Summary: Land Acquisition Act ( I of 1894)--- ----Ss. 4, 23 & 24---Acquisition of agricultural land---Compensation, quantum of---Potential market value of the acquired land---Scope---Acquiring Agency(appellants) filed appeal against acceptance of reference filed by land-owner (respondent), whereby, the Referee Court modified the award in terms that the compensation was enhanced along with 15% compulsory acquisition charges and 8% per annum compound interest---Validity---It is evident from record that the respondent (land-owner) has brought convincing and irrefutable evidence to demonstrate the true market and potential value of the acquired land and the appellants have failed to produce any evidence to rebut the same---It has been unequivocally established that the acquired land is situated within the territorial limits of (Lahore) metropolitan and has acquired urban features as the surrounding lands are being used for residential purposes---Referee Court aptly deciphered the evidence of the respondent (land-owner) and relied upon the relevant evidence pertaining to the period when the land was acquired to opine that although the land was agricultural at the time when it was so acquired yet its potential value was not kept in mind while making the final assessment, as such, enhanced the due compensation to Rs. 50,000/- per Marla against the claim of Rs. 200,000/-per Marla as claimed by the respondent---Appeal, being meritless, was dismissed, in circumstances. Federal Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Defence Rawalpindi and others v. Mst. Zakia Begum and others PLD 2023 SC 277 ref. Sikandar Nisar Saroya, Assistant Advocate General for Appellants. Muhammad Rizwan-ul-Hassan and Umer Bin Munawar for Respondent. Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025. Judgment Abid Hussain Chattha, J .--- This Appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the "Act") is directed against the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 22.04.2019 passed by Senior Civil Judge (Civil Division), Lahore, whereby, while accepting the reference under Section 18 of the Act of the Respondent, the Referee Court modified the award in terms that the compensation of Rs. 20,625/- per Marla was enhanced to Rs. 50,000/- per Marla along with 15% compulsory acquisition charges and 8% per annum compound interest from the date of taking possession till payment of compensation amount. 2. Precisely, the land of the Respondent measuring 06-K-16-M, 07-K-08-M and 08-K was acquired in Mouza Attari Saroba, Tehsil Cantt, District Lahore under the provisions of the Act at the behest of Building Department for establishment of Sports Complex Near Ayeshiana Housing Scheme, Lahore. After following the due process of law, Award No. 5/2011 dated 20.07.2011 was rendered determining compensation in favour of the Respondent as stated above. Being dissatisfied from the same, the Respondent claimed that his acquired land is situated within the territorial limits of Lahore Metropolitan and had acquired urban characteristics inasmuch as the surrounding lands are being used for residential purposes. As such, while determining the market value of the acquired land, the market and potential value has not been duly considered. Even, as per evaluation table maintained by Deputy Commissioner, the rate is Rs. 100,000/- per Marla although the market price is about Rs. 200,000/- per Marla. 3. Appellant No. 3 did not controvert the stated facts on merits, whereas, Appellants Nos. 1 and 2 appeared through their counsel but their right to file written reply to the reference was closed vide order dated 02.07.2014. Later, during the course of proceedings, no one appeared on behalf of Appellants Nos. 1 to 3 who were proceeded ex-parte on 27.06.2018, accordingly. Thereafter, ex-parte evidence of the Respondent was recorded and reference was decided in terms stated above. 4. Learned Law officer submitted that the impugned Judgment and Decree is in violation of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act; the compensation was not adequately determined; and the Appellants have been knocked on technical grounds on account of failure to tender their evidence. 5. Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that although the market and potential value of the acquired property is much more than what has been awarded by the Referee Court yet the Respondent accepted the same in order to receive timely compensation which has yet not been paid to him and that irrefutable evidence was brought on record to demonstrate the true market and potential value of the acquired land which could not be rebutted by the Appellants, therefore, the impugned Judgment and Decree is liable to be maintained. 6. Arguments heard. Record perused. 7. It is evident from record that the Respondent has brought convincing and irrefutable evidence to demonstrate the true market and potential value of the acquired land. The Appellants have failed to produce any evidence to rebut the same. It was unequivocally established that the acquired land is situated within the territorial limits of Lahore Metropolitan and had acquired urban features as the surrounding lands are being used for residential purposes. 8. The Referee Court aptly deciphered the evidence of the Respondent and relied upon the relevant evidence pertaining to the period when the land was acquired to opine that although the land was agricultural at the time when it was so acquired yet its potential value was not kept in mind while making the final assessment, as such, enhanced the due compensation to Rs. 50,000/- per Marla against the claim of Rs. 200,000/-per Marla as claimed by the Respondent. Reliance is placed on case titled, "Federal Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Defence Rawalpindi and others v. Mst. Zakia Begum and others" (PLD 2023 Supreme Court 277). 9. In view of the above, this Appeal is devoid of any merit and the same is hereby dismissed. MQ/P-10/L Appeal dismissed.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 196 & 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 124-A, 153-A, 500, 505, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Sedition, promoting enmity between different groups, defamation, public mischief, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, act of terrorism---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegations against the accused-petitioner were that he was delivering a speech inciting the people to revolt against the State---S.196, Cr.P.C., grants power to the Federal or Provincial Government to decide whether a person should or should not be tried, as the trial may embarrass the Government at home or abroad, so S.196, Cr.P.C., creates a clog on the taking of cognizance of a case by a Court, which cap can be removed only, if complaint provided under S.196, Cr.P.C., is lodged on the authorization of the concerned Government---In present case, admittedly no complaint from Federal or Provincial Government or Authorized Officer had been made---Section 7 of the Act of 1997 had also been cited in the FIR---Provisions of the Act of 1997 were part of the FIR; S.12 ibid deals with the jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court while S.19(3) of the Act of 1997 stipulates that Anti-Terrorism Court shall directly take cognizance of a case triable by such Court without the case being sent to it under S.190, Cr.P.C.