Summary: (a) Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) confers inherent powers upon the High Court to pass orders necessary to: (i) give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C.; (ii) prevent the abuse of the process of the Court; or (iii) secure the ends of justice. This inherent power is exceptional in nature and is exercised sparingly, primarily in cases where the continuation of proceedings would result in undue hardship or harassment to a party. Courts are regarded as sanctuaries of justice and, in exercising their authority ex debito justitiae—that is, in the discharge of their inherent obligation to rectify wrongs and suppress injustice—they may act beyond procedural constraints where necessary to do justice. No rigid fetters can be placed on the High Court’s ability to treat one kind of proceeding as another, provided the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter (lis) before it. (b) Section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.) empowers the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of any person—either entirely or in relation to a specific offence—at any time before the judgment is pronounced, but only with the permission of the Court. This provision functions as a safeguard against misuse of legal process and is intended to prevent continuation of prosecutions that are unnecessary, frivolous, or contrary to the interests of justice. The core objective of Section 494 Cr.P.C. is to avoid overburdening the criminal justice system with prosecutions that do not serve a public purpose. It recognizes the Public Prosecutor’s discretion to assess whether a case should proceed in light of available evidence, public interest, and principles of judicial economy. However, this discretion is not unfettered; it is subject to judicial oversight. The Court`s permission is a mandatory precondition for withdrawal, ensuring that the decision is neither arbitrary nor tainted by mala fides. Importantly, the Court cannot act suo motu under Section 494 Cr.P.C.; the initiation of withdrawal must come exclusively from the Public Prosecutor. The Court’s role is supervisory—it may grant or deny permission based on the facts and circumstances, but it cannot initiate the withdrawal process on its own motion.

Summary: For maintaining an appeal under section 15 of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance,1959 drawing or existence of a decree sheet is not mandatory.

Summary: Mere entries of co-ownership in the revenue record in respect of a land that had undergone transformation from agriculture use to constructed property several decades ago cannot be treated as proof that the petitioners were co-owner in all the houses built on the land. Such entries do not entitle the person mentioned therein to claim co-ownership or seek partition of any house of their choosing, constructed on the land.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 199—Maintainability—Availability of alternate statutory remedy—Doctrine of exhaustion of remedies Petitioner, a charitable educational institution, assailed the levy of property tax and conservancy charges imposed under Regulation No. 51 dated 23.11.2022—Held, where alternate and efficacious remedies are available under the statutory scheme, constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 cannot be invoked without first exhausting such remedies—Petitioner had remedy before the Assessment Committee under S. 68(2) of the Cantonments Act, 1924, and further rights of appeal, review, and revision under Ss. 84, 88 & 277 of the Act—Writ petition held premature and not maintainable. Cited cases: Province of Punjab v. Yasir Majeed Sheikh (2021 SCMR 624); Sana Jamali v. Mujeeb Qamar (2023 SCMR 316); Mian Azam Waheed v. Collector of Customs (2023 SCMR 1247); Fayyaz Dawar case (2023 SCMR 1442); Syed Masood Ali v. Mst. Feroza Begum (PLD 2025 SC 339); Executive Director State Life v. Muhammad Nisar (2025 SCMR 249). (b) Companies Act, 2017 ---- S. 42—Charitable institutions—Exemption from tax—Scope and conditionality Petitioner, registered as a Section 42 company for charitable educational purposes, claimed exemption from property tax under Notification dated 15/16.05.1956—Held, claim for exemption is conditional and must be substantiated by compliance with relevant policy directives, including provision of requisite information under para 2 of Policy Letter dated 08.05.2009 issued by Military Lands and Cantonments Department—Petitioner directed to pursue statutory procedure for exemption by first approaching Assessment Committee. Cited cases: Dr. Abdul Nabi v. Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Quetta (2023 SCMR 1267); PLD 2021 Lahore 86; 2021 MLD 346; 2020 PTD 1683; 2018 CLC 1602; PLD 2017 Lahore 790. (c) Cantonments Act, 1924 ---- Ss. 68(2), 84, 88 & 277—Assessment Committee—Jurisdiction—Procedure for tax exemption and appeal Held, Cantonments Act, 1924, provides comprehensive mechanism for assessment and dispute resolution relating to property taxation—Petitioner must first approach the Assessment Committee for redressal under S. 68(2), and avail remedies of appeal, review, or revision under Ss. 84, 88, and 277, respectively—Court cannot bypass specialized forums created under the statute. Principle: Constitutional jurisdiction cannot override legislative intent where an effective statutory framework exists. Disposition: Writ petition disposed of without adjudication on merits—Petitioner directed to appear before Assessment Committee with all requisite documents and supporting material—Committee to decide matter through a speaking order within four weeks of receiving certified copy of the judgment.

