Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 8, 39, 42, 54 & 55---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 215---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 54---Suit for possession through partition, declaration, cancellation of mutation and permanent and mandatory injunction---General power of attorney (GPA)---Transfer of property by the attorney/brother of petitioner---Plea of misuse of authority and deceitful transfer of property by the attorney in his own favour and his mother without permission of principal---Cancellation of GPA after the transfer of property---Obligations of attorney---Principal's consent---Scope---Suit and appeal instituted/preferred by the petitioner were dismissed by the trial and appellate courts concurrently---Validity---It was nowhere ordained in S. 215 of Contract Act, 1872, that consent of the principal shall be in writing, thus, it may be oral as well---There was sufficient material to indicate that before entering into the sale transaction, attorney of the petitioner apprised him about the transaction and after obtaining his consent, executed the mutations, thus, petitioner was precluded to exercise his right of repudiation as it is was more available to him in the circumstances--- Petitioner despite having knowledge of all the transactions, in the first instance, instituted a suit for separate possession through partition wherein he neither called in question mutations nor asserted that attorney misused his authority, being attorney, which spoke about the conduct of the petitioner---Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Mumtaz Khan (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Siraj Bibi (deceased) through L.Rs and others 2024 SCMR 978; Haq Nawaz and others v. Banaras and others 2022 SCMR 1068 and Mst. Akhtar Sultan v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others PLD 2021 SC 715 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. II, R. 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 8, 39, 42, 54 & 55---Suit for possession through partition, declaration, cancellation of mutation and permanent and mandatory injunction---Consolidation of suits---Effect---Bar to instituting second suit under O. II, R. 2, C.P.C.---Scope--- Object of O. II, R. 2, C.P.C. is to avoid splitting of claims and multiplicity of suits---Both suits were ultimately consolidated, which was sufficient to diminish the impact of said provision of law---When the petitioner parted with his ownership in the suit property by virtue of sanctioning of mutations, he could not claim himself as co-owner of the property and as such suit for separate possession through partition was not maintainable at all, thus, the bar in terms of O. II, R. 2, C.P.C, would not come into play. Ghulam Nabi and others v. Seth Muhammad Yaqub and others PLD 1983 SC 344 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Concurrent findings of facts by courts below---Substitution by High Court in its revisional jurisdiction---Scope---Scope of revisional jurisdiction under S.115 of the C.P.C. is quite limited where both the lower courts are unanimous in forming their view---High Court, being revisional court, cannot substitute the concurrent findings of the two courts of competent jurisdiction merely on the ground that from the re-appraisal of evidence, some other view is possible---Exercise of revisional powers is always guided by the necessary pre-conditions laid down in S. 115, C.P.C. Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others PLD SC 712; Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 and Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 rel. Tanvir Iqbal for Petitioner. Agha Muhammad Ali Khan for Respondents Nos. 1A to 1E, 2 to 5 and 7. Muhammad Omer Asad Chaudhary for Respondents Nos. 1F to 1J. Chaudhary Omer Hayat for Respondent No. 6 (in Civil Revision No. 424-D of 2024). Muhammad Shahid Munir, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents Nos. 8 to 13. Respondents Nos. 14 to 16, Ex-parte. Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025. Judgment Mirza Viqas Rauf, J .--- By way of this single judgment, I intend to decide the titled petition as well as C.R.No.424-D of 2024, being raising similar questions of fact and law, ensuing from consolidated judgment and decree dated 09th of July, 2024, handed down by learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, whereby he proceeded to dismiss the appeals preferred by the petitioner and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 13th January 2024, passed by learned Civil Judge, Rawalpindi. 2. Facts in brief are that the petitioner instituted a suit for separate possession through partition in the first instance averring therein that he is settled in United Kingdom (U.K.). It is asserted that parents of the petitioner namely Gul Hameed Asghar and Mst. Nusrat Parveen were joint owners in possession of land measuring 1800-kanal in the revenue estates of Jattal, Pind Dadu and Ghariba, Tehsil and District Rawalpindi. As per averments contained in the plaint, the petitioner entered into an investment agreement dated 27.07.2006 with his father to the extent of land measuring 165-kanal and in furtherance thereof he invested an amount of 165000 sterling pounds which was acknowledged by his father through investment agreement. It was also agreed between the petitioner and his father that in case he has less land than 165-kanals at his credit then the said deficiency will be made good from the land of his mother Mst. Nusrat Parveen, due to the fact that whole land measuring 1800-kanals was purchased from his own pocket by Gul Hameed Asghar which fact was not only known to the mother but also to the other family members. It is averred in the plaint that Gul Hameed Asghar died on 16.11.2014, leaving behind land measuring 1635-kanals as his legacy which devolved upon his legal heirs at the ratio i.e. 204-kanal in the name of Mst. Nusrat Parveen, 317-kanal in the name of each son and 159-kanal in the name of daughter. In this backdrop, the petitioner claiming himself to be co-owner, sought decree for possession through partition of land measuring 482-kanal. The suit was resisted by the respondents, who submitted their written statement, raising preliminary objections and also controverting the factual assertions contained in the plaint. The petitioner then instituted a second suit for declaration, seeking cancellation of Mutations Nos. 3420, 3421, 994 and 995 and injunction with the assertion that Gul Hameed Asghar, father of the petitioner, died on 16.11.2014, leaving behind the petitioner as well as other legal heirs, including respondent No.6. It is asserted that petitioner entered into an investment agreement with his father in furtherance whereof latter received an amount of 165000 sterling pounds from the petitioner for transfer of 165-kanal land from his ownership in favour of the petitioner, which deal was not matured. As per averments contained in the plaint, case titled "Ch. Riaz v. Gul Hameed Asghar" was pending adjudication before Civil Court at Rawalpindi during life time of the father in which the petitioner and other legal heirs have now stepped into his shoes, being legal heirs. The petitioner asserted that he along with other legal heirs of the deceased executed general power of attorney through registered deed No.1868 dated 15.05.2015 in favour of respondent No.6, being his brother but deed of attorney was cancelled by the petitioner vide cancellation deed No.300 dated 29.01.2019, as respondent No.6 misused the general power of attorney and deceitfully transferred petitioner's property in favour of M/s Marble Arch Developers, being Director through Mutations Nos. 3420, 3421, 994 and 995. As per averments contained in the plaint, respondent No.6 transferred 90% of the landed property in his own favour and remaining 10% in favour of Mst. Nusrat Parveen on 16.03.2018 but later on he included respondents Nos. 1 to 5 as shareholders which factum came in his knowledge during the pendency of the suit for separate possession through partition. It is asserted that in furtherance thereof, a housing society upon the land of the petitioner has been developed unauthorizedly. This suit was also contested by the respondents by filing written statement. Both the suits were consolidated and as a result, from the divergent pleadings of the parties, issues were framed. After framing of issues, evidence of both the sides was recorded and finally suit was dismissed by way of judgment and decree dated 13.01.2024 passed by learned Civil Judge, Rawalpindi. