Summary: (a) Property Law: --- Islamic Law of Gift --- Validity of gift to a minor --- Possession requirement --- The suit was filed for a declaration of ownership of 909 acres of land allegedly gifted by the father (Syed Noor Ahmed Shah) to his daughter (Mst. Surriya Begum) in 1959. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decree, citing lack of proof of possession by the donee. However, the High Court restored the trial court's decision, recognizing that under Islamic law, when a father gifts property to his minor daughter who resides with him, actual physical possession is not required for a valid gift. Held, in such cases, strict proof of possession is unnecessary. Reliance placed on Kaneez Bibi v. Sher Muhammad (PLD 1991 SC 466) and Riaz Ullah Khan v. Asghar Ali (2004 SCMR 1701). (b) Land Reforms & Declaratory Admissions: --- Martial Law Regulation No.64, 1959 --- Effect of declaration before Land Reforms Authorities --- The declaration made by Syed Noor Ahmed Shah on 13.04.1959 to the Land Reforms Authorities stated that he had gifted 909 acres (9,997 PIUs) to his daughter. Held, such declarations are judicially recognized as decisive steps in land reforms and constitute an admission of the gift, making it legally binding. The absence of revocation by the donor during his lifetime reinforces the validity of the gift. Reliance placed on Qazalbash Waqf v. Chief Land Commissioner (PLD 1990 SC 99) and Muzammil Shah v. Deputy Land Commissioner (PLD 2001 Peshawar 92). (c) Inheritance & Challenge to Gift: --- Effect of gift on inheritance --- Burden of proof on challengers --- After the demise of Syed Noor Ahmed Shah, inheritance mutation was attested in 1994, including the gifted land. However, none of the other heirs challenged the 1959 declaration or the Land Reforms records acknowledging the gift. Held, the failure of the other heirs to dispute the gift at any material stage bars them from challenging it now, especially since the government and land reforms authorities also accepted the declaration without objection. (d) Judicial Review of Factual Findings: --- High Court’s role in revisional jurisdiction --- Scope of appellate interference --- The appellate court wrongly set aside the trial court’s decree based on the lack of possession, ignoring settled principles of Islamic law and land reforms regulations. Held, the High Court rightly restored the trial court’s judgment, as it was based on documentary evidence from official land records. (e) Disposition: Appeal dismissed. High Court judgment upheld. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908)--- ---- S. 12(2)---Fraud and misrepresentation---Scope---Maintainability of application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Consent decree obtained through collusion between parties to deprive a third party---Effect. A consent decree entered into by collusion or fraud falls outside the protection of the lis pendens rule (S.52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882). Where a party to a decree has transferred property to a bona fide purchaser and then colludes with the opposing party to have the decree set aside on compromise, the doctrine of lis pendens cannot be applied mechanically. Fraud in judicial proceedings, including deceptive consent statements made to a court, justifies invoking S.12(2), C.P.C. (b) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882)--- ---- S. 52---Lis pendens---Exception where fraud is committed---Fraudulent compromise to defeat third-party rights. The rule of lis pendens does not apply where a decree is set aside through fraudulent collusion after a legitimate transfer has taken place. Where a judgment-debtor, after transferring property to a third party, later consents to setting aside a decree without disclosing the sale, such an act constitutes a misrepresentation before the court. Reliance placed on Fazal Karim v. Muhammad Afzal (PLD 2003 SC 818) and Muhammad Zubair v. Muhammad Tahir Shafique (PLD 2013 Lahore 154). (c) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908)--- ---- S. 12(2)---Scope of fraud against a third party not party to the original suit---Maintainability of application. An application under S.12(2), C.P.C. is maintainable not only by parties to a suit but also by any person adversely affected by a fraudulent decree. The law does not restrict the right of challenge solely to