Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 14.03.2013 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Civil Revision No. 4-D of 1995). Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- ----Ss. 39 & 42---Elderly and illiterate lady---Suit for declaration and cancellation of sale deed---Execution of sale deed denied by elderly and illiterate lady---Fraud regarding registration of sale deed, alleging of---Burden of proof---Plaintiff (elderly and illiterate lady) was not required to prove the factum of fraud; rather, the burden lay upon the beneficiaries of the sale deed to establish the genuineness of the transaction---Presumption attached with registered sale deed was rebuttable---Facts in brevity were that the predecessor-in-interest (vendor) of the petitioners filed a declaratory suit challenging the validity of a registered sale deed in favour of the respondents/defendants (beneficiaries) regarding the suit property claiming that at the time of execution of the impugned sale deed, she was an illiterate woman, approximately 80 to 90 years old, issueless, and her husband had passed away---She alleged that her close relatives (respondents/defendants) committed fraud---The trial court and appellate court decreed the suit by declaring the sale deed as null and void and ordering its cancellation, however, the High Court allowed the civil revision filed by the respondents/defendants (beneficiaries), holding that the deceased vendor and petitioners had to discharge the burden to prove the factum of fraud and forgery---Core point for determination by the Supreme Court was as to "Whether the burden of proof lay solely on the plaintiff/vendor (elderly and illiterate lady) to establish fraud, or whether the beneficiaries of the impugned transaction were required to prove the genuineness and bona fides of the transaction?"---Held: Presumption of truth was attached to the registered sale deed which was a public document but the said presumption was rebuttable---As the vendors alleged fraud regarding the registered sale deed and agreement in question, therefore, it was duty of the respondents/defendants being beneficiaries to prove the genuineness of the transaction qua the suit property in their favour through bringing on record confidence aspiring and trustworthy evidence---Respondents/defendants (beneficiaries) were legally bound to prove the genuineness of the alleged transaction by producing the concerned Registrar but the needful was not done---Similarly the respondent (beneficiaries) were bound to prove the payment of sale consideration but the bank record or any official/officer of bank was not produced by respondents to prove the factum of payment of sale consideration, therefore, the respondents being beneficiaries could not discharge the onus to prove the genuineness of the transaction in their favour---The judgment of the High Court whereby, the petitioner/plaintiff (vendor) was held responsible to prove the factum of fraud was passed against the settled law of the country on the subject---Once fraud was alleged by the original owner then the beneficiaries of the sale transaction were bound to show genuineness of the alleged transaction---Impugned judgment of the High Court was set-aside, resultantly the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the district court were restored---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Misbah Khanum v. Kamran Yasin Khan and another 2022 SCMR 1629 rel. Liaqat Ali Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (via video link, Lahore). Shabbir Ahmad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for the L.Rs of Respondent No. 1 (via video link, Lahore). Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order dated 13.03.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Civil Petition No. D-1077 of 2023). (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 516-A---Superdari---Interim custody of vehicle---Effect---Permitting interim custody of vehicle on Superdari neither amounts to prejudice the trial nor gives a clean chit to accused, nor does it relieve or exempt owner / recipient of custody from pending legal proceedings---Duration of interim custody may continue subject to the bond and surety till the final fate of the case---Till then the person allowed interim custody is duty-bound under law to attend, participate and produce the vehicle as and when directed by Court. (b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----Ss. 12, 13 & 17---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.516-A---Freezing of vehicle---Superdari---Interim custody, grant of---Non-filing of objections---Criminal Procedure Code, 1898---Applicability---Petitioner / accused was aggrieved of refusal to grant interim custody of vehicle in question which was frozen under section 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 by Accountability Court---High Court declined to give interim custody of the vehicle as the accused had not filed any objection against freezing order---Validity---Accused never endeavored to challenge freezing order, rather he accepted it without demur but he applied for custody of vehicle within the sphere of freezing order (which was confined to an embargo against transfer of vehicle only)---There was no demonstrable restriction or prohibition in law that if an accused or aggrieved person had failed to lodge a claim or objection against freezing order in terms of Section 13 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, they would be deprived and perpetually or unremittingly not be able to apply for interim custody of vehicle / property---There is no inconsistency or incongruity between section 516-A, Cr.P.C. and provision of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---There is no specific provision for releasing custody of vehicle embedded in National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and there are also no absolute restrictions against doing so---Aid and assistance may be taken by Courts from general provisions of Cr.P.C., particularly when the letter of law indubitably makes it clear that provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings unless there is anything inconsistent with the provisions of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court and allowed interim custody of vehicle in question on Superdari, in terms of Section 516-A, Cr.P.C.---Appeal was allowed. Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry v. Secretary, Ministry of Industries and Production, Government of Pakistan and others PLD 2004 SC 413; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630; Amanullah Khan v. Federal Government of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 1092; Abid Hasan v. PIAC 2005 SCMR 25 and Khalid Humayun v. The NAB through DG Quetta and others PLD 2017 SC 194 ref. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----General and special laws---Object, purpose and scope---Special law is meant to refer to laws regulating specific subjects and stipulating their own limitations and conditions to be applied---Special law prevails and dominates over general law---Courts while resolving the issue of whether a statute is a special or general law, the crucial consideration must be the legislative intent---In case of divergence, rule of harmonious construction may be adopted. Shaukat Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Sattar Mehmood Awan, Deputy Prosecutor General, Syed Meeral Shah, Special Prosecutor and Irfan Ali, I.O/Deputy Director for the NAB. Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025. (a) The Chairman NAB or the court trying an accused for any offence as specified under this Ordinance, may, at any time, if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed such an offence, order the freezing of his property or part thereof, whether in his possession or in the possession of any relative, associate or person on his behalf. (d) If the property ordered to be frozen consists of livestock or is of a perishable nature, the Chairman NAB, or the Court may, if it deems proper and expedient, order the immediate sale thereof and the proceeds of the sale may be deposited with the Chairman NAB or the Court, or as either may direct as Appropriate. (e) The powers, duties, and liabilities of a receiver, if any, appointed under this section shall be the same as those of a receiver appointed under Order-XL of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). 1 (f) The order of freezing mentioned in sub-sections 'a' to 'e' shall remain operative until the final disposal of the case by the Court, and in the event of the acquittal of the accused, shall continue to remain operative for a period of ten days after receipt of certified copy of the order of acquittal or release by NAB, whereafter it shall be subject to an order by the court in which an appeal, if any, is filed. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon all claims or objections against the freezing of any property under Section 12 above. Such claims or objection shall be made before the Court within 14 days from the date of the order freezing such property. (c) The accused or any other aggrieved party, whose claim or objection against freezing of property has been dismissed by the Court, may, within ten days file an appeal against such order before the High Court.

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----Ss.4(1), 18, 23, 28-A & 34--- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.23 & 24--- Acquisition of land---Compensation---Statutory interest under S.34 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894---The Irrigation department took possession of appellants' (land owners) land without notice or legal acquisition causing damage to the land constraining them to file a Constitutional petition, whereby, the authorities were directed to issue an award---The appellants (land owners) were offered Rs.438,00 per acre which they accepted under protest and subsequently filed a Land Acquisition Reference claiming Rs. 400,000 per acre along with interest and damages---The reference was dismissed by the Trial Court against which present appeal was preferred---The points for determination by the High Court were as to: (i) Whether valuation of the land was assessed in award in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; (ii) Whether the appellants were entitled to claim the benefits conferred under S.34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; (iii) Whether the appellants were eligible for the benefits outlined under S.28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; (iv) Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for damages---Held: To answer the first point, by virtue of S.23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the "Act") the market value of the acquired land was to be assessed as of the date of the publication of the notification under S.4(1) of the Act and it was evident that the land acquisition officer had correctly determined the valuation of the land in accordance with the relevant provisions---To answer the second point the land acquisition officer failed to adhere to the mandatory requirement of law by not awarding interest under S.34 of the Act---The rights of landowners were not only safeguarded under the Act but were also enshrined in Art.23 and 24 of the Constitution which provisions unequivocally guaranteed the rights of citizens---Since the award dated 02.02.2011 passed by the land acquisition officer revealed that possession was taken over by the acquiring agency after issuance of notification under S.4 of the Act dated 18.8.1988 and the final payment was made on 27.04.2011, as per the bank statement filed by the law officer, respondent No. 3 (Land Acquisition officer) was directed to modify the award and include interest from the date of possession as determined in the award till payment of the award (27.04.2011)---To answer the third point regarding grant of benefit of S.28-A of the Act, it was evident that the said provision had been omitted through S.4 of the Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Act 2009 (Act No.XVI of 2010)---To answer the fourth point, upon meticulous examination of the evidence adduced by the appellants (land owners) and their witnesses, it was evident that they had failed to furnish any cogent or substantive material to support their claim---There existed no legal infirmity or procedural irregularity in the findings of the Trial Court in denying the claim of damages---As no case of damages had been successfully demonstrated by the appellants (land owners), the findings of the Trial Court stood fully substantiated and were, therefore, maintained---Respondent No.3/land acquisition officer was directed to amend the award by incorporating interest accrued on the principal amount from date of possession as determined in the award until 27.4.2011 (the date when the amount was disbursed to the appellants-land owners), in accordance with the provisions of S.34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894---Furthermore, if any sum was erroneously granted to the appellant under S.28-A of the said Act same would be deducted accordingly---Appeal was disposed of, in circumstances. Sheikh Muhammad Ilyas Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others PLD 2016 SC 264; Dilawar Hussain v. Province of Sindh PLD 2016 SC 514; B.P. Pakistan Exploration and Production Inc. v. Ashique Hussain and others Civil Appeals Nos. 1653 to 1655 of 2007 and Jinad Shah and others v. General Manager NHA (LM and IS), Islamabad and others