Summary: i) Classification of Statutes; General & Special Statutes. -- ii) Tests of Repugnancy or Inconsistency between two Statutes or Provisions. -- iii) Irreconcilable Statutes or Provisions. -- iv) Repeal, Express or Implied. -- v) "leges posteriors priores contrarias abrognt (subsequent laws repeal prior contrary laws)" -- vi) Provisions contained in the NEPRA Act, 1997 will subside the conflicting provisions of Electricity Act, 1910 whenever there is conflict in two and both cannot be harmoniously construed, therefore, the opinions expressed in the judgments reported as "GEPCO and others v. Pakistan Television Corporation and others" (PLD 2018 Lahore 399) and "Faisalabad Electric Supply Company through Director v. Muhammad Jamil and 6 others" (PLJ 2017 Lahore 309), is correct enunciation of law on the subject.

Summary: Sentence upheld ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) –– Ss. 302 & 34 –– Murder committed jointly –– Ocular and circumstantial evidence –– Last seen, prompt FIR, medical corroboration, and recovery –– Conviction maintained –– Petitioners were convicted under Ss. 302 and 34, P.P.C., for the murder of Abdul Hameed, based on circumstantial and ocular evidence. Deceased was last seen leaving his home to meet the petitioners, after which gunshots were heard and his dead body was found in the house of one of the petitioners. The complainant and another eyewitness (PW-2) saw the petitioners fleeing the scene—one armed with a pistol. Medical evidence confirmed firearm injuries as the cause of death. Blood-stained earth was recovered from the appellant Khair Muhammad's house, and the recovery of blood-stained clothes corroborated the prosecution’s case. The chain of circumstances was found to be unbroken and consistent, leaving no room for doubt regarding the guilt of the petitioners. Cited cases: None mentioned by Court. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– S. 544-A –– Compensation –– Conviction upheld –– Liability to pay compensation to legal heirs affirmed –– The Trial Court had directed each petitioner to pay Rs. 100,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased under S. 544-A, Cr.P.C., in default whereof they would undergo six months' simple imprisonment. The compensation order remained intact as the conviction under S. 302/34, P.P.C., was affirmed. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– S. 382-B –– Benefit of set-off –– Period of incarceration to be deducted from sentence –– Petitioners were extended the benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., for time already undergone in custody since arrest, to be counted toward their sentence of life imprisonment. (d) Criminal trial –– Delay in recovery –– Recovery of pistol from public place –– Not treated as decisive –– Entire case not dependent on recovery –– Recovery of the alleged murder weapon (pistol) was made two weeks after the incident from a public place. The Court held that while delay in recovery may affect the weight of this particular evidence, the prosecution’s case did not rest solely on recovery. The overall chain of evidence was otherwise cogent and sufficient to uphold conviction. (e) Criminal trial –– Unproduced independent witness –– Prosecution failure to examine available witness –– Effect –– No fatal flaw if other evidence is strong and reliable –– One of the persons allegedly present at the crime scene (Habib-ur-Rehman) was not examined by the prosecution. However, the Court held that this omission was not fatal to the case since the testimonies of other witnesses, who were close relatives of the deceased, were consistent, confidence-inspiring, and corroborated by other independent evidence. (f) Criminal trial –– Night occurrence –– Source of light –– Challenge to identification –– No merit –– Defence questioned the identification of accused during a night-time occurrence, citing insufficient light. The Court rejected this claim, noting the presence of a functioning bulb and clear visibility at the time of incident, which allowed reliable identification of the petitioners. Disposition: Petitions dismissed. Conviction of Khair Muhammad and Zahoor Ahmed under Sections 302/34, P.P.C. and sentence of imprisonment for life upheld. Compensation of Rs. 100,000/- each under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C. and benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. maintained.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Constitutional petition—Maintainability—Petitioner challenged criminal complaint registered under Sales Tax Act, 1990 for alleged tax fraud without prior assessment of tax liability—Held, launching of criminal proceedings without prior civil adjudication was violative of due process and fundamental rights—Complaint registered under Section 2(37) read with Section 33 of Sales Tax Act quashed for being unconstitutional, ultra vires, and without lawful authority. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----Ss. 2(37), 11, 33, 37A & 48—Tax fraud—Requirement of prior tax assessment—Scope—Held, criminal liability for tax fraud must follow determination of tax liability by Competent Adjudicating Authority—Special Judge under the Act has no jurisdiction to assess or determine tax due; therefore, criminal proceedings under Section 2(37) and penalties under Section 33 cannot be invoked unless liability is assessed—Any sentence of fine or imprisonment linked to “amount of tax involved” presupposes a quantified liability which can only be determined under Section 11—Held further, the expression “shall be further liable” in Section 33 signifies that prosecution must follow assessment—Section 37A(4) allowing compounding of offence also presumes existence of assessed “tax due”—Complaint filed in absence of adjudicated liability found illegal and barred. (c) Administration of justice ----Criminal prosecution—Timing of proceedings—Where criminal liability depends on outcome of civil adjudication, criminal action must await determination of tax liability—Filing of criminal complaint without issuance of show cause notice, audit, or assessment order violates procedural fairness—Discretionary authority of department under S.R.O. 1301(I)/2018 to conduct criminal investigation must be exercised within bounds of statute—No bar exists on criminal proceedings per se, but lawful procedure must be followed. (d) Precedents cited ----Civil and criminal proceedings—Concurrent or sequential—Principle reiterated that both proceedings may run simultaneously, but where criminal liability hinges upon civil determination, prosecution must be deferred—Reliance placed on: • Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FBR 2014 PTD 1807 • Muhammad Tufail v. The State 1979 SCMR 437 • Sheraz Ahmad v. Fayyaz-ud-Din 2005 SCMR 1599 • Abdul Ahad v. Amjad Ali PLD 2006 SC 771 • Agricultural Development Bank v. Abid Akhtar 2003 CLD 1620 • UBL v. Government of the Punjab PLD 1982 Lahore 384 • Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR v. Taj International Civil Appeals No. 350–698/2016, order dated 04.12.2024 (SC) ----- Disposition: Petition allowed. Complaint No.05 dated 23.07.2024 quashed as unconstitutional, ultra vires the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and violative of fundamental rights.

Summary: (a) Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011: ----S. 15(1) & (2)—Licensing of food business—Poultry company selling eggs—Requirement of food license—Scope and jurisdiction of Punjab Food Authority. Petitioner company, licensed under the Punjab Poultry Production Act, 2016 for poultry farming, challenged notice issued by the Punjab Food Authority requiring it to obtain a food business license under S.15 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011—Held, that once the company engaged in the sale of eggs for human consumption, it fell within the statutory definition of "food business" under S.2(i) of the Act of 2011—Food Authority acted within jurisdiction by enforcing the requirement—Claim of exclusive regulation under the 2016 Act was untenable—Two statutes operate in distinct but complementary spheres: the 2016 Act governs poultry production and premises registration, while the 2011 Act governs food safety and consumer protection—No exemption under S.15(2) of the 2011 Act was produced by petitioner—Poultry enterprise could be concurrently subject to multiple regulatory regimes—Petition dismissed. ----Cited Laws: • Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 • Punjab Poultry Production Act, 2016 • Punjab Pure Food Regulations, 2018 (b) Statutory Interpretation: ----Concurrent regulatory jurisdiction—Overlap not amounting to repugnancy—Doctrine of complementarity between food safety and production regulation. Court clarified that overlap between two regulatory frameworks—poultry premises regulation (2016 Act) and food safety regulation (2011 Act)—does not result in legal inconsistency—Legislative competence allows co-existence of multiple sectoral regulatory statutes such as tax, labour, and environmental laws—Company engaged in sale of eggs for human consumption cannot invoke compliance under one statute to claim immunity from another—Legislative purpose of food safety statutes would be defeated if such construction were allowed—Overlap, held, was permissible and did not invalidate exercise of jurisdiction by the food authority. (c) Constitutional Law: ----Right to trade and business—Reasonable restrictions—Food safety regulation—Scope of judicial review. Petitioner's argument that additional licensing under the 2011 Act infringed its lawful business was rejected—Court held that regulatory frameworks ensuring public health and safety constitute reasonable restrictions under law—Such measures are within the permissible scope of State's regulatory authority and cannot be construed as arbitrary—Judicial review does not extend to questioning the wisdom of legislation when statutory provisions are clear, consistent, and rationally linked to public purpose. ----Disposition: Writ petition dismissed; Punjab Food Authority’s licensing requirement under S.15 of the 2011 Act upheld as lawful and within jurisdiction. ----Quote: A company being licensed under The Punjab Poultry Productions Act, 2016 is still subject to the licensing requirements U/S 15 of The Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011. The Two statutes can coexist validly.

Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Delegation of authority---Scope---Where the Constitution or the law does not itself provide for further delegation of authority, discretionary authority cannot be further delegated and must be exercised by the person or authority on which such power is conferred. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Subordinate legislation---Delegation of powers---Scope---Any act or subordinate legislation in contravention of the Constitution is ultra vires the fundamental law---Similarly, where the power to enact sub-statutory legislation is vested in any authority, the same can only be exercised within the four corners of the statute, in a manner consistent with the provisions of the statute. (c) Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973--- ----Rr.7 & 9---Islamabad High Court Act (XVII of 2010), Ss. 3 & 9---Islamabad Judicial Service Rules, 2011, Rr. 10(1)(b) & 13(1)---Judicial Officer of a Province appointed against posts in Islamabad Judicial Service on deputation basis---Deputationists---Absorption---Principle---Appellant challenged the absorption of respondent No. 2 in District Judiciary Islamabad; his regularization in service by curtailing the period of his probation and his promotion---Held: Nothing was on record about any decision of Islamabad High Court in terms of Rule 9 of the Judicial Service Rules explaining the extraordinary circumstances in which it was decided by the High Court (i.e. all Judges of the High Court) that Judicial Officers from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Service were to be appointed against posts in Islamabad Judicial Service on deputation basis---Only thing produced was an order of the Peshawar High Court dated 25.01.2012 revealing that 11 Judicial Officers belonging to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Service were allowed to join their new assignments---There was nothing to establish that it was the Islamabad High Court which, in its collegiate capacity, passed an order to fill posts in Islamabad Judicial Service on deputation by borrowing officers from the High Courts of other provinces in January or February of 2012 when respondent No.2 was appointed on deputation basis and assumed charge of the office of Senior Civil Judge on 01.02.2012---Even if any such order was passed, nothing had been produced where the High Court documented its reasons to fill such posts on a deputation basis while noting that the relevant expertise and ability was not available amongst members of Islamabad Judicial Service, as was required in view of the principles regulating appointments by deputation---It was no one's case that the officers belonging to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Service underwent a selection process before being appointed by Islamabad High Court on deputation basis---There was therefore nothing to conclude that such appointments on deputation basis were made in accordance with law---Respondent No.2 was appointed against the post of Senior Civil Judge, whereas the post of Senior Civil Judge was reserved to be filled on promotion made on seniority-cum-fitness basis from amongst the civil judges serving in Islamabad District Judicial, in terms of Rr. 10 & 13 of the Judicial Service Rules---As the method of appointment by promotion was prescribed for such post, it could not have been filled through transfer on deputation basis---Therefore, the appointment of respondent No.2 against the post of Senior Civil Judge on deputation basis was in breach of requirements of Rr. 10 & 13 of the Judicial Service Rules and was, thus, illegal---There was no provision in the Islamabad High Court Act or the Judicial Service Rules that vested any authority in the High Court to fill posts in Islamabad Judicial Service on deputation basis and affording such deputationists the option to be absorbed in Islamabad Judicial Service making the two-step process of posting on deputation and subsequent absorption an alternative method of recruitment and appointment within Islamabad Judicial Service---As there was no power vested in the High Court to afford the option of absorption to deputationists who were posted on deputation in January and February of 2012 and were not already serving on deputation at the time of creation of Islamabad High Court and the subsequent enactment of Judicial Service Rules, it was found that notification dated 14.3.2012, pursuant to which 11 Judicial Officers were absorbed in Islamabad Judicial Service, was in breach of Rr. 8, 9, 10 & 13 of the Judicial Service Rules and devoid of legal authority---Therefore, it was declared that the absorption of respondent No. 2 in terms of notification dated 14.03.2012 in Islamabad Judicial Service against the post of Senior Civil Judge, which post could only be filled by promotion on seniority-cum-fitness basis from amongst the civil judges serving in Islamabad Judicial Service, was illegal---Under the third proviso to R.20(2) of the Judicial Service Rules, it was the High Court (i.e. all Judges of the High Court) who as a collegiate capacity were vested with authority to reduce the period of probation of a member of the Islamabad Judicial Service---As it was on the recommendation of the Administration Committee that Chief Justice curtailed respondent's probation period, where neither the Chief Justice nor the Administration Committee were vested with authority for such purpose under Judicial Service Rules, such curtailment of probation was devoid of jurisdiction---Procedure of appointment by promotion was described in R. 13 of the Judicial Service Rules---Rule 13(4) provided that it