judgment-debtors or their legal successors. Any person whose legal rights have been jeopardized due to collusion in judicial proceedings has standing to seek relief under S.12(2), C.P.C.. Reliance placed on Abdur Rauf v. Abdur Rahim Khan (PLD 1982 Peshawar 172) and Ch. Jalal Din v. Mst. Asghari Begum (1984 SCMR 586). (d) Civil Procedure---Judicial Proceedings---Fraud on court---Duty to frame issues and record evidence. Where allegations of fraud require factual determination, the court must frame issues and allow parties to lead evidence. Summary dismissal of an application under S.12(2), C.P.C. is only justified where no prima facie fraud is evident, but where fraud is alleged in a decree obtained through compromise, failure to record evidence constitutes a legal infirmity. Reliance placed on Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Khan (2002 SCMR 2003) and Mrs. Anis Haider v. S. Amir Haider (2008 SCMR 236). (e) Revisional Jurisdiction--- ---- S. 115, C.P.C.---Jurisdictional defect---Failure to properly adjudicate fraud allegations---Remand of case. A revisional court is justified in setting aside a lower court's order where allegations of fraud in obtaining a consent decree are summarily dismissed without framing issues or recording evidence. The case must be remanded for proper adjudication. Reliance placed on Muhammad Iqbal v. Khair Din (PLJ 2014 SC 11). Disposition: Revision petition allowed. Impugned order set aside. Case remanded for adjudication after framing issues and recording evidence. Cited Cases: Muhammad Ashraf Butt v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti (PLD 2011 SC 905) Sheikh Muhammad Iftikhar Ahmad v. Faiz Ahmad (2023 SCMR 2158) Fazal Karim v. Muhammad Afzal (PLD 2003 SC 818) Syed Mehmood Ali Shah v. Zulfiqar Ali (PLD 2013 SC 364) Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Khan (2002 SCMR 2003)

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – ---- S. 115 – Revisional jurisdiction – Scope – Exercise of discretion by revisional court – The jurisdiction of the revisional court under S. 115, C.P.C. is confined to examining whether the subordinate court has (i) exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, (ii) failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity – Supreme Court held that the revisional court was competent to review the findings of the appellate court and restore the judgment of the trial court, as it had not acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 – ---- Arts. 100 & 114 – Presumption of genuineness of a thirty-year-old document – Proper custody – Rebuttable nature of presumption – Dower deed relied upon by the appellant was over thirty years old, but its presumption of genuineness was rebuttable – Supreme Court held that a document’s genuineness must be established through unsuspicious character, proper custody, and supporting evidence – Mere production of a document by a scribe does not fulfill the requirement of “proper custody” under Art. 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 – The appellant failed to produce corroborative evidence to prove that the dower deed was validly executed and attested, thereby failing to establish a valid title transfer. (c) Muslim Personal Law – ---- Dower deed – Transfer of title through dower – Burden of proof – Gift based on dower – Supreme Court held that for a dower deed to convey ownership, it must be validly executed and proven – In the absence of conclusive proof of the dower deed, the subsequent gift deed was ineffective in transferring title – Appellant failed to establish through evidence that the property was lawfully transferred to his predecessor (Mst. Kishwara) via dower, thereby rendering the subsequent gift in his favor ineffective. (d) Civil litigation – ---- Failure to prove dower deed – Effect on subsequent transactions – The trial court dismissed the appellant’s suit for declaration due to lack of evidence proving the execution of the dower deed – First appellate court reversed the findings, but the revisional court restored the trial court’s decision – Supreme Court upheld the revisional court’s ruling, stating that when the foundational document (dower deed) remained unproven, any subsequent transaction (such as a gift) based on it could not be legally sustained. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Cited Case: Allah Ditta v. Aimna Bibi (2011 SCMR 1483).