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner though preferred an appeal before learned Additional District Judge but remained unsuccessful as appeal was also dismissed by way of impugned judgment and decree. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that respondent No.6, being attorney of the petitioner, misused his authority and alienated property in the name of M/s Marble Arch Developers for his own benefit. It is contended that law to this effect is well settled that an attorney cannot alienate property of the principal without his prior consent in his own favour or in favour of his kith and kin. Learned counsel emphasized that though overwhelming evidence was produced by the petitioner in support of his claim but it has been discarded without assigning any lawful reasoning. It is emphatically contended by learned counsel that judgments of two courts are though concurrent but outcome of gross misreading and non-reading of evidence. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on Muhammad Mumtaz Khan (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Siraj Bibi (deceased) through L.Rs and others (2024 SCMR 978), Haq Nawaz and others v. Banaras and others (2022 SCMR 1068) and Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 715). 4. Conversely, learned counsel representing the respondents seriously resisted these petitions. It is contended that respondent No.6, being attorney of the petitioner, only got registered land subject matter of Mutations Nos. 3421 and 994 for which he obtained permission from the petitioner which fact is also evident from the statement of the petitioner himself. Learned counsel while making reference to the statement of the petitioner emphasized that petitioner is estopped by his words and conduct to challenge the mutations in question. It is submitted that petitioner was not sole principal who appointed respondent No.6 as attorney on his behalf but deed of attorney was executed jointly by the petitioner along with his two brothers who did not challenge the transfer made by respondent No.6 in furtherance of the deed of attorney which itself shows that the suit is frivolous. It is argued with vehemence that after alienation of the suit property through respondent No.6, being attorney of the petitioner, petitioner has left with no right, whatsoever, in the suit property and as such suits were rightly dismissed. Learned counsel contended that concurrent findings are based on proper appraisal of evidence and there is no room for interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 5. Learned Law Officer also supported the arguments of learned counsel for the respondents. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Before embarking upon the matter in controversy inter se parties, it would be advantageous to observe that the petitioner along with his brothers namely Fahad Hameed and Waqas Hameed executed a general power of attorney (Exh.P-4) in favour of respondent No.6, being their real brother with regard to the suit property, perusal whereof reveals that being principal, the petitioner along with his brothers authorized and empowered respondent No.6, being their attorney to supervise, to manage, to sell, to transfer by way of gift etc or to mortgage the suit land or enter into a sale agreement, to receive earnest, full and final sale consideration and execute sale deed or mutation on their behalf. In furtherance thereof, respondent No.6 got executed Mutations No.3420 (Exh.P-6), 3421 (Exh.P-7), 994 (Exh.P17) and 995 (Exh.P-16) in favour of respondent No.7. Needless to mention that though all these mutations have been questioned by the petitioner in the suit but learned counsel for the parties are in agreement that only Mutations Nos. 3421 (Exh.P-7) and 994 (Exh.P-17) are the mutations whereby the land of the petitioner has been transferred by respondent No.6, being his attorney. In this background, Issue No.3-B becomes pivotal, which reads as under:- 3-B Whether mutations Nos. 3421, 3420, 994 and 995 sanctioned in favour of defendant No.7 and subsequent mutations in favour of RDA and someone else are liable to be cancelled being unlawful? OPP 8. Adverting to the moot point, it is noticed that execution of the general power of attorney in favour of respondent No.6 is not disputed by the petitioner but his claim is that respondent No.6 misused the powers given through general power of attorney and as such he deceitfully transferred the landed property of the petitioner in favour of respondent No.7 in which respondent No.6 is one of the Directors. No doubt, power of attorney was later on revoked through deed (Exh.P-5) but it was executed on 29.01.2019 much later to the sanctioning of Mutations Nos.3421 (Exh.P-7) and 994 (Exh.P-17). 9. There is no cavil to the proposition that in case of transfer of property in his own name or in the name of close relatives, attorney is bound to seek prior permission, approval and consent of the principal as is laid down in the judgments (supra) heavily relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. Now, while examining the case in the light of well settled principles, it is noticed that ample material is available on the record to form an opinion that the mutations in questions were sanctioned with consent and knowledge of the petitioner. To this effect, statement of the petitioner, being PW-1 is of significance importance, relevant excerpt from the same is reproduced below:- It clearly evinces from the above that as per own statement of the petitioner, he duly authorized respondent No.6 to sell his property who at the time of sale of land in favour of respondent No.7 consulted with the petitioner and apprised him about the sale transaction. Though, in the volunteer portion, the petitioner stated that he was not apprised fully but this sole volunteer portion is of no avail to him. The above noted portion of the statement of the petitioner leads me to an irresistible conclusion that the land was transferred by respondent No.6 with the consent of the petitioner and he became well aware of the transaction in 2018 and also received his share in lieu thereof. 10. Section 215 of the Contract Act, 1872 equips the principal with a right to repudiate the transaction when agent deals on his own account, in the business of the agency without principal's consent. For ready reference and convenience, same is reproduced:- 215. Right of principal when agent deals on his own account, in business of agency without principal's consent.-If an agent deals on his own account in the business of the agency, without first obtaining the consent of his principal and acquainting him with all material circumstances which have come to his own knowledge on the subject, the principal may repudiate the transaction, if the case shows, either that any material fact has been dishonestly concealed from him by the agent, or that the dealings of the agent have been disadvantageous to him. From perusal of above referred provision of law, it clearly manifests that a principal can repudiate the transaction if:- i. an agent deals on his own account in the business of the agency; ii. without obtaining the prior consent of the principal; iii. not acquainting the principal with all material circumstances which comes to his own knowledge; iv. if it is shown either that any material fact has been dishonestly concealed from the principal by the agent or that dealing of the agent has been disadvantageous to the principal. Section 215 of the Act, ibid, however, nowhere ordains that consent of the principal shall be in writing. It may thus be oral as well. There is sufficient material available on record, as noted hereinabove, which indicates that before entering into the sale transaction, respondent No.6, being attorney of the petitioner, apprised him about the transaction and after obtaining his consent, executed the mutations under challenge. The petitioner is thus precluded to exercise his right of repudiation as it is no more available to him in the circumstances. 