Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) ----S. 179(3) & proviso; S. 2(s)—Limitation for passing order-in-original—Extension of time—Collector’s jurisdiction—Scope. Show cause notice was issued on 27-04-2020 alleging smuggling under S. 2(s) of the Act; order-in-original was passed on 10-08-2020. Tribunal (Referee Member concurring with Member Judicial) and High Court found the order time-barred. Supreme Court held that under the proviso to S. 179(3), where proceedings invoke S. 2(s), the order-in-original must be passed within 30 days of the show-cause notice and no extension is permissible. Collector’s self-granted extension without recorded reasons had no legal effect. Both Collector (Adjudication) and Tribunal wrongly presumed a 90-day period applicable to S. 2(s) matters. The 30-day limitation is absolute, leaving no discretion for extension. (b) Statutory construction—Mandatory time-limits in fiscal statutes. Court reiterated that limitation provisions in taxing laws are mandatory; administrative convenience cannot justify deviation. Once the statutory period lapses, adjudication stands void ab initio. The Collector’s purported extension was ultra vires, and the order-in-original passed beyond limitation was invalid. (c) Jurisdiction—Failure to act within prescribed time. Passing an order beyond the statutory time limit deprives the adjudicating authority of jurisdiction; the defect goes to the root and cannot be cured by consent or subsequent validation. Disposition: Petition dismissed—Leave to appeal refused—Judgment of Islamabad High Court upholding Tribunal’s view maintained.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) — S. 66 — Refund — Limitation — Application of s. 66 in VAT regime — Determination of “relevant tax period” during period of exemption under s. 13. Question arose whether limitation under s. 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 applied to a refund claim relating to input tax paid on goods acquired and utilized during a period when the supply of cement was exempt under s. 13 of the Act. The Court held that the “relevant tax period” under s. 66 refers only to a period in which taxable supplies exist and the output–input adjustment mechanism under s. 7 operates. During an exemption period, the mechanism is substantively suspended because exempt supplies are not “taxable supplies.” Consequently, no “tax period” exists in law during the exemption. Limitation under s. 66 therefore cannot begin to run from any date within such exempt period. The one-year limitation commences only after exemption ceases and taxable supplies resume. Held: Refund claim filed within one year of the end of the exemption period was not time-barred. The taxpayer’s claim was lawfully admissible in full. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Beverage Ltd. v. Large Taxpayer Unit 2010 PTD 2673 (affirmed in 2021 SCMR 1308) • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Arco Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. 2021 SCMR 1308 • Waseem Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 PTD 1733 (CA 600/2016 etc., decided 21.06.2025 = 2025 SCP 235) • Fleming (t/a Bodycraft) v. HM Revenue and Customs [2008] UKHL 2 • Metcash Trading Ltd. v. Commissioner of South African Revenue Service 2002 (4) SA 317 (Constitutional Court, South Africa) • Benyon & Partners v. HM Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2004] UKHL 53 (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990 — Ss. 7 & 8 — Input tax adjustment — Nature and legal character — Adjustment not a concession but integral to VAT mechanism. Court reaffirmed that Pakistan’s sales tax operates in value-added tax (VAT) mode, following the destination principle. The output–input adjustment under s. 7 is not a concession but a defining feature of the VAT structure. Denying input adjustment without express statutory exclusion would dismantle the entire VAT scheme. Any limitation provision must therefore be interpreted harmoniously with the structural logic of VAT. (c) Sales Tax Act, 1990 — S. 13 — Exemption of supplies — Effect on input tax and tax period. During exemption under s. 13, goods cease to be “taxable goods,” and supplies of such goods are not taxable supplies. Hence, the VAT mechanism, being inoperative, creates no meaningful “tax period” for input–output adjustment. Upon expiry of the exemption, the mechanism revives prospectively. Taxpayer’s claim for input tax carried forward to the first operative tax period after the exemption remains valid and enforceable. (d) Value Added Tax (VAT) — Nature, structure, and principles — Distinction between zero-rated and exempt supplies — Comparative jurisprudence. Court reaffirmed prior jurisprudence (Pakistan Beverage Ltd., Waseem Ahmed) elucidating the structural principles of VAT: (i) Sales tax under the 1990 Act is levied in VAT mode, operating on output–input adjustment. (ii) Pakistan applies the destination principle — imports taxed, exports zero-rated. (iii) “Zero-rated” supplies remain within the tax chain, while “exempt” supplies are removed from it. (iv) For exempt supplies, supplier becomes final consumer, bearing the entire input tax burden. International authorities such as Fleming (UKHL 2008) and Metcash (South Africa 2002) were cited to reinforce Pakistan’s alignment with global VAT structure. (e) Interpretation of fiscal statutes — Harmonious construction — Statutory purpose in VAT context. Section 66 must be interpreted in light of the functional logic of VAT. Limitation provisions cannot be construed to nullify substantive entitlement to input adjustment where statutory operation of “tax period” itself is suspended. Courts must interpret fiscal statutes purposively, maintaining internal consistency between substantive charging and procedural refund provisions. (f) Refund — Limitation — Commencement of limitation period. Time under s. 66 begins to run only when a valid “tax period” arises after cessation of exemption. Refund claim made in August–September 2001 for exemption ending 05.09.2000 was within limitation and lawfully payable. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. High Court judgment affirmed

