Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 11, O. VII Rr. 11 & 13, S. 149 ---- Res judicata --- Rejection of plaint --- Fresh suit --- Scope and limitations Where a plaint is rejected under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, the rejection does not constitute adjudication on merits and, by fiction of law, is considered a “decree” appealable under Section 2(2), CPC. The Court held that such rejection does not preclude the institution of a fresh suit under Order VII Rule 13 CPC, provided it is not barred by limitation or the principle of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 CPC requires a judicial determination that the matter was directly and substantially in issue in a previous suit between the same parties, and conclusively decided. Mere observations on title in a prior suit for damages do not bar a subsequent suit for possession and declaration, unless the ingredients of res judicata are strictly met. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ---- Ss. 3, 5, 14 to 16, Art. 142 ---- Condonation of delay --- Applicability to suits --- Misconception of law --- Mixed question of law and fact The Court clarified that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals and applications, not suits. Delay in filing a suit cannot be condoned under Section 5, but exclusion of time may be claimed under Sections 14 to 16 where applicable. In the instant case, the plaintiffs erroneously filed an application under Section 5 for condonation of delay in instituting the suit for possession. Nonetheless, the Court held that under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, the limitation period was twelve years from the date of dispossession, and the suit was within time. Dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court for being time-barred, without properly examining the cause of action, was declared a grave illegality. (c) Court Fees Act, 1870 ---- Ss. 4 & 6; Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ---- Ss. 148, 149 ---- Deficiency in court fee --- Discretion to allow cure --- Harmonious construction The Court held that a deficient court fee does not render a proceeding fatally defective. Under Section 149 CPC, the Court may allow payment of deficient court fee at any stage of the proceedings. Section 149 acts as a proviso to Sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act, permitting the court to regularize proceedings upon payment of deficient court fee subsequently. The dismissal of the petitioners' appeal by the First Appellate Court without providing an opportunity to cure the deficiency was held to be erroneous and contrary to the principles laid down in PLD 1984 SC 289 (Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan) and AIR 1976 SC 1503 (Diwan Bros. case). (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- Ss. 2(2), 96; O. VII R. 11 ---- Rejection of plaint vs. dismissal of suit --- Decree by fiction --- Scope of appealability The Court reiterated that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is deemed a decree under Section 2(2) CPC, appealable under Section 96 CPC. However, such rejection must be based on a proper examination of whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, and whether the suit is barred by law or limitation. The Trial Court’s mechanical dismissal of the suit, without applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act or giving the plaintiff an opportunity to correct procedural defects, was declared unjustified. (e) Judicial duty --- Application of correct law --- Responsibility of judges irrespective of parties’ errors The Court emphasized that judges are duty-bound to apply the correct law, even if the parties or their counsel fail to point it out. Misguided legal advice or poor pleading does not absolve courts of their responsibility to administer justice according to law. The judge must “wear all laws on the sleeve of his robe.” Failure to address key legal provisions, such as limitation or res judicata, in a reasoned manner vitiates judicial orders. (f) Concurrent findings --- When revisable --- Misreading or non-reading of law or evidence --- Corrective jurisdiction of higher courts Concurrent findings of lower courts are not immune from interference where they suffer from legal infirmities, misreading, non-reading, or flawed application of law. The Supreme Court held that when lower courts ignore binding legal provisions or dismiss a suit on misconceived grounds, such findings must be set aside in exercise of appellate jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned orders set aside; matter remanded to Trial Court for decision on merits within six months. Cited Cases: • Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289) • Abdul Hamid v. Dilawar Hussain (2007 SCMR 945) • Ahmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar Latifabad, Hyderabad (PLD 2025 SC 302) • Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (2024 SCMR 1059) • Meeru Khan v. Mst. Naheed Aziz Siddiqui (PLD 2023 SC 912) • Diwan Bros. v. Central Bank of India (AIR 1976 SC 1503) • Deepchand v. Land Acquisition Officer (AIR 1994 SC 1901) Cited Provisions: • Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Ss. 2(2), 3, 5, 11, 96, 148, 149, O. VII Rr. 11 & 13 • Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 5, 14–16, Art. 142 • Court Fees Act, 1870, Ss. 4 & 6