---Section 32 of the Act of 1997 stipulates that the Act of 1997 has overriding effect---Thus, Anti-Terrorism Court can proceed with such cases irrespective of the bar contained in S.196, Cr. P.C., which provision would not in any way effect the taking of cognizance by the Anti-Terrorism Court in exercising power under S.19 of the Act of 1997 for offence falling in Chapter VI of P.P.C. without having approval of Government---Section 124-A, P.P.C., provides two types of punishments i.e. one of imprisonment for life and other of imprisonment which may extend to three years---Hence the Trial Court had to form opinion after considering the material brought on record in evidence as to whether in the circumstances of the case, it would be a case punishable with imprisonment of three years or life---Therefore, bail could be granted on the ground of further enquiry, as at bail stage it could not be definitely held that the case against the accused fell within the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Tentative assessment of the material available on record showed that the present applicant was not the main accused who made alleged speech---Even the name of main accused was not mentioned in FIR---Only allegation against the applicant was that of raising slogans, however, the exact words of the alleged slogans were not mentioned in the FIR---Nothing was available on record to show if the prosecution was relying on any audio or video recording of the incident---Article 164 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, and S.27-B of the Act of 1997 provided the admissibility of such evidence secured through modern devices and electronic and forensic evidence---In the instant case, more than five months had passed, yet the Investigation Officer had not submitted final report under S.173, Cr.P.C., which by law he was required to submit after completing investigation in respect of cases triable by the Anti- Terrorism Court within thirty days as per S.19(2) of the Act of 1997--- In such circumstances, accused could not be kept in jail for indefinite period---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Salah Uddin Khan Gandapur and Safir Uddin Khan Gandapur for Applicant. Ms. Rahat Ehsan, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025. Order Tasneem Sultana, J .--- Through this bail application, applicant/ accused, namely, Mustafa Khan son of Gul Hawas Khan seeks post-arrest bail in FIR No.1135 of 2024, registered at P.S Shah Latif Town, Karachi under sections 124-A, 153-A, 500, 505, 148 and 149, P.P.C., read with section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ("Act of 1997"). 2. Precisely facts of the prosecution case are that, on 06.09.2024, complainant SIP Muhammad Rizwan along with his subordinate staff, while on patrolling, responded to an unauthorized gathering of PTM at Waziristan Road, Zafar Town, Karachi, where a person was delivering speech in Pushto and Urdu languages inciting the people to revolt against the State by saying that the uniform is behind the terrorism and that there are two laws in the country, one for Pushtoon and other for remaining Pakistanis. He was using indecent language against Generals of Army. The complainant with the assistance of his staff apprehended the applicant, who was raising slogan and also inciting the people. The alleged acts of the accused persons caused fear, panic and terror, however, a large number of armed persons fled from the crime scene. The complainant lodged the aforesaid FIR nominating 18 persons by names and 80-90 unknown accused persons. 3. Learned counsel for applicant has contended that the applicant has been booked under sections 124-A and 153-A, P.P.C., however, prosecution failed to comply with the provisions of section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ("Cr.P.C."), which requires prior permission from Government before filing a case under these sections. He has also contended that nothing incriminating has been recovered from the alleged place of incident, and no overt act has been assigned to applicant except that of his presence in the gathering; hence, the guilt against the applicant requires further inquiry entitling him to post-arrest bail. 4. Conversely, learned Additional P.G. Sindh, has vehemently opposed the instant bail application. She has maintained that the prosecution has no ill-will or personal grudge to implicate the applicant falsely and since the applicant was raising slogans against Pak Army, he attempted to create unrest, hatred and commotion in the minds of people against the Pak Army. She further maintained that the sections mentioned in the FIR have been properly applied and a letter for requisite permission under section 196, Cr.P.C has been sent, however, the same is being awaited; therefore, the applicant is not entitled to the concession of bail. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and examined the record with their assistance. 6. We would like to attend first the legal and procedural question raised by the learned counsel for the applicant in respect of non-compliance of section 196, Cr.P.C. It may be pointed out that section 124-A is in Chapter-VI of P.P.C., which relates to the offences against the State. It would be advantageous to reproduce section 196, Cr.P.C which is an exception to the general rule that anyone can set the law in motion by lodging FIR: - Sec 196: Prosecution for offences against the State. No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under chapter VI or IX-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (except section 127), or punishable under section 108-A, or section 153-A, or section 294-A, or section 295-A or section 505 of the same Code, unless upon complaint made by order of , or under authority from, the Federal Government, or the Provincial Government concerned, or some officer empowered in this behalf by either of the two Governments. 7. The object of legislating section 196, Cr.P.C is to grant power to the Federal or Provincial Government to decide whether a person should or should not be tried as the trial may embarrass the Government at home or abroad, so section 196, Cr.P.C creates a clog on the taking of cognizance of a case by a court, which cap can be removed only, if complaint provided under section 196, Cr.P.C is lodged on the authorization of the concerned Government. 