Summary: (a) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)--- ----Ss. 4 & 5---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(2)(ee), 7(1)(ff), 11-F(1), (2), (6), 27-A & 21(I)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 38---Making or possessing explosive substances under suspicious circumstances, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Disclosure of the accused before police---Scope---Prosecution case was that a wireless handset, which contained two electric detonators and 04-kilogram and 250-grams grey coloured explosive materials was recovered from the possession of accused---It was an admitted fact that no remote control was recovered from the possession of the accused/appellant and during the course of the investigation no documents was brought on record that the accused/appellant belonged to the proscribed organization, which was also admitted by the Investigation Officer---Only evidence against the accused/appellant was that while he was in police custody, he made a disclosure before the police and the said disclosure was not admissible in view of Art.38 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which stated that the confession made before the police was not admissible---There was no confessional statement under S.164, Cr.P.C of the accused/appellant before the Judicial Magistrate; as such, this piece of evidence was of no help to the prosecution case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)--- ----Ss. 4 & 5---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(2)(ee), 7(1)(ff), 11-F(1), (2), (6), 27-A & 21(I)---Making or possessing explosive substances under suspicious circumstances, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Infirmities prosecution case---Prosecution case was that a wireless handset, which contained two electric detonators and 04-kilogram and 250-grams grey coloured explosive materials was recovered from the possession of accused---Allegedly, the accused/appellant was arrested from a road near, which was newly built in the name of China Pakistan Economic Corridor Road, which was a straight road, and from where the accused/appellant was allegedly apprehended the police vehicles could easily be seen from a distance of 3 to 4 kilometers---It was alleged by the prosecution that the officials of CTD, along with officials of Anti-Terrorism Force (ATF), allegedly came in three officials vehicles, then how was it possible that a person belonging to proscribed organization who intended to explode the explosive substance did not try to escape from the scene and was without any weapon and would wait for Law Enforcement Agencies to come and apprehend him, which did not appeal to a prudent mind---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)--- ----Ss. 4 & 5---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(2)(ee), 7(1)(ff), 11-F(1), (2), (6), 27-A & 21(I)---Making or possessing explosive substances under suspicious circumstances, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Safe custody of the recovered explosive substances and its safe transmission to the laboratory not proved---Prosecution case was that a wireless handset, which contained two electric detonators and 04-kilogram and 250-grams grey coloured explosive materials was recovered from the possession of accused---Prosecution produced Head Moharar of Police Station, who stated in his statement that on 08.09.2023 the Investigating Officer handed over the parcels to him and he kept the same in malkhana after registering in Register No. 19 but he did not say a single word that to whom and when he handed over the parcels for onward transmission to Forensic Sciences Agency---Head Constable stated in his statement that on 09.09.2023, Parcel Nos. 1 and 5 and sealed Parcel No. 06 were handed over to him for taking the same to Forensic Science Agency by Head Moharar and on 10.09.2023, he reached to L-(Lahore) and handed over the same to an official of Forensic Science Agency, but on the other hand, the Investigating Officer stated that on 13.09.2023 the parcels for Forensic Science Agency were handed over to Head Constable and he further stated in his statement that on the said datehe recorded the statement under S.161, Cr.P.C, of Head Constable---Once said Head Constable received parcels for onward transmission to Forensic Science Agency, on 09.09.2023 from Head Moharar and the Investigating Officer gave another stance that he handed over the parcels to Head Constable on 13.09.2023, but in Forensic Science Laboratory Report,the parcels were received on 11.09.2023 by the official of Forensic Science Agency---Said contradictions in the statements of the witnesses created serious doubt about the safe custody and safe transmission of the alleged explosive substances to Forensic Science Agency; as such, in the instant case, the concept of safe custody of the property and safe transmission had completely been shattered---As a result, the chain of custody broken and the forensic report lost credibility---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)--- ----Ss. 4 & 5---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(2)(ee), 7(1)(ff), 11-F(1), (2), (6), 27-A & 21(I)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342---Making or possessing explosive substances under suspicious circumstances, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Statement of the accused under S. 342, Cr.P.C, not been recorded in accordance with its spirit---Prosecution case was that a wireless handset, which contained two electric detonators and 04-kilogram and 250-grams grey coloured explosive materials was recovered from the possession of accused---Perusal of the statement of the appellant, under S.342, Cr.P.C., revealed that the portion of the evidence, i.e. report of Forensic laboratory, as well as about safe custody and safe transmission of case property was not put to the accused in his statement under S.342, Cr.P.C., enabling him to explain the circumstances, particularly when the same was abandoned by him---If any piece of evidence was not put to the accused in his statement under S.342, Cr.P.C., then the same could not be used against him, for his conviction---In this case, the Court below, without realizing the legal position, not only used the said portion of the evidence against him but also convicted him on a such piece of evidence, which could not be sustained---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Shah v. The State 2010 SCMR 1009; Qaddan and others v. The State 2017 SCMR 148 and Bashir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2022 SCMR 986 rel. (e) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single reasonable doubt qua the guilt of the accused would be sufficient to acquit him of the charge. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Where evidence creates doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution story, its benefit has to be given to the accused without any reservation, and there is no alternative but to acquit the accused by giving him the benefit of the doubt. Agha Nadir Shah for Appellant. Ms. Noor Jahan Kahoor, APG for the State. Date of hearing: 17th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 (XI of 1994)--- ----Ss.5 & Sched.---Suit for maintenance allowance of minors---Interim allowance---Right of minor---Father, obligation of---Scope---Father challenged interim allowance fixed for minors---Held: Minors were the real children of appellant---Maintenance allowance is legal and moral responsibility of the father as well as an indispensable right of the minor---A father is not only legally, but also morally under an obligation to meet the expenses of his minors, regardless of the fact that the minors reside either with him or their mother---Family Court has to take into consideration the interest of the minor at the earliest, for which end, it(Family Court) has to adopt a pragmatic approach while fixing the interim maintenance---In Islamic Law, a father is under legal, moral and religious obligation to maintain his children till the age specified, recognized, elaborated and emphasized by the law/ Sharia---Interim maintenance for minors is a temporary measure ordered by a Family Court to ensure that the child’s basic needs are met during a maintenance dispute---It is a crucial aspect of child welfare, particularly when parents are separated or divorced and legal proceedings are underway---The Court considers factors like the child’s basic needs, the parent’s financial capacity, and the circumstances of the case when determining the amount and duration of interim maintenance---Appellant /father was unable to point out any patent illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order---Appeal, filed by father, was dismissed, in circumstances. PLD 2013 SC 557 and 2010 YLR 3275 ref. (b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 (XI of 1994)--- ----Preamble, Ss.5 & Sched.---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.17-A---Suit for maintenance allowance for minors---Interim allowance, fixation of---Family Court, jurisdiction of---Father challenged interim allowance fixed for minors---Held: The issue of maintenance allowance is dealt with under S.17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964, at any stage of proceedings in a suit for maintenance---Family Court may pass an interim order for maintenance, whereunder the payment shall be made by the fourteenth of each month, failing which the Court may strike off the defence of the defendant and decree the suit---Though Family Courts Act, 1964, is not adopted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, however, in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993, is adopted and under S.5 of the said Act, Family Court can adjudicate the matters which are envisaged in the Schedule to the Act, 1993---While considering the whole spirit and scheme of the Family Courts Act, 1993, and its Preamble, the intention of the legislature is clear that the Family Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon such matters as well---The order recorded by the Court below regarding interim maintenance also falls under the Schedule and the Family Court at any stage of the proceedings in a case pending before it can pass an interim order for maintenance---Appellant / father was unable to point out any patent illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order---Appeal, filed by father, was dismissed, in circumstances. (c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 (XI of 1994)--- ----Ss. 5 & Sched.---Suit for maintenance allowance of minors---Order fixing interim allowance of minors, assailing of---Appeal---Maintainability---Finality of an order---Scope---Father challenged interim allowance fixed for minors---Held: Admittedly, it is not a final order, but passed only to facilitate the minors to meet their day to day life expenses till the final adjudication of the family suit---Family suit was still pending and during its pendency, the Family Court had passed the impugned order, which was undoubtedly for all intents and purposes an interim order and the legislature has specifically prohibited the filing of an appeal against an interim order and if is allowed to be filed against such order, it would tantamount to defeating the very intent of the legislature---Order of fixing the interim maintenance had not attained the status of a final order---Appellant / father was unable to point out any patent illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order---Appeal, filed by father, was dismissed, in circumstances. (d) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 (XI of 1994)--- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 17-A---Suit for maintenance allowance of minors---Interim allowance---Right of minor---Father, obligation of---Scope---Father challenged interim allowance fixed for minors---Held: It is legal as well as moral right of every minor/ child that he/she be brought up in healthy atmosphere and be brought up with the feelings of self-respect along with necessities of life and it is duty of the father to bring up his children as per his financial status---Nobody/parents or any blood relative can waive the right of any minor regarding his maintenance allowance which has been given by Sharia---In the present case, keeping the basic needs of minors in juxtaposition with their age, the interim maintenance allowance fixed by the Family Court was proper---Thus, impugned order could not be termed as illegal---Appellant /father was unable to point out any patent illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order---Appeal, filed by father, was dismissed, in circumstances. Samina Sadiq for Appellant. Naila Sikandar for Respondents.