and Land Acquisition Collector v. Muhammad Sultan PLD 2014 SC 696 rel. (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----S.34---Acquisition of land---Compensation---Statutory interest, computation of---Scope and concept---The acquiring agency is under an obligation to compensate the landowner by paying the requisite amount, including the accrued interest---The fundamental principle underpinning the provision of payment is that the party dispossessed of its property is deprived of any profit or usufruct from the date possession is taken---If the collector fails to effect payment prior to taking possession, the affected party is entitled to interest from that date---This principle is analogous to that in a contractual sale and purchase of land, wherein the purchaser is obligated to pay interest on the unpaid purchase amount from the date of possession---When the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the collector shall pay the amount awarded with compound interest at the rate of eight per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited; provided that any waiver of the above right by the land owner shall be void and he shall be entitled to the said interest notwithstanding agreement to the contrary. Muhammad Hashim Bajeer for Appellants. Allah Bachayo Soomro, Addl. A.G., assisted by Muhammad Ismail Bhutto, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th February, 2025. Judgment Abdul Hamid Bhurgri, J --- The appellants, through the present appeal, have impugned the judgment dated 23.11.2017, rendered by the learned II-Additional District Judge, Badin, in Land Acquisition Reference No. 01 of 2011, titled Ghulam Abbas and others v. Land Acquisition Officer and others, whereby the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit of the appellants. Consequently, this appeal has been preferred. 2. The crux of the matter pertains to the acquisition of land measuring 3-12 acres, identified as Survey No. 84, situated in Deh Kak, Taluka Tando Bago, which was appropriated by the Irrigation Department for the excavation of saline water Drain 5-R. The plaintiffs/appellants contend that defendant No. 2/respondent unlawfully took possession of the subject land on 18th August 1988 without issuing any prior notice or intimation. The project encroached upon the agricultural land of the plaintiffs/appellants, resulting in significant damage to their standing crops. Additionally, adjacent land under sugarcane cultivation was adversely affected, thereby exacerbating their financial losses. Furthermore, approximately four acres of their land became uncultivable, as it was buried under layers of mud due to the excavation process. For over two decades, the plaintiffs/appellants were deprived of the opportunity to cultivate their land, particularly five acres situated adjacent to the Sim Nala on the northern side. The construction of Sim Nala obstructed the natural flow of water, preventing its passage to the plaintiffs' fields and rendering cultivation practically impossible. Despite the fact that the Sim Nala was constructed without lawful acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, repeated applications submitted by the plaintiffs/ appellants to the Deputy Commissioner (DC) Badin (dated 4.4.1991) and subsequent appeals to the Provincial Ombudsman remained unaddressed. Although multiple notices were issued by the Ombudsman, the relevant authorities failed to address the appellants' grievances. 3. Subsequently, the plaintiffs/ appellants filed Constitutional Petition No. D-441 of 2010 before the Honourable High Court, which, via order dated 19.10.2010, directed the defendants/respondents to issue an Award. In compliance, the defendants/ respondents passed the impugned Award on 02.2.2011 and issued a cheque of Rs.438,500 as partial payment to the plaintiffs/appellants. However, the appellants accepted the amount under protest and proceeded to institute the instant suit, seeking compensation at the rate of Rs. 4,00,000 per acre for five acres, along with additional benefits under Sections 28-A and 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, including interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 4. The defendant No. 2/respondent No.1, in response, filed written objections, categorically denying the appellants' claims. He contended that at the time of land acquisition, the prevailing market price ranged between Rs.3,000 and Rs.5,000 per acre, and a 15% compensation increment had already been provided. Therefore, he prayed for the outright dismissal of the plaintiffs' application. 5. Upon examining the pleadings, the following issues were framed for determination by the trial court: I S S U E S 1. Whether the application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, seeking additional compensation, is maintainable, given that the land price was assessed at the time of the Section 4 notification issued in August 1989? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensation as per the land rate applicable in 1988, when possession was taken, or as per the rate prevailing in 2011, when payment was made by the defendants? 3.Whether the plaintiff suffered substantial financial losses due to the destruction of standing sugarcane crops as a result of the Sim Nala's construction? 4. Whether the plaintiffs' land was rendered unfit for cultivation due to the absence of any alternative water supply for irrigation? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed? 6. What should be the appropriate decree? 6. To substantiate their claim, the plaintiffs/appellants produced the following evidence: ? Ghulam Abbas (PW-1), whose deposition was recorded at Exhibit 71, he provided documentary evidence, including Exh. 71/A (Reference of Proceedings and orders) and Exh. 71-B (Khata of Land with Video Entry No. 13). ? PW-2 Ali Ahmed (Exh. 75), PW-3 Muhammad Ramzan (Exh. 76), and PW-4 Mohsin Ali Chandio, Mukhtiarkar Tando Bago (Exh. 77). Thereafter the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants closed their side of evidence vide statement at Exh.78. 7. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties and adducing evidence had dismissed the reference hence, this appeal. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the award rendered by the Land Acquisition Officer contravenes the law, as the appellants have not been granted the benefits enshrined under Sections 28-A and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. He further asserted that the Land Acquisition Officer (Respondent No. 3) and the learned trial judge have erroneously assessed the valuation of the land, calculating it from the date of notification issuance rather than from the date of the award. Furthermore, the counsel submitted that, despite the appellants having adduced cogent evidence demonstrating the damage sustained, both the trial judge and the Land Acquisition Officer failed to duly appreciate the evidence, thereby dismissing the appellants' claim. Consequently, he prayed for the award to be set aside, thereby enabling the present appeal. 