Summary: 1. Where preliminary inquiry/investigation is started and conducted before the registration of case therefore element of deliberations on the part of prosecution cannot be ruled out and in that eventuality such investigation cannot be safely relied upon for the purpose of conviction. 2. Where ocular account furnished by eyewitnesses is not trustworthy and confidence inspiring and is not supported by any medical evidence and the occurrence has not been proved in the mode and manner as alleged in the Crime Report then such ocular account cannot be relied upon. 3. There is no cavil with the proposition that merely because a witness has stamp of injury on his/her person is not per-se tantamount to a stamp of credence on his/her testimony. 4. If eyes of the deceased are open at the time of preparation of inquest-report then presence of eyewitnesses being close relatives of the deceased becomes doubtful. 5. Prosecution is not bound to set a motive however when once it opted to set a motive then it has to be proved and in case of its failure to do so benefit thereof has to be given to the accused. 6. Mere abscondance cannot be made a ground for the conviction of an accused as disappearance of a person after the occurrence is but natural if he is involved in a criminal case rightly or wrongly. 7. For giving benefit to an accused it is not essential that there should be many circumstances creating doubts even a single doubt is sufficient to extend its benefit to an accused person.

Summary: The petitioner claimed that impugned gift dated 27.02.1999 was made by the donor/father was angry with the respondent/daughter on account of her love marriage contracted in the year 1980. The gift was challenged within two years from the date of death of the father. Held: Allah (Subhanahu wa Ta'ala) has fixed share of inheritance and Holy Prophet (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) has ordained not to cause harm to anyone and be just with the children and therefore, if a father gifts his property to his son (the petitioner) alone, with the sole intention of depriving his daughter (the respondent) of her rightful inheritance, the father inflicts harm?both material and moral. Such a gift is considered unjust and contrary to the teachings of Islam. The rationale is that such transactions contradict the fundamental objectives of Shariah, which seeks to uphold justice and equity in the family matters. (a) Islamic Law—Gift (Hiba) and Inheritance: —Validity of gift—Discriminatory treatment of legal heirs—Effect. Islamic law permits lifetime transfers of property through gifts (Hiba), provided they meet essential legal conditions: (i) declaration by the donor, (ii) acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession. However, gifts intended to unjustly exclude other rightful heirs contravene Islamic principles of fairness and equity. The donor, being the father of both the petitioner and respondent, allegedly gifted the suit property to the petitioner (son) due to anger against the respondent (daughter) over her marriage. Such motivation, if aimed at depriving a legal heir of inheritance, is contrary to the teachings of Islam, as emphasized in Sahih al-Bukhari, Hadith No. 2587 and Sunan Ibn Majah, Hadith No. 2341. The Court held that a gift executed under such circumstances is legally impermissible and does not override the respondent’s right to inheritance. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: —Art. 129(g)—Adverse presumption—Failure to produce key witness—Effect. The petitioner claimed that the gift mutation was attested in the presence of a key witness, Yaseen. However, the said witness was never produced before the Court, nor was any attempt made to introduce secondary evidence in his absence. The best available evidence was withheld, triggering an adverse presumption under Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Court ruled that withholding such crucial evidence further weakened the petitioner’s claim and rendered the alleged oral gift unproven. (c) Contract Act, 1872: —S. 16—Undue influence—Gift executed under distress—Legal consequences. The petitioner argued that the donor (father) gifted the property to him due to his continuous distress over the respondent’s marriage. The Court observed that distress over a period of 19 years suggested undue influence, as the donor may have lacked the mental capacity to make a free and rational decision. Under S. 16 of the Contract Act, 1872, a transaction is voidable if one party dominates the will of another due to authority, fiduciary relations, or mental distress. Given that the donor participated in the respondent’s second marriage, it was improbable that he remained hostile for decades and transferred the entire property solely out of resentment. The Court held that the gift, even if executed, was legally questionable. (d) Civil Procedure—Concurrent findings of fact: —Scope of revisional jurisdiction—High Court’s power to interfere. It is a settled principle that revisional courts do not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless they suffer from illegality, jurisdictional defect, misreading of evidence, or procedural impropriety. The petitioner failed to establish any such grounds. The High Court, therefore, upheld the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, dismissing the petitioner’s revision petition. ----Disposition: Petition dismissed. Gift mutation declared invalid. Judgment of lower courts upheld.

