Summary: The bare perusal of Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 reflects that an initiative has to be taken by the petitioner who's first stance is to offer himself for oath in support of his lis where after at his request the Court has to call upon the other side to refute the said statement of the petitioner on oath and the Court is bound to pass any order in the light of the said statement of the parties. Under the Oath Act 1873 the party desirous of decision on oath ask other party to take oath whereas under Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat the party having desire to decide the matter on oath put himself to task by offering to take oath first and then on his request the court calls upon the other party to refute the said statement on oath. Both the provisions of Oath Act 1873 and Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat are opposite to each other. In present case the plaintiff/respondent did not make an offer for administering special oath as provided in Article 163 of Qanun-e-shahadat Order 1984 but offered the petitioners/defendants to take oath which clearly manifest that respondents/plaintiffs offer was under Oath Act 1873 and not under Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat. The mentioning of wrong nomenclature will not change the complexion or nature of the application and the Court has to see the pith and substance of the application rather than nomenclature of the application.

Summary: Held: (1) Admittedly the respondent No.1 is the only daughter of the deceased Ghulam Yasin while he divorced his wife during his lifetime. The Shia Law of Inheritance divide heirs into two groups namely (1) heirs by consanguinity that is blood relations and (2) heirs by marriage that is husband and wife. Heirs by consanguinity are divided into three classes and each class is sub- divided into two sections. (2) Of three classes of heirs first excludes the second from inheritance and the second excludes third. In the present case the respondent No.1 being heir of first class excludes the petitioners who are the heirs of third class. (3) It is settled principle of Islamic Law that nearer in degree excludes the remoter. The petitioners are not only distant kindred of Ghulam Yasin but also remoter in degree. (Civil revision was dismissed).

Summary: (a) Refusal of discretion of bail in honour killing cases in light of sub-section (3) of section 345 Cr.P.C. (b) Status of legal heirs of deceased to compound an offence of honour killing within the meaning of section 311 PPC.

Summary: (a) A High Court can evaluate & assess grounds furnished by learned trial Court qua grant of bail to an accused person under 3 rd proviso of section 497 Cr.P.C in view of conclusion of delay in his/her trial. (b) Those dates of hearing cannot be counted in total tally of an accused person wherein his learned counsel was though not in attendance however on those particular dates of hearing prosecution could not produce their complete set of witnesses and no progress could otherwise be made in a case even if learned counsel representing an accused person would have been present. (c) Exceptional and extraordinary grounds would be required for recall or cancellation of bail granting by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

Summary: Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 being applicable vests the Court with Vast discretion to condone delay in case where the Court is satisfied that the application seeking condonation of delay discloses “sufficient cause” by accounting for each day`s delay. It is also settled that once discretion is exercised by the Court qua condonation of delay the High Court or as the case may be the Supreme Court would interfere in very rare cases and in exceptional circumstances.

Summary: Longstanding entries in the revenue record particularly those reflected in successive Jamabandie cannot be altered by revenue authorities in summary manner. Correction of entries envisaged under Section 45 of the Land Revenue Act 1967 has very limited scope and can be invoked only in cases where all the parties consented or where it was supported by a decree or order of the Court binding on all parties. Article 10-A right to fair trial.