9. Conversely, the learned Additional Advocate General (AAG) argued that the trial court's order is well-reasoned and does not warrant any interference. He contended that appellants are not entitled for benefit of Section 28 A of the Land Acquisition as the same has been omitted through Section 4 of the Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Act 2009 (Act No. XVI of 2010). The learned AAG relied upon PLD 2016 SC page 514. In the end, he prayed for the dismissal of the appeal. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned AAG. In order to adjudicate upon the appeal at hand, the following key points have been identified for the determination: 1. Whether valuation of the land was assessed in award in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act? 2. Whether the appellants were entitled to claim the benefits conferred under section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? 3. Whether the appellants were eligible for the benefits outlined under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act? 4. Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for damages? 5. What should the order be? POINT NO.1. 11. The primary contention of the counsel for the appellant is that the valuation of the acquired land must be determined based on the date when the award was passed. However, the Land Acquisition Officer calculated the price on the date when the notification was issued, which the appellants argued is incorrect. 12. Under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, the market value of the acquired land is to be assessed as of the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1). The relevant portion of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act is as follows:- "23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation.-(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration--- "firstly, the market-value of the land on the date of the publication of the [notification under Section 4], subsection (1). secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof; thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land; fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, if any other manner, or his earnings; fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change; and sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land". 13. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the Land Acquisition Officer has correctly determined the valuation of the land in accordance with the provision of the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly, this point is answered in the affirmative. POINT NO.2. 14. The Land Acquisition Officer failed to adhere to the mandatory requirement of the law by not awarding interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The relevant portion of the compensation of land in Award is reproduced hereunder:- "Compensation of land" Market value of the land in 1988 has been obtained through the local inquiry, which was about Rs.10,000/- in the concerned Dehs. Also, the amount of Rs.10,000/- has been referred to as compensation amount against 01-00 acres land. Thus the basic amount of compensation per Acre in the said Dehs has been decided at Rs.10,000/-. Applicants, however, did not show dissent over the decided basic amount of compensation to be awarded to them in 1989. Furthermore, as per subsection (2) of Section 23, I am required to 'award a sum of 15% on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition, as it has been made for public purpose. In addition to this, Section 28-A, administering additional compensation, attracts in this case by which 'an additional amount of 15% per annum of the compensation so fixed shall be paid from the date of the notification under section 4 to the date of payment of the compensation". This constitutes a fundamental contravention of legal provisions, as the acquiring agency/respondents Nos. 2 and 4 admittedly did not deposit the requisite amount at the time of taking possession of the subject land. The trial court also failed to rectify this legal irregularity committed by Respondent No. 3. The relevant portion of Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is reproduced below: "34. Payment of interest-When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with compound interest at the rate of eight per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited." Provided that any waiver of the above right by the land owner shall be void and he shall be entitled to the said interest notwithstanding agreement to the contrary". 15. The rights of a landowners are not only safeguarded under the Land Acquisition Act but are also enshrined in Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. These constitutional provisions unequivocally guarantee the rights of citizens, as they constitute fundamental rights inherent to every individual. Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution are reproduced as follows: "23. Provision as to property. Every citizen shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property in any part of Pakistan, subject to the Constitution and any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest. 24. Protection of property rights, (1) No person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law. (2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save for a public purpose, and save by the authority of law which provides for compensation therefor and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given. (3) Nothing in this Article shall affect the validity of- (a) any law permitting the compulsory acquisition or taking possession of any property for preventing danger to life, property or public health; or (b) any law permitting the taking over of any property which has been acquired by, or come into the possession of, any person by any unfair means, or in any manner, contrary to law; or (c) any law relating to the acquisition, administration or disposal of any property which is or is deemed to be enemy property or evacuee property under any law (not being property which has ceased to be evacuee property under any law); or (d) any law providing for the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period, either in the public interest or in order to secure the property management of the property, or for the benefit of its owner; or (e) any law providing for the acquisition of any class of property for the purpose of- (i) providing education and medical aid to all or any specified class of citizens; or (ii) providing housing and public facilities and services such as roads, water supply, sewerage, gas and electric power to all or any specified class of citizens; or (iii) providing maintenance to those who, on account of unemployment, sickness, infirmity or old age, are unable to maintain themselves; or (f) any existing law or any law made in pursuance of Article 253. (4) The adequacy or otherwise of any compensation provided for by any such law as is referred to in this Article, or determined in pursuance thereof, shall not be called in question in any court". 