Summary: Acquittal upheld ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- ----S. 302(b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Identification parade---Doubtful prosecution case---Principles for proper identification parade---Case against accused not proved beyond a reasonable doubt---Benefit of doubt to be extended---Accused persons acquitted---Prosecution's appeal against acquittal dismissed. Accused were initially convicted by the Trial Court for murder and related offences, with Rashid sentenced to death, Haider Ali and Naveed to life imprisonment under S. 302(b), PPC, and Talha sentenced under S. 302(b) read with S. 109, PPC for abetment. The High Court upheld the convictions of Rashid, Haider Ali, and Naveed but acquitted Talha for lack of direct involvement. The Supreme Court reappraised the evidence and found the prosecution case fraught with inconsistencies and procedural lapses. The FIR was lodged against unknown persons, and the identification parade, conducted two months after the incident, failed to meet the legal standards laid down by superior courts. Witnesses did not attribute specific roles to the accused, and the injured witness, Muzaffar Hussain, never testified. Moreover, improvements in witnesses’ statements during the trial rendered their testimony unreliable. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, extended the benefit of doubt to the accused, and acquitted them accordingly. The appeal by the State against the acquittal of Talha was dismissed as infructuous. Cited Cases: - Kanwar Anwaar Ali v. The State PLD 2019 SC 488 - Subha Sadiq v. The State 2025 SCMR 50 - Abdul Samad v. The State 2025 SCP 31 - Abdul Hayee and Abdullah alias Ghazali & another v. The State 2025 SCMR 281 - Syed Fida Hussain Shah v. The State 2024 SCMR 1622

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Drugs Act, 1976 (XXXI of 1976) –– Sections 17, 18 & 19: Inspection and seizure of drugs – Due process – Non-compliance with statutory requirements – Validity –– Drug Inspector conducted an inspection of the appellant’s premises, alleging sale and stocking of allopathic drugs without a Drug Sale License, without warranties, and with spurious alternative medicines –– The prosecution failed to prove compliance with mandatory procedural requirements under Section 18 of the Drugs Act, 1976, particularly regarding search, seizure, and notification of the accused –– No independent witnesses were associated with the search despite the statutory obligation to do so under Section 18(1)(e) of the Drugs Act, 1976, and Section 103 of the Cr.P.C. –– Drug Inspector’s failure to adhere to the procedural safeguards under Section 19 of the Drugs Act, 1976, including proper division and handling of seized drug samples, rendered the entire prosecution case doubtful –– Held, compliance with statutory provisions is mandatory, and non-compliance vitiates the prosecution case. [Muhammad Ismail & Others v. The State (2017 SCMR 898) relied upon.] (b) Punjab Drug Rules, 2007 – Rule 5(3) – Show Cause Notice – Right to fair hearing: Failure to serve a valid show cause notice – Violation of due process – Effect –– The Drugs Act, 1976, and the Punjab Drug Rules, 2007, require that before initiating prosecution, a show cause notice must be served to the accused, granting an opportunity for a personal hearing –– In the present case, the record did not establish that the show cause notice was received by the appellant or that he willfully avoided appearance before the District Quality Control Board –– Furthermore, the meeting of the District Quality Control Board was conducted an hour before the scheduled time given in the notice, demonstrating procedural irregularity –– No secondary notice was issued upon non-appearance of the appellant, contrary to standard practice –– Held, failure to ensure proper service of a show cause notice before prosecution vitiates the proceedings. (c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) – Section 103: Search and seizure – Non-association of independent witnesses – Effect –– Search and seizure conducted in contravention of Section 103 Cr.P.C., which mandates the presence of two respectable inhabitants of the locality –– Drug Inspector failed to associate any independent witnesses despite the statutory requirement –– Mere notation by the Drug Inspector that no witness was available, without any supporting evidence or compliance with Section 103(5) Cr.P.C., renders the recovery proceedings doubtful –– Held, failure to adhere to legal requirements for search and seizure vitiates the prosecution case. (d) Criminal trial – Benefit of doubt – Standard of proof: Failure to prove charges beyond reasonable