was the Departmental Promotion Committee that was to consider a panel of three members of Islamabad Judicial Service against each post to be filled by promotion---Recommendations made by the Departmental Promotion Committee were then to be forwarded to the Chief Justice in terms of R.13(5) and the Chief Justice was to appoint a successful candidate on promotion basis in terms of R. 13(6) of the Judicial Service Rules---Notification of promotion of respondent No. 2 to the post of AD & SJ stated that the Chief Justice had been pleased to promote him on the recommendation of the Administration Committee---Rule 2(a) defined the Administration Committee and Rule 2(g) defined the Departmental Promotion Committee---Respondent No.1 failed to provide the composition of the two committees at the relevant time---On the face of it, given that the promotion was ordered on the basis of R. 13(4) of the Judicial Service Rules to recommend Judicial Officers for promotion, the said notification was coram non judice and devoid of legal authority---Thus, the promotion order was found to be not in accordance with the requirements of Rule 13 of the Judicial Service Rules---Respondent No.2 was appointed on deputation basis without being subjected to any selection process (i.e. temporarily against the post of Senior Civil Judge otherwise reserved to be filled by promotion alone---No reasons were recorded as to why extraordinary power to fill a post on deputation basis, contrary to the prescribed method of appointment, was exercised---Respondent No.2 took charge of the post of Senior Civil Judge on 01.02.2012---On 14.03.2012, in less than a month and a half, he along with 10 other judges from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Service were absorbed in Islamabad Judicial Service on a permanent basis---After absorption, respondent No.2 was to serve on probation for a period of one year in terms of R.20(2)---Probation period was curtailed and his service as Senior Civil Judge was regularized on 27.06.2012 (i.e. within three and a half months of him being absorbed)---No reasons were recorded as to the exceptional circumstances that informed the decision to curtail the probation period---Decision to curtail such period was also not taken by the High Court, which was the authority competent for such purpose---On the very same day when service of respondent No. 2 as Senior Civil Judge was regularized, he was promoted to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge---Thus, the notifications that had been impugned in the instant appeal were liable to be set aside and as consequence, respondent No.2's appointment on deputation basis, his absorption in Islamabad Judicial Service, the regularization of his service upon curtailment of his probation period, and his promotion to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge were illegal and he was liable to be repatriated to his parent judicial service---Petition was allowed, accordingly. Case law referred. Asad Iqbhal Siddiqui and A. Ammar Sehri for Appellant. Malik Abdul Rehman, State Counsel. Rizwan Shabbir Kayani and Hafiz Farman Ullah for Respondent No.2. Muhammad Asif Iqbal, Departmental Representative for Respondent No.1. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Presence of eye-witnesses at the place and time of occurrence proved---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Ocular account of the incident hinged upon the testimonies of complainant and an eye-witness, who happened to be the real brother and paternal cousin of deceased---Although both the said witnesses were closely related to the deceased, but their presence at the place of occurrence was quite natural and they had no animus towards the appellant---Complainant while appearing before the Trial Court reiterated the same facts as narrated in the FIR as well as private complaint and his statement had been fully corroborated by eye- witness---Both the eye-witnesses were residents of the same vicinity--- Moreover, it was daylight occurrence, took place in that Mohallah, and the appellant was quite familiar to the eye-witnesses prior to the occurrence, therefore, there was no chance of misidentification of the appellant at the time when he was causing firearm injuries to the deceased---Complainant stated during his examination-in-chief that on the fateful day, he along with eye-witnesses were going behind deceased after offering Zohar prayer in "Masjid Aqsa", when deceased reached near his house, the said unfortunate occurrence took place---Similarly, eye-witness during his testimony had completely endorsed the evidence of complainant---In that way the presence of both the eye-witnesses at the time and place of occurrence was quite natural and probable---Said witnesses were cross-examined at length but nothing favourable to the appellant could be brought on the record--- Circumstances established that the prosecution proved its case beyond any shadow of doubt, however, due to some mitigating circumstances, death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life---With said modification in sentence, appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Related witnesses, evidence of---Reliance---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Much emphasis had been laid by defence that complainant and eye-witness were closely related to the deceased and for the said reason, their evidence was not reliable---In this regard, mere relationship of eye-witnesses with the deceased by itself was no ground to disbelieve their evidence---Even otherwise, evidence of said witnesses was trustworthy and confidence inspiring which could not be discarded