The Court emphasized the purpose of such policies, which was to encourage individuals to gain more knowledge and expertise for themselves and enhance their performance in their duties. It also noted that the policy was not discriminatory and applied uniformly to all eligible employees.In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 17th September 2018.In summary, the Supreme Court upheld the policy regarding advance increments based on higher qualifications and found that the respondent was not entitled to additional increments due to the conditions outlined in the policy. The Court's decision was based on the interpretation of the policy and the absence of discrimination in its application.

Summary: Background:In Civil Petition No. 3465-L of 2022 before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the petitioners challenged the order dated 25.11.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court in Civil Revision No. 4911 of 2016. The petitioners' predecessor had purchased land through sale mutation No. 727, attested on 13 June 1994. However, the respondent filed a suit on 6 November 2008 challenging the sale.---Issues:Whether the respondent's suit was time-barred.Whether the thumb impression on the sale mutation belonged to the respondent.Whether the petitioners were illegally possessing the land.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court found that the respondent's suit was decreed on 16 October 2014, and the petitioners' subsequent appeal and revision petitions were dismissed. Despite three court decisions against them, the petitioners continued to possess the land illegally.The burden of proving the sale lay on the beneficiary, which was not discharged. The Finger Print Bureau's report conclusively established that the thumb impression on the sale mutation did not belong to the respondent.The Court dismissed the petition with costs throughout and imposed compensatory costs of one hundred thousand rupees. The petitioners were directed to immediately hand over the land to the respondent, with revenue authorities instructed to ensure compliance.