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – O.VII R.11 – Punjab Irrigation, Drainage and Rivers Act, 2023, S.189 – Rejection of plaint – Scope – Suit for declaration challenging orders passed by Canal Authorities under the repealed Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 – Maintainability – Held, orders were challenged on grounds of mala fide, conspiracy, and violation of natural justice – Jurisdiction of Civil Court not ousted retrospectively by 2023 Act when proceedings originated under 1873 Act – Trial Court erred in rejecting plaint under O.VII R.11 without framing issues or allowing evidence – Civil Court can examine legality of actions where allegations of excess or lack of jurisdiction, mala fides, or violation of law are raised.(b) Punjab Irrigation, Drainage and Rivers Act, 2023 – S.189 – Ouster of Civil Court’s jurisdiction – Interpretation – Held, ouster clauses must be construed strictly – Section 189 does not retrospectively bar jurisdiction of Civil Court in matters where rights accrued under repealed law (Canal and Drainage Act, 1873) – Unless clear legislative intent exists to bar jurisdiction over pending or accrued matters, Civil Courts retain authority to adjudicate civil disputes.(c) General Clauses Act, 1956 (Punjab) – S.4 – Effect of repeal – Scope – Repeal of statute does not affect rights accrued, liabilities incurred, or legal proceedings commenced under repealed statute – Suit instituted in respect of rights or grievances arising under repealed law can proceed as if repeal had not occurred – Application of maxim: Nova Constitutio Futuris Formam Imponere Debet, Non Praeteritis.(d) Specific Relief – Judicial review – Actions of Canal Authorities challenged on grounds of lack of hearing, ex-parte decision, and malafide exercise of power – Held, where statutory authorities act beyond jurisdiction or violate natural justice, ouster clause does not apply – Civil Court has jurisdiction to determine legality and validity of such acts.(e) Civil Procedure – O.VII R.11 – Premature rejection of plaint – Principle – Held, rejection of plaint without inquiry into facts and framing of issues is not sustainable – Trial Court must allow parties to produce evidence on jurisdictional and legal questions before rejecting suit – Reference made to Abbasia Cooperative Bank v. Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghous (PLD 1997 SC 03).Disposition:Civil Revision allowed. Orders of the Trial and Appellate Courts rejecting the plaint set aside. Suit restored and remanded to Trial Court to frame issues regarding jurisdiction and legality of Canal Authorities’ actions, and decide the matter after recording evidence.Cited Cases:Abbasia Cooperative Bank v. Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghous (PLD 1997 SC 03)Muhammad Saif Ullah v. LDA (PLD 2021 Lahore 168)Ch. Zafar Hussain v. Border Area Committee (2012 MLD 1538)Mr. Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi (PLD 1965 SC 698)Province of Punjab v. Haji Yaqoob Khan (2007 SCMR 554)Cited Legislation & Provisions:Punjab Irrigation, Drainage and Rivers Act, 2023, Ss. 189, 205Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, Ss. 67, 68Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956, S.4Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, O.VII R.11, S.9

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Concurrent findings of lower courts—Judicial review—Scope of interference—Held, concurrent findings of facts recorded by courts below are not sacrosanct and can be interfered with where found to be arbitrary, perverse, or contrary to law. Reliance placed on Hajid Wajdad v. Provincial Government (2020 SCMR 2046) and Subedar (Retd.) Jamil Khan v. Salim Khan (2017 SCMR 860). (b) Power of Attorney—Revocation ----Attorney's authority—Condition of prior permission—Held, an attorney acting on a General Power of Attorney cannot transfer property in favor of themselves or their kith and kin without obtaining specific written permission from the principal. Failure to meet this condition renders such transactions invalid. Relying on Mst. Naila Kausar v. Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh (2016 SCMR 1781) and Mst. Shumal Begum v. Mst. Gulzar Begum (1994 SCMR 818). (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O.VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Effect—Dismissal of a prior suit for injunction or related proceedings does not bar subsequent suits seeking relief for distinct causes of action, such as cancellation of fraudulent transactions. Held, the doctrine of election or res judicata does not apply in such cases. (d) Fraudulent transactions ----Fraud—Effect on transactions—Fraudulent transfer of property by an attorney in favor of their real brother based on a revoked General Power of Attorney. Held, fraud vitiates even solemn proceedings, and a transaction executed in such circumstances cannot sustain. (e) Sale Deeds ----Proof of consideration—Burden of proof—Beneficiary of a sale deed is required to establish the validity of the transaction, including proof of consideration and transfer of possession. In the absence of evidence of consideration, the transaction is deemed invalid. Cited Cases: • Mst. Naila Kausar v. Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh (2016 SCMR 1781) • Mst. Shumal Begum v. Mst. Gulzar Begum (1994 SCMR 818) • Hajid Wajdad v. Provincial Government (2020 SCMR 2046) • Subedar (Retd.) Jamil Khan v. Salim Khan (2017 SCMR 860) ----- Disposition: Petition allowed. Concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below set aside. Suit for cancellation of the sale deed decreed in favor of the petitioners. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Cause of action---Triable issues---Mixed questions of fact and law---Summary rejection---Maintainability---Petitioner filed a suit seeking declaration of ownership, cancellation of lease deed, and permanent injunction based on an alleged oral gift from his father (respondent No. 4)---Trial Court rejected plaint under O.VII, R.11, CPC, on the ground that plaintiff had no legal character due to absence of a registered gift deed and that respondent No.4 held a registered lease deed---Held, that the rejection of a plaint under O.VII, R.11, CPC, must be based solely on averments in the plaint, and not on disputed facts or merits requiring evidence---The plaint disclosed a cause of action, raised substantial triable issues, and could not be dismissed merely because petitioner lacked a registered document---Genuineness or forgery of gift deed required proper trial---Concurrent findings of lower fora found to be perverse and made in disregard of settled principles of law---Orders of Trial Court, First Appellate Court, and High Court set aside.(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)----S. 42---Legal character---Right to property---Scope---Declaration---Expression “legal character” interpreted to include broader legal status and justiciable rights, not limited to ownership through registration---Held, that unregistered gift deed raising issues of fact and conflicting claims must be tried on merits---Declaration could not be refused merely on technical deficiencies where cause of action existed and triable issues were apparent---Plea of misrepresentation or unclean hands does not justify rejection of plaint when issues of fact require evidence.(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss. 96, 100 & O. VII, R. 11---Appellate jurisdiction---Concurrent findings---Scope of interference---Held, that appellate courts are not precluded from interfering with concurrent findings where such findings are in violation of law or based on patent legal error, non-reading or misreading of record---In present case, High Court and First Appellate Court failed to appreciate foundational controversy between father and son, thus causing miscarriage of justice.(d) Practice & Procedure----Triable issues---Summary disposal---Scope---Disputed factum of gift---Execution of gift deed---Authenticity---Held, question whether gift was made voluntarily or forged is central to controversy and cannot be summarily determined---Rejection of plaint without trial unjustly denies opportunity to prove case---Proper course is framing of preliminary issue and trial on merits.**(e) Court Directions---Remand proceedings---Expeditious trial---Consent order---Held, matter remanded with consent of parties---Respondent No. 4 to file written statement within three weeks---Trial Court directed to frame preliminary issue regarding execution and validity of gift deed and to conclude trial within four months without granting unnecessary adjournments---Trial Court authorized to seek expert opinion (e.g. forensic analysis) if necessary---Compliance report to be submitted.Disposition:Petition converted into appeal and allowed; plaint reinstated; orders of Trial Court, First Appellate Court, and High Court set aside; suit remanded for trial on preliminary issue regarding genuineness of gift deed.