merely on the basis of their relationship with the deceased especially when they had no animosity with the appellant---Similarly, due to close and blood relation of eye-witnesses with deceased, said witnesses were in fact not likely to let off the actual perpetrator of the offence by falsely implicating the appellant, against whom they admittedly had no previous malice, ill-will, animosity or grudge---Moreover, substitution of real culprits especially in cases where the eye-witnesses lost their kith and kin before their own eyes was a rare phenomenon---Circumstances established that the prosecution proved its case beyond any shadow of doubt, however, due to some mitigating circumstances, death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life---With said modification in sentence, appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487; Amanullah v. The State and another 2023 SCMR 527; Ali Asghar alias Aksar v. The State 2023 SCMR 596; Aman Ullah and another v. The State and others 2023 SCMR 723; Imran Mehmood v. The State and another 2023 SCMR 795; Khalid v. The State through P.G. Sindh 2024 SCMR 1474; Aqil v. The State 2023 SCMR 831 and Muhammad Ijaz v. The State 2023 SCMR 1375 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Material discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of eye-witnesses--- Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---It was alleged by defence that complainant had admitted in his cross-examination that no one from the complainant’s side (‘us’) was eye-witness in the case---After scrutinizing the entire statements of complainant and eye-witness, it was observed that mentioning of word "us" in the quoted line from the cross-examination of the complainant was a typographical error due to casual and careless attitude of the Presiding Officer while dictating the evidence---Complainant had categorically stated in his examination-in-chief that appellant made straight fire shots which hit victim on left side of his abdomen and left shoulder and due to the firearm injuries, he fell down---Complainant along with eye-witnesses came forward and witnessed the occurrence---During cross-examination, defence put some questions to complainant regarding the place of occurrence and its location, whereupon he replied that place of occurrence was surrounded by inhabited houses and in that sequence, a question was put to him upon which he replied that "none from us was eye-witness in the case”---Said fact clearly manifested that in a sequel of cross-examination a question was put about the availability of inhabitants of locality and not about the presence of the complainant as well as eye-witnesses mentioned in the crime report and due to the carelessness of the Presiding Officer instead of word "them" word "us" had been typed---Similarly, such type of question was also put to eye-witness wherein correct word “them” had been used and not “us”---Moreover, during cross-examination on complainant, a specific suggestion was put to him that he and other eye-witnesses were not present at the place of occurrence---Complainant categorically denied that fact and clarified that they were present at the time and place of occurrence---Thus, it appeared that typographical error had occurred while dictating cross-examination of complainant---If the Urdu translation of the evidence had been prepared during the same sitting as well as in the presence and hearing of the Presiding Officer and all parties involved, then the correct answer could have emerged clearly on the record---Evidence of any witness was to be taken into consideration as a whole, not in bits and pieces---Said witness during examination-in-chief as well as in the cross- examination had fully supported the case of prosecution---Law did not permit the Court to pick and choose a sentence from the entire evidence and based its decision while reading only that sentence in favour of the appellant, in isolation to the remaining evidence available on record---Circumstances established that the prosecution proved its case beyond any shadow of doubt, however, due to some mitigating circumstances, death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life---With said modification in sentence, appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Medical evidence supporting ocular account---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Complainant and eye-witness had specifically described the injuries sustained by deceased at the hands of appellant---Medical evidence was in complete harmony with the ocular testimony and no conflict could be pointed out to create dent in the prosecution case as the ante-mortem injuries on the person of deceased were reflected in the post-mortem report, which ultimately became the cause of his unnatural death as opined by Medical Officer, who conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of deceased and those injuries were specifically attributed by the eye-witnesses to the appellant---Furthermore, the ocular evidence about the kind of weapon used during the occurrence, time of incident and locale of injuries as narrated by the eye-witnesses had also fully tallied with medical evidence---Said Medical Officer was also subjected to cross-examination but nothing beneficial to the appellant could be extracted from him---Circumstances established that the prosecution proved its case beyond any shadow of doubt, however, due to some mitigating circumstances, death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life---With said modification in sentence, appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Co-accused acquitted on the basis of same