16. The acquiring agency was under an obligation to compensate the landowner by paying the requisite amount, including the accrued interest. However, the Land Acquisition Officer failed to fulfill this obligation, an oversight that was further compounded by the trial court, which also neglected to acknowledge this crucial aspect of the case. Since the respondents neglected to deposit the amount as required by law, they are consequently liable to bear the penal implications of Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. 17. The fundamental principle underpinning the provision of payment is that the party dispossessed of its property is deprived of any profit or usufruct from the date possession is taken. If the collector fails to effect payment prior to taking possession, the affected party is entitled to interest from that date. This principle is analogous to that in a contractual sale and purchase of land, wherein the purchaser is obligated to pay interest on the unpaid purchase amount from the date of possession. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment reported in 2023 page 493,(sic) which for the sake of convenience is reproduced hereunder: "10. Now moving to the next question, the relevant starting date for the payment of compound interest on compensation amount, in terms of section 34 of Land Acquisition Act, is the date of taking possession of the acquired land till the date of payment by the Collector where normal stator procedure has been observed. In this regard, reference may be made to the case of "Sheikh Muhammad Ilyas Ahmed and others v. Pakistan through Sectary Ministry of Defence, Islamabad and others" (PLD 2016 SC 64). However, in "Syeda Nasreen Zohra v. Government of the Punjab" (2022 SCMR 890) it was held, "We find that the compound interest would continue to accrue till such time that the entire compensation is paid in its entirely. Once the original amount has been deposited, the matter goes out of the penal consequences of section 34 of the Act". A similar view has been adopted by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Sheikh Muhammad Ilyas Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others, reported in PLD 2016 SC 264. 18. Since the award dated 2.2.2011 passed by the Land Acquisition officer of the land revealed that possession was taken over by the acquiring agency after issuance of notification under section 4 dated 18.8.1988 and the final payment was made on 27.04.2011, as per the bank statement filed by the learned AAG. The respondent No. 3 (Land Acquisition officer) is hereby directed to modify the award and include interest from the date of possession as determined in the award till payment of the award (27.4.2011). This issue is answered accordingly. POINT NO.3 19. As far as the contention of appellants' counsel regarding grant of benefit of Section 28-A of land acquisition act is concerned, it is evident that the said provision has been omitted through Section 4 of the Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Act 2009 (Act No.XVI of 2010). The statute explicitly states: "In the said Act, Section 28A shall be omitted and shall be deemed to have been so omitted as if it had never been enacted". 20. The rationale behind this legislative amendment was further clarified in the case of Dilawar Hussain v. Province of Sindh, as reported in PLD 2016 SC 514, wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has held as under:- "5... In the present circumstances, the Federal Shariat Court found the provisions of the Section 28-A to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The preamble of the repealing Act states that the Federal Shariat Court has directed that certain amendments be made to the Act in its application to the Province of Sindh. The plain words of section 4 of the repealing Act indicate the intention of the legislature that this Section 28-A is non est and therefore as per the ratio of the Dr. Mubashir Hassan case (supra) the appellants cannot be granted the benefit of Section 28-A as claimed in the instant appeal. It is settled law that appeal is a continuation of the original lis and therefore there is no past and closed transaction which may have afforded them protection in the event of the Section 28-A being declared to have "never been enacted". 21. Reliance is also placed on Civil Appeals Nos. 1653 to 1655 of 2007 (decided in 2024) (B.P. Pakistan Exploration and Production Inc. v. Ashique Hussain and others), wherein the Honourable Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance on the applicability of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 22. In the light of the established legal position, it is unequivocally clear that the appellants cannot claim any entitlement under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. Despite their plea for such benefits in the present appeal, the perusal of the Award demonstrates that the Land Acquisition Officer erroneously granted them such relief. Consequently, if any sum has been awarded to the appellants under Section 28A, the respondent Land Acquisition officer is hereby directed to deduct the said amount from the total award. Accordingly, this point is determined in the negative. POINT NO.4 23. The burden of proof rests upon the appellants to establish the alleged damages in the reference. Reliance is placed on 2023 SCMR page 1005 in the case of Jinad Shah and others v. General Manager NHA (LM and IS), Islamabad and others and Land Acquisition Collector v. Muhammad Sultan (PLD 2014 SC 696). Upon meticulous examination of the evidence adduced by the appellants and their witnesses, it is evident that they have failed to furnish any cogent or substantive material to support their claim. There exists no legal infirmity or procedural irregularity in the findings of the trial court in denying the claim of damages. As no case of damages has been successfully demonstrated by the appellants, the findings of the trial court stand fully substantiated and are, therefore, maintained. This point therefore, is answered accordingly. POINT NO.5. 