8. In present case, admittedly no such complaint from Federal or Provincial Government or authorized officer has been made. However, section 7 of the Act of 1997 has also been cited in the FIR, as offence allegedly committed by the applicant. The basic procedural law for trial of criminal cases is the Cr.P. C.; subsection (2) of Section 1 thereof clearly provides that nothing contained in Cr.P.C. shall affect any special or local law now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for time being in force. As pointed out earlier, the provisions of the Act of 1997 are part of the FIR, Section 12 ibid deals with the jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court ("ATC") while section 19(3) of the Act of 1997 stipulates that ATC shall directly take cognizance of a case triable by such court without the case being sent to it under section 190, Cr.P.C. It is pertinent to note that section 32 of the Act of 1997 stipulates that the Act of 1997 has over riding effect. For the sake of convenience, section 32 (1) ibid is reproduced, as under: - 32. Overriding effect of Act?.(1) The provisions of this act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law but, save as expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the previsions of this act, applied to the proceedings before [an Anti-Terrorism Court], and for the purpose of the said provisions of the Code, [an Anti-Terrorism Code] shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions. 9. We are, therefore, of the view that ATC can proceed with such cases irrespective of the bar contained in section 196, Cr. P.C., which provision would not in any way effect the taking of cognizance by the ATC in exercising power under Section 19 of the Act of 1997 for offence falling in Chapter VI of P.P.C. without having approval of Government. 10. Section 124-A, P.P.C. provides two types of punishments i.e. one for imprisonment for life and other for imprisonment which may extend to three years. Hence the Trial Court has to form opinion after considering the material brought on record in evidence as to whether in the circumstances of the case, it would be a case punishable with imprisonment of three years or life. Reliance is placed on Zahid Malik v. The State (1990 PLJ 1310) where in similar circumstances bail has been granted on the ground of further enquiry, as at bail stage it cannot be definitely held that the case against the accused falls within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr. P.C. 11. It appears from the tentative assessment of the material available on record that the present applicant is not the main accused who made alleged speech. Even the name of main accused is not mentioned in FIR. The only allegation against the applicant is that of raising slogans, however, the exact words of the alleged slogans are not mentioned in the FIR. Nothing is available on record if the prosecution is relying on any audio or video recording of the incident. It will be relevant to mention here that Article 164 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and section 27-B of the Act of 1997 provide the admissibility of such evidence secured through modern devices and electronic and forensic evidence. 12. It may be observed that in the instant case, more than five months have passed, yet the I.O. has not submitted final report under section 173, Cr.P.C which by law he is required to submit after completing investigation in respect of cases triable by the ATC within thirty days as per section 19(2) of the Act of 1997. In such circumstances, accused cannot be kept in jail for indefinite period. 13. For the foregoing reasons, this Criminal Bail application is allowed. The applicant is admitted to post-arrest bail subject to his furnishing solvent surety in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) and P.R Bond in like amount to the satisfaction of trial Court. 14. Above are the detailed reasons of our short order dated 24-02-2025. JK/M-84/Sindh Application allowed.

Summary: (a) Gift--- ----Oral gift---Essential ingredients---Onus to prove---Exclusion of uneducated female member of the family from her share in inheritance---F emale heirs' inheritable rights must be protected---Shariah and inheritance law protections to female heirs emphasized---Donee's absence from witness box to prove the alleged gift, effect of---Incurable defect---Fatal defect under Art. 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---The instant matter brought into focus the jurisprudential and evidentiary imperatives surrounding the alleged oral transfer of immovable property by way of gift, particularly where such a claim was advanced to circumvent the vested inheritance rights of a female legal heir---Petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant were real siblings and the only legal heirs of their deceased father, who passed away on 08.10.1998---The dispute concerned agricultural land (the "Suit Property")---The petitioner/plaintiff (sister of respondent/defendant who was the beneficiary of the gift) filed a suit on 24.02.2011 seeking cancellation of mutation No. 600 dated 29.04.1998, recorded as a gift in favor of her brother (respondent/defendant) and alleged that the gift mutation was obtained fraudulently and without knowledge, consent, or valid intention of their deceased father---It was contended by the petitioner that after their father's death, the petitioner trusted her brother's assurance that her share had been included in an inheritance mutation; that she accepted small payments under the impression they were her share of the property income; that upon facing financial hardship and requesting to sell her share, the brother refused and she discovered the alleged mutation of gift; that she had no knowledge of such a gift, asserting it was forged and not in accordance with law---It was the case of the respondent that his claim was firmly anchored in lawful entitlement under a gift dated 18.04.1998 from his father which was made during his life---He alleged that all requirements of a valid gift (offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession) were fulfilled---Held: Present case was a typical case where a woman was deprived of her rightful inheritance under the pretense of an alleged oral gift made by the deceased father to her brother---Such claims were often used by male heirs to exclude female relatives, prompting courts to remain vigilant against fraudulent practices involving oral gifts, which were frequently employed to deny women their legal entitlements---The essential legal requirements for validating such transactions, by now, have been firmly established in our jurisprudence and require no further elaboration---While juxtaposing the facts of the case in hand, High Court was of the