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) ----S. 36(1), (2) & (3)–––Time limitation for passing order after issuance of show cause notice–––Scope and effect–––Mandatory nature of prescribed period–––Where statute provides that order-in-original shall be made within 120 days of issuance of show cause notice, extendable only by 60 days for recorded reasons, any order made thereafter would be time-barred–––No extension beyond 180 days permissible under law–––In present case, show cause notices were issued on 30.06.2000 and 12.12.2001, whereas orders-in-original were passed on 02.02.2001 and 20.04.2002 respectively–––Both orders made beyond statutory period–––Held, orders-in-original were barred by limitation and had no legal effect–––Provisions of S.36(3) being mandatory, non-compliance rendered proceedings void ab initio–––Larger Bench judgment in Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore (2025 SCMR 1280) applied. (b) Central Excises Act, 1944 ----S. 33(3)–––Adjudication proceedings–––Time limit of 45 days for deciding matter after issuance of show cause notice–––Order passed beyond prescribed period–––Validity–––Held, order-in-original passed after expiry of statutory period was time-barred and without jurisdiction–––Observance of limitation is mandatory to ensure certainty and fairness in fiscal adjudication. (c) Fiscal statutes–––Mandatory nature of limitation provisions ----Interpretation–––Timeframes in taxing statutes must be strictly construed–––Non-compliance with statutory timelines deprives the authority of jurisdiction to act–––Corrigenda issued after expiry of limitation could not revive jurisdiction or cure the lapse–––Held, consequence of failure to pass order within prescribed period is nullity of entire proceedings–––Subsequent proceedings and demands, being consequential, also stood annulled. Cited Case: • Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore (2025 SCMR 1280). Disposition: Appeals allowed–––Impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court set aside–––Orders-in-original declared time-barred and without lawful authority.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ---- S. 47 --- Reference Jurisdiction --- Question of Law --- Limitation --- Maintainability --- Primary question that came for consideration before High Court in referred Sale Tax Reference (STR No.14 of 2008) was whether adjudication vide Order-in-Original involved was hopelessly time barred and this prime fact which is also paramount question of law has been taken care of/adjudicated upon by foras below --- Follow up question which was decided was whether such question, if not raised in lower fora, could be raised and argued before High Court in reference jurisdiction --- Impugned judgment concluded above question in terms of its paragraph 15, whereby it was held that no doubt Court (reference jurisdiction) exercises special jurisdiction under section 47 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") however that jurisdiction merely extends to decide question of law, which arises out of order and not otherwise --- Court, in its order restricted itself not to go into any question of law raised for first time before it --- In paragraph 16 of impugned judgment, it concluded that "reference applications do not give rise to question of law to arise from orders of appellate tribunal and thus references were dismissed" --- Court held that reason that prevailed with High Court was of special jurisdiction being exercised under section 47 of Act which, according to judgment could only be extended to question of law that arises out of order --- Court held that perhaps view in impugned order was that it is restricted to question "raised" before lower fora and "decided" and that new question of law (even if arises out of order) cannot be framed and that in terms of paragraph 16 (referred above) reference application devoid of such order --- Court held that in its understanding this concept/principle was completely alien, as order gives rise to question and not reference application --- Court held that as to scope of reference jurisdiction under relevant statute, matter came up for consideration with reference to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 --- Court held that there was no cavil to proposition that scope of reference is now extended to extent of appeal, which is continuation of main lis and in consequence thereof such principles, considering statutory frame of reference jurisdiction are also attracted --- Court held that in terms paragraphs 49 and 50 of Messrs Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2017 SCMR 1006), this Court has held that independent interpretation of section 133 of Ordinance, 2001, as it stands today, on plain language of law, liberated from burden or benefit of earlier judgments, would make position very clear --- Court held that subsection (1) confers right on any person or Commissioner aggrieved by final order