Summary: (a) Gas (Theft, Control & Recovery) Act, 2016: ----S. 6---Jurisdiction of Gas Utility Courts Scope and jurisdiction of Gas Utility Courts under the Gas (Theft, Control & Recovery) Act, 2016---Section 6 provides an equitable and expeditious remedy for filing complaints or suits regarding disputes on billing, metering, or default before Gas Utility Courts---Gas Utility Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters covered under the Act, which include disputes related to billing, penalties, and recovery of outstanding dues---Held, consumers are not barred from directly invoking the jurisdiction of the Gas Utility Court even if an alternate dispute resolution mechanism exists under the OGRA Ordinance, 2002. (b) Statutory Interpretation: ----Role of preamble in interpretation of statutes The preamble of a statute plays a contextual role in interpreting legislative intent but cannot restrict or override the express provisions of the statute---Court held that the Trial Court erred in relying solely on the preamble of the 2016 Act to restrict the scope of the statute---A holistic approach to interpretation must be adopted, ensuring the substantive provisions align with the legislative intent. (c) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): ----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint Trial Court rejected the plaint under O. VII, R. 11, CPC, on grounds of non-maintainability due to the availability of an alternate remedy under the OGRA Ordinance, 2002---Held, Section 6 of the 2016 Act explicitly allows consumers to approach Gas Utility Courts for resolving billing disputes, making the rejection of plaint unjustified. (d) Special Law vs. General Law: ----Applicability of special laws Special laws like the Gas (Theft, Control & Recovery) Act, 2016, override general laws when they provide a specific framework for resolving disputes---The rule generalia specialibus non derogant (general provisions do not override specific provisions) was applied to uphold the exclusive jurisdiction of Gas Utility Courts. (e) Purposive Interpretation: ----Maxim: ut res magis valeat quam pereat Court emphasized the principle of purposive interpretation, holding that statutes must be construed to promote their purpose and remedy mischief---Statutes should not be rendered ineffective by narrow interpretations of their provisions. (f) Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation: Court underscored that the interpretation of statutes must remain faithful to legislative intent---Literal interpretations that lead to absurd results must yield to interpretations aligned with the statute’s objectives, applying principles established in Heydon’s Case and other jurisprudential sources. ----Disposition: Civil Petitions dismissed; leave to appeal refused. The Islamabad High Court’s judgment remanding the suits to the Gas Utility Court for a decision on merits upheld.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O.VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Repetitive and vexatious applications—Abuse of process of law Petitioner’s second application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. in a suit for malicious prosecution was dismissed with costs for being identical to his earlier application under the same provision and another under S.21, General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002—Earlier orders had attained finality and could not be re-agitated—Repeated filing of similar applications held to be frivolous and intended merely to delay proceedings; such conduct constitutes misuse of the process of law—Concurrent findings of Trial and Revisional Courts warranted no interference. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ----Art.120—Limitation in suits for malicious prosecution—Mixed question of fact and law Determination of limitation in a claim for malicious prosecution depends upon factual inquiries and legal evaluation—Properly triable only after recording of evidence—Trial Court rightly declined to reject plaint summarily on limitation grounds. (c) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss.8, 12 & 13—Distinction between defamation and malicious prosecution Underlying suit sought damages for malicious prosecution and not defamation under Defamation Ordinance, 2002—Contentions regarding limitation and exclusive jurisdiction under the Ordinance held misconceived—Courts below correctly found the Ordinance inapplicable to the controversy. (d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Art.199—Constitutional jurisdiction—Scope of interference High Court’s jurisdiction under Art.199 confined to correcting jurisdictional or constitutional errors—No such infirmity or violation found—Concurrent orders of lower courts based on sound reasoning; interference declined. (e) Practice and procedure ----Vexatious litigation by an advocate party-in-person—Imposition of costs Petitioner, an Advocate, repeatedly filed frivolous applications after settlement of issues, demonstrating a pattern of obstinate and abusive litigation—Courts are empowered to discourage such