doubt – Acquittal –– Prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot succeed merely on probabilities –– In the present case, the prosecution evidence suffered from inconsistencies, procedural lapses, and non-compliance with mandatory statutory provisions –– Prosecution witnesses contradicted the record, particularly regarding whether the appellant signed the Form-5 seizure memo –– Drug Inspector’s own documents contained conflicting assertions –– Supreme Court precedent affirms that even a single doubt in the prosecution case is sufficient for acquittal –– Held, appellant entitled to the benefit of doubt and acquitted of all charges. [Naveed Asghar & Two Others v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600), Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shahzad (2024 SCMR 51), Muhammad Nawaz & Another v. The State & Others (2024 SCMR 1731), Rehmat Ullah & Two Others v. The State & Others (2024 SCMR 1782) relied upon.] -----Disposition: Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence set aside. Appellant acquitted of all charges.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 61, 167, 439---Police custody remand---Scope---Legal parameters---Where a person accused of an offence is arrested without a warrant, he cannot be detained by police beyond 24 hours except under a Magistrate’s special order under Section 167, Cr.P.C.---If an investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation is well-founded, the Magistrate may authorize further detention in police custody, but not beyond 15 days---Duty of the Magistrate includes reviewing police diaries, assessing the accusations against the accused, and evaluating whether sufficient evidence exists to justify police custody remand---In cases of scheduled offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the Administrative Judge under Section 13(2) exercises powers akin to a Magistrate for granting remand under Section 21-E of the Act, which corresponds with Sections 61 and 167, Cr.P.C. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ----Ss. 6, 7, 13(2), 19(1), 21-E---Scheduled offences---Grant of police custody remand in terrorism-related cases---Scope and judicial application---Police custody remand is a crucial pre-trial mechanism that allows investigating officers to gather evidence, verify facts, cross-check statements, and uncover co-accused or criminal networks---Refusal to grant police custody remand without valid justification undermines the investigation of heinous offences---Administrative Judge must exercise judicial discretion while deciding such remand requests to ensure that investigation is not frustrated by premature judicial custody remand. (c) Criminal Law ----S. 365, 365-A, P.P.C.---Kidnapping for ransom---Allegation against accused---Criminal liability---Accused allegedly abducted the complainant’s son and subsequently demanded ransom of Rs. 2 crore via WhatsApp call, leading to the addition of Sections 365-A, P.P.C., and 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, in the F.I.R.---Police raid on the accused’s residence, based on search warrant, resulted in a violent armed encounter where law enforcement officers suffered firearm injuries---Heavy arms and ammunition recovered from accused’s house---Accused had a previous criminal record---Police sought custody remand for further investigation, but the Administrative Judge declined the request and remanded the accused to judicial custody, despite the well-founded accusations. (d) Criminal Law ----Ss. 324, 353, P.P.C. read with S. 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 & Ss. 23(1)(a), 25 of Sindh Arms Act, 2013---Attempt to murder, assault on police, and illegal possession of arms---Accused allegedly resisted arrest, engaged in an armed encounter with police, and injured law enforcement officers---Three separate F.I.Rs. lodged for these offences---Administrative Judge denied police custody remand solely on accused’s complaint of maltreatment, without examining the necessity of further investigation. (e) Judicial Discretion ----Powers of Administrative Judge---Improper exercise of jurisdiction---Failure to consider police remand in a terrorism-related case---Administrative Judge, instead of granting short-term police remand with directions for a medical examination of accused, straightaway remanded accused to judicial custody---Such refusal adversely affected the investigation of serious offences---Administrative Judge’s decision found arbitrary and contrary to law. (f) Judicial Misconduct ----Tampering with remand orders---Use of correction fluid (“whito”) to alter remand order from “police custody” to “judicial custody” without initials---Improper influence alleged---Father of accused present in the chamber of the Administrative Judge for two hours during remand proceedings---Serious procedural irregularities observed in remand process. (g) Joint Investigation Team (JIT) ----S. 19(1) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Jurisdiction of Administrative Judge to order JIT constitution---Scope---JIT formation is a prerogative of the Government, not the judiciary---No party requested JIT formation, yet Administrative Judge passed such an order without lawful authority---Such act exceeded judicial jurisdiction. (h) High Court’s Supervisory Powers ----S. 439, Cr.P.C.