opinion that both the courts below had acted illegally and with material irregularity while exercising jurisdiction---The respondent as the principal beneficiary and direct participant in the purported gift was the most vital witness to establish its essential elements, yet he conspicuously chose not to appear before the court, offering no reasonable justification for his absence, and instead relied on the testimony of his son, "TS" (DW-7), who appeared merely as his attorney---In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the unequivocal position in terms of Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, it did not behoove to reason as to how such fatal and inherent defect escaped the attention of both the Courts below---Respondent/defendant's son was in no position to testify on behalf of his father regarding offer and acceptance of gift---The written statement filed by the defendant/respondent did not find mention the presence of DW-7 on the alleged occasion of oral gift, thus, the mandatory ingredients of offer of gift by the donor and acceptance thereof by donee, had gone abegging in this case---Therefore, non-appearance of defendant/respondent was an incurable defect in his quest to prove the gift---Concurrent findings of the courts below fell within the exception of interference for exercising revisional jurisdiction of the court and the same were therefore set aside---The civil revision was allowed and the suit filed by the petitioner (plaintiff) was decreed as prayed for. (b) Gift--- ----Oral gift---Burden of proof, shifting of---Scope---Burden of proof shifts upon denial of gift---When validity and correctness of a gift transaction is challenged it becomes mandatory and essential for the beneficiary to prove the valid execution of same---Female member of the family deprived by male member of her share in inheritance---In order to prove her case, the petitioner/plaintiff who was deprived by his brother from inheritance of their deceased father, appeared as PW3 and supported the contents of the plaint---She deposed that her deceased father never gifted the suit property to the respondent/defendant (brother of petitioner/plaintiff) and the same was outcome of fraud---She specifically stated that she was never aware of any such transaction---This very statement of the petitioner/plaintiff had clearly shifted the onus of proving onto the respondent/defendant (brother of petitioner/plaintiff) being beneficiary of oral gift which he failed to discharge by shying away from appearance as a witness---The respondent/defendant instead of appearing before the court merely relied on testimony of his son who merely appeared as his father's attorney---It was an unfortunate fact that male members of families deprive their female relatives of their legal entitlement to inheritance and in doing so Sharia and law was violated---Concurrent findings of the courts below fell within the exception of interference for exercising revisional jurisdiction of the court and the same were therefore set aside---The suit filed by the petitioner/plaintiff (female legal heir deprived from inheritance) was decreed as prayed for---Civil revision was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Ejaz and 2 others v. Mst. Khalida Awan and another 2010 SCMR 342 rel. (c) Gift--- ----Inheritance---Oral gift---Deceptive mechanism to usurp inheritance share of female legal heirs---Proof---Threshold test---Legal standards for validating oral gifts---Scope---In our society there has been an unstoppable bent to invent grotesque devices conceived to deprive daughters, sisters, mothers, widows, orphans etc of their share of inheritance; the 'Oral Gift' being the most fancied of all, employed by unscrupulous male members of the family---It is for this reason that there is overwhelming settled jurisprudence in this country to arrest all such emblems of frauds, forgery, impersonations and uncalled for persuasions, nevertheless, the menace continues---The threshold tests of such transactions are now etched in our jurisprudence as tablet of stone, hardly requiring any further quest, however, if one needs reiteration, following principles be strictly adhered to, particularly in the context of the case in hand: (i) Beneficiary of the impugned transaction of gift/transfer of immovable property(s) bears the heavy onus to prove the transaction; (ii) The beneficiary of a gift has to plead and prove three mandatory ingredients of gift i.e. declaration/offer by the donor, acceptance of gift by the donee; and, delivery of possession under the gift; (iii) The possession of immovable property by one of the siblings/LRs to the exclusion of others will be treated as constructive possession on behalf of all others, unless proved otherwise ; (iv) In case of oral transactions, it is mandatory for a beneficiary of oral transaction to prove the same through positive evidence by supplying mandatory material particulars in the pleadings i.e. the time and date, the venue, and the persons/witnesses in whose presence the alleged transaction was brought about; (v) The oral transaction of transfer of immovable property, be it sale, gift/tamleek, surrender or will etc. has to be proved separately from its incorporation/attestation in revenue record by way of sanctioning of the mutation since a mutation cannot by itself be considered a document of title; (vi) Where a gift, which excluded a legal heir, irrespective of whether such transaction is evidenced by registered deed, the donee is required to prove original transaction and must justify the disinheritance of a legal heir from the estate; (vii) Parties are bound by their pleadings; no amount of evidence can be led beyond the scope of pleadings; and in case any such evidence is brought on record, the Court cannot consider and rely upon the same and has to discard it; (viii) Mere efflux of time does not extinguish the right of inheritance, thus, the question of limitation in case of inheritance and fraud is not attracted and becomes insignificant. Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276; Mst. Parveen (deceased) through L.Rs. v. Muhammad Pervaiz and others 2022 SCMR 64; Mst. Hayat Bibi and others v. Alamzeb and others 2022 SCMR 13; Islam ud Din (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Noor Jahan (deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2016 SCMR 986; Phull Peer Shah v. Hafeez Fatima 2016 SCMR 1225; Peer Baksh through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Khanzadi and others 2016 SCMR 1417; Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar and 2 others 2015 SCMR 1; Ibrahim Kamal v. Mst. Malooka Bibi and others 2012 SCMR 1; Khaliqdad Khan and others v. Mst. Zeenat Khatoon and others 2010 SCMR 1370; Bilal Hussain Shah and another v. Dilawar Shah PLD 2018 SC 698; Khalid Hussain and others v. Nazir Ahmad and others 2021 SCMR 1986; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary Civil Secretariat, Peshawar and others v. Shah Faisal Wahab and others 2023 SCMR 1642; Mst. Tahira Samina and others v. Javed Saeed Tariq and others 2024 SCMR 24; Mst. Saadia v. Mst. Gul Bibi 2016 SCMR 662; Khalida Idrees and others v. Anas Farooq Chaudhary and others PLD 2018 Lah. 819; Mst. Rasheeda Bibi v. Mukhtar Ahmad and others 2008 SCMR 1384; Islam-ud-Din through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Noor Jahan through L.Rs. and others 2016 SCMR 986; Mst. Shafqat Parveen v. Muhammad Iftikhar Amjad and others 2012 SCMR 1602; Rehmat Noor v. Zulqarnain 2023 SCMR 1645; Syed Ahmad v. Ali Akbar and others 2021 SCMR 743; Agha Syed Mushtaque Ali Shah v. Mst. Bibi Gul Jan and others 2016 SCMR 910; Fareed and others v. Muhammad Tufail and another 2018 SCMR 139; Muhammad Shafiq Ullah and others v. Allah Bakhsh (deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2021 SCMR 763; Saddaruddin (since deceased) through L.Rs. v. Sultan Khan (since deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2021 SCMR 642; Muhammad Riaz and others v. Mst. Badshah Begum and others 2021 SCMR 605; Atta Muhammad and others v. Mst. Munir Sultan (deceased) through her L.Rs. and others 2021 SCMR 73; Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338; Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd. Karachi v. Ravi Steel Company, Lahore PLD 2020 SC 324; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Sakina Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 1021; Moiz Abbas v. Mrs Latifa and others 2019 SCMR 74; Naveed Akram and others v. Muhammad Anwar 2018 SCMR 1095; Allah Ditta and others v. Manak alias Muhammad Siddique and others 2017 SCMR 402; Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs. v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through L.Rs. and others 2013 SCMR 1360; Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs. v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through L.Rs. and others 2013 SCMR 1300; Mst. Brikhna v. Faiz Ullah Khan and others 2020 SCMR 1681; Fazal Ellahi (deceased) through its Legal Heirs v. Mst. Zainab Bibi 2019 SCMR 1930; Ghulam Sarwar (deceased) through L.Rs. and others's case 2019 SCMR 567; Phul Peer Shah v. Hafeez Fatima 2016 SCMR 1225; Muhammad Ishaq v. Muhammad Shafiq and 9 others 2007 SCMR 1773; Haji Muhammad Anwar v. Muhammad Ahmed and others 2007 SCMR 1961; Rehmatullah and others v. Saleh Khan and others 2007 SCMR 729; Aurangzeb through L.Rs. and others v. Muhammad Jaffar and another 2007 SCMR 236; Mst. Janntan and others v. Mst. Taggi through L.Rs. and others PLD 2006 SC 332; Muhammad Akram and another v. Altaf Ahmad PLD 2003 SC 688; Muhammad Lehrasab Khan v. Mst. Aqeel un Nisa and 5 others 2001 SCMR 338; Muhammad Ishaq and another v. Mst. Gazala Riaz and 8 others 1997 SCMR 974; Mst. Noor Fatima and another v. Begum Bibi and another 1990 SCMR 629; Fareed and others v. Muhammad Tufail and another 2018 SCMR 139; Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914; Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhai and others PLD 2016 SC 730; Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam 2015 SCMR 21; Messrs Essa Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited and another 2014 SCMR 922; Mohammad Boota (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fatima daughter of Gohar Ali and others 2023 SCMR 1901; Noor Din (deceased) through L.Rs. v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others 2023 SCMR 1928; Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLD 2022 SC 353; Syed Kausar Ali Shah and others v. Syed Farhat Hussain Shah and others 2022 SCMR 1558; Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85; Muhammad Sharif and others v. MCB Bank Limited and others 2021 SCMR 1158; Haji Wajdad v. Provincial Government through Secretary Board of Revenue, Government of Balochistan, Quetta and others 2020 SCMR 2046; Shabla and others v. Ms. Jahan Afroz Kilat and others 2020 SCMR 352; Ghulam Farid and another v. Sher Rehman through L.Rs. 2016 SCMR 862; Syed Mehmood Ali Shah v. Zulfiqar Ali and 5 others PLD 2013 SC 364; Messrs Paramount Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise Appellate Tribunal and another 2012 SCMR 1860; Muhammad Iqbal and 5 others v. Allah Bachaya and 18 others 2005 SCMR 1447; Muhammad Zubair and others v. Muhammad Sharif 2005 SCMR 1217; Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212; Khan Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others 2017 SCMR 1476; Muhammad Mahmood Shah v. Syed Khalid Hussain Shah and others 2015 SCMR 869; Rehmatullah and others v. Saleh Khan and others 2007 SCMR 729; Arshad Khan v. Mst. Resham Jan and others 2005 SCMR 1859; Khair Din v. Mst. Salaman and others PLD 2002 SC 677; Mst. Gohar Khanum and others v. Mst. Jamila Jan and others 2014 SCMR 801 and Ghulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 rel. Mst. Nagina Begum v. Mst. Tahzim Akhtar and others 2009 SCMR 623 ref. (d) Gift--- ----Oral gift, proof of---Constructive possession, principle of---Scope---Continuous possession by male heir deemed constructive on behalf of sister (female heir)---No presumption of gift merely due to possession of sole male heir---Burden of proof not discharged by mere possession---In a bsence of proof of a valid gift the continuous possession of the respondent/defendant (brother of petitioner/plaintiff) being the only male surviving member of the family was constructive possession on behalf of her sister (petitioner/plaintiff), an uneducated village lady---Possession of the suit property by the only brother of the petitioner/plaintiff lady could not solely confirm the transaction of the impugned gift---Merely because the respondent/defendant (brother) was in possession of the land did not mean, let alone established, that the land was gifted to him, however, it itself confirmed that he took advantage of his gender and position and made the best out of the vulnerability of a dependent female---Civil revision was allowed and suit filed by petitioner/plaintiff (female heir) was decreed. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R.7---Oral gift---Proof---Failure to plead essential ingredients of oral gift---Oral gift claims must disclose time, place, and witnesses in the pleadings---Written statement lacking particulars of oral gift--- No mention of date, time, venue or witnesses of the alleged transaction---Inherent pleading defects cannot be cured by subsequent evidence---Evidence beyond pleadings is impermissible---Defendant's (beneficiary's) failure to plead core elements of gift rendered the entire gift transaction unsustainable in law---A perusal of the written statement filed by the defendant/respondent led to only one inescapable conclusion that the defendant had failed to plead the necessary ingredients of oral transaction of gift---Neither the specific venue of the oral transaction of gift was mentioned nor its date, time and witnesses had been spelt out---So far as the date of impugned oral transaction was concerned, it further destroyed the case of the defendant/respondent; para 3 of the preliminary objections of the written statement pleaded that on the day of transaction of oral gift i.e. 18.04.1998 rappat roznamcha waqiati No. 371 was recorded by the Patwari of revenue estate which made it abundantly clear that no amount of evidence could cure this inherent defect of pleadings, which conspicuously failed to put forth the name of the witnesses of the oral transaction, and the exact date, time and venue thereof---Statements of defendant's son were beyond the scope of pleadings and in terms of O. VI, R. 7 of C.P.C., no amount of evidence could be led or considered which was beyond pleadings---The suit filed by the petitioner/plaintiff (female legal heir deprived from inheritance) was decreed as prayed for---Civil revision was allowed, in circumstances. (f) Islamic law--- ----Inheritance---Oral gift---Relinquishment of inheritance share by vulnerable female heirs in favour of male heirs---Such relinquishment of inheritance share by female heirs is contrary to public policy and Shariah---Strict burden to prove voluntary relinquishment by female legatee---Advantageous familial positions cannot be used to extract implied consent from vulnerable females to relinquish their inheritance share---Inheritance rights of female heirs must be jealously guarded---In the present case the plaintiff's/petitioner's entitlement in her father's estate was a common ground; being a female in a muslim household, it was her due, conferred by Divine Law, recognized by the law of the land; it was so ordained in Sura Al-Nisa (4/10)---Given the preponderance of conferment, such a right, rooted into personal law, has to be jealously guarded, therefore, a heavy onus is cast upon the claimant to demonstrate that a female legatee had parted with her entitlement by choice and for considerations, consciously, without duress or uncalled for persuasions by those placed qua her in advantageous positions---Male heirs frequently resorted to fraud and other tactics to deprive female heirs from their share of inheritance---Such deprivation caused suffering to those deprived, and it also unnecessarily taxed the judicial system of the country, resulting in needless waste of resources---Each and every day that a male heir deprived a female heir was also an abomination because it contravened what has been ordained by Almighty Allah---Civil revision was allowed and suit filed by petitioner/plaintiff (female heir) was decreed. Mst. Aksar Jan and others v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2025 SCMR 88; Ghulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1; Shabla and others v. Ms. Jahan Afroz Khilat and others 2020 SCMR 352; Tahsimullah v. Mst. Parveen (deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2022 SCMR 346; Mst. Parveen (deceased) through L.Rs. v. Muhammad pervaiz and others 2022 SCMR 64 and Ghulam Qasim and others v. Mst. Razia Begum and others PLD 2021 SC 812 rel. (g) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S.42---Oral gift---Mutation---Proof and scope---Mutation alone does not confer legal title to immovable property---No evidence existed of the alleged oral gift transaction---Having concluded that there was absolutely no evidence regarding transaction of impugned gift and that a mutation could not by itself be considered a document of title, it was evident that even the impugned mutation had not been proved in terms of S. 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, which required that such mutation had to be presented and sanctioned in the common assembly (Jalsa-e-Aam) of the estate concerned---Civil revision was allowed and suit filed by petitioner/plaintiff (female heir) was decreed. Mian Tariq Hussain for Petitioner. Respondent proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 02.02.2023. Khawaja Mohsin Abbas, Additional Advocate General for Respondent (on Court's call). Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 199, 212(2) & 13---Writ jurisdiction despite Art. 212(2) bar---Order directing de-novo inquiry not a “final order” relating to terms and conditions; High Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 199 not ousted---Initiating a second/de-novo inquiry on identical charges after a lawful exoneration violates Art. 13 (double jeopardy) and the rule that no one be vexed twice for the same cause. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Tariq Saeed v. Government of the Punjab, 2022 LHC (relied upon for maintainability where only an inquiry is ordered) • Sayyed Saeed Hussain Shah v. Province of Punjab 1981 PLC 297 • Muhammad Yar Buttar v. Board of Governors, OPF 1999 SCMR 819 (b) Balochistan Employees’ Efficiency and Discipline Act, 2011 ----Ss. 13(6) & 17(7)---Scope of de-novo inquiry and revisional powers---Where, pursuant to Supreme Court’s directions, a regular inquiry has been conducted, recommendations accepted by the competent authority, and the civil servant reinstated, a subsequent statement of allegations on the same charges under S. 13(6) is void ab initio; departmental reliance on S. 17(7) cannot override finality of prior exoneration. (c) Fundamental Rules ----FR-54 (Section-I, Chapter-VIII), cl. (a)---Back benefits on reinstatement---Entitlement to arrears, seniority, and related service benefits must be examined under FR-54 by the competent authority/committee; inquiry limited to quantum and conditions of back benefits (including mitigation for outside earnings), not to re-opening concluded misconduct charges. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Bashir v. Government of Punjab 1994 SCMR 1801 (guidelines for FR-54 determination and committee process) (d) Service law—effect of earlier Supreme Court order and departmental exoneration ----De-novo inquiry after exoneration---Pursuant to Supreme Court’s order dated 12-02-2018 in CP No. 169-Q/2012, a regular inquiry was held and the petitioner was exonerated; recommendations accepted and petitioner reinstated vide notifications dated 17-07-2019 and 01-08-2019---Issuance of fresh statement of allegations on identical facts is unlawful and contrary to final departmental adjudication. Cited Cases: • Director-General (Field), Agriculture Dept., Lahore v. Haji Abdul Rehman, PLD/SC (principle against being vexed twice affirmed) Disposition --- Constitution petition partly allowed. Statement of allegations/de-novo inquiry dated 31-08-2022 under S. 13(6) of BEEDA, 2011 set aside. Competent authority directed to process petitioner’s claim for back benefits strictly under FR-54 and in light of Muhammad Bashir (1994 SCMR 1801). Order accordingly.

