Summary: (Against the judgment dated 22.12.2014 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Special Customs Reference Applications Nos.8 to 33 of 2011). (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 33 & First Sched.---Classification of imported goods---Correct PCT Heading, determination of---Domain of Classification Committee-- -Scope---Respondent-company had imported twenty-six consignments described as "BOPP" Printed Laminated Packaging Film (Metalized)---Assessment was completed and the goods were given out of customs charge on the basis of the respondent-company's own declarations---PCT Headings attracting customs duty at the rate of 25% were also declared by the respondent-company---Belatedly, the respondent-company filed an application for refund of customs duty under section 33 of the Customs Act, 1969 on the ground that at the time of clearing the goods customs duties were paid through error because the correct H.S. Code was not declared, and that instead of 20% the customs duties were paid at the rate of 25%---On the request of the respondent-company the matter was referred to the Classification Committee constituted by the Federal Board of Revenue---Classification Committee issued a comprehensive classification ruling and determined that the imported goods fell under PCT Heading 3920.2040 which attracted customs duty at the rate of 25%---Classification Committee had sent samples to the Customs House Laboratory for analysis and after subjecting them to tests a report was accordingly submitted---Committee, in the light of the test analysis report and the physical attributes of the samples, had concluded that 'Biaxially Oriented Polypropylene film (BOPP) fell under one of the four PCT Headings i.e. 3920.2010, 3920.2020, 3920.2030 and 2920.2040---Committee further concluded that the composition of the imported goods described in the test report rendered all the aforementioned headings to merit equal consideration---Committee considered the three sub-rules of Rule 3 of the General Rules for Interpretation to the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 ("Rules for Interpretation") in order to make a determination and the reasoning was recorded in the classification ruling---Rule 3(a) was excluded because none of the headings was most specific---Rule 3(b) was not attracted because all the headings merited equal consideration---As a consequence the determination was made by applying Rule 3(c) and on that basis PCT Heading 3920.2040 was determined since it was the heading which was last in numerical order among those which equally merited consideration---Committee had correctly determined PCT Heading 3920.2040 because it occurred last in the numerical order among those headings which merited equal consideration---Determination made by Committee was in accordance with the correct appreciation of the Rules of Interpretation and it did not suffer from any infirmity---Appellate Tribunal had made its own determination and that too without considering the test report and the classification ruling of the Committee---Tribunal had also not sought any technical assistance from the Committee or the Board---High Court also did not appreciate that the Committee had interpreted the Rules of Interpretation in accordance with the Explanatory Notes and other documents---Rules of Interpretation, particularly Rule 3(c), had not been properly appreciated and thus misinterpreted---Determination made by the Classification Committee did not suffer from any legal infirmity nor was found to be in violation of the Rules of Interpretation read with the Explanatory Notes---Appeals were allowed, judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court were set-aside, and consequently, the Order in Original whereby the refund application of respondent-company was rejected stood restored. (b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 18 & First Sched.---Classification of imported goods---Correct PCT Heading, determination of---Classification Committee, power of---Scope---Classification of goods is one of the most basic functions of the procedure in the context of import or export of goods---It is a specialised job and technical in nature---It essentially requires expertise and taking of multiple factors into consideration e.g. examining the goods, all the relevant documents, understanding the classification aids and technical literature etc.---Classification Committee constituted by the Federal Board of Revenue includes experts who possess the skills, knowledge and experience in respect of classification of goods in conformity with the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System ('Harmonised System')---Classification Committee and its classification rulings, therefore, have crucial importance---There is a presumption of regularity attached to its proceedings and findings regarding classification of goods---This presumption, however, is rebuttable if it can be demonstrably shown that the findings are arbitrary, fanciful and in violation of the General Rules for Interpretation to the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 ("Rules for Interpretation"), the Explanatory Notes and other relevant guidelines or principles relating to classification of goods under the Harmonised System---Appellate Tribunal nor the High Court can substitute the findings of the Classification Committee unless they can be shown to be arbitrary, fanciful or in violation to the applicable rules and principles of interpretation. Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court along with Ch. M. Javed, Chief (L), FBR and Nayyar Shafiq, Chief (Tariff) for Appellant. Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 18th January, 2024. ATHAR MINALLAH, J.--- Leave in this matter was granted vide order dated 06.8.2015 to consider questions of law that had arisen from the judgment of the High Court, dated 22.12.2014.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 22.12.2014 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Special Customs Reference Applications Nos.8 to 33 of 2011). (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 33 & First Sched.---Classification of imported goods---Correct PCT Heading, determination of---Domain of Classification Committee-- -Scope---Respondent-company had imported twenty-six consignments described as "BOPP" Printed Laminated Packaging Film (Metalized)---Assessment was completed and the goods were given out of customs charge on the basis of the respondent-company's own declarations---PCT Headings attracting customs duty at the rate of 25% were also declared by the respondent-company---Belatedly, the respondent-company filed an application for refund of customs duty under section 33 of the Customs Act, 1969 on the ground that at the time of clearing the goods customs duties were paid through error because the correct H.S. Code was not declared, and that instead of 20% the customs duties were paid at the rate of 25%---On the request of the respondent-company the matter was referred to the Classification Committee constituted by the Federal Board of Revenue---Classification Committee issued a comprehensive classification ruling and determined that the imported goods fell under PCT Heading 3920.2040 which attracted customs duty at the rate of 25%---Classification Committee had sent samples to the Customs House Laboratory for analysis and after subjecting them to tests a report was accordingly submitted---Committee, in the light of the test analysis report and the physical attributes of the samples, had concluded that 'Biaxially Oriented Polypropylene film (BOPP) fell under one of the four PCT Headings