---High Court’s power to correct illegal remand orders---Administrative Judges and Magistrates are answerable to the High Court for irregularities in granting remands under Sections 167, Cr.P.C., and 21-E of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Impugned orders remanding accused to judicial custody instead of police custody were illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to law---High Court set aside impugned orders and directed Anti-Terrorism Court No. II, Karachi, to decide police remand afresh. Disposition: Impugned orders dated 10.02.2025 and 11.02.2025 passed by the Administrative Judge were declared illegal and set aside. Case remanded to the Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No. II, Karachi, for fresh orders on police custody remand. Registrar directed to place order before Acting Chief Justice and Home Secretary for possible reassignment of Administrative Judge’s powers under Section 13(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws—Maintenance—Scope and Interpretation: ----Maintenance of wife and children---Extent of maintenance---Inclusion of medical treatment---Scope. Petitioner challenged the inclusion of medical treatment expenses under the head of maintenance for his ex-wife and minor son. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming that maintenance is not limited to basic necessities like food, clothing, and shelter but extends to all essential needs, including medical expenses. The Court rejected the argument that medical treatment was outside the scope of maintenance, holding that a father/husband is responsible for ensuring the overall well-being of his dependents, including their healthcare. The Court relied on Islamic principles and legal precedents, emphasizing that maintenance should be interpreted broadly to reflect contemporary social and economic realities. ----Cited Cases: Qudrat Ullah v. Additional District Judge, Renala Khurd (PLD 2024 SC 581) Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum (PLD 2022 SC 686) Humayun Hassan v. Arslan Humayun (PLD 2013 SC 557) (b) Islamic Law—Maintenance of Wife and Children—Religious and Legal Obligations: ----Quranic injunctions and Hadith---Husband’s duty to maintain wife and children---Legal framework. The Court referred to Quranic injunctions and Islamic jurisprudence, stating that men are responsible for the protection and financial support of their wives and children. The interpretation of maintenance must align with Islamic teachings, which emphasize care, well-being, and financial security of dependents. ----Cited Cases: Azizah Mohd, "Muslim Wife’s Rights to Maintenance: Husband’s Duty to Maintain a Working Wife in Islamic Law" (2010) 18 IIUMLJ 103 Al-Mubarakpuri, Tuhfat al-Ahwadhi, Vol. 4, Maktabat al-Salafiyyah, Medina (1965), p. 326. (c) Family Law—Quantum of Maintenance—Judicial Review: ----Assessment of maintenance by Family Court---Enhancement by appellate court---Interference by High Court---Scope. The Family Court awarded Rs. 12,000 per month as maintenance for the minor, which was enhanced to Rs. 20,000 by the Appellate Court. The High Court refused to interfere, holding that the quantum of maintenance depends on the financial status of the father and the standard of living of the family. The Supreme Court affirmed the broad interpretation of maintenance, ruling that courts have the discretion to assess and enhance maintenance based on financial ability and reasonable needs of the dependents. (d) Civil Procedure—Scope of Judicial Review in Maintenance Cases: ----Limited scope of interference by High Court and Supreme Court---Findings of Family and Appellate Courts. The Court held that Family and Appellate Courts’ findings on maintenance are matters of fact and judicial discretion, which do not warrant interference by the High Court or Supreme Court unless there is a gross misinterpretation of law. The petitioner's failure to prove any legal error justified the dismissal of the petition. ----Disposition: Petition dismissed. Leave to appeal refused.