Summary: Right of appeal available at the time of promulgation of Amendment Act extinguishes if amendment is made effective retrospectively or from a particular date.

Summary: Civil servants cannot be given liberty to invoke constitutional jurisdiction of High Court in matters relating to terms and conditions of their service in the garb of challenging laws/notifications, in presence of Article 212 of the Constitution and rider "no other adequate remedy" provided in Article 199 of the Constitution.

Summary: The concept of trust envisages that one person (the settlor), while relying on another (the trustee) and reposing special confidence in him, entrusts property or assets to him. There is a fiduciary relationship between the two in law. In this context, Section 405 PPC defines criminal breach of trust as follows: "405. Criminal breach of trust.? Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property, in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits criminal breach of trust." The necessary ingredients of criminal breach of trust under the above provision are, (i) the accused must be entrusted with property or dominion over it, and (ii) he must have dishonestly misappropriated the property or converted it to his own use, or disposed of it in violation of the trust. The general punishment is provided under Section 406 PPC, whereas aggravated forms of the offence are addressed under Sections 407 to 409 PPC. 5. The first condition under Section 405 PPC involves three key elements, entrustment, dominion, and property. "Entrustment" refers to the transfer of possession for a specific purpose without conferring ownership. "Dominion" implies control or authority over the property. The term "property" is used broadly and should not be confined to movable assets alone. However, the presence of "entrustment" and "dominion" must be assessed in the context of the relationship between the parties and the nature of the property allegedly misappropriated. Notably, a breach of trust can only occur if the property belongs to someone other than the accused. 6. The ingredients necessary to constitute an offence under Section 408 PPC are not reflected in the contents of the crime report. A master-servant relationship between the complainant and the petitioner, and the question of whether any entrustment of property actually took place, are factual issues that can only be determined after recording of evidence during the trial.

Summary: The incident in this case took place on 12.06.2019, examination in chief of Muhammad Adeel (PW-2) as well as Ghulam Ali (PW-3) was recorded on 20.10.2020. However, cross-examination over Muhammad Adeel (PW-2) was recorded on 16.06.2021, whereas cross-examination upon Ghulam Ali (PW-3) was recorded on 08.06.2021. It is relevant to mention that with the passage of time human memory fails regarding any particular event and the facts cannot be reiterated in the photographic manner, particularly when in this case occurrence took place in the year 2019, examination in chief of PWs was recorded in the year 2020 and cross-examination was conducted in the year 2021. Then, mere slip of tongue of any matter by such witness cannot destroy evidentiary value of their testimony and their evidence cannot be considered unreliable on this score.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Availing of loan facility against mortgage of agricultural land, which loan was compulsorily got insured with the Insurance Company by the Bank against paid premium by the insured. The crops were badly affected due to heavy flood upon which it was declared calamity hit area by the government. Insurance claim filed but the Insurance Company denied payment of said claim on the ground that Insurance Policy was obtained through Bank and insured has no right to directly lodge insurance claim. Held that Bank has compulsorily got its advanced amount of loan on payment of premium by the loanee. Thus the said insured person is entitled to receive the insurance claim from the Insurance Company. The appeal of Insurance Company stood dismissed.

Summary: An appellate court dealing with an appeal under Section 14 of the Act, 1964 not only is vested with the inherent power to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution but it can also restore the same on showing sufficient cause by the appellant if his appeal has been dismissed on account of default.

Summary: Law does not permit the Court to pick and choose a sentence from the entire evidence and base its decision while reading only that sentence in favour of the appellant, in isolation to the remaining evidence available on record. We are sanguine that the Federal and Provincial Governments are conscious of their duty to take necessary steps for implementation of Article 251 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in the light of directions given by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as "Muhammad Kokab Iqbal and another vs. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others" (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 1210). Most of the witnesses in the Province of Punjab give their evidence in Urdu, which the accused can also easily understand, for the reason, if the evidence of a witness dictated by the Presiding Officer in English is simultaneously translated in Urdu, it shall become convenient for the Presiding Officer to comply with the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. as well. This practice shall definitely reduce the chance of any violation of the right of fair trial given to the parties in terms of Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. All the learned Judges of Sessions Courts and Special Courts in the Province of Punjab shall ensure that whenever the evidence of a witness is recorded in English, its translation in Urdu shall be reduced into writing simultaneously at the same sitting as well as in the presence of witness(es), accused and the Presiding Officer and then the provisions contained in Section 360, Cr.P.C. shall also be adhered to in letter and spirit so that if any ambiguity in the evidence recorded in English comes on the surface of record, the same can be then and there removed in the light of translation of evidence in Urdu.