Summary: A declaratory suit was decreed by the learned trial Court and appeal filed there against was dismissed by the learned appellate Court. During execution proceedings the petitioners filed application under Section 12(2) CPC to the effect that they being necessary party were not impleaded in the suit therefore the decree was based on misrepresentation and fraud. Learned Civil Court tried and accepted the application under Section 12(2) CPC however the learned Revisional Court held that the application under Section 12(2) CPC was not maintainable before the Civil Court rather same was required to have been filed before the appellate Court as such ordered return of application to the learned Civil Court. The petitioners then filed fresh application under Section 12(2) CPC before the learned appellate Court. The learned appellate Court dismissed the application on the ground of limitation. Held; In the case in hand the petitioners had been pursuing their application under Section 12(2) CPC before the wrong forum therefore they are required to fulfil the conditions provided in sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the Act i.e. that such proceedings were prosecuted in good faith. If the petitioners succeed to meet out such requirement of sub-Section (2) of Section 14 they would be entitled to get benefit and in case of their failure such benefit could not be extended to them. No doubt the petitioner preferred fresh application instead of filing the returned memo of petition however the returned memo of petition was annexed with the subsequent fresh petition and the fresh petition was in continuation of the former application. No lapses were found on behalf of the petitioners while pursuing their application before the wrong forum i.e. the Court of learned Civil Judge-VI Mansehra. The application under Section 12(2) CPC was entertained and decided by the learned Civil Judge-VI Mansehra. Upon decision of revision petition by the revisional Court the learned Civil Judge-VI ordered return of petition under Section 12(2) CPC on 22.12.016 and the petitioners filed application under Section 12(2) CPC before the learned Additional District Judge-II Mansehra on 23.12.2016 which was well within time. The time consumed in pursuing the application before the learned Civil Judge-VI Mansehra was required to have been excluded because the petitioners were able to establish that the proceedings were being pursued before the learned Civil Judge-VI Mansehra in good faith and secondly they could not be made to suffer due to act of the Court because in view of the findings rendered above it was also the duty of the Court to have returned the petition to the petitioners for its presentation before the Court having jurisdiction in the matter while the learned Civil Judge-VI Mansehra instead of returning the petition entertained and decided the same. Revision Petition allowed.

Summary: Sentenced reduced ---- (a) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997)----S. 7(a)---Application of anti-terrorism provisions---Requirement of motive, object, or purpose behind an act---Scope---Mere gravity or brutal nature of an offence is not sufficient to bring it under the definition of "terrorism" unless it is designed to intimidate the public, government, or a segment of society---Accused was convicted under S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for the murder of a police constable, but evidence revealed that the deceased was not in uniform or performing official duty at the time of the incident---Prosecution failed to establish that the act was committed to intimidate the government or the public---Held, that mere killing of a police officer does not automatically constitute terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 unless the requisite intent is proven---Supreme Court deleted S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 from the conviction of the accused.Cited Case:Ghulam Hussain v. The State PLD 2020 SC 61(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----S. 302(b) & S. 302(c)---Murder---Self-defence---Plea of accused---Scope---Accused claimed to have acted in self-defence, arguing that the deceased police constable, not being in uniform, approached him in darkness, causing a reasonable apprehension of an assassination attempt---Evidence established that the deceased grappled with the accused before being shot---Supreme Court held that while the accused had a reasonable apprehension of danger, the extent of force used exceeded the right of self-defence, making it a case of mitigating circumstances rather than complete exoneration---Death sentence under S.302(b) PPC converted into life imprisonment.Cited Cases:Faiz v. The State 1983 SCMR 76Sultan Khan v. Sher Khan PLD 1991 SC 520Shabbir Ahmad v. The State PLD 1995 SC 343(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 342---Statement of accused---Acceptance as a whole---Scope---Statement of accused must be accepted or rejected in its entirety unless independent evidence contradicts the exculpatory portion---Accused's plea of self-defence was supported by circumstantial evidence, including lack of police uniform on the deceased and the absence of light at the scene---Court considered the plea of self-defence in light of mitigating factors and reduced the sentence.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 544-A---Compensation---Quantum of compensation---Scope---Supreme Court reduced the compensation amount payable to legal heirs of the deceased from Rs. 10 Lac to Rs. 2 Lac, considering mitigating circumstances of the case.---- Disposition: Appeal partially allowed. Conviction under S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, set aside. Death sentence under S.302(b) PPC converted into life imprisonment. Compensation reduced to Rs. 2 Lac.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) – Section 3 – Condonation of delay – Duty of the court to examine limitation – Government departments not entitled to preferential treatment Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it is the inherent duty of the court to examine the question of limitation, regardless of whether it is raised as an objection. The mere fact that a government department was involved does not entitle it to any special consideration or leniency in condoning the delay. Government entities are to be treated on the same footing as private litigants, and internal correspondence among departments cannot be considered a valid excuse for failing to file an appeal within the prescribed period. Reliance placed on Government of Pakistan v. Messrs Malbrow Builders, Contractors (2006 SCMR 1248) and Town Administration v. Mohammad Khalid (2024 SCMR 1852). (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) – Section 54 – Appeal against enhancement of compensation – Delay in filing – Condonation refused An appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, against an award enhancing compensation for acquired land, must be filed within the prescribed limitation period. In the present case, the government appellants failed to justify the delay of 318 days in filing the appeal. The stance that the judgment was not in the knowledge of the department was found to be contrary to the record, as the appellants were duly represented before the trial court. It is a settled principle that limitation is not a mere technicality but creates a vested right for the opposite party. Reliance placed on Cholistan Co-operative Wool Development Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bashir Ahmad (1983 SCMR 1105) and Asad Ali v. The Bank of Punjab (PLD 2020 SC 736). (c) Law of Limitation – Justification for each day's delay required – Absence of cogent reasons leads to dismissal For condonation of delay, each day's delay must be satisfactorily explained with justified and cogent reasons. Mere laxity, carelessness, or bureaucratic inefficiency in government offices does not constitute sufficient cause for condoning a prolonged delay. The doctrine of "Leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviunt" applies, meaning that the law aids those who are vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. Reliance placed on Province of Punjab v. Kishwar Qudus Paul (2004 SCMR 571) and Government of Pakistan v. Messrs Malbrow Builders, Contractors (2006 SCMR 1248). ----Disposition: Application for condonation of delay dismissed. Consequently, the appeal stands dismissed as being time-barred.