24. In light of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby disposed of with a direction to respondent No.3/Land Acquisition Officer to amend the award by incorporating interest accrued on the principal amount from date of possession as determined in the award until 27.4.2011 (the date of when the amount was disbursed to the appellants), in accordance with the provisions of Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. Furthermore, if any sum erroneously granted to the appellant under Section 28 A of the said Act shall be deducted accordingly. 25. The appeal stands disposed of in these terms. The office is instructed to prepare the decree accordingly. UN/G-12/Sindh Order accordingly.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302 & 396---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused nominated on the statement of co-accused---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of son of complainant and a passerby by firing during robbery and also causing firearm injuries to security guard---Ocular account was furnished by two witnesses, who were related to the deceased and complainant---Admittedly, the appellant was not nominated in the FIR---After the arrest of an injured co-accused, who was apprehended on the same night and upon his disclosure the present appellant was nominated in this case---However, statement of accused could not be used against his co-accused because the same was inadmissible in the eye of law---Circumstances established that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Shabiul Hassan v. The State PLD 1991 SC 898 and Shafqat Abbas and another v. The State 2007 SCMR 162 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302 & 396---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Test identification parade---Delay of twenty months in conducting identification parade---Accused were charged for committing murder of son of complainant and a passerby by firing during robbery and also causing firearm injuries to security guard---Incident took place on 29.08.2018, but the identification parade was conducted after more than 20 months on 30.04.2020---No explanation had been offered for that considerable delay---Similarly, no features of the appellant and his co-accused had been described in the crime report as well as statements of witnesses under S.161, Cr.P.C.---In that way, identification parade had no legal worth---According to the prosecution's case when the appellant had already been nominated by his co-accused, then subsequent identification parade lost its significance---Said identification parade was never put to the appellant in his statement under S.342, Cr.P.C.---If any piece of prosecution evidence, which had not been put to accused in his statement under S.342, Cr.P.C, did not have any legal sanctity---Circumstances established that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Mehboob Hassan v. Akhtar Islam 2024 SCMR 757; Javed Khan alias Bacha and another v. The State and another 2017 SCMR 524; Sabir Ali alias Fauji v. The State 2011 SCMR 563 and Muhammad Shah v. The State 2010 SCMR 1009 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302 & 396---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Medical evidence---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of son of complainant and a passerby by firing during robbery and also causing firearm injuries to security guard---As regard medical evidence, both deceased were found to have died due to firearm injuries---In the present case, no specific role of inflicting the injuries on the body of any deceased had been attributed to the appellant, thus the medical evidence did not support to his extent---In fact, the allegation of firing was leveled against co-accused---Circumstances established that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Medical evidence---Scope---Medical evidence is only a corroborative piece of evidence which can tell about nature of injuries, the kind of weapon used etc. but cannot identify the culprit. Hashim Qasim and another v. The State 2017 SCMR 986 rel. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302 & 396---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence and crime empties---Reliance---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of son of complainant and a passerby by firing during robbery and also causing firearm injuries to security guard---Record showed that a Kalashnikov along with three live bullets, allegedly effected from a "ghairabaddhari" (abandoned house) and taken into possession---To prove the said recovery, the prosecution produced the attesting witnesses---However, the said recovery was totally inconsequential in proving the guilt of the appellant for multiple reasons---Firstly, no crime empty was sent to the Forensic Science Agency for matching with the recovered Kalashnikov---Absence of such forensic linkage rendered the recovery a disjointed event, unconnected with the actual offence in question---Mere recovery of a weapon could not by itself be treated as incriminating unless it was corroborated through forensic comparison with crime empties---Secondly, the prosecution failed to prove that the abandoned house from which the Kalashnikov was allegedly recovered was in the exclusive possession of the appellant---Site plan prepared by the Investigating Officer did not establish such exclusive dominion---Nor was there any other circumstantial evidence to connect the place of recovery with the appellant personally---Thirdly, the recovery was witnessed and attested only by prosecution witnesses who were related to the complainant and deceased---Therefore, the recovery of Kalashnikov along with three live bullets neither met the requirements of credibility nor fulfilled the legal criteria of relevance---Circumstances established that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Nasir Ahmed v. The State 2023 SCMR 478 and Arshad Khan v. The State 2017 SCMR 564 rel. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Benefit of doubt, however slight, arising from any infirmity in the prosecution case must always go to the accused. Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 and Sikandar Ali alias Bhola v. The State 2025 SCMR 552 rel. Peer Masood-ul-Hassan Chishti, Defence Counsel on State expense for Appellant. Muhammad Waqas Anwar, DPG for the State. Sh. Usman Karim-ud-Din for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025. Judgment Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, J .--- Through this single judgment, we intend to dispose of Criminal Appeal No.4189 of 2024, filed by Shahid Mahmood alias Demo, appellant against his conviction and sentence along with Murder Reference No.323 of 2023 transmitted by learned trial court for confirmation or otherwise of death sentence of the appellant being originated from the same judgment dated 15.12.