Summary: Cancellation of Bail set aside ---(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---Ss. 435, 439 & 497(5)---Cancellation of bail---Principles governing cancellation of bail---Addition of new sections to invoke the prohibitory clause---Scope Petitioner challenged the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad (West), whereby post-arrest bail granted to him in FIR No. 496, dated 28.07.2023, under Sections 420, 468, 471, 381, and 34, PPC, was recalled on the ground that Section 467, PPC was later added, bringing the case under the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. The court noted that the investigation officer (I.O) had not included Section 467, PPC in the remand applications but subsequently added it after the grant of bail, which was not disclosed before the Magistrate. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Tanveer v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 733) held that bail cannot be cancelled merely due to the addition of a new section if the prosecution’s conduct indicates mala fide intent. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Saeed Ullah v. The State (2023 SCMR 1397) laid down that bail may only be cancelled in exceptional circumstances, such as misuse of bail, interference with prosecution evidence, or likelihood of absconding. The court found that none of these grounds were present, and the prosecution’s act of adding a new section post-bail to bring the case under the prohibitory clause was an attempt to misuse the legal process. Consequently, the cancellation of bail by the Additional Sessions Judge was declared unjustified, and the recall order was set aside. ----- Cited Cases: Muhammad Tanveer v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 733) Saeed Ullah v. The State (2023 SCMR 1397) Muzafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Imran Aziz (2004 SCMR 231) The State v. Muhammad Sarwar (2017 SCMR 1993) ----- Disposition: Revision petition accepted—Cancellation of bail set aside—Bail order restored as its recall was based on mala fide and procedural impropriety.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Criminal Trial—Presumption of Innocence—Burden of Proof ---- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A ---- An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt through legally admissible, confidence-inspiring, and reliable evidence. The mere gravity of the offense cannot override constitutional guarantees of a fair trial. The burden of proof does not shift to the accused, and failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden entitles the accused to an acquittal. (Rel. PLD 2021 SC 600, 1992 SCMR 1134, 1995 SCMR 1377) (b) Delay in Lodging FIR—Effect on Prosecution Case ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 154 ---- An unexplained delay in lodging the FIR casts doubt on the credibility of the prosecution’s case. In the present case, the FIR was registered after a delay of 3 hours and 35 minutes despite the short distance (13 km) between the police station and the crime scene. The delay, coupled with the failure of eyewitnesses to explain it, suggested post-occurrence deliberation and manipulation of the case. (Rel. 2019 SCMR 274, 2022 SCMR 1527, 2022 SCMR 393) (c) Delay in Conducting Postmortem—Presumption of Falsehood ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129 ---- A significant delay in conducting the postmortem examination is often an indication that the FIR was lodged after deliberation and fabrication. In the present case, postmortem was conducted 12 to 18 hours after the incident, raising suspicions that time was used to fabricate a false story. The absence of immediate medical examination suggests the presence of fake witnesses. (Rel. 2011 SCMR 1190, 2016 SCMR 1628, 2012 SCMR 327, 2017 SCMR 54, 2018 SCMR 326, 2020 SCMR 192) (d) Ocular Testimony—Unreliable Eyewitnesses—Unnatural Conduct ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 17 & 129 ---- Eyewitnesses must be natural, independent, and credible. In the present case, the eyewitnesses (PW-3 and PW-4) were close relatives of the deceased, which rendered their testimony interested. Their conduct at the time of the incident was unnatural as they failed to intervene despite being close relatives of the victim. The owner of the "Dara" where the alleged murder took place was not produced, and the complainant’s uncle (who was a named witness) was deliberately withheld, justifying an adverse inference against the prosecution. (Rel. 2008 SCMR 95, 2015 SCMR 315, 2018 SCMR 326, 2006 SCMR 1846, 2010 SCMR 385, 2024 SCMR 1507) (e) Improvement in Witness Testimony—Legal Effect ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 151 ---- Material improvements in witness statements during trial cast doubt on their credibility. In the present case, prosecution witnesses made significant deviations from their initial statements, including conflicting details about the day of the murder and the number of accused. Such dishonest improvements rendered their testimony unreliable. (Rel. 2019 SCMR 631, 2021 SCMR 810, 2022 SCMR 1107) (f) Medical Evidence—Failure to Corroborate Ocular Account ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129 ---- Medical evidence cannot be relied upon to establish guilt unless it corroborates independent eyewitness testimony. In this case, the presence of open eyes of the deceased at the time of postmortem indicated that no family member was present at the crime scene to close the eyes, which contradicted the prosecution’s claim that relatives were eyewitnesses. (Rel. 2017 SCMR 2002, 2017 SCMR 486) (g) Recovery of Weapon—Negative Forensic Report—Effect ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129 ---- The recovery of the alleged murder weapon is inconsequential if forensic reports do not link it to the crime. In the present case, the forensic report was negative, undermining the prosecution’s case. (Rel. 2016 SCMR 1605) (h) Motive—Failure to Prove—Effect ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129 ---- Motive must be independently established with concrete evidence. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive of a prior quarrel between the accused and the deceased, making it a weak and unreliable supporting factor. (Rel. 2016 SCMR 2021) (i) Benefit of Doubt—Legal Requirement for Acquittal ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 265-K ---- If even a single doubt arises regarding the prosecution’s case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. In the present case, multiple material doubts emerged, including delayed FIR, unreliable witnesses, delayed postmortem, lack of forensic confirmation, and failure to prove motive. The court ruled that in light of these deficiencies, the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused. (Rel. 2024 SCMR 156, 2024 SCMR 1146, 2024 SCMR 1191, 2024 SCMR 1427, 2024 SCMR 1490, 2024 SCMR 1507) Disposition: Appeal allowed. The conviction and death sentence of Muhammad Mohsan were set aside, and he was acquitted of all charges. The Murder Reference was answered in the negative, and his release was ordered unless required in another case.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 227---Alteration of charge---Jurisdiction of trial court---Scope---Applicant, being the complainant, challenged the dismissal of his application seeking alteration of charge under S. 227, Cr.P.C.---Held, that the trial court is competent to alter or add to any charge at any stage of the trial before the pronouncement of judgment, provided such alteration does not cause prejudice to the accused---However, the trial court cannot exclude a charge for an offence that is triable by the same court without proper legal justification---In the present case, the Additional Sessions Judge, upon transfer of the case, amended the charge and excluded S. 324, P.P.C., despite the fact that the Sessions Judge had initially framed the charge including S. 324, P.P.C.---Court held that once cognizance of an offence is taken by a competent court, the charge cannot be excluded merely on the basis of medical evidence unless substantial grounds justify the alteration. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Jameel Azeem v. Ghulam Shabbir (2011 SCMR 1145) (b) Criminal Law ----S. 324, P.P.C.---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd---Determination of applicability based on medical report---Scope---Accused was initially charged under S. 324, P.P.C., for attacking the complainant with an iron rod with the intention to commit murder---Upon transfer of the case, the Additional Sessions Judge excluded S. 324, P.P.C., relying on medical evidence that categorized the injuries under S. 337-F(i) and 337-F(v), P.P.C.---Held, that an attempt to commit qatl-i-amd (S. 324, P.P.C.) is determined by the intent and circumstances of the act, not merely by the extent of the injury caused---Section 324, P.P.C., explicitly states that if an act is committed with the intent or knowledge that it could result in murder, it constitutes an attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, irrespective of whether the victim suffers grievous harm or not---Trial court was not justified in excluding S. 324, P.P.C., especially when the nature of the allegation remained unchanged. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Farooq v. Ahmed Nawaz Jagirani (PLD 2016 SC 55) (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Concurrent jurisdiction---Trial by court of lower grade---Rule of propriety---Scope---Trial court framed charge under S. 506(b) and S. 34, P.P.C., offences which are triable by either a Sessions Court or a Magistrate of the first class as per Column 8 of Schedule II of Cr.P.C.---Held, that when an offence falls under concurrent jurisdiction, propriety demands that the case be tried by the court of lower grade unless there are compelling reasons for a higher court to retain jurisdiction---Additional Sessions Judge, upon excluding S. 324, P.P.C., should have referred the case back to the Magistrate rather than proceeding with the trial himself, as the remaining offences were triable by a lower court---Failure to do so amounted to misapplication of jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Farooq v. Ahmed Nawaz Jagirani (PLD 2016 SC 55) (d) Criminal Law ----Framing of charge---Legal principles---Distinction between framing of charge and judgment---Scope---Held, that the process of framing a charge is not equivalent to delivering a judgment; rather, it is a procedural step to determine whether to proceed with the trial---Trial court is not expected to assess evidence at the stage of framing charge as if deciding the final verdict---In the present case, Additional Sessions Judge’s act of excluding S. 324, P.P.C., on the basis of medical evidence amounted to premature assessment of evidence, which is a function reserved for judgment and not charge-framing. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Jameel Azeem v. Ghulam Shabbir (2011 SCMR 1145) (e) Judicial Conduct ----Misapplication of judicial discretion---Failure to apply judicial mind---Scope---Court observed that both Additional District and Sessions Judges, who amended the charge and dismissed the application for alteration, failed to exercise proper judicial discretion and did not appreciate the legal principles governing jurisdiction and framing of charge---Held, that a judge may err in exercising jurisdiction, but deviation from well-established legal principles and rules of propriety is not expected from a Sessions Judge---Accordingly, impugned order was set aside, and the initial charge framed by the Sessions Judge, including S. 324, P.P.C., was reinstated. Disposition: Revision allowed; impugned order set aside; original charge restored; trial court directed to proceed accordingly.

Summary: Summary pending