i.e. 3920.2010, 3920.2020, 3920.2030 and 2920.2040---Committee further concluded that the composition of the imported goods described in the test report rendered all the aforementioned headings to merit equal consideration---Committee considered the three sub-rules of Rule 3 of the General Rules for Interpretation to the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 ("Rules for Interpretation") in order to make a determination and the reasoning was recorded in the classification ruling---Rule 3(a) was excluded because none of the headings was most specific---Rule 3(b) was not attracted because all the headings merited equal consideration---As a consequence the determination was made by applying Rule 3(c) and on that basis PCT Heading 3920.2040 was determined since it was the heading which was last in numerical order among those which equally merited consideration---Committee had correctly determined PCT Heading 3920.2040 because it occurred last in the numerical order among those headings which merited equal consideration---Determination made by Committee was in accordance with the correct appreciation of the Rules of Interpretation and it did not suffer from any infirmity---Appellate Tribunal had made its own determination and that too without considering the test report and the classification ruling of the Committee---Tribunal had also not sought any technical assistance from the Committee or the Board---High Court also did not appreciate that the Committee had interpreted the Rules of Interpretation in accordance with the Explanatory Notes and other documents---Rules of Interpretation, particularly Rule 3(c), had not been properly appreciated and thus misinterpreted---Determination made by the Classification Committee did not suffer from any legal infirmity nor was found to be in violation of the Rules of Interpretation read with the Explanatory Notes---Appeals were allowed, judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court were set-aside, and consequently, the Order in Original whereby the refund application of respondent-company was rejected stood restored. (b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 18 & First Sched.---Classification of imported goods---Correct PCT Heading, determination of---Classification Committee, power of---Scope---Classification of goods is one of the most basic functions of the procedure in the context of import or export of goods---It is a specialised job and technical in nature---It essentially requires expertise and taking of multiple factors into consideration e.g. examining the goods, all the relevant documents, understanding the classification aids and technical literature etc.---Classification Committee constituted by the Federal Board of Revenue includes experts who possess the skills, knowledge and experience in respect of classification of goods in conformity with the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System ('Harmonised System')---Classification Committee and its classification rulings, therefore, have crucial importance---There is a presumption of regularity attached to its proceedings and findings regarding classification of goods---This presumption, however, is rebuttable if it can be demonstrably shown that the findings are arbitrary, fanciful and in violation of the General Rules for Interpretation to the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 ("Rules for Interpretation"), the Explanatory Notes and other relevant guidelines or principles relating to classification of goods under the Harmonised System---Appellate Tribunal nor the High Court can substitute the findings of the Classification Committee unless they can be shown to be arbitrary, fanciful or in violation to the applicable rules and principles of interpretation. Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court along with Ch. M. Javed, Chief (L), FBR and Nayyar Shafiq, Chief (Tariff) for Appellant. Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 18th January, 2024.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R.4---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 113, 117 & 120--- Gift transaction---Legality---Fraud---Onus of proof---Admission as to validity of gift---Necessity to prove the transaction of gift---Facts need not to be proved---Contention of the petitioner was that respondents being beneficiaries of the gift transaction had failed to divulge details thereof in their written statement, thus, the suit had rightly been dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---Party pleading any misrepresentation and fraud was obliged to narrate particulars to that effect---Plaint was lacking any details or particulars that how the transaction was tainted with fraud---Donor and predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners accepted the donee as lawful owner of the suit land and never challenged the gift mutation in their lifetime---Article 113 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, ordains that no fact need be proved in any proceedings which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings---Petitioner's own witness admitted qua the validity of gift, thus, there remained no necessity for the respondents to assert or lead any material to that effect---After effecting of gift mutation necessary entries were incorporated in the revenue record for the subsequent years---Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Mst. Grana through Legal Heirs and others v. Sahib Kamala Bibi and others PLD 2014 SC 167; Mst. Kalsoom Begum v. Peran Ditta and others 2022 SCMR 1352 and Mst. Faheeman Begum (Deceased) through L.Rs and others v. Islam-Ud-Din (Deceased) through L.Rs and others 2023 SCMR 1402 ref. Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85; Noor Din (Deceased) through LRs v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others 2023 SCMR 1928; Mst. Rabia Gula and others v. Muhammad Janan and others 2022 SCMR 1009; Syed Kausar Ali Shah and others v. Syed Farhat Hussain Shah and others 2022 SCMR 1558; Principal Public School Sangota, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others v. Sarbiland and others 2022 SCMR 189 and Saadat Khan and others v. Shahid-ur-Rehman and others PLD 2023 SC 362 distinguished. (b) Gift--- ----Proof---Principle of acquiescence and estoppel---Scope---Gift not challenged by the donor in his lifetime---Where in his lifetime donee did not challenge the validity of gift, his successors would be precluded to throw any challenge to such transaction on the principle of acquiescence and estoppel---Gift mutation was sanctioned in the year 1962 and the donor though remained alive till 1969, but he did not challenge the gift in favour of his son/donee---Petitioners were claiming right in the suit land being successor-in-interest/another son of donor, who too remained alive till 1978, but never challenged the gift, thus, petitioner were precluded to dispute the gift mutation on the ground of estoppel. Ghulam Abbas and others v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs and others 2016 SCMR 1403; Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others 2013 SCMR 299 and Jamila Khatoon and others v. Aish Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 222 rel. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.18 & First Sched, Art.120---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42--- Gift mutation---Suit for declaration challenging gift mutation on the ground of fraud---Limitation period, commencement of---Scope---Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, (Act) ordains that any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled---Right to sue accrues to a person against the other for declaration of his right, as to any property, when the latter denies or is interested to deny his such right---In the present case limitation started running from the date of knowledge of the donor and not the petitioners---Petitioners nowhere in their plaint asserted that their father or the grandfather (donor), who both remained alive for a considerable time after the sanctioning of gift mutation, were not aware of the same, thus, could not challenge it during their lifetime---After the incorporation of suit land in his name in furtherance of gift mutation the donee transferred part of the suit land in favour of the respondents through two mutations in the year 1981, thus, petitioners were well aware of the gift mutation right from its inception but they brought their suit in 2003, which was clearly barred by time---Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLD 2022 SC 353 and Mst. Rabia Gula and others v. Muhammad Janan and others 2022 SCMR 1009 rel. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction---Scope---Conflict of judgment of lower courts---Preference---In the matter of giving preference to the judgments of lower courts while analyzing the same in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, preference and regard is always given to the findings of the appellate court, unless they suffer from any legal infirmity or material irregularity. Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through L.Rs. and others 2013 SCMR 1300; Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar and 2 others 2015 SCMR 1 and Muhammad Hafeez and another v. District Judge, Karachi East and another 2008 SCMR 398 rel. Tanvir Iqbal for Petitioners. Ch. Afrasiab Khan and Abdul Basit Khan Tanoli for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4. Nemo for Respondent No. 5. Dates of hearing: 5th and 7th December, 2023. Judgment Mirza Viqas Rauf, J .--- This petition invokes the revisional jurisdiction of this Court as contemplated under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) (hereinafter referred to as "C.P.C.") against the judgment and decree dated 01st November, 2012 handed down by learned District Judge, Rawalpindi, whereby he proceeded to allow the appeal preferred by respondents Nos.1 to 4 (hereinafter referred to as "respondents") as a result setting at naught the judgment and decree dated 24th December, 2011 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-I, Rawalpindi. 2. The proposition involved in this petition is quite common to our society. Abdul Rehman son of Khatar Khan was a big landlord in the revenue estate of Daultala Tehsil Gujar Khan District Rawalpindi. He was having two sons namely Muhammad Afsar and Muhammad Khan whereas Aksar Jan was his daughter. Abdul Rehman purportedly gifted a part of land measuring 101 Kanal 19 Marla (hereinafter referred to as "suit land") to Muhammad Khan (one of his sons) qua which mutation No.633 dated 18th September, 1962 was recorded. Abdul Rehman died in the year 1969 whereas Muhammad Khan passed away in the year 1998, who ultimately survived the "respondents". The petitioners being the successors-in-interest of Muhammad Afsar instituted a suit for declaration, separate possession through partition and injunction averring therein that their predecessor-in-interest namely Muhammad Afsar died in the year 1978 and after his death, they remained under the custody of Muhammad Khan, who however died later on. It is asserted that after demise of Muhammad Khan, the petitioners and "respondents" started living separately on the basis of family settlement, however, "respondents" refused to give half share in the "suit land" on the plea that it is not joint being gifted to their predecessor-in-interest by Abdul Rehman. On further inquiry by the petitioners it revealed on them that a gift mutation No.633 was sanctioned on 18th September, 1962 in favour of Muhammad Khan, which as per their stance was the outcome of fraud and misrepresentation having no effect upon their rights. 3. Suit was resisted by the "respondents" on multiple grounds through a written statement. On account of serious challenge on both sides as reflected in their respective pleadings, the trial court proceeded to frame multiple issues. After framing of issues both the sides produced their evidence and upon completion of the same, suit was decreed vide judgment dated 24th December, 2011. Feeling aggrieved the "respondents" preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Rawalpindi. The appeal was ultimately allowed by way of impugned judgment and decree. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that being the beneficiaries, it was though obligatory for the "respondents" in the first instance to plead the gift transaction but no such assertion was made in the written statement. He added that evidence can only be led with regard to a fact, which finds mention in the pleadings. Learned counsel contended that suit was mainly resisted by the "respondents" on the ground of limitation. He added that in case of fraud no limitation runs against the person, who has been defrauded. Learned counsel submitted that even otherwise the proceedings relating to sanctioning of gift mutation are tainted with material irregularities. It is contended with vehemence that gift was never pleaded and mutation by itself is not a document validating the original transaction. Learned counsel emphasized that suit was initially rightly decreed but the appellate court while forming a contra view has grossly misread the evidence. It is argued that the impugned judgment and decree is not tenable under the law. In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others (PLD 2022 SC 85), Noor Din (Deceased) through LRs v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others (2023 SCMR 1928), Mst. Rabia Gula and others v. Muhammad Janan and others (2022 SCMR 1009), Syed Kausar Ali Shah and others v. Syed Farhat Hussain Shah and others (2022 SCMR 1558), Principal Public School Sangota, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others v. Sarbiland and others (2022 SCMR 189) and Saadat Khan and others v. Shahid-ur-Rehman and others (PLD 2023 SC 362). 5. Conversely, learned counsel for the "respondents" submitted that gift was validly made. He added that the petitioners on account of their conduct were precluded to institute the suit. Learned counsel submitted that in pursuance to the gift mutation necessary entries were incorporated in the revenue record and the petitioners were well aware of the same. Learned counsel emphasized that even otherwise the donor though remained alive for a considerable period but he never challenged the gift transaction. Learned counsel contended that suit was instituted by the petitioners on account of mala fide. It is also contended that fraud was though alleged but no particulars of fraud were mentioned in the plaint. Learned counsel submitted that suit was wrongly decreed by the trial court and the appellate court was fully justified to set at naught the findings of the trial court in the circumstances. In the last, learned counsel argued that suit was hopelessly barred by time. In order to supplement his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on Mst. Grana through Legal Heirs and others v. Sahib Kamala Bibi and others (PLD 2014 SC 167), Mst. Kalsoom Begum v. Peran Ditta and others (2022 SCMR 1352) and Mst. Faheeman Begum (Deceased) through L.Rs and others v. Islam-ud-Din (Deceased) through L.Rs and others (2023 SCMR 1402). 6. Heard. Record perused. 