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge Nankana Sahib in case FIR No.274/2018 dated 29.08.2018 in respect of offences under sections 302, 396, P.P.C. read with Section 7 of the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 registered at Police Station Syedwala, District Nankana Sahib whereby, after conclusion of trial in the said case, he convicted the appellant as under:- i) Under section 302(b), P.P.C.: sentenced to death for Qatl-i-amd of Zafar Ullah. He was also ordered to pay compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C in the sum of Rs.200,000/- to the legal heirs of the deceased, failing which he was ordered to further undergo S.I for 6 months. ii) 302(b), P.P.C.: sentenced to death for Qatl-i-amd of Umar Hayat. He was also ordered to pay compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C in the sum of Rs.200,000/- to the legal heirs of the deceased, failing which he was ordered to further undergo S.I for 6 months. iii) Under section 396, P.P.C.: sentenced to death for committing dacoity with murder of Zafar Ullah. He was also ordered to pay compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C in the sum of Rs.100,000/- to the legal heirs of the deceased, failing which he was ordered to further undergo S.I for 6 months. All the sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case, as unfolded through the FIR (Ex.PM), lodged by Basharat Ahmad complainant, is that on 29.08.2018, at about 06:00 PM, he was present in his jewelry shop along with his son Muhammad Zafar Ullah, Abdul Salam, Ghulam Sabir, and security guard Ghulam Rasool, when 6 or 7 unknown armed persons, riding on three motorcycles (Honda 125, United 70 CC, and Honda 70 CC), arrived. Two of them were carrying Kalashnikovs, one was armed with a pistol and a hand grenade, while two others had .12-bore repeaters. The intruders pointed their weapons, issued threats to kill, and forcibly entered the shop. They looted around 200 tolas of gold (including 150 tolas new and 50 tolas old), 900 tolas of silver, Rs. 6,15,000 from the almirah and Rs. 3,20,000/- from the counter. One of the assailants gave a blow with butt of pistol on head of Ghulam Rasool and snatched his weapon. When Zafar Ullah resisted, one of the accused fired three straight shots hitting him in the chest, neck, and right cheek, causing him to fall on the ground. The culprits then resorted to indiscriminate firing. While fleeing, a bullet struck a passerby Umar Hayat in the chest near the heart, who died on the spot. His companion Abdul Hafeez narrowly escaped. Zafar Ullah succumbed to his injuries on the way to the hospital. The accused fled away from the scene while firing. 3. Initially, the FIR was lodged against unknown persons. During investigation, Muhammad Nawaz alias Bhalli, an injured co-accused, was arrested. He allegedly disclosed the names of his companions including Shahid Mahmood alias Demo appellant, who was arrested on 05.03.2020 and subsequently identified in an identification parade conducted on 30.04.2020. The recovery of a Kalashnikov with three bullets was also shown to have been effected at his instance on 11.05.2020. After finalization of investigation, report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. was submitted in the trial court. Then the appellant was charge sheeted, who pleaded not guilty and claimed for trial. 4. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined 24 witnesses in total. Among them, Ghulam Sabir (PW.3) and Abdul Salam (PW.8) were eye-witnesses of the occurrence allegedly took place inside the shop, whereas Abdul Hafeez (PW.5) and Muhammad Ilyas (PW-6) were present at the time of occurrence, which happened in the bazaar resulting in the death of passerby Umar Hayat. The investigating officers, namely Muhammad Boota SI (PW-15), Azmat Ali Inspector (PW-17) and Muhammad Hayat DSP (PW-23), detailed the sequence of investigation including recovery memos, site plans, and statements of the accused. Rehan-ul-Hassan, Magistrate (PW-11), supervised the identification parade of the appellant. Dr.Faraz Ahmad Bhatti (PW-12) conducted postmortem examination on the dead body of Umar Hayat (deceased) whereas, Dr.Usman Riaz Qadeer Maan (PW.13) conducted autopsy of Muhammad Zafar Ullah. The prosecution also produced documentary evidence including postmortem reports, inquest reports, recovery memos of alleged looted property and weapons of offence, crime scene reports of PFSA, polygraph reports and fingerprint examination reports. 5. After close of the prosecution evidence, the appellant recorded his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C., denied all allegations, pleaded innocence, and claimed that the identification parade was tainted and that no recovery was ever effected at his instance. He also contended that he was not seen in the CCTV footage produced during the trial and alleged that the prosecution had manipulated evidence to falsely implicate him in order to show performance. However, the appellant neither opted to record his statement under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C. on oath nor produced any defence evidence. 6. Learned trial court found the ocular account consistent and corroborated by recovery, medical evidence, and identification parade. On such premises, conviction and sentences were recorded against the appellant through the impugned judgment, hence this appeal. 7. We have heard the arguments from both the sides and found it imperative to reappraise the entire evidence through the lens of settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. 8. It is a trite principle that in a case of capital charge, the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt through cogent and convincing evidence. Mere suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot substitute legal proof. We proceed to examine the pillars on which the prosecution case rests, i.e., ocular account, identification parade, medical evidence and recovery. 9. The ocular account was furnished by Ghulam Sabir (PW-3) and Abdul Salam (PW-8), who were related to the deceased Zafar Ullah and complainant Basharat Ahmad. Admittedly, the appellant was not nominated in the FIR. It was after the arrest of Muhammad Nawaz alias Bhalli, an injured co-accused, who was apprehended on the same night and upon his disclosure the present appellant was nominated in this case. It is settled principle of law that statement of accused cannot be used against his co-accused because the same is inadmissible in the eye of law. Reliance is placed upon the following case laws titled as "Shabiul Hassan v. The State" (PLD 1991 SC 898) and "Shafqat Abbas and another v. The State" (2007 SCMR 162). 