conduct through imposition of realistic costs—Costs of Rs.35,000 imposed, payable to the Sindh High Court Clinic within fourteen days. Cited cases: None reported. (g) Disposition — Petition dismissed with costs of Rs.35,000/-, to be deposited with the Sindh High Court Clinic within fourteen (14) days—All pending applications dismissed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908) —O.VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Scope—Plaint for specific performance of oral agreement—Maintainability—Admitted oral agreement and pleaded part-performance—Effect— Suit for specific performance based on oral sale agreement was rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. for lack of written contract and limitation bar—Held, where oral agreement and part-payment are admitted by defendant in written statement and legal notice, plaint cannot be rejected solely for lack of written terms—Court must treat averments in plaint as true and assess maintainability accordingly—Rejection of plaint in such case constitutes material irregularity—Order of lower courts set aside. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 —Art. 113—Specific performance—Limitation—Starting point—No fixed date for performance—Refusal of performance— Held, where no date is fixed for performance in oral agreement, limitation under Art. 113 begins from date plaintiff has notice of defendant’s refusal—Legal notice dated 12.05.2018 constituted clear refusal—Suit filed on 06.05.2019 was within prescribed three-year period—Findings of lower courts based on incorrect application of limitation law—Rejection of suit on this ground was erroneous. (c) Contract Act, 1872 & C.P.C., 1908 —Ss. 29 & 10—Oral agreements—Uncertain terms—Pleading of general facts—O.VI, R.12— Court observed that an oral agreement need not recite all terms in detail in the plaint—Where contract arises from conversations or conduct, general pleading is permissible—Omission to state witness names or specific performance date not fatal—Ambiguity in pleadings may be cured by seeking further particulars under O.VI, R.5, C.P.C., rather than rejecting suit at threshold. Disposition: Revision Allowed—Judgment and decree of Appellate and Trial Courts set aside—Plaint reinstated—Matter remanded for trial on merits—Application under O.VII, R.11 dismissed. Cited Case Law: Haji Abdul Karim v. Messrs Florida Builders (Pvt.) Ltd., PLD 2012 SC 247 Siraj Din v. Mst. Khurshid Begum, 2007 SCMR 1792 Shoukat Ullah v. Adil Tiwana, 2021 SCMR 56 Ghulam Nabi v. Muhammad Yaqub, PLD 1983 SC 344 Jaiwanti Bai v. Amir Corporation, PLD 2016 Sindh 498

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908):----O.VII, R.11---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Rejection of plaint---Legal character---Cause of action---Scope---Plaints of two suits filed by residents of Shaheed Shah Inayat Village (SSI Village) were rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., inter alia, on the ground that the village had been de-regularized and land was reserved for public amenities---Appellants challenged the rejection on the ground that no formal cancellation order existed and that allotment orders in their favor remained valid---Held, rejection of plaint requires that the cause of action be barred by law on the face of plaint; contentions of parties and evidence cannot be adjudicated at this stage---Appellants asserted leasehold rights based on allotment documents and claimed infringement of those rights---Where no express cancellation order was on record, the basis for rejecting the plaint under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. did not stand---Impugned order rejecting plaints was set aside; suits restored for adjudication in accordance with law.Cited Cases:• Jewan v. Federation of Pakistan 1994 SCMR 826• Raja Ali Shan v. Essem Hotel 2007 SCMR 741• Abdul Karim v. Florida Builders PLD 2012 SC 247• Al Meezan Investment Management v. WAPDA First Sukuk PLD 2017 SC 1(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877):----S.42---Declaratory relief---Legal character---Regularization---Cancellation---Appellants claimed declaratory relief over plots in SSI Village based on leasehold rights granted by the Government---Contended that no proper cancellation order of village regularization existed, and thus rights remained intact---Held, S.42, Specific Relief Act, 1877, allows persons asserting legal character or right in property to seek declaration---Where official cancellation was neither formalized nor communicated through proper legal process, suit seeking declaration could not be said to be barred by law---Scope of S.42 not limited to declared ownership; lease rights and threatened infringement provide basis for maintainability.