Summary: Acquittal granted ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 109, 148, 149—Qatl-i-Amd—Benefit of doubt—Acquittal—Appellant, a juvenile, was convicted under Section 302(b) PPC for allegedly murdering her husband—Eyewitnesses (brothers of the deceased) claimed to have seen the accused firing a rifle at the deceased—However, only one crime empty was recovered from the scene, contradicting their version that two shots were fired—The appellant had previously contracted love marriage with the deceased against her family’s wishes, making it improbable for her to have a motive to kill him—Co-accused (father, brothers, and uncle) were acquitted in separate trial, discrediting the prosecution’s case—Recovery of the alleged murder weapon from an open field was held to be inadmissible—Reliance placed on Arshad Khan v. The State (2017 SCMR 564)—Held, prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt—Appeal accepted, conviction set aside. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 382-B—Benefit of doubt—Presumption of innocence—Fundamental principle of criminal law is that the burden lies on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt—Mere presence of the appellant in the house where her husband was murdered did not shift the burden of proof onto her—Held, in the absence of direct evidence linking the appellant to the crime, the benefit of doubt must be extended to her as a matter of right, not grace—Reliance placed on Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230). (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ----Principles of appreciation of evidence—Contradictory prosecution version—Failure to prove motive—Prosecution’s claim that the murder was instigated by the appellant’s family due to a love marriage dispute was contradicted by defense evidence—The appellant had voluntarily supported her husband against her parents in court proceedings—Held, prosecution failed to establish a motive, and its story was a concocted version to falsely implicate the appellant. (d) Acquittal—Failure of prosecution to prove guilt ----Presumption of innocence strengthened upon acquittal—Where an accused is acquitted due to prosecution’s failure to establish guilt, courts should not interfere unless the acquittal is found to be perverse or arbitrary—Held, the trial court’s judgment suffered from misreading of evidence, and the conviction could not be sustained—Appellant acquitted. ----- Disposition: Criminal appeal accepted. Conviction and sentence set aside. Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Dismissal of Suit Under Order XVII Rule 3 CPC: ----Scope and applicability—Failure to produce evidence despite repeated opportunities—Effect—Trial court dismissed suit for damages of Rs. 670 million under Order XVII Rule 3 CPC after appellant failed to produce evidence despite multiple opportunities—Record reflects that appellant was granted final opportunity with warning and cost, yet she failed to present any evidence—Held, once a trial court grants a last opportunity with a specific warning, it must enforce its order strictly—Reliance placed on Moon Enterpriser CNG Station v. SNGPL (2020 SCMR 300) and Duniya Gul v. Niaz Muhammad (PLD 2024 SC 672). (b) Duty of Courts to Prevent Abuse of Process: ----Adjournment culture—Need for judicial discipline—Case remained pending for over three years, causing undue delay—Litigation backlog exacerbated by frivolous adjournments—Courts must strictly enforce procedural discipline and avoid unnecessary delays—Reliance placed on Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh (PLD 2024 SC 887), which emphasized that adjournments must not become an excuse for delaying justice. (c) Findings of the Court: ----Proper application of Order XVII Rule 3 CPC—Appellant was given ample opportunities to present evidence but failed to do so—Trial court acted within its jurisdiction by dismissing the suit—Appellate court found no material illegality or misreading of evidence warranting interference—Reliance placed on Duniya Gul v. Niaz Muhammad (PLD 2024 SC 672). (d) Disposition: Appeal dismissed in limine as being devoid of merit. No order as to costs.

Summary: Though Order VI Rule 17 of CPC provides ample powers to the courts to allow amendments in pleadings, yet such powers should be used under certain limitations/conditions. (a) Amendment of Pleadings—Scope and Limitations: ----Amendment Application—Factors Considered by Courts—Petitioner sought amendment in plaint to challenge inheritance mutation and revenue orders issued prior to filing of suit for specific performance—Held, amendment may be allowed only if it does not introduce a new cause of action, prejudice the opposing party, or revive past transactions—Courts must balance procedural fairness with the rights of the opposing party—Reliance placed on Muhammad Ramzan v. Liaqat Ali (2001 SCMR 1984), Atta-ur-Rehman v. Abdur Rashid (2016 MLD 533), and Bashir Ahmed Anjum v. Muhammad Raffique (2021 SCMR 772). (b) Principles Governing Discretionary Power to Amend Pleadings: ----Finality of Judicial and Revenue Orders—Doctrine of Waiver—Petitioner was aware of mutation No.1131 and order dated 20.03.2017 but failed to challenge them at the time of filing the suit—Such omission constitutes waiver, precluding subsequent amendment—Further, amendment sought to convert suit from one of specific performance to declaration and cancellation, thereby altering the core cause of action—Reliance placed on Ijaz Mahmood v. Manzoor Hussain (1988 SCMR 34) and Abdur Rashid v. Muhammad Hanif (1994 SCMR 2035). (c) Procedural Deficiencies in Amendment Application: ----Amendment in Body of Plaint Without Amending Prayer Clause—Petitioner failed to amend the prayer clause, rendering the amendment ineffective—A valid amendment must specify the changes sought with precision and clarity—Court cannot allow vague, general amendments that waste judicial resources—Reference made to Matwali Khan v. Shah Zaman (PLD 1965 Azad J & K 26). (d) Findings and Disposition: ----No Justification for Amendment—Petition Dismissed—Petitioner failed to satisfy the legal conditions for amendment, including timeliness, consistency with original pleadings, and absence of prejudice to opposing party—As revenue orders had attained finality, amendment would revive a past and closed transaction, contrary to settled principles—Writ Petition dismissed with no order as to costs—Trial Court directed to expedite hearing of consolidated suits and conclude proceedings before May 2025. ----Petition dismissed. Orders of lower courts upheld.