of Appellate Tribunal to file application before High Court along with statement of case stating any questions of law arising out of Tribunal's order --- Court held that there is direct right to approach High Court in similar manner as in appeals, revisions, reviews etc --- Court held that order being challenged is final order but challenge is limited to questions of law only --- Court held that statement must set out facts, Tribunal's determination and questions of law which arise out of its order in terms of subsection (3) --- Court held that questions of law which may be referred are only those which "arise" out of order of Tribunal --- Court held that on plain language of law, this would include any question which can be made out from order of Tribunal --- Court held that there is nothing in scheme of section to impute any extraordinary limitations on type of questions which may be posed --- Court held that facts as stated in Tribunal's order have to be taken as recorded and any question which can be made out from those facts may be raised in application under section 133 ibid, regardless of whether it was previously urged or not --- Court held that there is absolutely no reason for confining questions which may be referred to only those which were argued before Tribunal on hypothesis that this is advisory jurisdiction as that is not what language of law contemplates --- Court held that law, as it stands, allows all questions "arising" out of order to be referred and not just questions "argued" or "raised" before Tribunal --- Court held that section 133 ibid clearly states that upon hearing case, High Court is obligated to decide question of law raised by reference and pass judgment thereon and Tribunal's order automatically stands modified by order of High Court --- Court held that this is extremely significant aspect as it is essence of appellate order that it per se modifies order of lower forum, or, in other words, merges into it --- Court held that this particular aspect of section 133 ibid was introduced for first time by way of 2005 amendment and was not present in section 66 of Act, 1922 during brief period between 1971 and 1974 when law was similar to present one --- Court held that it is therefore clear beyond any doubt that remedy under section 133 ibid is appellate in nature and must be construed and applied as such --- Court held that language of law must be given effect to, rather than unnecessarily restricting scope of jurisdiction on basis of judgments from era when law and circumstances were completely different --- Court held that civilized world, including our own country, has been moving towards greater rights for citizens over last century to extent that privilege of fair trial has now become constitutional right --- Court held that in these circumstances, it is not appropriate to restrict scope of legal remedy available to citizens on basis of old decision, especially when language of law is clearly pointing in opposite direction --- Court held that question of limitation is always considered as integral part of main lis and can never be isolated, be it special/appellate or regular plenary jurisdiction etc --- Court held that limitation ought to have been decided as it is always betrothed with litigation --- Court held that it is attached with litigation in such way that it becomes court's duty to look into it as priority, on its own --- Court held that matter of treating reference as appeal came for consideration in another case of Messrs Rafeh Limited which to large extent reiterated principles laid down in case of Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd --- Court held that it is not case of respondents that orders in all cases, were not passed beyond period mandated under law --- Court held that only contention was that question of limitation was never raised in lower fora hence cannot be agitated in reference jurisdiction, which question was set at rest in light of aforesaid judgments of Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd. and Messrs Rafeh Limited --- Court held that it is thus not only those questions which have been pleaded and raised before lower fora which could be agitated in reference jurisdiction but would also include those which arise out of order of Tribunal --- Court held that order of Tribunal talks about passing of order-in-original and thus its validity, in terms of timeframe as contoured by relevant statute is to be adjudged and should have been adjudged, which indeed arises out of order --- Court held that there is thus nothing in referred provision of reference jurisdiction to prevent appellants from raising such question of law which can be made out and seen from contents of order, impugned in reference jurisdiction --- Court held that conclusion of paragraph 49 of Squibb case judgment has overriding effect and that is law, as it stands which allows all questions "arising" out of order to be referred and not just questions "argued" or "raised" before Tribunal --- Court held that thus, learned High Court erred in special jurisdiction under section 47 (which is pari materia to section 133 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001) by not allowing appellants to raise questions of law that could be seen flowing and arising out of order --- Court held that therefore, instant bunch of civil appeals are allowed and impugned judgment/orders are set aside --- Appeals were allowed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 ---- Ss. 179(3) & 179(4)---- Adjudication proceedings—Limitation for passing order-in-original—Mandatory