----Cited Cases:• Parveen Begum v. Shah Jehan PLD 1996 Kar. 210• Abdul Razzak Khamosh v. Abbas Ali PLD 2004 Kar. 269• Arif Majeed Malik v. Board of Governors 2004 CLC 1029• Naseem-ul-Haq v. Raes Aftab Ali Lashari 2015 YLR 550**(c) Injunctions---Equitable relief---Amenity land---Burden of proof---Claim of regularization of village---Injunction refused---Appellants failed to establish a prima facie case regarding the authenticity of SSI Village and their proprietary interest---Satellite imagery (SUPARCO) showed no existence of village prior to cut-off date (31.12.2000) required under applicable regularization policy (SOC, 2008)---Appellants did not fulfill criteria under SOC, 2008 nor executed registered conveyance deeds---Held, injunction is a discretionary remedy requiring proof of balance of convenience and irreparable loss---Where the very basis of claim is in doubt, injunctive relief cannot be granted---Ad interim orders recalled; injunction application not restored on restoration of suits.----Cited Cases:• Puri Terminal Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 2004 SCMR 1092• Supreme Court Employees Cooperative Housing Society v. Marshal Construction Management 2022 SCMR 366(d) Constitution Petition No. 9 of 2010 (Naimatullah Khan case):----Amenity plots---Illegal conversion---Restoration---Supreme Court directives for restoration of amenity land such as parks, playgrounds, and graveyards to original use---SSI Village land overlapped with plots reserved for public amenities under Karachi’s Master Plan---Held, Supreme Court's directives and precedents (including Ardeshir Cowasjee v. KBCA 1999 SCMR 2883) bar conversion of amenity land for residential or commercial purposes---No claim over such land can be maintained regardless of assertions of regularization.----Cited Cases:• Ardeshir Cowasjee v. Karachi Building Control Authority 1999 SCMR 2883• Abdul Karim v. Nasir Salim Baig 2020 SCMR 111----Disposition:Appeals allowed---Impugned order rejecting plaints set aside---Suit Nos. 1598/2013 and 888/2014 restored for trial---Injunction application not restored---Appellants not entitled to equitable relief of injunction.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)— ----O. VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Effect—Deposit made pursuant to court direction—Refund— Suit for specific performance was rejected under O.VII, R.11, CPC for non-deposit of court fee and non-deposit of remaining sale consideration—Petitioner had, however, deposited a sum of Rs.22,910,000/- in Treasury through Challan Form No.32-A in purported compliance of Trial Court direction—Subsequent application for refund was dismissed by Trial Court on ground that no order existed permitting such deposit and order-sheet did not reflect the permission—Held, where record (including challan/register entries and treasury verification) establishes deposit in relation to suit proceedings, omission of court to properly record permission in order-sheet cannot be used to deny refund—Litigant cannot be prejudiced by act/omission of Court and technicalities cannot be employed to perpetuate injustice—Impugned refusal of refund was unsustainable. Cited Case: Irfan Rasheed v. Muhammad Muazim and others PLD 2022 Lahore 372 (b) Administration of justice—Act of Court—Maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”— ----Court’s omission—Litigant not to suffer— Trial Court’s record showed petitioner’s application to deposit amount was allowed by marginal endorsement, and treasury record verified deposit under suit title—Held, if court after allowing deposit failed to reflect the same in order-sheet, such inaction was attributable to Court and could not form basis to deprive petitioner of her money—A litigant is not to be affected by mistake/omission of Court; otherwise court becomes instrumental in perpetuating injustice—Refund could not be denied on mere technical ground where deposit stood admitted and no adverse claimant existed. (c) Contract Act (IX of 1872)— ----Ss. 68–72—Unjust enrichment—Restitution—Equitable jurisdiction— Amount deposited in Treasury was not required in any other matter and neither State nor respondent had any right or claim over it—Respondent expressly raised no objection to disbursement in petitioner’s favour—Held, retention of petitioner’s money by State in absence of any lawful entitlement would amount to unjust enrichment; remedy lies in restitution—Doctrine of unjust enrichment and restitution applies to prevent benefit at expense of another; refund could not be withheld where deposit was proved and no competing claim existed—Court, in exercise of equitable jurisdiction, set aside impugned order and directed Trial Court to facilitate refund after codal formalities. Cited Cases (comparative reference): Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005 Towers v. Barrett 1 T.R. 133 Sinclair v. Brougham L.R. (1914) A.C. 398 Disposition: Writ Petition No.57749 of 2023 was allowed; impugned order dated 29.04.2023 was set aside; petitioner’s application for refund of Rs.22,910,000/- was accepted; Trial Court was directed to proceed to enable refund after completing codal formalities.