7. "Suit land" (101 Kanal 19 Marla) was part of estate owned by Abdul Rehman, who was Headman of village Daultala Tehsil Gujar Khan District Rawalpindi. Abdul Rehman breathed his last on 06th January, 1969 leaving behind two sons namely Muhammad Khan and Muhammad Afsar as well as one daughter namely Aksar Jan. The petitioners are the successors-in-interest of Muhammad Afsar whereas the "respondents" are the legal heirs of Muhammad Khan. The matter in controversy stems from mutation No.633 dated 18th September, 1962 purportedly effected in favour of Muhammad Khan. 8. Before delving into the merits of the case it would be advantageous to point out certain admitted facts, which even otherwise are quite relevant for the matter in controversy. Gift mutation No.633 was sanctioned on 18th September, 1962 whereas Abdul Rehman (donor) died on 06th January, 1969. Muhammad Khan (donee) passed away on 28th December, 1998 whereas Muhammad Afsar, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners took his last breath on 04th March, 1978. It would not be out of context to mention here that Muhammad Afsar was Sub-Inspector in police department. 9. The points for determination before this Court are; firstly, validity of gift transaction; secondly, effect of non-challenging of gift by the donor and; thirdly, limitation. 10. Adverting to the first limb of controversy it is noticed that to this effect issue No.7 was framed. Being the plaintiffs, it is the claim of the petitioners that gift mutation is a product of fraud. Contrary to this the "respondents" pleaded that gift transaction was valid one. In terms of Order VI Rule 4 of the "C.P.C." a party pleading any misrepresentation or fraud is obliged to narrate particulars to that effect. When plaint is examined in this context it is clearly lacking any details or particulars that how the transaction was tainted with fraud. In order to prove their claim, the petitioners examined Muhammad Rizwan being one of the petitioners as PW1. In his statement he reiterated the facts contained in the plaint and asserted that Abdul Rehman has though never made any gift in his lifetime, but Muhammad Khan was since Headman, so in connivance with the revenue officials, he succeeded in getting the gift mutation effected in his favour. Bashir Ahmad being close relative of the petitioners as well as the "respondents" appeared as PW2. He stated that Muhammad Afsar and Muhammad Khan partitioned their property in the year 2003 and he came to know about the gift in the said year. During his cross-examination Bashir Ahmad admitted that Mst. Munawar Jan, petitioner No.1 gifted him portion of land from the share of her inherited property. He also admitted that one Muhammad Ashiq had filed a suit against Abdul Rehman and Muhammad Khan wherein he acted as special attorney on behalf of the latter and the suit was dismissed finally. He also admitted that Abdul Rehman has rightly made the gift in favour of Muhammad Khan. Though there were certain pivotal admissions in the statement of Muhammad Rizwan (PW1) as well but the statement of Bashir Ahmad (PW2) was quite fatal to the claim of the petitioners. 11. There can be no cavil that mutation by itself is not a document of title and it is only an acknowledgment of the original transaction, which has taken place prior to the incorporating/sanctioning of mutation and a person relying upon mutation has to establish the original transaction in the first instance. The facts of this case are, however, bit different. The "respondents" though did not plead the original transaction in clear words in their written statement but they while responding to para No.4 of the plaint and denying the averments of the para, asserted that the original owner Abdul Rehman made a valid gift of "suit land" in favour of Muhammad Khan through mutation No.633 attested on 18th September, 1962 whereafter the gift mutation was incorporated in the revenue record and the donee (Muhammad Khan) enjoyed the possession as well as ownership of the "suit land". They further asserted that Abdul Rehman (donor) and Muhammad Afsar, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners accepted the donee as lawful owner of the "suit land" and never challenged the gift mutation in their lifetime. 12. Article 113 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ordains that no fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings. To the above effect when the statement of Bashir Ahmad (PW2) is analyzed, he in his cross-examination deposed as under :- In view of admissions with regard to the validity of gift by the petitioners' own witness, there remains no necessity for the "respondents" to assert or lead any material to that effect. It clearly evinces from the record that after effecting of gift mutation necessary entries were incorporated in the revenue record for the subsequent years. 13. Coming to the question of effect of non-challenging of gift by the donor, it is noticed that Abdul Rehman survived two sons namely Muhammad Khan and Muhammad Afsar as well as one daughter namely Aksar Jan. Donor was owner of about 300 Kanal land in Daultala Tehsil Gujar Khan District Rawalpindi, however, he gifted "suit land" to his son namely Muhammad Khan. It appears that as Muhammad Afsar was in the police department, so the donor being father of Muhammad Khan (donee) opted to gift the "suit land" in his favour, so as to safeguard his rights as he was unemployed. Leaving aside this aspect it is an oft repeated principle of law that where in his lifetime donor did not challenge the validity of gift, his successors would be precluded to throw any challenge to such transaction on the principle of acquiescence and estoppel. 14. In the present case gift mutation was sanctioned on 18th September, 1962 and the donor though remained alive till 06th January, 1969 but he did not challenge the gift in favour of his son (Muhammad Khan). Furthermore the petitioners are claiming right in the "suit land" being successors-in-interest of Muhammad Afsar, who too remained alive till 04th March, 1978 but never challenged the gift. The petitioners are thus precluded to dispute the gift mutation on the ground of estoppel. Reference to this effect can be made to Ghulam Abbas and others v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs and others (2016 SCMR 1403), Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others (2013 SCMR 299) and Jamila Khatoon and others v. Aish Muhammad and others (2011 SCMR 222). 15. Now attending the last point for determination, which relates to limitation, it is observed that a suit for declaration of any right as to any property, the person claiming such right has to institute the suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and the limitation of such suit is to be regulated and governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Suit was instituted by the petitioners on 30th July, 2003 challenging the validity of gift mutation on the ground of fraud asserting that the cause of action accrued to them six months before institution of the suit on claim of the respondents' that they are exclusive owners of the "suit land". 16. It is evident from the record that after the gift mutation entries were incorporated in the light thereof in the revenue record. It also evinces that after the incorporation of "suit land" in his name in furtherance of gift mutation the donee transferred portion of the "suit land" in favour of the "respondents" through mutation No.2786 dated 30th May, 1981 (Exhibit-P23). Not only this but through mutation No.2714 (Exhibit-D18) 03 Kanal 18 Marla of land was mutated in favour of the petitioners as well through gift. 17. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 ordains that any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled. Section 42 of the Act ibid is reproduced below for the purpose of convenience :- "42. Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right.- (1) Any person entitled to any character, or any right to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a suit filed under subsection (1) shall be decided by the Court within six months and the appellate court shall decide the appeal not later than ninety days, as the case may be." From the bare perusal of the above referred provision of law it becomes crystal clear that the right to sue accrues to a person against the other for declaration of his right, as to any property, when the latter denies or is interested to deny his such right. 18. In the case of Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others (PLD 2022 SC 353) Supreme Court of Pakistan outlined the scope of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 in the following words :- "25. A suit for declaration of any right as to any property is filed under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 ("Specific Relief Act"). Therefore, to ascertain when the right to sue accrues to a legal heir to seek a declaration of his ownership right over the property inherited by him and of his such right not to be affected by the further transfer of such property, we need to consider section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads:-- 42. Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right-- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. (Emphasis added) It becomes evident by reading the above provisions that the right to sue accrues to a person against the other for declaration of his right, as to any property, when the latter denies or is interested to deny his such right. It thus postulates two actions that cause the accrual of right to sue, to an aggrieved person: (i) actual denial of his right or (ii) apprehended or threatened denial of his right. 26. What "actions" can be termed as an "actual denial of right", and what a mere "apprehended or threatened denial of right", in the context of adverse entries recorded in the revenue record, is a question that requires consideration. Admittedly, entries in the revenue record do not create or extinguish proprietary rights. Such an entry may at most be termed as a mere "apprehended or threatened denial" of right, and not an "actual denial" of right. Accordingly, every new adverse entry in the revenue record relating to proprietary rights of a person in possession (actual or constructive) of the land regarding which the wrong entry is made, gives to such person, a fresh cause of action to institute the suit for declaration. The situation is, however, different in a case where the person in possession (actual or constructive) of the land regarding which the wrong entry is made, is ousted from such possession, besides a wrong entry in the revenue record. In such a case, the act of ousting him from the actual or constructive possession of the land, constitutes an "actual denial" of his rights, and does not remain a mere "apprehended or threatened denial". Therefore, in such a case, if the person injuriously affected by such an act of "actual denial" of his rights does not challenge the same within the prescribed limitation period, despite having knowledge thereof, then his right to do so becomes barred by law of limitation. 27. In an inheritance case, like the present one, a wrong mutation in the revenue record, as to inheritance rights does not affect the proprietary rights of a legal heir in the property, as the devolution of the ownership of the property on legal heirs takes place under the Islamic law, through inheritance immediately, without any formality including sanction of inheritance mutation. Therefore, a wrong mutation is a mere "apprehended or threatened denial" of right, not necessitating for the person aggrieved thereby to institute the suit. The position is, however, different when the co-sharer in possession of the joint property, on the basis of a wrong inheritance mutation, sells the joint property, or any part thereof exceeding his share, claiming him to be the exclusive owner thereof and transfers possession of the sold land to a third person, the purchaser. In such a circumstance, the co-sharer by his said act "actually denies" the rights of the other co-sharer, who is only in constructive possession of the same, and ousts him from such constructive possession also by transferring the possession of the sold land to a third person, the purchaser. In such circumstances, the right to sue accrues to the aggrieved co-sharer from the date of such sale, and transfer of actual possession of the sold land to the third person, the purchaser." Reliance in this respect can also be placed on Mst. Rabia Gula and others v. Muhammad Janan and others (2022 SCMR 1009). 19. After having an overview of the principles laid down in the cases cited above, it can safely be held that limitation would start running from the date of knowledge of the donor and not the petitioners. Even otherwise the petitioners nowhere in their plaint asserted that their father or the grandfather (donor), who both remained alive for considerable time after the sanctioning of gift mutation, were not aware of the same and thus could not challenge it during their lifetime. Contrarily sufficient material is available on the record to show that the petitioners were well in knowledge of the gift mutation right from its inception but they brought their suit on 30th July, 2003, which is clearly barred by time. 20. So far judgment in the case of Faqir Ali's heavily relied by learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, it is noticed that in the said case by way of gift mutation female members of the family were deprived from their share in inheritance of their predecessor. They instituted a suit for declaration alleging fraud and were ultimately succeeded to establish that the gift mutations were the product of fraud. In this background, Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that fraud vitiates even the most solemn transactions and any transaction that is based upon fraud is void and notwithstanding the bar of limitation. Courts would not act as helpless by stands and allow a fraud to perpetuate. Facts in the case of Noor Din (Deceased) supra were also almost the same, as such principles laid down therein are not applicable to the case at hand. In the case of Saadat Khan's above, the matter was relatable to estate of Isa Khan, who died and after his death inheritance mutation was sanctioned only in favour of his son Abdul Rehman on 23rd March, 1995, which was later on challenged in the year 2004 by Mst. Mehro and Mst. Afsro claiming themselves daughters of said Isa Khan and in this background, Supreme Court of Pakistan again observed that a suit instituted by a female legal heir for declaration of her ownership rights as to the property left by her deceased father in his inheritance, against her brother who denies her rights is thus governed by the provisions of Article 120. To decide whether such a suit is barred by limitation, the six-year period of limitation provided by Article 120 is to be counted from the time when the right to sue for declaration accrues as provided therein. The question, when the right to sue for declaration has accrued in a case, depends upon the facts and circumstances of that case, as it accrues when the defendant denies (actually) or is interested to deny (threatens) the rights of the plaintiff as per Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The principles laid down in the said judgment are same as were previously held in the case of Faqir Ali's supra. 