10. We have further observed that the incident took place on 29.08.2018, but the identification parade was conducted after more than 20 months on 30.04.2020. No explanation has been offered for this considerable delay. The august Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as Mehboob Hassan v. Akhtar Islam (2024 SCMR 757) while dilating upon delayed conducting of identification parade held as under:- "The identification was conducted after a lapse of more than two years of the occurrence, therefore, it is hard to believe that the witnesses could still have momentary glimpse of the respondents." Similarly, no features of the appellant and his co-accused have been described in the crime report as well as statements of PWs under section 161, Cr.P.C. In this way, identification parade has no legal worth. Reference can be made to the case law reported as "Javed Khan alias Bacha and another v. The State and another" (2017 SCMR 524) wherein the august Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:- "8. The Complainant (PW-5) had not mentioned any features of the assailants either in the FIR or in his statement recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. therefore there was no benchmark against which to test whether the appellants, who he had identified after over a year of the crime, and who he had fleetingly seen, were in fact the actual culprits." Further reliance can be placed on the case law reported as "Sabir Ali alias Fauji v. The State (2011 SCMR 563). Moreover, according to the prosecution's case when the appellant has already been nominated by his co-accused Muhammad Nawaz alias Bhalli, then subsequent identification parade lost its significance. 11. It is also worth mentioning here that the said identification parade was never put to the appellant in his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C. It is settled law that if any piece of prosecution evidence, which has not been put to accused in his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C does not have any legal sanctity. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case titled as "Muhammad Shah v. The State" (2010 SCMR 1009), the relevant excerpt thereof is reproduced hereunder:- "It is well-settled that if any piece of evidence is not put to the accused in his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C then the same cannot be used against him for his conviction. In this case both the Courts below without realizing the legal position not only used the above portion of the evidence against him, but also convicted him on such piece of evidence, which cannot be sustained." 12. As regards medical evidence, both deceased Zafar Ullah and Umar Hayat were found to have died due to firearm injuries. In the present case, no specific role of inflicting the injuries on the body of any deceased has been attributed to the appellant, thus the medical evidence does not support to his extent. In fact, the allegation of firing was levelled against co-accused Muhammad Nawaz. It is settled by now that the medical evidence is only a corroborative piece of evidence which can tell about nature of injuries, the kind of weapon used etc. but cannot identify the culprit. Guidance in this regard can be sought from the case law reported as "Hashim Qasim and another v. The State" (2017 SCMR 986) wherein the Supreme Court of Pakistan has held as under:- "The medical evidence is only confirmatory or of supporting nature and is never held to be corroboratory evidence, to identify the culprit." 13. Another piece of evidence on the basis of which the conviction of the appellant was recorded is the recovery of Kalashnikov (P.15) along with three live bullets, allegedly effected from a "ghair abad dhari" (abandoned house) and taken into possession vide recovery memo. Exh.PJ. To prove the said recovery, the prosecution produced the attesting witnesses of Exh.PJ, namely Ghulam Sabir (PW-3) and Abdul Salam (PW-8). However, the said recovery is totally inconsequential in proving the guilt of the appellant for multiple reasons. Firstly, no crime empty was sent to the Punjab Forensic Science Agency (PFSA) for matching with the recovered Kalashnikov (P.15). The absence of such forensic linkage renders the recovery a disjointed event, unconnected with the actual offence in question. It is now firmly established that mere recovery of a weapon cannot by itself be treated as incriminating unless it is corroborated through forensic comparison with crime empties. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case titled Nasir Ahmed v. The State (2023 SCMR 478), wherein it was held that in the absence of forensic examination linking the recovered weapon of offence, the recovery of the same cannot be given probative value. Secondly, the prosecution failed to prove that the abandoned house from which the Kalashnikov allegedly recovered was in the exclusive possession of the appellant. The site plan prepared by the investigating officer did not establish such exclusive dominion. Nor was there any other circumstantial evidence to connect the place of recovery with the appellant personally. The principle that recovery must be from the conscious and exclusive possession of the accused has been emphasized by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of "Arshad Khan v. The State (2017 SCMR 564) wherein it is held that recoveries effected from open or unoccupied places, or from places not shown to be in exclusive possession of the accused, carry little evidentiary value. Thirdly, the recovery was witnessed and attested only by prosecution witnesses who were related to the complainant and deceased. Therefore, the recovery of Kalashnikov (P.15) along with three live bullets neither meets the requirements of credibility nor fulfills the legal criteria of relevance. The learned trial court erred in giving undue significance to this piece of evidence while convicting the appellant. 14. The prosecution, in our considered view, has miserably failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As repeatedly enunciated by the superior courts in a chain of cases including "Tariq Pervez v. The State" (1995 SCMR 1345), "Ayub Masih v. The State" (PLD 2002 SC 1048) and "Sikandar Ali alias Bhola v. The State" (2025 SCMR 552), the benefit of doubt, however, slight, arising from any infirmity in the prosecution case must always go to the accused. It is not simply a procedural requirement; rather it serves as a crucial protection within the criminal justice system that helps preventing wrongful convictions. 15. Resultantly, we allow Criminal Appeal No.4189 of 2024, set-aside the conviction and sentences awarded to Shahid Mahmood alias Demo (appellant), who is in judicial custody and be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other criminal case. Murder Reference No. 323 of 2023 is answered in the NEGATIVE and death sentence awarded to Shahid Mahmood alias Demo is NOT CONFIRMED. JK/S-41/L Appeal allowed.