set of evidence---No overt act attributed to acquitted co-accused---Effect---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---It was alleged by defence that co-accused persons stood acquitted by Trial Court in the same trial while disbelieving the same evidence which rendered the credibility of prosecution evidence seriously doubtful even against the appellant---Record showed that no overt act was attributed to the acquitted co-accused persons of the appellant---Thus, the acquittal of co-accused, in the circumstances of the case, was not sufficient to discredit the overwhelming prosecution evidence available against the appellant---Circumstances established that the prosecution otherwise proved its case beyond any shadow of doubt, however, due to some mitigating circumstances, death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life---With said modification in sentence, appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of pistol from the possession of accused---Reliance---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that a pistol 30 bore was recovered from the possession of appellant and positive report of the Forensic Science Agency was there---However, the same were not helpful to the prosecution because while effecting the said recovery from the appellant, the Investigation Officer had flagrantly violated the mandatory provisions of S.103, Cr.P.C., as no independent person was associated during the said recovery proceedings---Circumstances established that the prosecution otherwise proved its case beyond any shadow of doubt, however, due to some mitigating circumstances, death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life---With said modification in sentence, appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Nasir Butt and 2 others v. The State and others 2025 SCMR 662 and Muhammad Ramzan v. The State 2025 SCMR 726 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Motive not proved---Sentence, reduction in---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Motive set up by complainant in private complaint was that a quarrel took place between deceased and appellant etc. at noon time on the day of occurrence and due to that grudge, the accused persons with their common object committed murder of deceased---Notable that the prosecution had not led any substantial evidence in that regard, therefore, mere oral assertion of eye-witnesses in that regard could not be considered enough to prove the motive part of prosecution's case---Prosecution evidence was completely silent as to where and in whose presence the alleged altercation took place at noon time before the occurrence, hence, the prosecution had failed to prove the motive and actual circumstances due to which the appellant had taken such an extreme step against the deceased which remained shrouded in mystery---Circumstances established that the prosecution otherwise proved its case beyond any shadow of doubt, however, due to some mitigating circumstances, death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life---With said modification in sentence, appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Mitigating circumstances---Sentence, reduction in---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that there were some mitigating circumstances which called for reduction in the quantum of sentence of appellant---Prosecution had failed to prove the recovery and motive part of its case against the appellant, therefore, alternate sentence of imprisonment for life to appellant for the murder of the deceased, which was also a legal sentence, would meet the ends of justice---Hence, the conviction under S.302(b), P.P.C., awarded to appellant by the Trial Court was maintained, however, his sentence was altered from death to imprisonment for life---With said modification in sentence, appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstance. Qaddan and others v. The State 2017 SCMR 148; Abdul Wasay and others v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 1059; Muhammad Shaban v. The State 2022 SCMR 1608; Muhammad Bashir and another v. The State and others 2023 SCMR 190; Sohail Akhtar and another v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 67 and Muhammad Yasin and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 128 rel. Barrister Shehram Saqi, Muhammad Abid Hussain Saqi, Zahid Iqbal and Rana Shujja Farooq for Appellant. Rana Muhammad Asif Iqbal, Assistant District Public Prosecutor for the State. Kazim Ali Malik and Shamim-ur-Rehman Malik for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 29th April, 2025. Muhammad Tariq Nadeem, J .--- Through this single judgment, we intend to decide Criminal Appeal No.77330 of 2021, filed by Muhammad Irfan alias Pomi appellant against his conviction and sentence along with Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No.81562 of 2021, filed by Muhammad Qaiser complainant against the acquittal of Tahir Usman, Afzaal, Hamza and Kaleem co-accused/ respondents No.1 to 4 and Murder Reference No.221 of 2021, transmitted by learned trial court for confirmation or otherwise of death sentence of Muhammad Irfan alias Pomi appellant being originated from the same judgment dated 02-12-2021 passed by the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhalwal, in a private complaint under sections 302, 148, 149 P.P.C, emanated from case FIR No.328 dated 08-11-2018, under Sections 302,148,149 P.P.C, registered at Police Station Miani, District Sargodha, whereby the learned trial court while acquitting co-accused namely Tahir Usman, Afzaal, Hamza and Kaleem, convicted and sentenced the appellant as under:-