Summary: (a) Evidence—Secondary evidence—When admissible; duty to first secure primary evidence ––Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 72, 76 & 77; Cr.P.C., Ch. VI. Secondary evidence is an exception and may be received only when the preconditions in Art. 76 are strictly met. The trial court, relying merely on a process-server’s report that the autopsy/medical officers (P.Ws. 20 & 21) were “not found” at the given address, allowed an application to lead secondary evidence without (i) exhausting coercive process under Ch. VI, Cr.P.C. to procure their attendance, and (ii) recording reasons to show which limb(s) of Art. 76 were attracted. Held, the order permitting secondary evidence was illegal; the contents of medico-legal and post-mortem documents ought first to be proved through primary evidence, and only upon due satisfaction under Arts. 76/77 could secondary evidence be considered. (b) Criminal trial—Medico-legal/post-mortem evidence—Non-examination of authoring doctors—Effect Where the autopsy doctor (P.W.-20) and examining CMO (P.W.-21) were pivotal to the prosecution, their non-production—without lawful effort to secure them—could not be cured by summoning a hospital clerk to tender papers as secondary evidence. Such cursory resort to secondary evidence vitiated the conviction. (c) Practice & procedure—Reasoned orders—Mandatory An order allowing secondary evidence must disclose the specific statutory ground(s) under Art. 76, and why primary evidence cannot be produced “in reasonable time”. Absence of such reasons renders the approach perverse and the resultant judgment unsustainable. (d) Murder reference—Consequence of procedural illegality ––APC, Ss. 302(ii), 458, 342; Arms Act, S. 15(2); Cr.P.C., Ss. 544-A, 382-B. Given the foundational evidentiary illegality, the conviction and sentences (including death as tazir under S.302(ii) APC) were set aside. The murder reference for confirmation of death sentence, consequently, could not be affirmed. Disposition: Appeal allowed; judgment dated 28-11-2019 set aside. Case remanded to the District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Haveli/Kahuta, to decide afresh in light of these observations, within four months of this judgment. Parties to appear before the trial court on 13-01-2025.

Summary: (a) Islamic Law— ----Gift—Validity—Possession—Donee being a minor—Donor as natural guardian—Effect— Where a gift is made by a father to his minor daughter, actual physical delivery of possession is not essential under Islamic law—In the instant case, land measuring 909 acres (9,997 PIUs) was gifted by father to daughter, then a minor aged 11—Declaration made by donor before Land Reforms Authorities affirming the gift constituted valid admission—Held, possession by the minor donee living with the donor-father is deemed constructive delivery—Non-entry in revenue record or mutation of inheritance showing devolution to all heirs does not negate valid gift—High Court rightly relied on precedents affirming that strict proof of possession is unnecessary in cases of gift to minor by guardian-donor. ----Cited Cases: • Kaneez Bibi v. Sher Muhammad PLD 1991 SC 466 • Riaz Ullah Khan v. Asghar Ali 2004 SCMR 1701 (b) Land Reforms— ----Martial Law Regulation No.64, para. 9(a)—Declaration of landholding—Gift prior to declaration—Judicial recognition—Effect— Donor's declaration under MLR No.64 (1959) before Land Reforms Authorities that 909 acres were gifted to daughter was never revoked or challenged—Land Reforms record showed retention of 36,000 PIUs and gift of remaining 9,997 PIUs—Held, such declaration served dual legal function: (i) prevented resumption of land by government; and (ii) constituted conclusive admission of gift—No dispute raised by authorities or legal heirs against said declaration—Gift recognized as valid and binding—Declaration held decisive in establishing ownership rights of donee. (c) Civil Procedure— ----Concurrent findings—High Court restoration of trial court decree—Scope of appellate review— Trial court had decreed suit declaring donee as owner based on donor's declaration and Land Reforms record—Appellate court reversed decree on ground of non-proof of possession—High Court allowed revision and restored trial court’s findings—Held, High Court correctly appreciated evidence and applied settled law on gifts to minors—Appellate court erred in requiring physical possession despite legal recognition of constructive possession—Supreme Court upheld High Court’s judgment, finding no legal infirmity. ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed; High Court’s restoration of trial court decree upheld.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 115---Concurrent findings of fact---Interference in revisional jurisdiction---Scope---Petitioner (widow and uneducated village woman) sought cancellation of oral gift mutation in favour of her brother, allegedly executed by their deceased father shortly before his death---Courts below dismissed her suit based on continuous possession and mutation in revenue record---Held, that both courts below committed material illegalities and misreadings by ignoring settled legal principles regarding oral gifts---Heavy burden lay on the beneficiary (brother) to prove offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession; however, he failed to appear as a witness and relied solely on his son (DW-7), whose testimony was neither competent nor sufficient under Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, Art. 129(g)---Pleadings failed to disclose essential particulars of time, venue, and witnesses of oral transaction; contradictory testimonies of defense witnesses further eroded credibility---Mutation document lacked signature or thumb impression of donee; no substantive evidence proved valid oral gift---Possession of male heir presumed constructive on behalf of all co-heirs---Findings of lower courts were perverse, and revisional interference was warranted---Suit decreed in favour of petitioner, and concurrent judgments set aside. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi (2020 SCMR 276) • Mst. Parveen v. Muhammad Pervaiz (2022 SCMR 64) • Bilal Hussain Shah v. Dilawar Shah (PLD 2018 SC 698) • Muhammad Ejaz v. Mst. Khalida Awan (2010 SCMR 342) • Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1) (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 129(g)---Oral gift---Failure of donee to appear as witness---Adverse presumption---Donee, claiming oral gift of entire estate from deceased father, failed to testify despite being the only competent witness of alleged transaction---Held, court was bound to draw adverse presumption under Art.129(g) of QSO, 1984---Evidence led through attorney-son (DW-7), who was not shown to be present at the time of alleged gift, held inadmissible---Failure to discharge burden fatal to claim of oral gift. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs. v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan (2013 SCMR 1360) • Muhammad Riaz v. Mst. Badshah Begum (2021 SCMR 605) • Muhammad Shafiq Ullah v. Allah Bakhsh (2021 SCMR 763) (c) Muhammadan Law / Islamic Inheritance Principles ----Right of inheritance---Female heirs---Oral gift to disinherit female heir---Burden of proof---Judicial reluctance to uphold disinheritance of women based on vague oral transactions---Courts must jealously guard inheritance rights of female heirs---Mere lapse of time does not extinguish inheritance rights---Held, in absence of compelling, cogent and lawful proof, oral gift depriving petitioner of her Quranic share could not be sustained---Male heirs must justify disinheritance of female heirs beyond doubt---Shariah and statutory rights must be protected. Cited Cases: • Mst. Aksar Jan v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar (2025 SCMR 88) • Mst. Gohar Khanum v. Mst. Jamila Jan (2014 SCMR 801) • Shabla v. Jahan Afroz Khilat (2020 SCMR 352) • Ghulam Qasim v. Mst. Razia Begum (PLD 2021 SC 812) (d) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967) ----S. 42---Mutation---Sanctioning of mutation in gift---Requirement of common assembly---Effect of failure---Impugned gift mutation was claimed to have been sanctioned in common assembly at village headman's residence, whereas village headman testified it occurred at Tehsil office---Held, inconsistency in place of sanctioning undermined legal validity of mutation; further, mutation alone could not prove ownership or transaction of gift in absence of separate proof of transaction. Cited Cases: • Mst. Brikhna v. Faiz Ullah Khan (2020 SCMR 1681) • Muhammad Nawaz v. Sakina Bibi (2020 SCMR 1021) • Muhammad Lehrasab Khan v. Mst. Aqeel un Nisa (2001 SCMR 338) **(e) Civil law---Pleadings and evidence---Evidence beyond pleadings---Scope---Held, under O. VI, R. 7, CPC, no party may lead or rely on evidence beyond their pleadings---Defendant's witnesses offered contradictory narratives about the circumstances of the gift---Essential details such as time, date, venue, and presence of witnesses omitted from pleadings---Such discrepancies could not be cured by extraneous oral statements---Court was bound to disregard such evidence. Cited Cases: • Moiz Abbas v. Mrs. Latifa (2019 SCMR 74) • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue (2014 SCMR 914) Disposition: Civil Revision allowed---Concurrent judgments and decrees of courts below set aside---Suit decreed as prayed with costs throughout.

Summary: Order 27 Rule 8-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 states that in certain cases no security deposit is required from the Government or a public officer when they are sued for actions taken in their official capacity. Essentially this rule exempts the Government from providing security in specific legal proceedings against it. This means that when the Government or a public officer is sued for official acts they are not required to furnish a security deposit as per the usual provisions of Order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code 1908. However this exemption applies only when the lawsuit pertains to actions performed in an official capacity. On the other hand Order 21 Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 states that if a judgment debtor wishes to object to the execution of a decree they must first deposit the decretal amount in court or provide security for its payment. This means that a judgment debtor cannot simply file an objection without first offering financial assurance to the court. This rule is considered mandatory meaning the court cannot entertain an objection unless the security requirement is met.

Summary: Even recognizing that this dower is categorized as an unpaid debt recoverable from the legacy of the deceased the legitimacy of suit brought against one set of legal heirs while excluding other being necessary and proper party remains in question. In the absence of all legal heirs of deceased being necessary party as previously stated the suit in its current form is bad therefore the ex-parte decree issued against the petitioners is even otherwise not legally sustainable.