21. From the facts and circumstances of the present case it is since established on the record that neither donor nor father of the petitioners challenged the gift mutation in their lifetime and the petitioners even did not assert in their plaint either of them were not aware about the gift mutation, so their suit becomes badly barred by time. Even otherwise in view of availability of material qua the fact that donee gifted some portion of land to the petitioners and they accepted the same, there remains no room to infer that they were not having knowledge of the gift. Suit was thus rightly adjudged as barred by time by the appellate court. 22. Though there is divergence of views in the courts below and conclusion are contrary to each other but this Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction is supposed to make comparative analysis of both the judgments in order to examine their validity on the touchstones of Section 115 of "C.P.C". It is cardinal principle of law that in the matter of giving preference to the judgments of lower courts while analyzing the same in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the preference and regard is always given to the findings of the appellate court, unless those are suffering with any legal infirmity or material irregularity. Reference in this respect, if needed can safely be made to the case of Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through L.Rs. and others (2013 SCMR 1300). Relevant extract from the same is reproduced herein below:- "12???We have also taken into consideration the judgment of the Appellate Court which is based on proper appraisal of evidence on record and the findings of the Appellate Court are to be preferred as it has been held by this Court in the cases of Madan Gopal and others v. Maran Bepari and others (PLD 1969 SC 617) that if the findings of fact reached by the first appellate Court is at variance with that of the trial Court, the former will ordinarily prevail, although it would not possess the same value or sanctity as a concurrent finding." This view also finds support from the cases of Muhammad Shafi and others v. Sultan Mahmood and others (2010 SCMR 827)??.." The above view also finds support from the cases of Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar and 2 others (2015 SCMR 1) and Muhammad Hafeez and another v. District Judge, Karachi East and another (2008 SCMR 398). 23. After having a comparative analysis of both the judgments, I am of the firm view that the learned District Judge, Rawalpindi has rightly interfered with the judgment passed by the learned Civil Judge, Rawalpindi. The petitioners have failed to point out any illegality or material irregularity in the impugned judgment, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The instant petition thus fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. SA/M-133/L Revision dismissed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Scope---Interference by revisional court---Principles---Petitioners challenged the judgment and decree of the appellate court under S. 115, C.P.C., contending that the appellate court misread evidence and wrongly set aside the trial court’s decision---Held, revisional jurisdiction is limited to correcting legal infirmities and jurisdictional errors rather than reappraising evidence---Preference is given to the findings of the appellate court unless they suffer from any legal infirmity or material irregularity---Appellate court’s judgment was based on proper appraisal of evidence and correctly reversed the trial court’s findings---Revisional court cannot interfere in concurrent factual determinations unless they are perverse or based on misreading of evidence---Petition dismissed. ------Cited Cases: Muhammad Nawaz v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan (2013 SCMR 1300) Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar (2015 SCMR 1) Muhammad Hafeez v. District Judge Karachi East (2008 SCMR 398) (b) Gift under Islamic Law ----Gift (Hiba)---Proof of gift---Effect of non-challenging of gift by donor---Legal heirs’ right to contest gift---Mutation entry and ownership rights---Gift mutation No.633 was attested on 18th September 1962 in favor of the donee (Muhammad Khan), who possessed and enjoyed ownership of the suit land---Donor (Abdul Rehman) remained alive for several years after the attestation of mutation but never challenged the transaction---Held, where a donor does not dispute a gift during his lifetime, his successors-in-interest are barred from challenging it on grounds of estoppel and acquiescence---Mutation alone does not confer title, but its long-standing acknowledgment in the revenue record without challenge by the donor reinforces its validity---Admissions by the petitioners’ own witness (PW2) further supported the gift’s legitimacy---Petitioners’ challenge was meritless. ------Cited Cases: Ghulam Abbas v. Muhammad Shafi (2016 SCMR 1403) Muhammad Rustam v. Mst. Makhan Jan (2013 SCMR 299) Jamila Khatoon v. Aish Muhammad (2011 SCMR 222) ------(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ----Art. 120---Suit for declaration---Challenge to gift mutation on grounds of fraud---Limitation---Accrual of cause of action---Fraud and misrepresentation---Held, a suit for declaration must be filed within six years from the accrual of cause of action under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Limitation begins when the plaintiff gains knowledge of an adverse claim---In the present case, the gift mutation was sanctioned in 1962, and both the donor and the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest remained alive for several decades without challenging it---Petitioners' claim that they only discovered the fraud in 2003 was unsubstantiated and contradicted by evidence, including entries in the revenue record and prior transactions involving the petitioners themselves---Suit was time-barred and rightly dismissed by the appellate court. ------Cited Cases: Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2022 SC 353) Mst. Rabia Gula v. Muhammad Janan (2022 SCMR 1009) (d) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ----S. 42---Declaration of ownership rights---When right to sue accrues---Actual denial vs. threatened denial of rights---Effect of long-standing revenue entries---Petitioners alleged fraud in the attestation of a decades-old gift mutation but failed to provide particulars of fraud as required under O. VI, R. 4, C.P.C.---Held, mere entry in revenue records does not extinguish ownership rights, but when coupled with possession and acceptance by all parties over an extended period, it strengthens the donee’s claim---Right to sue accrues when an adverse claim is made, not when the plaintiff subjectively claims to have learned of it---Petitioners’ delay in filing suit was unjustified. ------Cited Cases: Faqir Ali v. Sakina Bibi (PLD 2022 SC 85) Noor Din v. Pervaiz Akhtar (2023 SCMR 1928) Saadat Khan v. Shahid-ur-Rehman (PLD 2023 SC 362) (e) Administration of Justice ----Judicial preference for appellate court’s findings---Interference by revisional courts---Held, when findings of the appellate court are based on proper appreciation of evidence, revisional courts do not interfere unless there is a jurisdictional error or a gross misreading of evidence---Appellate court correctly set aside the trial court’s decree, and no legal infirmity was found---Petition dismissed. ------Disposition: Civil revision dismissed. Judgment of the appellate court upheld. Petitioners failed to establish fraud, and their suit was barred by limitation.