Summary: (a) Termination of Employment—Violation of Procedural Fairness: ----Non-Adherence to Service Regulations—Petitioner, a TEVTA Instructor, was terminated without due process despite successful completion of probation—TEVTA failed to follow proper disciplinary procedures under TEVTA Employees Service Regulations, 2011—Held, termination order violates fundamental principles of fairness and due process—Reliance placed on Homoeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed v. Government of Punjab (2022 SCMR 1546). (b) Finality of Judicial Orders—Failure to Challenge Prior Decision: ----Effect of Court’s Direction to Reinstate Employee—High Court, in W.P. No. 2625 of 2018, directed Respondent No.2 to address Petitioner’s grievances and process her regularization, yet Respondent failed to comply—As the 2018 order was never challenged, it attained finality—Respondent’s subsequent refusal to reinstate Petitioner amounts to contemptuous non-compliance—Reliance placed on Dr. Sayyid A. S. Pirzada v. Chief Secretary (2023 SCMR 1087). (c) Fundamental Rights—Non-Payment of Salary: ----Right to Livelihood and Dignity—Petitioner’s termination led to non-payment of salary, infringing her fundamental rights to life (Article 9), dignity (Article 14), and livelihood (Articles 37 & 38)—Withholding of salary amounts to economic exploitation, violating constitutional guarantees—Reliance placed on Abdul Qadir v. District Education Officer (2001 PLC (C.S.) 1073) and Rector COMSATS v. Ghulam Umar Kazi (2006 SCMR 1894). (d) Disposition: ----Termination Order Set Aside—Reinstatement Ordered—Impugned orders dated 09.08.2019 and 14.06.2018 set aside—Respondent No.2 directed to: Reinstate Petitioner immediately. Process her regularization per rules. Pay all pending salaries and benefits. Petition allowed. Respondent directed to comply forthwith.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.23---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 23---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Rejection of plaint---Mortgaged property---Transfer of assets---Restrictions---Plaintiff company sought specific performance of agreement to sell regarding suit properties which were mortgaged with bank as security for a finance facility---Defendant company sought rejection of plaint on the plea that the suit was not maintainable---Validity---Provision of S. 23 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, did not operate retrospectively and transfers that occurred prior to promulgation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were not to be treated as void---General restraints as contained in Ss. 23(1) & 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 could only set aside those registered transfers that had violated provisions of each of those subsections---Properties that were not furnished as security were not impacted by S. 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 prior to any decree passed and were valid transfers---Agreement of sale instituted for sale of a mortgaged property would be void under S. 23 of Contract Act, 1872 as the object of agreement of sale would be to defeat the provision of law i.e., S. 23 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Right of redemption may be recognized in the context of transfers subject to S. 23 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Jurisdiction to determine performance of agreement to sell as entered into between parties, in terms of Ss. 23(1) & 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 at all times vested with Banking Court and Civil Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain such suit---Plaint seeking specific performance of agreement to sell was barred under the provisions of Ss. 23(1) & 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and was liable to be rejected under the provisions of O.VII, R. 11(d), C.P.C.