nature of time frame—Effect of delay—Show cause notice issued on 05.12.2014 under S. 179(3), Customs Act, 1969—Adjudicating officer was legally bound to pass the order-in-original within 120 days, with a maximum 30-day extension under second proviso to S. 179(3), making 150 days in total—Order-in-original dated either 19.05.2015 (title page) or 04.06.2015 (signature page), both falling outside the prescribed time frame—Extension under S. 179(4) allegedly granted on 20.05.2015, was also beyond limitation—Held, entire adjudication proceedings rendered time-barred—Provisions of S. 179(3) and 179(4) are mandatory and non-compliance vitiates proceedings. (b) Limitation—Mandatory statutory timelines—Interpretation by Supreme Court ---- Time-bound adjudication under fiscal statutes—Non-compliance results in nullity—Supreme Court reaffirmed that adjudication timelines under Customs Act, 1969 are mandatory—Cited and affirmed larger bench ruling in Messrs Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax (2025 SCMR 1280), which upheld earlier precedent in Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Mohammad Din (2017 SCMR 1427)—Provisions mandating time-limited adjudication must be strictly followed—Late extensions or post-facto regularizations cannot cure jurisdictional defect. (c) Fiscal Law—Adjudication under show cause notices—Invalidity due to lapse of limitation --- Adjudication orders passed beyond statutory time—Invalidity and consequences—Where adjudicating officer fails to conclude proceedings within prescribed time under S. 179(3) Customs Act, and extension (if any) is granted after expiry, the resulting adjudication order is without lawful authority—Proceedings under show cause notice abate—Held, order-in-original passed beyond limitation period was unlawful and proceedings void. (d) Disposition Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Impugned order of Lahore High Court set aside—Order-in-original held to be time-barred and proceedings under show cause notice declared invalid—Stay application (CMA No. 5968/2025) disposed of accordingly. Cited Cases: Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Mohammad Din, 2017 SCMR 1427 Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, 2018 SCMR 1474 Messrs Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, 2025 SCMR 1280

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Arts. 151 & 156----Appeal against order making arbitral award rule of the Court----Whether governed by Art.151 (20 days) or Art.156 (90 days)----Scope---Single Judge of High Court, in exercise of original civil jurisdiction, made award rule of the Court on 22.01.2013 and directed decree to be drawn; decree was drafted the same day and signed on 31.01.2013---Certified copy applied for on 26.04.2013 (after expiry of 20 days); copies supplied on 29.04.2013; High Court Appeal filed on 11.06.2013---Held, decision making award rule of the Court and consequent decree was a “decree or order of a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction”, thus squarely attracting Art.151 which provides 20 days’ limitation---Even assuming Art.156 (90 days) to apply, the appeal was still hopelessly time-barred on the admitted dates---High Court rightly dismissed appeal as barred by time; no question of law arose to justify interference. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.5 & Art.151----Condonation of delay---“Sufficient cause”---Obligation to explain each day’s delay---Effect of plea that impugned award/order is “void”---Appellant’s application under S.5 for condonation of delay neither disclosed any plausible ground nor explained each day’s delay; only plea taken was that award/ proceedings were “void”, hence no limitation would run----Held, mere assertion that an award or decree is void does not by itself constitute “sufficient cause” for condoning delay; party seeking condonation must furnish bona fide, detailed and satisfactory explanation for entire period of delay; carelessness, inattention or lack of bona fide cannot be rewarded by extending limitation---In absence of any convincing explanation, High Court was justified in refusing condonation and dismissing time-barred appeal. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.3----Duty of Court to examine limitation; public policy; law aids the vigilant and not the indolent----Scope---Law of limitation is founded on public policy to secure finality in litigation and prevent stale claims from being agitated after lapse of the prescribed period; under S.3 it is the Court’s inherent duty to examine limitation and dismiss proceedings instituted after expiry of prescribed period, whether or not limitation is pleaded as a defence---Expression “sufficient cause” in S.5 is conditioned by bona fide conduct; concocted or fanciful grounds cannot displace statutory bar; law assists vigilant litigants, not those sleeping over their rights, as encapsulated in maxims “Leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviunt” and “Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt”---Government departments, autonomous bodies and private entities are all to be treated alike; no extra leniency is to be extended to institutional litigants in condonation matters; delay caused by negligence or lack of diligence must not be condoned. Cited case: Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari (2024 SCMR 1021 = 2023 SCP 323). Disposition: Civil appeal dismissed; impugned judgment of High Court dismissing High Court Appeal as hopelessly time-barred maintained; no interference warranted.