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908):----O. VII, R. 11(a) & (d)---Rejection of plaint---Lack of cause of action---Suit barred by law---EffectThe suit filed by the respondent challenging the transfer of property by a company to the appellant was rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(d), C.P.C., as it was barred by law under Section 5 of the Companies Act, 2017. The respondent was neither a shareholder nor a member of the company, and therefore, lacked locus standi to question the transfer of the company's property. The Appellate Court, however, remanded the case to the Trial Court for framing an issue on the maintainability of the suit. The High Court set aside the remand order, holding that where a suit is barred by law or does not disclose a cause of action, it should be terminated at the inception to prevent unnecessary litigation and harassment of defendants.----Cited Cases:• Haji Abdul Karim v. Messrs Florida Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2012 SC 247)• Abdul Waheed v. Mst. Ramzanu (2006 SCMR 489)• S.M. Sham Ahmad Zaidi v. Malik Hassan Ali Khan (Moin) (2002 SCMR 338)(b) Companies Act, 2017----S. 5, S. 136---Jurisdiction of Civil Court barred in corporate matters---Exclusive jurisdiction of High Court---EffectThe High Court held that corporate disputes, including challenges to board resolutions and transfer of company assets, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court under the Companies Act, 2017. Section 5(2) expressly bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters governed by the Act. The respondent’s remedy, if any, was to file a petition under Section 136 before the High Court, subject to the threshold requirement of holding at least 10% shareholding. Since the respondent had no such shareholding, the suit was inherently incompetent before the Civil Court.----Cited Cases:• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Mst. Sardar Begum (2017 CLD 1080)(c) Corporate Law---Locus Standi to Challenge Board Resolutions:----Challenge to transfer of company property by non-shareholder---Legal competency to file suit---ScopeThe respondent, claiming to be a shareholder of the holding company (Wincom LLC), sought to challenge a board resolution of its subsidiary (Wincom Pvt. Ltd.) approving the transfer of property to the appellant. The court held that only members or directors of the company have standing to challenge its resolutions. A shareholder of the holding company, without direct membership in the subsidiary, lacks legal competency to question its decisions. The challenge to the board resolution was thus held to be inherently flawed and beyond the respondent’s legal capacity.----Cited Cases:• Rai Bahadur Mohan Singh Oberoi v. Rai Bahadur Jodha Mal Kuthalia (PLD 1961 SC 6)• Anjum Rashid v. Shehzad (2007 CLD 1210)(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908):----O. XLI, R. 33---Appellate Court’s powers---Remanding a matter when no triable issue exists---EffectThe High Court held that where a plaint is barred by law or does not disclose a cause of action, remanding the case to the Trial Court is an unnecessary exercise that prolongs litigation. The Appellate Court erred in remanding the matter for the framing of issues when it was apparent that the suit was not maintainable. Courts should exercise discretion under Order XLI, Rule 33, C.P.C., to decide matters conclusively rather than prolonging proceedings where no triable issue exists.----Cited Cases:• M. Khurram Muggo v. Mst. Perveen Hameed Muggo (PLD 2007 Lahore 518)(e) Specific Relief Act, 1877:----S. 42---Declaration of legal character---Requirement of vested interest---EffectThe respondent sought a declaration and cancellation of the sale deed transferring the company's property to the appellant. The court held that under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, only a person with a vested legal interest could seek such a declaration. Since the respondent was neither a shareholder nor a director of the company, he lacked the legal character to seek such relief. The right to challenge the transaction vested solely in the company or its board.(f) Suit for Rendition of Accounts:----Essential requirements for suit to be maintainable---Lack of fiduciary relationship---EffectThe respondent also sought rendition of accounts from Wincom Pvt. Ltd. The court held that a suit for rendition of accounts is only maintainable where a fiduciary relationship exists, such as between trustee and beneficiary or principal and agent. As the respondent was neither a shareholder nor had any legally recognized fiduciary relationship with the company, the suit for rendition of accounts was incompetent.----Cited Cases:• Messrs Friend Engineering Corporation v. Government of Punjab (1991 SCMR 2324)• Muhammad Azam Khan v. Askari Leasing Ltd. (2014 CLD 462)(g) Judicial Economy---Avoidance of Frivolous Litigation:----Bar against prolonging legally untenable cases---EffectThe High Court emphasized the need to prevent prolonged litigation where the plaint is barred by law or does not disclose a cause of action. Courts must terminate such suits at the earliest stage to avoid harassment of defendants and save judicial resources. The remand order of the Appellate Court was therefore set aside, and the suit was dismissed.----Disposition:Appeal allowed. Suit dismissed as barred by law and lacking cause of action.