---High Court rejected the plaint seeking specific performance of agreement to sell under O. VII, R. 11(d), C.P.C. as jurisdiction to consider the performance on the agreement of sale in respect of mortgaged property vested in Banking Court under Ss.23(1) & 23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plaint was rejected in circumstances. Mst. Nasira Khatoon and another v. Mst. Aisha Bai and 12 others 2003 SCMR 1050; University of Health Sciences and others v. Mumtaz Ahmad and another 2010 SCMR 767; Subedar Sardar Khan through Legal Heirs and others v. Muhammad Idress through General Attorney and another PLD 2008 SC 591; Rubina Amjad v. Javaid Shafique Siddiqui and others 2023 MLD 201; Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Nasrullah 2023 SCMR 273; Zamiruddin Ahmad v. Havas Khan PLD 1969 SC 57; Sheikh Jameel Ahmad v. Raja Khalid Hussain 2010 CLD 571; Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited v. Messrs Dagra Textiles (Pvt.) Limited and 3 others 2017 CLD 1256; Habib Bank Limited v. Daizy Knitwear (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 3 others 2006 CLD 206; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Dharamdad and 2 others 2006 CLD 771; Rafiq Ahmed Sanauri through Attorney and 3 others v. Union Bank Limited through Bank Manager and 5 others 2007 CLD 1002; Citizens Investment Co. v. Askari Leasing Ltd. and others 2009 CLD 1392; Muhammad Hussain and another v. Judge Banking Court No. 1 Multan and 3 others 2013 CLD 1684; Askari Bank Ltd. v A.H. International (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2016 CLD 1028; Muhammad Mansha v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2020 SCMR 1069; Azra Saeed v. Raees Khan through General Attorney and 5 others 2009 CLD 779; Muhammad Ashraf v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2018 CLD 911; Azra Saeed v. Raees Khan 2009 CLD 779; Citizens Investment Co. v. Askari Leasing Ltd. and others 2009 CLD 1392; Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Ltd. v. A.H. International (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2007 CLD 175; Soneri Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Punjab Engineering Services (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others 2016 CLD 440; Raja Riaz Ahmad Khan v. United Bank Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 552; Muhammad Ejaz v. Allah Bakhsh 2017 CLC Note 28; Bank Al-Falah Ltd. v Bilal Spinning Mills Ltd. 2005 MLD 1358; Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and others v. Messrs National Development Finance Corporation 2002 CLC 166; Rao Abdul Rehman (Deceased) v. Muhammad Afzal (Deceased) 2023 SCMR 815; Javaid Iqbal v. Abdul Aziz PLD 2006 SC 66; Mst. Rasheda Begum v. Muhammad Yousaf 2002 SCMR 1089; Muhammad Bakhsh v. Zia Ullah 1983 SCMR 988; Zohair Zakaria v. National Bank of Pakistan 2009 CLD 915; See Muhammad Mansha v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2020 SCMR 1069; Al Haj Chaudhry Muhammad Bashir v. Citibank NA 2002 CLD 962; Sheikh Muhammad Khalid v. Malik Food Industries through Sole Proprietor 2009 CLD 1038; Muhammad Ejaz and another v. Allah Bakhsh and 7 others 2017 CLC N 28; Nasir Abbas Bhatti v. Abid Hussain 2024 CLC 268, Gujranwala Steel Industries through Partner v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and 7 others 2024 CLD 343 and Muhammad Sadiq and others v. Muhammad Mansha and others PLD 2018 SC 692 ref. Ali Mehdi for Plaintiff (in Suit No.290 of 2018). Nemo for Defendant (in Suit No.290 of 2018). Hanif Faisal Alam, Barrister-at-Law for Plaintiff (in J.M. No.32 of 2022). Waqar Ahmed for Respondent No.1 (in J.M. No.32 of 2022). Mrs. Heer Memon, Barrister-at-Law for Respondents Nos.2 and 4 (in J.M. No.32 of 2022). Hanif Faisal Alam, Barrister-at-Law for Plaintiff (in J.M. No.33 of 2022). Waqar Ahmed for Respondent No.1 (in J.M. No.33 of 2022). Mrs. Heer Memon, Barrister-at-Law for Respondents Nos.2 and 4 (in J.M. No.33 of 2022). Dates of hearing: 8th, 19th September, 2nd October, 2023, 29th February, 2024 and 11th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) [as amended by the Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2022], Ss. 6. 9(1), Sr.No. 3(c), 25 & 51---Recovery of 2-kg charas on spy information---Post arrest bail, refusal of---Red-handed seizure of considerable quantity of the contraband; timely sending of the samples to laboratory; absence of animosity and ill motives; applicability of S. 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act, 1997, (Act); the nature of the crime and its serious implications on overall society; and the legal jurisprudence on the subject as developed so far were the reasons which convinced the High Court to reach to the prima facie assessment that reasonable grounds existed to connect the applicant with the alleged crime, which brought him within the remit of 'Prohibition’, as contemplated by S. 51 of the Act; thus, no case of further inquiry was made out which could entitle him to bail---Calendar of witnesses appeared to be short suggesting likelihood of early conclusion of trial without unnecessary delay---Unless the High Court at the very outset was satisfied that the charge against the accused appeared to be false or groundless, the discretion under S. 497, Cr.P.C., could not be exercised with regards to offences, which were punishable with death or imprisonment for life---Bail had been declined by High Court in identical circumstances even for lesser quantities--- Post arrest bail was dismissed, in circumstances. 