Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 449, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, house trespass, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay in lodging FIR---Scope--- Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing firearm injuries to complainant and his sister---As per case of prosecution, occurrence took place at 7:30 p.m. on 25.06.2016 whereas same was reported to the police through written application at the Police Station at 09:05 p.m. when FIR was registered---Distance of place of occurrence from the Police Station was just 16-kilometres as per column No.4 of the FIR---First Information Report which was cornerstone of the case of the prosecution, could not be termed as promptly recorded rather it could be safely said that same was recorded with delay, however, ante-time had been mentioned in the record, and such sort of FIR could not provide any support to the case of prosecution and superstructure i.e. case of prosecution raised on the basis of such sort of FIR was bound to fall--- Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Haroon Shafique v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 2118; Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1068; Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192; Muhammad Adnan and another v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 16 and Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 449, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, house trespass, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay of seven and half hours in conducting postmortem on the dead body of the deceased---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing fire arm injuries to complainant and his sister---As per FIR, deceased of the case died on the way while being taken to the hospital, meaning thereby that deceased died before registration of the case i.e. 09:05 p.m. on 25.06.2016 whereas post-mortem examination was conducted on dead body of deceased at 5:00 a.m. on 26.06.2016 while dead body as well as police documents were received at 4:00 a.m. on 26.06.2026---Meaning thereby that post-mortem examination was conducted after about nine and half hours of the occurrence and after about seven and half hours of registration of the case as per case of the prosecution---So, it was crystal clear that post-mortem examination had been conducted with delay and reason for such delay was very much clear from the statement of Medical Officer that police papers were handed over to the doctor at 04:00 a.m.--- Such state of affairs clearly showed that police papers for autopsy were not promptly prepared and time was consumed for consultation, deliberation and tailoring story for registration of the case which resulted into preparation of documents for autopsy with delay and ultimately conducted post-mortem examination with delay---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Injured witness, evidence of---Scope--- Mere presence of injury on the person of prosecution witness does not stamp him to be a truthful witness. Amin Ali and another v. The State 2011 SCMR 323; Muhammad Arif v. The State 2019 SCMR 631 and Ishtiaq Hussain and another v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 159 rel. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Dishonest improvement---Scope---If prosecution witness including injured witness introduces dishonest improvement in order to strengthen the case, then his evidence is to be thrown away altogether and cannot be relied upon. Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772; Muhammad Arif v. The State 2019 SCMR 631; Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600 and Khalid Mehmood and another v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 810 rel. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 449, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, house trespass, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---No document presented to establish injury sustained by accused---Suppression of facts---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing firearm injuries to complainant and his sister--- Record showed that it was mentioned in the application for registration of the case, FIR and complaint that appellant and acquitted co-accused also received firearm injuries by the firing of their co-accused persons---Prosecution witnesses did not point out the place of receipt of firearm injuries by said accused to Investigation Officer and draftsman at the time of preparation of site plan of place of occurrence and any point to show that where accused received injuries, where their blood fell and where was their blood trail was not available in the site plan prepared by police as well as by draftsman---Said witnesses also did not disclose rather suppressed that who shifted said accused persons from the place of occurrence to the hospital and where and when they were medically examined---Prosecution even did not disclose that where were their Medico-Legal Examination Certificates, who Medical Officer medically examined them and issued their Medico-Legal Examination Certificates and even any Medical Officer who medically examined/treated said accused persons was neither cited as witness nor examined during trial of the case---Said all things had been suppressed/concealed by the complainant and other prosecution witnesses of ocular account---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 449, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, house trespass, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of Kalashnikov and crime empties of .9mm---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing firearm injuries to complainant and his sister---According to application for registration of the case, F.I.R and complaint as well as statements of complainant and other eye-witnesses, neither any accused was equipped with Kalashnikov nor with .9mm pistol---Strange enough that empties of .9mm pistol and Kalashnikov were recovered from the spot---Question did not arise that who used Kalashnikov and .9mm pistol at the place of occurrence---.9mm pistol was subsequently recovered from the possession of the complainant---In such state of affairs when cross-firing had been admitted by the complainant in his statement before the Court, the availability of empties of .9mm pistol and Kalashnikov clearly showed that actual facts had been suppressed by the prosecution witnesses---Complainant produced Kalashnikov before the Investigating Officer while mentioning that same was snatched from accused on the day of occurrence but as per application for registration of the case, F.I.R and complaint, accused was armed with pump action.12-bore gun and