11. Needless to mention that the petitioner despite having knowledge of all the transactions, in the first instance, instituted a suit for separate possession through partition wherein he neither called in question Mutations Nos. 3421 (Exh.P-7) and 994 (Exh.P-17) nor asserted that respondent No.6 misused his authority, being attorney, which goes a long way to speak about the conduct of the petitioner. 12. Though, learned counsel for the respondents resisted second suit while pleading a bar under Rule 2 of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) to which effect Issue No.5-A was also framed but when they were confronted with the Court's query that both suits were ultimately consolidated, which is sufficient to diminish the impact of said provision of law, they conceded the legal proposition. Even otherwise, when the petitioner parted with his ownership in the suit property by virtue of sanctioning of Mutations Nos. 3421 (Exh.P-7) and 994 (Exh.P-17), he could not claim himself as co-owner of the property and as such suit for separate possession through partition was not maintainable at all and the bar in terms of Order II, Rule 2 of Code, ibid, would not come into play in the light of law laid down in Ghulam Nabi and others v. Seth Muhammad Yaqub and others (PLD 1983 Supreme Court 344). 13. There are concurrent findings of facts recorded by two courts of competent jurisdiction, which are, apparently, founded on proper appraisal of evidence. Scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. is quite limited where both the lower courts are unanimous in forming their view. This Court, being revisional court cannot substitute the concurrent findings of the two courts of competent jurisdiction merely on the ground that from the re-appraisal of evidence, some other view is possible. The exercise of revisional powers is always guided by the necessary pre-conditions laid down in the above referred provision of law. The scanning of evidence and the perusal of impugned judgments does not reflect any illegality or material irregularity, justifying interference by this Court. Reference in this respect can be made to Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others (PLD 2016 SC 712), Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan (PLD 2022 SC 21) and Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others (PLD 2022 SC 13). 14. The nutshell of above discussion is that these petitions are devoid of any merits. Resultantly, the same are dismissed, with no order as to costs. SA/M-55/L Revision dismissed.

Summary: Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 398, 399 & 400---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss.413, 414 & 415---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 47(3), 151 & O. XXI, R. 50(1)(b)---Execution proceedings---Recovery of decretal amount---Impleading former directors of judgment debtor company---Decree holder sought impleading former directors of judgment debtor / company in execution proceedings on the plea that they were liable for making payment of decretal amount along with interest up to date---Validity---Former directors knew second arbitral award had been announced against them and decree holder's claim for damages against them had crystallized into a liability accrued against judgment debtor / company---Matter was pending before Supreme Court when ex directors decided to dissolve the company under Companies Easy Exit Scheme---Ex-directors and ex-shareholders could not benefit from their wrongdoings and they must be accountable as per undertaking, indemnity and provisions of law---Even if ex-directors/ex-shareholders were affected Court notice under O. XXI, R. 50, C.P.C. which provision ordinarily related to suits against firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their own, such, as partner(s) of a firm, nevertheless, two judgment debtors had stepped forwarded and defended and/or had been defending execution proceedings unconditionally and without claiming any prejudice since 2019 till then---Ex-directors could not approbate and reprobate now in oral arguments---Such liability was not limited to the two ex-directors/ex-shareholders, who were before High Court---Decree holder was at liberty to include remaining ex-directors/ex-shareholders in execution proceedings given the undertaking, indemnity and provisions of law which applied to all of the ex-directors, ex-shareholders, and ex-officers of judgment debtor company dissolved under Companies Easy Exit Scheme, read with S. 439 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Application was allowed, in circumstances. Nadeem Qutub for Decree-Holder. Aitezaz Manzoor for Judgment-Debtor. Date of hearing: 20th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Trade Organizations Act (II of 2013)--- ----Ss.3(2)(b), 14(3)(g), 21, 21(2) & 21(4)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.190---Trade Organizations Rules, 2013---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, invoking of---Maintainability of a Constitutional petition while alternate remedy is provided by relevant law---'No confidence motion' against President of a trade organization---Applicability of the Companies Act, 2017 to trade organizations in governing their affairs---Facts in brevity were that the petitioner filed a Constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution challenging letters for convening an executive meeting concerning a "No Confidence Motion" against the President of Bahawalpur Chamber of Commerce and Industry (the "BCCI")---It was alleged that such actions had no legal basis in the governing documents of the trade organization---High Court considered as to "whether the Constitutional petition was maintainable under Art. 199 of the Constitution to challenge directions issued for convening a no confidence motion in a trade organization, despite the availability of an alternative remedy under S. 21 of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 and in light of the applicability of the Companies Act, 2017 to such organizations"---Held: A bare reading of S. 21 of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 established that the same provided a specific channel for addressing grievances and the aggrieved person must have exhausted this avenue before seeking further recourse---The petitioner's case fell within the purview of S. 21(2) Trade Organizations Act 2013 as the regulator/respondent No.2 had directed the secretary general of the trade organization/respondent No.3 to convene a meeting of the executive members to table the "No Confidence Motion" against the president of BCCI---The petitioner failed to provide a valid reason for not utilizing the available alternate remedy, which was a statutory, time-bound, and legislatively prescribed solution---Moreover, the Companies Act, 2017 was applicable to trade organizations in governing their affairs and BCCI licensed under S. 3(2)(b) of the of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 and registered under S. 42 of the Companies Act, 2017 was required to comply with the provisions of the Companies Act, 2017---Therefore, any breach of the Companies Act, 2017 would violate the Trade Organization Rules, 2013 and the terms of the license---The regulator directed the BCCI to convene an executive committee meeting to discuss a "No Confidence Motion" and his directions were at par with S. 190 of the Companies Act 2017, thus, respondent No.2 (the "regulator") was well within its authority to issue the impugned direction---The instant petition was not maintainable due to availability of an alternate efficacious remedy under S. 21(2) of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 and the directions issued by Respondent No.2 were lawful and in conformity with the Trade Organizations Act, 2013---Consequently, the Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Ms. Saba Gul v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Commerce and 3 others 2020 CLD 251 ref. (b) Trade Organizations Act (II of 2013)--- ----Ss.3(2)(b), 14(3)(g), 21, 21(2) & 21(4)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.190---Trade Organizations Rules, 2013---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, invoking of---Availability of alternate