2024 SCMR 934; 2022 PCr.LJ 690 and 2022 MLD 1538 distinguished. 2023 SCMR 573 and 2017 PCr.LJ 1012 ref. Javed Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 1989; 2024 YLR 1061; 2023 YLR 1264; 2022 MLD 998 and 2022 MLD 735 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Post-arrest bail---Deeper appreciation of evidence---Scope---Deeper appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the bail stage. Saleh Muhammad’s case PLD 1986 Sc 211 and The State v. Zubair and 4 others PLD 1986 SC 163 rel. (c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) [as amended by the Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2022]--- ----S. 25---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103---Non-association of private witnesses---Exclusion of S. 103, Cr.P.C.---Police witnesses---Evidentiary value---Section 25 of the Act specifically excludes applicability of S. 103, Cr.P.C---Such conscious exclusion by the legislature in the cases of narcotics, actually highlights lack of cooperation and willingness from private witnesses being associated in the process of recovery, as a usual conduct symptomatic of social apathy towards civic responsibility---Members of State functionaries are second to none in their status and their acts are statutorily presumed, prima facie, intra vires. 2020 SCMR 1257 rel. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) [as amended by the Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2022], S. 9(1), Sr. No. 3(c)---Recovery of huge quantity of contraband---Liberal exercise of huge discretion---Scope---Special care and caution is required while dealing with the case of narcotics, which are not only a menace and a serious crime against the society, but they even brings bad reputation to the country globally---Liberal exercise of discretion under S. 497, Cr.P.C., in cases of recovery of contraband stuff in huge quantity has been deprecated. Bilal Khan’s case 2021 SCMR 460 rel. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497---Post arrest bail, refusal of---Claim of false implication---Tentative assessment---Scope---Claim of false implication is an issue that cannot be attended without going beyond the barriers of tentative assessment and is an exercise prohibited by law. Noor Khan v. State 2021 SCMR 1212 rel. Shahnawaz Brohi for Applicant. Shaharyar Shar, Special Prosecutor ANF for the State. Date of hearing: 11th February, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 22-A & 561-A---Powers of Justice of Peace under S.22-A, Cr.P.C---Scope---Petition filed under S.22-A, Cr.P.C, by the applicant for the registration of criminal case was declined by the Ex-officio Justice of Peace---Validity---Justice of Peace was duty bound to apply his judicial mind in order to form a prima facie view that cognizable information had been brought on record by the applicant---From the facts of the application no cognizable information was stated by the applicant---Ex-officio Justice of Peace was not bound to issue in all cases a direction to SHO concerned for the registration of FIR---Section 22-A, Cr.P.C, was an enabling and beneficiary piece of legislation and therefore a duty was also cast upon the Courts to save it from being misused and abused and to ensure that it was used in only genuine cases---Application was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Arif v. The State 2009 YLR 1533 and 2010 YLR 189 rel. Liaqat Ali for Applicant. Khadim Hussain Khuharo, DPG, SIP Shabbir, P.S. Brigade, Inspector Muhammad Mithal, SHO P.S. Birgade. Proposed accused are also present. Applicant is also present. Date of hearing: 21st February, 2025. “Not always necessary to direct the Police to register the FIR, if on the face of it application filed by the complainant appeared to be mala fide---No doubt before passing the order of registration of FIR no enquiry was necessary, but Justice of Peace had to apply his mind to form an opinion about the commission of a cognizable offence and it was not obligatory for the Justice of Peace to issue direction in every case irrespective of the facts and circumstances of the case.”