Summary: Background: This civil revision petition was filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against the judgment of the District Judge, Rawalpindi, dated 1st November 2012, which allowed an appeal by the respondents and overturned the trial court's decree in favor of the petitioners. The case revolves around a land dispute over 101 Kanal and 19 Marla of land (the "suit land") originally owned by Abdul Rehman, who purportedly gifted the land to his son, through mutation No. 633, dated 18th September 1962. The petitioners, as successors of Abdul Rehman's other son, Muhammad Afsar, challenged the gift mutation, claiming it was fraudulent and sought declaration, partition, and injunction against the respondents. -----Issues: 1- Whether the gift mutation was valid or the result of fraud. ----2- Whether the non-challenge of the gift by the donor (Abdul Rehman) during his lifetime affects the case. ----3- Whether the suit was barred by limitation. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Validity of Gift Transaction: The petitioners alleged that the gift mutation was fraudulent, but the court found that the petitioners failed to provide specific details of the alleged fraud as required by law. Additionally, one of the petitioners’ witnesses, Bashir Ahmad (PW2), admitted in his cross-examination that Abdul Rehman had validly made the gift in favor of Muhammad Khan. Since the mutation was incorporated into the revenue records and the donee (Muhammad Khan) enjoyed ownership and possession without challenge, the court held that the gift was valid. --Non-challenge of the Gift by the Donor: Abdul Rehman, the donor, did not challenge the gift mutation during his lifetime, even though he lived for several years after the mutation was effected. The court noted that under the principle of acquiescence and estoppel, the petitioners (as successors of Muhammad Afsar) were precluded from challenging the gift since neither Abdul Rehman nor Muhammad Afsar contested it during their lifetimes. The court cited multiple precedents affirming that the donor's failure to challenge the gift precludes the successors from doing so later. --Limitation: The court held that the suit was barred by limitation. The gift mutation was effected in 1962, and the suit was only filed in 2003. Under the Limitation Act, the right to challenge such a mutation would have accrued when the petitioners became aware of it. The petitioners, however, failed to prove that they were unaware of the mutation for several decades. Additionally, the petitioners had benefited from the donee's land through a gift, further supporting the conclusion that they had knowledge of the gift mutation. The court dismissed the civil revision petition, affirming the appellate court's decision that the suit was barred by time, the gift was valid, and the petitioners were estopped from challenging it. The appellate court’s findings were deemed correct, and no legal irregularity or material error was found in the judgment. -----Citations/Precedents: FAQIR ALI vs. SAKINA BIBI (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 85) NOOR DIN (DECEASED) vs. PERVAIZ AKHTAR (2023 SCMR 1928) GHULAM ABBAS vs. MOHAMMAD SHAFI (2016 SCMR 1403) MUHAMMAD RUSTAM vs. Mst. MAKHAN JAN (2013 SCMR 299) Mst. RABIA GULA vs. MUHAMMAD JANAN (2022 SCMR 1009) MUHAMMAD NAWAZ vs. HAJI MUHAMMAD BARAN KHAN (2013 SCMR 1300) AMJAD IKRAM vs. Mst. ASIYA KAUSAR (2015 SCMR 1)

Summary: Background: The appellant, the Additional Collector of Customs, filed an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, which favored the respondent, M/s K. S. Sulemanji Esmailji & Sons Pvt. Ltd. The dispute arose over the classification of goods imported by the respondent, specifically “BOPP” Printed Laminated Packaging Film (Metalized). The respondent sought a refund on customs duties, claiming that an incorrect classification had led to an overpayment of customs duty at 25% instead of 20%. After referring the matter to the Classification Committee of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), the committee classified the goods under a heading that maintained the 25% duty rate. Both the Tribunal and the High Court rejected the committee's ruling, favoring the respondent's classification, which attracted a 20% duty rate. The appellant challenged this decision in the Supreme Court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the classification ruling of the Classification Committee under PCT Heading 3920.2040 was correct. 2- Whether the Tribunal and the High Court erred in substituting their own classification of the goods without considering the ruling of the Classification Committee. 3- Whether the High Court and the Tribunal failed to properly interpret Rule 3(c) of the General Rules for Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court. The Court held that the Classification Committee’s determination under PCT Heading 3920.2040, which attracted a 25% customs duty, was correct and in accordance with the applicable rules. The Committee had relied on the Customs House Laboratory’s analysis and the Explanatory Notes to the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System, issued by the World Customs Organisation. The Court emphasized that the Classification Committee, established by the FBR, has technical expertise in determining the correct classification of imported goods. It further ruled that the Tribunal and the High Court had overstepped their bounds by disregarding the Committee's ruling without demonstrating that the Committee’s decision was arbitrary or in violation of the relevant rules and guidelines. The Supreme Court noted that Rule 3(c) of the Rules of Interpretation had been correctly applied by the Committee, and the classification under the heading "Others" was inappropriate as it pertained to films other than BOPP. Thus, the rejection of the respondent’s refund application was restored, and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant. ----Citations/Precedents: Rule 3(c) of the General Rules for Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969. Explanatory Notes of the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (World Customs Organisation).

Summary: ''Articles: 199, 04, 10, 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.Sections: 46, 54, 61, 62, 167, 551 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.Rules: 23.17, 26.8 Police Rules, 1934.I) Arrest and detention: Arrest of a person in one case is arrest in all cases already registered against the person.II) Information Sheet ( Parcha 12) under police Rules, 1934.III) No action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation, or property of any citizen under the Constitution is permissible, subject to law.IV) Right of fair trial: every person for determination of his civil rights and obligation or in any criminal charge against him shall be entitled to a fair trial and due process.V) Superior Courts jealously safeguard the rights of citizens. On release in one case, re-arrested of a person in another case(s) already registered against such person, prior to his arrest, is not warranted by Law'' ---- The petitioner sought judicial intervention to obtain information about criminal cases and inquiries registered against him, emphasizing his right to this information under Article 19-A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to access information in matters of public importance.The court's deliberation touched upon various legal and constitutional provisions regarding arrest and detention, notably Sections 46, 54, 61, 62, and 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.), and Police Rules, 1934. These legal frameworks outline the procedure for arrest without a warrant, the reporting of such arrests, and the permissible duration of police custody. The court highlighted the necessity for law enforcement to adhere to these legal mandates to ensure that arrests and detentions are conducted lawfully and do not infringe upon the fundamental rights of individuals.The judgment also reflected on the broader constitutional protections afforded to individuals, including Articles 4, 9, 10, and 10-A of the Constitution, which safeguard the rights to legal treatment, life, liberty, and fair trial. The court underscored the importance of these articles in protecting individuals from unlawful actions by the state that could detrimentally affect their life, liberty, body, reputation, or property.The court criticized the practice of re-arresting individuals in successive cases after they secure bail in one case, labeling it as an illegal practice that undermines the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. Drawing from the principles established in the cases "Mst. Razia Pervez and another vs. The Senior Superintendent of Police Multan and others" (1992 P Cr LJ 131) and "Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad vs. E-Movers (Pvt) Limited" (2022 SCMR 1021), the judgment emphasized the sanctity of personal liberty and the due process of law.The Peshawar High Court directed the respondents to provide the petitioner with the requested information about the criminal cases and inquiries against him. It further ordered that the respondents refrain from the practice of re-arresting individuals in a manner that violates their constitutional rights. The judgment serves as a reminder of the judiciary's role in upholding the constitutional guarantees of fair treatment, liberty, and justice, ensuring that state actions remain within the bounds of law and due process.