Summary: (a) Family appeal—Computation of limitation—Exclusion of time for obtaining certified copies—Where an appellant applies for certified copies within the prescribed period and the appeal is filed immediately after receipt thereof, the period spent in obtaining such copies must be excluded in computing limitation. Failure to exclude this period constitutes a material illegality. (b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court Act, 2017—Section 7—Limitation for filing family appeal—Thirty days’ limitation prescribed—Exclusion of copy-preparation period mandatory under settled legal principles—Appeal filed on September 26, 2023, against judgment dated August 25, 2023, remained within limitation after exclusion of September 16–18, 2023, period consumed in obtaining copies. (c) Procedural law—Substantial justice versus technicalities—Courts are not to adopt rigid or mechanical interpretation of limitation provisions to defeat a party’s substantive right; procedural rules are handmaids of justice, not its mistress. (d) Remand—Scope—Where appeal dismissed on erroneous technical ground without adjudication on merits, matter to be remanded for decision afresh after hearing both sides. Disposition: Appeal accepted—Judgment of High Court dated 11-09-2024 set aside—Case remanded to High Court for decision on merits within three months.

Summary: (a) Islamic law --- Gift (Hiba) --- Essentials --- Offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession --- Proof --- Failure to prove valid oral gift --- Effect. Petitioners, legal heirs of deceased Imdad Ali, claimed title to inherited property through alleged oral and registered gift deeds. Supreme Court reaffirmed that a valid gift requires: (i) offer by the donor, (ii) acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession. Petitioners failed to plead or prove these elements. Neither the date, time, nor place of the alleged oral gift was provided, nor were any attesting witnesses of the gift transaction produced. No cogent or confidence-inspiring evidence was led to establish offer and acceptance. The petitioners also failed to produce key evidence such as the scribe, marginal witnesses, stamp vendor, sub-registrar, or Patwari to prove the execution and attestation of the registered gift deeds. Consequently, the gift was held to be invalid, and the petitioners' claim was rejected. Cited Cases: • Bilal Hussain Shah v. Dilawar Shah PLD 2018 SC 698 • Khalid Hussain v. Nazir Ahmad 2021 SCMR 1986 • Faqir Ali v. Sakina Bibi PLD 2022 SC 85 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim 2025 SCMR 955 • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 (b) Law of evidence --- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 --- Arts. 129(g) & 133 --- Best evidence rule --- Withholding material witnesses --- Adverse inference --- Application. Petitioners failed to produce essential witnesses, including the scribe, attesting witnesses, and relevant revenue officials, raising an adverse presumption under Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Court held that in cases where a party fails to present the best available evidence, the court is justified in drawing a presumption against that party. Oral claims of gift unsupported by credible documentary or witness testimony were held insufficient. (c) Succession --- Inheritance --- Gift by ancestor to exclusion of daughters --- Burden of proof --- Reason for exclusion must be shown --- Presumption against disinheritance. The Court noted that no reason was given by the petitioners for the exclusion of daughters from the inheritance. In cases involving alleged gifts by a deceased ancestor in favour of male heirs to the exclusion of female heirs, courts must scrutinize the claim with greater care. Absence of evidence showing affection or reward-based motivation for the gift raised strong suspicion. Petitioners bore the heavy burden to justify exclusion, which they failed to discharge. (d) Pleadings and evidence --- Relief beyond pleadings --- Impermissibility --- Case to be proved within bounds of pleadings. Supreme Court reiterated that no party may lead evidence beyond its pleadings. Petitioners did not clearly plead the particulars of the alleged oral gift in their written statements and thus were barred from leading evidence in that regard. Courts below correctly refused to entertain unpleaded facts. Cited Cases: • Zulfiqar v. Shahdat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582 • Combined Investment Ltd. v. Wali Bhai PLD 2016 SC 730 • Saddaruddin v. Sultan Khan 2021 SCMR 642 (e) Limitation Act, 1908 --- Art. 120 --- Declaratory suits --- Right to sue --- When accrues --- Continuing right in suits based on inheritance. Court held that in inheritance-based declaratory suits, the right to sue is a continuing right so long as the plaintiff retains a claim over the property. Where fraud or concealment is alleged, limitation begins from the date of knowledge. Respondents in this case only discovered the fraudulent gift when attempting to obtain a revenue extract in 2009. All three courts below rightly held the suit within time under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act. Cited Case: • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim 2025 SCMR 955 (f) Civil procedure --- Concurrent findings of fact --- Scope of interference by Supreme Court --- Principles. The Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of three courts below, holding that the judgments were based on proper appraisal of evidence and application of settled legal principles. The petitioners had failed to dislodge those findings through any legal or factual error warranting interference under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. Disposition: Leave refused. Petition dismissed. Judgments of trial court, appellate court, and High Court upheld concurrently.