remedy by the relevant law---No confidence motion against President of a trade organization---Applicability of the Companies Act, 2017 to trade organizations in governing their affairs---Scope---Trade organizations must follow provisions of the Companies Act, 2017---A "Registered Trade Organization" is by definition, an entity incorporated under the Companies Act, 2017---To obtain a license, a trade organization must be registered as a company with limited liability under the Companies Act, 2017---Additionally, license holders are required to apply for incorporation within 30 days and secure incorporation within 90 days---It is established that the Companies Act, 2017 would be applicable to trade organizations in governing their affairs---In the present case Bahawalpur Chamber of Commerce and Industries (BCCI) licensed under S. 3(2)(b) of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 and registered under S. 42 of the Companies Act, 2017 must comply with the Companies Act, 2017, which governs corporate formation, operation, and management, ensuring standards of conduct, accountability, and transparency---Specifically, S. 190 of the Companies Act, 2017, outlines the process for removing a chief executive by requiring a majority vote from the board of directors---Additionally, Clause 14(1) of BCCI's license requires compliance with the Companies Act, 2017---Therefore, any breach of the Companies Act would constitute a breach of the Trade Organizations Rules, 2013 and the terms of the license---Section 14(3)(g) of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 empowers the Regulator to direct trade organizations to comply with the Companies Act, 2017---In the instant case, the Regulator directed BCCI to convene an executive committee meeting to discuss a "no confidence motion" and his directions were at par with S. 190 of the Companies Act, 2017--Thus, respondent No.2 (the regulator) was well within its authority to issue the impugned direction---The instant petition was not maintainable due to availability of an alternate efficacious remedy under S. 21(2) of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 and the directions issued by respondent No.2 were lawful and in conformity with the Trade Organizations Act, 2013---Consequently, the Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Pakistan Poultry Association through Secretary General v. Regulator of Trade Organizations and another 2024 CLD 1266 ref. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.XXIX, R.1---Suits by or against corporations---Board resolution, requirement of---Scope---A company has a separate legal identity and to sue or initiate legal action on its behalf, authorization through board resolution is required, however, if a company official is sued personally, no board resolution is needed, as individuals and the company are legally distinct entities. SDO, PESCO Daudzai Sub-Disvison Ring Road, Peshawar and others v. Wadan Sher 2023 SCMR 236 rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, invoking of---Availability of alternate remedy---Scope---Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a routine matter of right---Instead, it has specific limitations that must be considered by the High Court when exercising its discretionary powers---Article 199 of the Constitution outlines these limitations, including the requirement that alternate remedies must have been exhausted. Ms. Saba Gul v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Commerce and 3 others 2020 CLD 251 ref. (e) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----S.190---Removal of chief executive of a company---Process---The board of directors by a majority vote can remove a chief executive of a company and the whole process for conducting such an exercise has been provided under S.190 of the Companies Act, 2017. Muhammad Nawazish Ali Pirzada and A.R. Aurangzeb for Petitioner. Tahir Mehmood Mufti, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No.1. Malik Ghulam Sabir for Respondent No.4. Muhammad Tahir Saeed Ramay for Respondent No.3. Sardar Abdul Basit Khan for Respondent No.4. Rai Mazhar Hussain Kharal, A.A.G. on Court's call. Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Suit for recovery filed by Bank---Assertion of defendant---Proof, absence of---Effect---Plea of the appellant ( customer/defendant) was that the respondent (plaintiff /Bank) obtained signatures of defendant on blank printed form of relevant documents---Validity---Appellant (customer/defendant) utterly failed to discharge its burden, since neither any complaint was lodged by them, nor any evidence was produced to prove that signatures of the customer were obtained on blank printed documents---The presence of relevant documents (a registered mortgage deed, a fire insurance policy) and the admitted insurance claim by the appellant further negated such a bald plea---Appeal, filed by customer, was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Suit for recovery filed by Bank---Assertion of defendant---Documentary proof---Effect---In view of production of chain of documents executed by the appellant (customer/defendant) including the registered mortgaged documents) and Statement of Accounts by the respondent (plaintiff/Bank) and admission of loan but failure to produce any receipt against repayment of loan by appellant's attorney, the Banking Court was justified in deciding that the appellant / defendant had not committed any default in payment of facility/loan amount and markup/riba---Appeal, filed by customer, being meritless, was dismissed, in circumstances. (c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Insurance policy availed by customer through Bank---Loss of stock due to fire set by mob---Bank / plaintiff, responsibility of---Scope---Plea raised by appellant (customer / defendant) was that insurance policy also covered loss in the event of loss/damage by fire/strike by burglary ; thus, they claimed, while relying on an FIR (FIR-in-question) that on 27-12-2007 due to death of Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, a mob attacked his shop and godown and burnt, damaged and looted the insured property---Validity---There seemed no dispute between the parties on the insurance of the stock with Excel Insurance Company Limited in the sum of Rs.36,00,000/- under fire policy No.1923 dated 01-02-2007---However, upon perusal of the FIR-in-question it appeared that the same was lodged by cashier of the appellant---Surprisingly, the said complainant/ cashier was not even produced in evidence as a witness, especially when he was not a party to the suit and the attorney of the defendant/appellant was not his attorney---Additionally, during his cross- examination, the sole witness/ attorney for the appellants stated that an official of the concerned Deputy Commissioner (DC) had given a report in respect of the damage in the said incident, however, no such report was produced in evidence---It was also admitted during his cross-examination that no documents to establish the alleged loss of Rs.4 million or as allegedly assessed by the DC were produced in evidence---The same could not be established in evidence since no document or witness was produced by the appellant to establish its claim, except a mere oral assertion by the appellant---Statements of facts contained in a First Information Report under S. 154, Cr.P.C., were not gospel truth but the same are mere statement of facts; hence, for placing reliance on a First Information Report in civil proceedings, the statements of facts contained therein are required to be established, corroborated and proved through positive evidence by the party relying on the same---On the contrary, neither the complainant appeared as a witness, nor any other employee of the appellant (Petrol Pump) on the said incident was produced, nor any proof of loss of Rs.4 million was established, nor the purported report by the DC was produced---Appeal, filed by customer / defendants, being meritless, was dismissed, in circumstances. (d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Insurance policy availed by customer through Bank---Loss of stock due to fire set by mob---Bank / plaintiff, responsibility of---Scope---Plea of the appellant was that it was the responsibility of the Bank to file