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): —Ss. 364, 374—Confessional statement—Validity—Death sentence confirmation—Legal and procedural defects in the confession statement—Effect. The accused was arrested on 25.06.2004, and the confessional statement was recorded the following day. The confession was written on a cyclostyled printed form, rather than in the Magistrate’s handwriting, in violation of the requirements under S. 364, Cr. P.C. Additionally, the Magistrate failed to provide a certificate explaining why he did not record the confession in his own handwriting. Further, no extra time was given to the accused to reflect before making the confession, and no examination was conducted to determine whether he was coerced or subjected to torture before confessing. Such procedural irregularities rendered the confessional statement unreliable and inadmissible in evidence. The failure to observe mandatory procedural safeguards cast serious doubt on the voluntariness and authenticity of the confession. (b) Evidence Law: —Recovery of weapon—Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report—Legality of evidence—Mere matching of empties with the recovered weapon not sufficient to convict an accused. The accused allegedly led the police to the location where the crime weapon was recovered. However, the weapon and empties were sent to the FSL together, which is contrary to established legal principles. The police procedure was flawed as it failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody. Furthermore, key prosecution witnesses admitted that the crime scene articles, including the empties and weapon, were not properly sealed in their presence, raising serious doubts about tampering. In such circumstances, the forensic evidence could not be relied upon as conclusive proof of guilt. (c) Criminal TrialL —Benefit of doubt—Prosecution’s failure to prove motive—Effect. No motive was attributed to the accused, and the prosecution failed to establish any prior enmity or dispute between the parties. The absence of motive significantly weakened the prosecution’s case. The Court reaffirmed that motive is a double-edged weapon, and if the prosecution sets up a motive but fails to prove it, the benefit must go to the accused. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Hassan v. State (2024 SCMR 1427), which held that where the prosecution's evidence is doubtful, the accused is entitled to acquittal. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) & Law of Evidence: —Testimony of witnesses—Hearsay evidence—Contradictions and improvements—Effect. Key prosecution witnesses provided contradictory statements. One witness (PW-6) admitted that he was not an eyewitness and merely relied on information from another person who was also not presented as a witness. Another prosecution witness (PW-7) stated that the accused confessed to him while traveling, but the alleged confession was not made before the police or a Magistrate. The contradictions in the depositions and the reliance on hearsay evidence rendered the prosecution’s case unreliable. (e) Criminal Law—Standard of Proof: —Presumption of innocence—Burden of proof on prosecution—Benefit of doubt must go to the accused. The Court held that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and cannot rely on the weaknesses of the defense. Once a single loophole is observed in the prosecution’s case, the benefit must automatically go to the accused (Abdul Jabbar v. State (2019 SCMR 129)). Since the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused was entitled to acquittal. ----Disposition: Appeal allowed. Conviction and death sentence set aside. Accused acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.