Summary: Javed Iqbal, the respondent, was employed as a Bio-Medical Engineer on a contract basis with the Punjab Employees Social Security Institution (PESSI), Lahore, since 04.02.2009. His contract was extended periodically. However, unlike other contract employees, Iqbal was not regularized. He filed Writ Petition, during which he was granted interim relief that his services would not be terminated until further notice. Despite this, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him under the Punjab Employees, Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, leading to his suspension and eventually dismissal from service on 05.05.2021. His departmental appeal against the dismissal was rejected on 21.03.2022. --- The main issue was whether the disciplinary actions taken against the respondent, leading to his dismissal and the subsequent rejection of his appeal, were justifiable in light of the interim relief granted by the High Court and the procedural and substantive aspects of his employment and dismissal --- The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the Lahore High Court's judgment that reinstated Javed Iqbal with all back benefits and directed the consideration of his regularization. ---The Supreme Court found no irregularity or perversity in the High Court's judgments. It noted that the allegations against Iqbal regarding poor performance and misconduct were not substantiated by evidence, as his performance evaluations from 2009 to 2020 were satisfactory. The Court also highlighted the mala fide intentions of the petitioners, evidenced by the timing of the disciplinary actions, which were initiated after Iqbal had sought legal redress. Furthermore, the Court observed that the High Court had thoroughly addressed all legal and factual aspects of the case. --- The judgment underscores the importance of fair and transparent disciplinary proceedings, especially when an employee is under the protection of interim relief granted by a court. It also emphasizes the need for employers to substantiate allegations against employees with clear and convincing evidence. --- This case reaffirms the judiciary's role in protecting employee rights against arbitrary and unjust disciplinary actions, particularly in the context of contractual employment within public institutions. It also highlights the need for administrative bodies to act in good faith and adhere to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

Summary: Background:The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in its appellate jurisdiction, addressed Civil Petitions challenging the judgments from the Islamabad High Court dated 27.04.2021, among others, related to the interpretation of Section 22(1) and (2) of the Employees? Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. The main issue revolved around the entitlement of insured persons to old-age pension, specifically the applicability of an exception under Section 22(2) regarding the required years of contributions based on the age of the insured persons at specific cut-off dates.----Issues:The determination of the stage at which the exception under Section 22(2) of the Employees? Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 becomes applicable.Whether the exception is contingent upon the age of the insured person at the time of entering insurable employment or at the specific cut-off dates provided in the Act.-----Holding/Reasoning:The Supreme Court held that the exception under Section 22(2) of the Act is not universally applicable based on the age of the insured person upon entering insurable employment. Instead, the exception applies strictly in relation to the age of the insured person at two specific cut-off dates: (i) the first day of July 1976, when the Act was implemented, and (ii) the date on which the Act became applicable to the industry or establishment in question. The Court clarified that the age of the insured person alone does not trigger the exception under Section 22(2); the age criterion must coincide with the relevant cut-off dates. Therefore, an insured person employed after these dates, irrespective of their age, would not qualify for the reduced years of contribution exception provided in Section 22(2). The petitions filed by the Employees? Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) were allowed, converting them into appeals, while those filed by the insured persons were dismissed.----Citations/Precedents:The Court?s decision was informed by the principle that statutory provisions, especially in welfare legislation like the Employees? Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, should be interpreted liberally to fulfill the objective of the statute. The Court referenced its duty under Article 38 of the Constitution to promote social and economic well-being through compulsory social insurance, emphasizing the Act?s role in providing security and benefits to employees. The judgment reconciled conflicting interpretations from different High Courts by emphasizing the importance of the specific cut-off dates in the application of Section 22(2)?s exception.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964) --- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.36, 48, 74 & O.XXI, R.8---Suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---Dower, return of---Obligation upon wife---Scope---Execution of decrees---Principles---Scope and procedural framework---Respondent No.1, during marriage with the petitioner, filed a suit before the family court seeking dissolution of marriage through khula along with recovery of dowry articles and maintenance---During the pendency of proceedings, the family court dissolved the marriage by way of khula subject to the condition that 25 tolas of gold be returned to the respondent at the time of dissolving marriage as dower---The petitioner later filed an execution petition seeking enforcement of the said order, which was dismissed---The matter travelled to various forums including the High Court and upon remand, the final appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the district court---The petitioner then filed the present constitutional petition challenging the order of the family court dismissing execution as well as the appellate judgment--- Held: Part II of the C.P.C. dealt with execution and its Ss.36 &74 were relevant--- Moreover, Order XXI of the C.P.C. prescribed a detailed procedure for the execution of decrees and orders---According to S.36 of C.P.C., petition for execution of orders was competent/maintainable---Where a court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a lis and to pass orders then it could also enforce such orders---It was an admitted fact that order passed by family court whereby decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula subject to return of dower i.e. 25 tolas of gold by respondent No.1/wife as well as judgment and decree of the appellate court with the same condition were still intact and the respondent No.1/wife had not challenged them before the appellate forums---Respondent No.1/wife failed to justify how without the return of dower, respondent had contracted second marriage and failed to provide any reasoning for non-compliance of orders passed by courts below---Respondent No.1/wife was directed to return the dower i.e. 25 tolas of gold to the petitioner/husband---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Haji Abdul Wali Khan and another v. Muhammad Hanif and another 1991 SCMR 2457 rel. Mohammad Wajid Murshid and another v. Silk Bank Limited 2021 CLD 744; Muhammad Boota through LRs and others v. Roshan through LRs and others 2017 CLC Note 150; Tajamal Abbas v. Inamullah 2018 CLC 1833; Shaikh Muhammad Tariq v. Messrs Premium Developers through CEO 2022 YlR 1867 and Izhar Alam Farooqi, Advocate and another v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and others 2008 CLD 149 ref. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964) --- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 10--- Suit for dissolution of marriage---Preliminary decree, passing of---Effect---Dower, return of---Obligation upon wife---When a preliminary decree for dissolution of marriage or khula, in terms of S.10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, is granted then the wife shall be ordered to return the dower already received by her. Sohail Ahmed v. Mst. Samreena Rasheed Memon and others No. C.P. 488-K of 2023 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----S.48---Execution of decrees---If a decree has not been satisfied then the decree-holder can move the court for a number of times for execution of a decree within a period of six years. Lall Zaman v. Safdar Ali Khan 1996 MLD 860 ref. Abdul Rashid Pirzada for Petitioner. Raja Saif-ur-Rehman and Asim Riaz Awan for Respondent.