a suit against the insurance company with respect to the claim lodged by the appellant and since the Bank had failed to file such a suit, the Bank was responsible to pay Rs.3.6 million---Validity---One of the witnesses of respondent / Bank, in his cross-examination, stated that the Petrol Stock was insured with Insurance Company in the sum of Rs.36,00,000/- and the letter by the customer /appellant was received and the same was also forwarded to the manager of the Insurance Company and in said regard an officer of the insurance company also visited the place of alleged incidents at the petrol pump of the customer, however the Insurance Company refused to allow the claim, since the claim was not covered under the policy---Filing a suit against the insurance company by the Bank had been rightly denied by the respondent/Bank on the grounds that it was not the responsibility of the Bank to lodge suit against the insurance company---Appeal, filed by customer, was dismissed, in circumstances. (e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Insurance policy availed by customer through Bank---Loss of stock due to fire set by mob---Bank / plaintiff, responsibility of---Scope---Whether or not, in view of the incident of the alleged fire and the existence of Insurance policy, the Bank was entitled to claim the outstanding liability/ default amount from the customer under the Ordnance 2001?; and whether the Bank was under an obligation to seek reimbursement of the same against the insurance company instead?---Held: In the absence of any clause in the insurance policy, which could possibly put Bank under obligation to file a claim with the insurance company of any outstanding liability of customer/ defendants, the Bank was not responsible to file such claim on behalf of the customer---Suit filed by Bank against its customers was only concerned with the determination of liability against the customers / defendants---Even the claim under an insurance clause was an independent and separate agreement, which could not be made the basis to restrict the Bank to recover the amount only through the said process---Appeal, filed by customer / defendants, being meritless, was dismissed, in circumstances. Messrs Jan Sher Khan Petroleum Service through Proprietor and another v. Messrs Allied Bank Limited 2013 CLD 526; Riaz Ahmad (Rana Riaz Anjum) and another v. The Bank of Punjab 2016 CLD 596 and Bhatti and others v. United Bank Limited and 2 others 2005 CLD 643 ref. (f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Insurance policy availed by customer through Bank---Loss of stock due to fire set by mob---Bank / plaintiff, responsibility of---Scope---Contention of the appellant (customer/defendants) was that incident of fire burning the stock was an Act of God, thus the principal borrower was exonerated from the liability---Validity---The right of the Bank to recover the claim against its customer was unimpaired by the insurance policy---Stance of the customer for making recovery from the insurance company in the case of the alleged fire incident in the factory of appellants was rejected---Appeal, filed by customer / defendants, being meritless, was dismissed, in circumstances. Imran Enterprises through Proprietor and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank through Manager and another 2007 CLD 555 and Messrs Nawaz Enterprises through Sole Proprietor and another v. Habib Bank Limited and 5 others 2007 CLD 952 ref. (g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 2(c) & 9---Claim against Insurance Company---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---Insurance policy availed by customer through Bank---Loss of stock due to fire set by mob---Bank / plaintiff, responsibility of---Scope---An insurance company is not a customer under S.2(c) of the Ordinance, 2001 and the Banking Court has no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon claim against insurance company under a finance agreement---In the present case, the appraisal of documents produced in evidence by the respondent (Bank / plaintiff) clearly reflected that appellants (customers / defendants) had availed the facility-in-question---It further established that the insurance policy was duly signed by the appellant nor did the appellant point out towards any clause in such policy which could possibly put the respondent /Bank under obligation to file a claim with the insurance company of any outstanding liability of the appellant in case of default---Even if such a clause did exist, the right of the Bank to claim the outstanding liability against its customer was duly protected under the Ordinance, 2001---The insurance policy was obtained in the name of the company of the appellant No.1 and the entire insurance policy documents were singed and the premium was also paid by the appellants---As per clause of insurance in the sanction advice it was the condition precedent that all the assets of the company and/or personal properties of the partners/directors be charged with the Bank as security for the payment/obligations of company until the facility was fully settled and the assets shall be insured with an insurance company acceptable to the Bank---However, such insurance was meant to cover the risks of fire---Notably, such insurance policy had been assigned in favour of respondent / Bank but nothing had been mentioned in the finance facility about the extinguishment of the liability of the appellants towards Bank on account of any loss, whether it was insured or not---Appellants had also failed to point out any such condition, either in the sanction or in the terms and conditions of the insurance policy which absolved them from discharging their liability of payment of outstanding amount to the respondent / Bank---In the circumstances it appeared that the condition of insurance of hypothecated stock goods was imposed only to doubly secure the liabilities of the Bank in addition to the execution of other security documents including the mortgage deed of the properties against the finance facility provided by the respondent / Bank---Appeal filed by customer / defendants, being merit less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Adieu (Pvt.) Limited through Directors/ Chief Executives v. Platinum Commercial Bank Limited through President and 3 others 2005 CLD 1781; Pakistan General Insurance Company Limited through Executive Vice-President v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and 4 others 2015 CLD 600; 'Messrs United Bank Limited v. Messrs Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. and 2 others 1988 CLC 1660; EFU General Insurance Ltd. through Executive Vice-President v. Chairman, Banking Tribunal No.1, Lahore, and 3 other PLD 2001 Lah. 313; Messrs Evergreen Press and 3 others v. Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 239; Messrs Grace Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Habib Bank Limited and 5 others 2003 CLD 1685; National Bank of Pakistan (N.B.P.) and 5 others v. Punjab Road Transport Board through Managing Director and 3 others 2003 CLD 653 and P.M. Packages and others v. Silk Bank Limited 2019 CLD 713 ref. Sunder Das for Appellant. Imran Ali Borano for Respondent. Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R. 17---Suit for recovery---Application for leave to defend filed---Application seeking amendments in the application for leave to defend---Maintainability---One of the defendants (applicant) filed an application under R. 17 of O. VI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking amendments in the application for leave to defend (PLA)---Plea of the applicant was that he had been wrongly impleaded as a defendant (customer of the plaintiff /Bank ) whereas he was no more a partner; neither he was mortgagor nor an alleged guarantor for enforcement of liability of other defendants arrayed by the plaintiff /Bank, as such, the guarantees appended with the plaint contained fake and fictitious signatures of the applicant---Plaintiff / Bank raised objection on the maintainability of application seeking amendment on the ground that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance, 2001') was a special law and as such, no miscellaneous application could be filed and entertained before the decision of PLA---Held, that where amendments sought for were supplementary and not destructive, the same could be allowed to be raised and even the limitation would not come in its way---The only consideration should be that plea(s) should not be inconsistent or divergent to the pleas raised earlier and there was no bar to move such an application---Principle of amendment in pleadings enshrined in O.VI, R.17 of the C.P.C. could be pressed with respect to amendment in the PLA---In the present case, the applicant in his original joint PLA with other defendants already raised the plea(s) he had raised in his application seeking amendment in PLA---Applicant while placing reliance upon two previous letters ('letters-in-question'), had taken an additional plea that the waiver of special condition had been contained in the last Facility Offer Letter---Plaintiff / Bank (in its reply to application seeking amendment) had not disowned the letters-in-question, though it took / stated a different version---Applicant primarily pleaded that the said letters be placed on record and their effect be considered while deciding the PLA---High Court directed that let the letters-in-question be made part of record and the same would be considered while deciding the PLA in the light of respective stances of the applicant and the plaintiff / Bank---Application under O. VI, R. 17 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, filed by defendants, was allowed accordingly. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Bela Automotives Ltd. and 7 others 2010 CLD 1243 and Messrs Maroof Knitwear (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 8 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2003 CLD 1610 ref. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Suit for recovery filed by Bank---Pledged stock, expiry of---Customer, responsibility of---Scope---Stance of the defendants was that plaintiff /Bank was responsible for expired pledged stock---It was evident from the contents of the application for leave to defend (PLA) that the defendants had accepted and admitted the sanctioning and availing of the facilities from the plaintiff / Bank ; as such, the grant and utilization of Finance Facilities in terms of financing documents appended with the plaint was fully established---Thus, stance of the defendants (that plaintiff / Bank was responsible for expired pledged stock) was not tenable for the reason that the defendants in their PLA had not identified any particular clause in the Letter of Pledge which was breached by the plaintiff / Bank---In a pledge transaction, a financial institution only maintains constructive possession over the pledged stock through the Muqadam but practically, the customer maintains its physical custody and operates it in concert with the creditor in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Letter of Pledge---For all intents and purposes, the customer was responsible to undertake its business and the plaintiff / Bank had no concern with the running of the business of the customer---In said context, the plaintiff / Bank rightly maintained in its replication that the defendants defrauded the plaintiff /Bank by not replacing the expired stock of the pledged goods after default, thereby, eroding and diminishing its value despite insistance of the plaintiff / Bank to replace the same which compelled the plaintiff /Bank to initiate criminal proceedings against the defendants---Plaintiff / Bank was not obliged to renew the Facilities of defendant / Partnership as the latter had defaulted in the repayment of the Facilities---Hence, the plaintiff / Bank could not be held responsible for engineering default of defendant---Hence, in the wake of admission qua availing of the Facilities by the defendants and their failure to raise any substantial question of law and fact which required recording of evidence, the High Court rejected the PLA of the defendants---Nevertheless, minute perusal of the statement of accounts appended with the plaint revealed that the plaintiff /Bank had claimed mark-up beyond the period of expiry of the Facilities which could not be granted to the plaintiff / Bank---As such, the plaintiff / Bank was only entitled to recover the amounts excluding said amount---Suit filed by the Bank was decreed accordingly. Messrs World Trans Logistics and others v. Silk Bank Limited and others 2016 SCMR 800 and Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited v. Nazir Rice Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive Officer and others 2020 CLD 796 ref. (c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 9(3), 10(4)(5) & 10(4)(7)---Suit for recovery filed by Bank---Default, incidence of---Scope---The incidence of default was fully narrated in the plaint in compliance with the requirements of S. 9(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001')---Rather notably, the defendants did not fulfill the mandatory requirements of S. 10(4)(5) and (7) of the Ordinance, 2001 and as such, the PLA merited to be dismissed on this single score alone---Defendants failed to raise any substantial question of law and fact which required recording of evidence---High Court rejected the PLA of the defendants---Nevertheless, minute perusal of the statement of accounts appended with the plaint revealed that the plaintiff / Bank had claimed mark-up beyond the period of expiry of the Facilities which could not be granted to the plaintiff / Bank ; as such, the plaintiff / Bank is only entitled to recover the amounts excluding said amount---Suit filed by the Bank was decreed accordingly. (d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Suit for recovery filed by Bank---Status of guarantor denied by defendant(s)---Plea of two Defendants (Nos. 4 and No.5) from a total of six defendants, including Partnership-entity/customer (defendants-in-question) was that they (defendants-in-question) had not executed their guarantees and as such, they were unnecessarily impleaded as parties to the suit---Validity---Record reveals that by virtue of relevant Partnership Deed dated 27.09.2004, Defendants Nos. 2 & 4 were its partners---On 20.11.2004, the number of partners soared to four but the same were reduced to two i.e. defendants Nos. 2 and 3 through Partnership Deed dated 25.03.2006---As such, defendants-in-question did not remain the partners of defendant No. 1 /entity thereafter, however, as third party they provided personal continuing guarantees having stakes in Group entities---Record depicted that defendants-in-question executed their continuing personal guarantees dated 15.05.2006 which were appended with the plaint with respect to each Facility obtained by entity / defendant No. 1---Similarly, continuing personal guarantees dated 01.03.2007 were also on record---Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 also executed their fresh personal guarantees dated 02.08.2010 along with defendant No. 6 which executed its corporate guarantee in favor of the plaintiff / Bank---Defendants-in-question in their original PLA claimed that their personal guarantees were fake and forged---Later through an amendment, it was stressed that guarantees were invalid as the special condition of Facility Offer Letter dated 25.10.2025 mandating them to tender their personal guarantees was waived by the plaintiff / Bank---The argument was self-defeating in as much as by resorting to subsequent plea, it was unequivocally accepted that prior to the claimed waiver, personal guarantees on record had indeed been furnished as maintained by the plaintiff /Bank---Letter dated 02.02.2011 relied upon in said behalf simply stated that the competent authority of the plaintiff /Bank had approved to waive off the special condition pursuant to request dated 28.12.2010 as contained in Facility Offer Letter dated 25.10.2010---However, there was no evidence on record that the said approval was acted upon by discharging the personal guarantees of defendants-in-question on record, which in their terms, were continuing in nature, unequivocally guaranteeing the repayment of the Facilities of defendant No. 1 /entity in the event of default---This was particularly so when the plaintiff /Bank maintained that the letter dated 02.02.2011 was never acted upon on account of failure of defendant No. 1/entity to replace expired pledged stock and subsequent default, whereafter, the Facilities were not renewed---As such, defendants-in-question had failed to demonstrate that they were unnecessarily arrayed as defendants since they had executed guarantees to secure the facilities extended to defendant No. 1/entity---Hence, the defendants failed to raise any substantial question of law and fact which required recording of evidence---High Court rejected the PLA of the defendants---Nevertheless, minute perusal of the statement of accounts appended with the plaint revealed that the plaintiff /Bank had claimed mark-up beyond the period of expiry of the Facilities which could not be granted to the plaintiff / Bank---As such, the plaintiff / Bank was only entitled to recover the amounts excluding said amount---Suit filed by the Bank was decreed accordingly. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Hyderabad Beverage Company (Private) Limited and others 2016 SCMR 451 and Mian Aftab A. Sheikh and 2 others v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation Limited and another 2003 CLD 702 ref. Syed Muhammad Kaswar Gardezi for Plaintiff. Mughees Aslam Malik, Sohail Iqbal Bhatti and Malik Muhammad Husnain Rajwana for Defendants. Date of hearing: 10th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal law—Standard of proof—Benefit of doubt ––Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 117; Cr.P.C., Ss. 342 & 382-B. Prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; any dent or doubt must accrue to the accused as of right, not grace. The trial court overlooked material doubts and failed to fairly evaluate the record; benefit of doubt extended. (Abdul Majeed v. State 2023 P.Cr.LJ 331; Lal Bux v. State 2023 YLR 321; Arshad Mahmood v. Raja Muhammad Asghar 2008 SCR 345; The State v. Mushtaq Ahmed PLD 1973 SC 418; Ayob Masih v. State 2002 SCMR 1048; Khalid Mehmood v. State 2011 SCMR 664; Syed Riffat Hussain v. State 2020 P.Cr.LJ 1486; State of MP v. Dharkole 2004 SCC 308, rel.) (b) Penal law—Forgery & use of forged document—Ingredients—Failure of proof—Effect ––APC/PPC, Ss. 464, 468 & 471; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1950, S. 5(2). Forgery under S.464 contemplates making/altering a document as another or procuring it by deception; use under S.471 presupposes a proved “false document”. Prosecution neither produced nor exhibited the impugned notification dated 19-09-2014 nor subjected the disputed signatures to handwriting examination; mere denial by the Section Officer was insufficient. Without proving forgery, convictions under Ss.468/471 and S.5(2) PCA could not stand. (Ghulam Abbas v. State 2020 P.Cr.LJ 1678; Saadat Sultan v. Muhammad Zahoor Khan 2006 SCMR 193; Murarilal v. State of M.P. AIR 1980 SC 531; Fazal Hussain v. Muhammad Bashir PLD 1982 SC AJK 89, rel.) (c) Criminal trial—Foundational document not exhibited—FIR/primary document—Consequences ––Cr.P.C., Ss. 154, 173; QSO, Arts. 17 & 159 (general). Non-exhibition of the FIR and non-production/exhibition of the allegedly forged notification struck at the root of the prosecution; investigation premised on un-proved documents cannot support a conviction. (Qaiser v. State 2018 PTD 1961; Nasima Bibi v. State 2008 P.Cr.LJ 613, rel.) (d) Statement of accused—Mandatory duty to confront—Non-putting of incriminating material—Effect ––Cr.P.C., S. 342. All material circumstances used against the accused must be specifically put to him; failure to confront the accused with the very notification alleged to be forged is an incurable illegality vitiating conviction. (Nuzhat Bibi v. Shabbir Hussain 2008 YLR 2866; Muhammad Anwar v. State 2019 P.Cr.LJ Note 80 (85), rel.) (e) Evidence—Expert opinion on handwriting—Role and necessity in forgery prosecutions While expert opinion is ordinarily corroborative, where forgery of signatures is the linchpin, obtaining and evaluating handwriting expertise is a necessary investigative step; absence thereof, coupled with non-production of the document, leaves the charge unproved. (Saadat Sultan, supra; Murarilal, supra; Fazal Hussain, supra, rel.) (f) Sentencing—Illegality of sentence under S.471 APC/PPC ––APC/PPC, Ss. 465 & 471. Punishment for “using as genuine a forged document” (S.471) cannot exceed that prescribed for the underlying forgery; where S.465 applies (max: two years or fine or both), a sentence of three years under S.471 is illegal. (g) Investigation—Lapses and selective inquiry—Effect on prosecution case Failure to investigate custodians of the service book, facilitators, or authors/scribers of the impugned notification, and reliance on untested assertions rather than objective verification (e.g., signature comparison) undermined the prosecution case; conjecture cannot substitute proof. (Rahat Hussain Zaidi v. Settlement Commissioner 1988 MLD 113; Salim Javed Durrani v. State 2005 P.Cr.LJ 22, rel.) Cited Cases: • Abdul Majeed v. State 2023 P.Cr.LJ 331 • Lal Bux v. State 2023 YLR 321 • Arshad Mahmood v. Raja Muhammad Asghar 2008 SCR 345 • Ghulam Abbas v. State 2020 P.Cr.LJ 1678 • Saadat Sultan v. Muhammad Zahoor Khan 2006 SCMR 193 • Murarilal v. State of M.P. AIR 1980 SC 531 • Fazal Hussain v. Muhammad Bashir PLD 1982 SC AJK 89 • Qaiser v. State 2018 PTD 1961 • Nasima Bibi v. State 2008 P.Cr.LJ 613 • Nuzhat Bibi v. Shabbir Hussain 2008 YLR 2866 • Muhammad Anwar v. State 2019 P.Cr.LJ Note 80 (85) • The State v. Mushtaq Ahmed PLD 1973 SC 418 • Ayob Masih v. State 2002 SCMR 1048 • Khalid Mehmood v. State 2011 SCMR 664 • Syed Riffat Hussain v. State 2020 P.Cr.LJ 1486 • State of MP v. Dharkole 2004 SCC 308 • Rahat Hussain Zaidi v. Settlement Commissioner 1988 MLD 113 • Salim Javed Durrani v. State 2005 P.Cr.LJ 22 • Muzaffar Hussain v. State 2023 P.Cr.L.J Note 47 (78) • Adeel Zahoor Malik v. Abdul Sayyad Shaikh 2023 YLR 187 • Wali Muhammad Raja v. Sikilado Rahimoon 2014 YLR 1114 • Umair Ahmed Khan v. Yousuf Ali Khan Ghouri 2014 MLD 953. Disposition: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentences under Ss.468 & 471 APC and S.5(2) PCA set aside; appellant acquitted; benefit of S.382-B Cr.P.C. already extended noted.

Summary: (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (NAO) --- Ss. 12, 13 & 17 --- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 --- S. 516-A --- Freezing of property --- Scope of freezing order --- Interim custody of vehicle on superdari --- Maintainability of application under S. 516-A, Cr.P.C. during pendency of NAB Reference --- Applicability of Cr.P.C. in NAB proceedings. A freezing order under section 12(b)(iii) of NAO 1999, which prohibits the transfer of property, does not amount to seizure or possession by the NAB. Therefore, a vehicle subject to such an order can be released on superdari under section 516-A, Cr.P.C., provided no inconsistency arises between NAO and Cr.P.C. provisions. In the present case, the freezing order only restricted the transfer of the vehicle and did not bar interim custody. The petitioner, while accepting the freezing order without objection, retained the right to seek superdari. The Court held that section 516-A Cr.P.C. applies mutatis mutandis to NAB proceedings under section 17 of the NAO 1999 and that the denial of interim custody was legally misconceived. Cited Cases: Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry v. Secretary Ministry of Industries (PLD 2004 SC 413) Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Govt. of Pakistan (2015 SCMR 630) Amanullah Khan v. Federal Government of Pakistan (PLD 1990 SC 1092) Khalid Humayun v. NAB (PLD 2017 SC 194) Abid Hasan v. PIAC (2005 SCMR 25) (b) Freezing Order --- Interpretation --- Typographical error in freezing order --- Correction by trial court --- Discretion of courts to consider substance over form. The Freezing Order referred to the impounded vehicle as “Toyota Vezel” whereas the correct make was “Honda Vezel.” The Supreme Court directed the trial court to treat the superdari order as applicable to the vehicle identified by registration, chassis, and engine numbers, irrespective of the typographical error in the original order. Substance must prevail over clerical error to avoid unjust deprivation of property. (c) Constitutional law --- Arts. 23 & 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 --- Right to property --- Interim deprivation of property --- Judicial discretion to grant superdari must be exercised fairly and reasonably. Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution protect the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and prohibit deprivation without due process of law. Courts, when dealing with applications for superdari, must consider the constitutional safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of property. Discretion under section 516-A Cr.P.C. must be exercised fairly, and reasons must be recorded to justify withholding or granting interim custody. (d) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 --- S. 516-A --- Superdari --- Judicial responsibility --- Standard for granting custody of seized property --- Requirement of ownership proof and solvent surety. An application under section 516-A Cr.P.C. must be decided based on clear ownership documents such as registration certificates or purchase invoices. Interim custody should be granted subject to furnishing personal bond and solvent surety equivalent to market value. Courts must record specific reasons while granting or denying interim custody and must ensure the vehicle is produced whenever required during trial. (e) Accountability Court --- Discretion --- Exercise of jurisdiction --- Requirement of speaking order --- Duty to apply judicial mind. The Accountability Court failed to examine the exact scope of the Freezing Order and summarily dismissed the application for superdari without analyzing the relevant statutory provisions or the facts specific to the petitioner. The Supreme Court observed that slipshod or perfunctory dismissal of interlocutory applications violates the obligation to provide reasoned, lawful, and structured decisions, especially in matters involving fundamental rights. Disposition: Appeal allowed; Orders of Accountability Court and High Court set aside. Application under S. 516-A, Cr.P.C. for custody of vehicle on superdari allowed subject to personal bond and solvent surety equivalent to market value, and undertaking to produce the vehicle before court as required. Trial court directed to mark caution against vehicle’s transfer.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 342—Failure to put incriminating evidence—Effect—Identification parade not put to accused in statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C.—Held, that such omission renders the evidence legally inadmissible—Conviction based partly on such identification was not sustainable—Reference made to Muhammad Shah v. The State (2010 SCMR 1009). (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 396—Qatl-i-Amd—Dacoity with murder—Benefit of doubt—Eyewitnesses were related and prosecution failed to assign specific role of fatal firing to appellant—Appellant not named in FIR—Nominated later on the disclosure of co-accused, which is inadmissible—Identification parade held after 20 months without explanation—No features described in FIR or 161 Cr.P.C. statements—Identification held legally inconsequential—Recovery of weapon not connected to the crime through forensic analysis nor recovered from exclusive possession—Held, prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt—Appellant acquitted. (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ----Identification evidence—Delayed test identification parade—Evidentiary value—Identification conducted 20 months after occurrence—No explanation for delay—No features described in crime report or witness statements—Held, such identification lacks legal worth—Relied on Mehboob Hassan v. Akhtar Islam (2024 SCMR 757), Javed Khan alias Bacha v. The State (2017 SCMR 524), and Sabir Ali alias Fauji v. The State (2011 SCMR 563). (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 129—Presumption—Recovery—Kalashnikov allegedly recovered from abandoned house not proven to be in exclusive possession of accused—No crime empties sent for forensic matching—Held, recovery irrelevant—Supported by Nasir Ahmed v. The State (2023 SCMR 478), Arshad Khan v. The State (2017 SCMR 564). (e) Medical Jurisprudence ----Firearm injuries—Corroborative nature—No specific injury attributed to appellant—Role of firing attributed to co-accused—Held, medical evidence did not corroborate prosecution’s claim against appellant—Cited Hashim Qasim v. The State (2017 SCMR 986). (f) Criminal trial ----Principle of benefit of doubt—Scope—Held, prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt—Infirmities in identification, recovery, and absence of specific role in causing death warranted acquittal—Benefit of doubt must go to the accused—Relied on Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345), Ayub Masih v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 1048), and Sikandar Ali alias Bhola v. The State (2025 SCMR 552). Disposition: Criminal Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentences of Shahid Mahmood alias Demo set aside. He is acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Murder Reference answered in the negative; death sentence not confirmed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Criminal Law – Appeal Against Acquittal: ----Ss. 302, 311, 201, 34, Cr.P.C. & S. 20 of Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 Acquittal of accused in honour killing case involving alleged viral video of deceased girls––State filed appeal against acquittal by trial court––Allegation that two girls were murdered by cousins after a video involving them and accused went viral on social media––Initial investigation claimed motive was based on honour––Mobile phone and video footage taken into possession but forensic reports failed to establish direct connection between recovered device and accused––Judicial Magistrate’s exhumation attempt obstructed by tribal elders and deceased families citing religious and cultural reasons––Confessional statement of main accused failed to constitute a true confession of murder––Held, prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt––In an appeal against acquittal, presumption of innocence is doubled––Unless trial court’s judgment is perverse, arbitrary, or mechanical, findings are not to be lightly interfered with––Trial court rightly extended benefit of doubt and based findings on sound legal reasoning––Appeal dismissed. ----Cited Cases: • Ghulam Sikandar v. Mamaraz Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 11 • Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shehzad and another 29249-51 • The State v. Abdul Khaliq and others PLD 2011 SC 554 • Amin Khan v. Gul and others (citation not specified) "(Appeal against acquittal) (a) Appeal against acquittal--Ss.302, 311, 201/34 P.P.C read with Section 20 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016—Reappraisal of evidence—Respondents/accused were charged for committing murder of two girls on the pretext of honour and were buried without conducting autopsy on the dead bodies—The occurrence was unseen as the complainant S.H.O on receiving information about the murder of two ladies, rushed to the crime village where it was told to him that they were murdered by their cousin reportedly due to their objectionable video with accused Umer Ayaz, which had gone viral on social media. Although the mobile phone through which the objectionable video featuring two deceased women and the accused Umer Ayaz was allegedly taken into possession which was sent to the F.S.L, however, there was no report on file to confirm that the said mobile phone belonged to the accused. (b) Confessional statement—The confessional statement of accused Umer Ayaz, relied upon by the prosecution, did not constitute confessional statement as the same only acknowledged friendship of the accused with the deceased women, specially given that the accused had not been charged with the murder of the two women. (c) It is cardinal principal of law and natural justice that every person, accused of an offence, is to be considered innocent, unless and until proved guilty on the basis of legal and unimpeachable evidence. However, after facing full-fledged trial, if an accused of a crime is acquitted by the competent Court of law, then a presumption of his innocence gets doubled and very strong and exceptional circumstances are required to overturn the conviction judgment. (Appeal was dismissed in limine)."PECA