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) —S. 34—Compensation—Interest—Additional charges— Referee Court enhanced compensation in land acquisition reference, awarding interest @ 6% per annum from date of possession, 15% compulsory acquisition charges, and additional compensation @ 15% per annum from date of notification under S.4 till payment—High Court maintained enhancement—Supreme Court held that findings of Referee Court were based on consideration of necessary legal components; no misreading or non-reading of evidence shown—Interference not warranted. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) —Condonation of delay—Government litigation—Principles— Appeal filed by Province of Sindh barred by 30 days—Application for condonation contained only generic assertions of administrative delays in obtaining certified copies and processing file—Held, law aids the vigilant, not the indolent—Mere inter-departmental correspondence or procedural delay does not constitute “sufficient cause”—Government and autonomous bodies cannot be accorded preferential treatment; cases to be dealt with uniformly like ordinary litigants—Routine filing of mechanical applications for condonation deprecated. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) —Condonation of delay—Doctrine of equality before law— Court emphasized that careless or intentional delay undermines rule of law—Condonation cannot be granted as a matter of course—Latin maxim “Leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviunt” applied—Law of limitation does not create a right but extinguishes stale claims through efflux of time—Duty of Court to consider limitation even if not raised. (d) Administration of justice —Government litigation—Duty of vigilance— Trend of belated appeals by government departments on stereotypical excuses condemned—Such approach viewed as mala fide or intended to benefit opposite side—Court reiterated principle that adjudication on merits cannot override the mandatory requirement of limitation without sufficient cause. Cited Cases Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari 2024 SCMR 1021 = 2023 SCP 323. Disposition Appeal dismissed, being barred by limitation as well as on merits.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 –– S. 179(3) & (4) –– Time limits for adjudication –– Mandatory nature –– Extension of time only in “exceptional circumstances” –– Extension granted without proper justification –– Order-in-original held void –– The adjudicating authority passed the order-in-original beyond the mandatory 120-day period prescribed under S. 179(3), Customs Act, 1969. Although an extension was sought under S. 179(4), the Board granted it without recording any "exceptional circumstances" as required by law. The Supreme Court held that such power to extend adjudication deadlines is narrow and conditional upon exceptional circumstances. Mere reference to the revenue involved or internal delays does not suffice. The Collector's failure to act in a timely manner could not be cured retroactively by an unlawful extension. Consequently, the order-in-original was invalid and rightly set aside by the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. Cited cases: Collector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia 2017 SCMR 1427; Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal 2019 SCMR 1735; Wak Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Larger Bench judgment dated 14.05.2025). (b) Administrative Law –– Exercise of statutory discretion –– Power must be exercised strictly within legal bounds –– Board’s extension order invalid due to lack of application of mind –– Subjective satisfaction not sufficient –– The Court reiterated that statutory powers must be exercised within the express limits of the statute. The Board's extension under S. 179(4) was not preceded by any objective inquiry or justification regarding “exceptional circumstances.” Reliance on subjective satisfaction or vague justifications such as revenue stakes renders the act ultra vires. No material was placed on record to establish that the Board applied its mind to the requirement of "exceptional circumstances." Cited cases: Super Asia 2017 SCMR 1427 (reaffirmed in Larger Bench ruling of 14.05.2025); Wak Ltd. (CA 634/2018). (c) Customs Act, 1969 –– S. 224 –– Extension of time limits by “aggrieved party” –– Inapplicable to Collector –– Limited applicability of condonation provision –– S. 224 of the Customs Act permits condonation of delay by the Board, but only upon application by an “aggrieved party.” The Court clarified that the Collector, acting as the adjudicating authority, could not claim to be an aggrieved party under this provision. Therefore, S. 224 was not applicable, and the Collector’s reliance on the concept of condonation was misplaced. (d) Interpretation of tax statutes –– Harmonious reading with Sales Tax and Excise laws –– Time bars interpreted strictly –– Adjudication orders passed after lapse of limitation are without legal effect –– The Court applied the principles laid down in indirect tax jurisprudence, including the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Federal Excise Act, 2005, to the Customs Act. The time limits in S. 179(3) were interpreted as mandatory, consistent with interpretations under S. 74 of the Sales Tax Act. Late adjudication, even if technically extended, must satisfy statutory thresholds and cannot be justified post facto without proper legal basis. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused. Petition dismissed. The order-in-original under Section 179, Customs Act, 1969, was held unlawful and void due to lack of lawful extension. High Court judgment upholding Appellate Tribunal’s decision affirmed.