not with Kalashnikov, hence same was also dishonest improvement on the part of the prosecution---Furthermore, complainant in application for registration of case mentioned that brother of complainant/injured was being taken to the hospital in injured condition who succumbed to the injuries on the way but said fact had clearly been negated by hospital record, which reflected that deceased was brought in the hospital in injured condition where medical treatment was given to him---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 449, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, house trespass, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Ocular account and medical evidence---Conflictions---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing fire arm injuries to complainant and his sister---As per statements of complainant and eye-witnesses as well as application for registration of the case, F.I.R and complaint, injured sister of complainant received firearm injury at her left shin/calf whereas Women Medial Officerwho conducted her medical examination clearly stated that kind of weapon used was "blunt"--- Said fact on the one hand negated the ocular version to the extent of said injury and on the other hand raised question mark about the testimony of complainant and witnesses---As per site plan, "H" was the point from where accused fired shot at deceased and distance between them had been mentioned as 3-feet---If length of barrel of the rifle as well as length of arm were deducted from three feet, then it became very close range which resulted burning on the entry wound but burning was not present on the entry wound of the deceased---So when all the said factors were taken into consideration in totality, then it was crystal clear that though witnesses had been mentioned as injured witnesses but they had suppressed the actual facts and their testimonies were neither confidence inspiring nor truthful hence not reliable---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (h) Criminal trial--- ----Medical evidence---Scope---Medical evidence is mere supportive/confirmatory type of evidence---Medical evidence can tell about locale, nature, magnitude of injury and kind of weapon used for causing injury but it cannot tell about identity of the assailant who caused the injury, therefore, same neither can provide any corroboration nor is of any help to the prosecution in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Akbar Ali v. The State 2007 SCMR 486; Sajjan Solangi v. The State 2019 SCMR 872 and Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State PlD 2021 SC 600 rel. (i) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single dent/ circumstance in case of prosecution is sufficient for acquittal. Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2022 SCMR 1527 rel. (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 417---Appeal against acquittal---Scope---Acquittal cannot be disturbed for the reason that another view is equally possible---After acquittal, accused attains double presumption of innocence and same can only be disturbed/interfered with if it is capricious, fanciful, perverse, speculative, artificial or arbitrary. Ghulam Sikandar and another v. Mamaraz Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 11; Mst. Zahida Saleem v. Muhammad Naseem and others PlD 2006 SC 427; Javaid Akbar v. Muhammad Amjad and Jameel alias Jeela and another 2016 SCMR 1241; Haji Paio Khan v. Sher Biaz and others 2009 SCMR 803 and Muhammad Shafi alias Khddoo v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 1045 rel. Muhammad Iftikhar Ullah Dhillon for Appellants along with Kashif (Appellant on bail). Nisar Ahmad Virk, Deputy Prosecutor General along with Asif, S.I. for the State. Muhammad Ahsan Nizami for the Complainant and also for the petitioner (in Crl. Rev. No. 2871 of 2022), as well as for the petitioner (in P.S.L.A No. 2870 of 2022). Date of hearing: 30th April, 2025. Judgment Farooq Haider, J .--- This single judgment will dispose of Crl. Appeal No. 79724/2021 filed by Ghulam Qadir (appellant/convict) against his "conviction and sentence", Criminal Appeal No.79726/2021 preferred by Kashif (appellant/convict) against his "convictions and sentences", Criminal Revision No.2871/2022 filed by Muhammad Asif (complainant) for enhancement of sentences of Ghulam Qadir and Kashif as well as convicting and sentencing both of them for offences under Sections: 148, 149, 449 P.P.C. as well and P.S.L.A. No.2870/2022 filed by Muhammad Asif (complainant) against order of acquittal of Shah Nawaz, Imdad, Saif Ullah, Javed Asif, Ali Akbar, Shabbir, Mirza Javed, Shah Muhammad, Sajjad, Fiaz and Amir from the charges as all the matters have arisen out of one and the same impugned judgment dated: 02.12.2021 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pattoki/trial court. 2. Ghulam Qadir and Kashif (appellants) along with their co-accused persons namely Shah Nawaz, Imdad, Saif Ullah, Javed Asif, Ali Akbar, Shabbir, Mirza Javed, Shah Muhammad, Sajjad, Fiaz and Amir were summoned and charge was framed against all accused except Shoban (who died earlier to that) on 01.06.2017 in complaint case titled as "Muhammad Asif v. Ghulam Qadir, etc." under Sections: 302, 324, 337 A(i), 337 F(i), 148, 149, 449 P.P.C. (Shoban/co-accused, could not be tried being dead) and after conclusion of the trial, while acquitting aforementioned co-accused persons namely Shahnawaz, Imdad, Saif Ullah, Javed Asif, Ali Akbar, Shabbir, Mirza Javed, Shah Muhammad, Sajjad, Fiaz and Amir vide impugned judgment dated: 02.12.2021, trial court has convicted and sentenced the appellants as under: - GHULAM QADIR Conviction Sentence 1. Under Section: 302 (b) P.P.C. "Imprisonment for Life" with payment of compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- under Section: 544-A Cr.P.C. to the legal heirs of the deceased and in default whereof to further undergo S.I. for six months. Benefit of Section: 382-B Cr.P.C. was extended in favour of the accused. KASHIF Conviction Sentence 1. Under Section: 324 P.P.C. "Five Years" Rigorous Imprisonment along with fine of Rs.50,000/- to be paid to Qasim (injured) as required under Section: 544-A Cr.P.C. and in default whereof to further suffer S.I. for three months. Benefit of Section: 382-B Cr.P.C. was extended in favour of the accused. 2. Under Section: 337 A(i) P.P.C. "Daman" amounting to Rs.40,000/- and in case of non-payment of the same, it was directed that the accused will remain in jail till full payment of "Daman" and shall be dealt with the same manner, if sentenced to simple imprisonment. 3. Primarily, Muhammad Asif (complainant/PW-1) set the machinery of law into motion by moving application (Ex.PA) to Muhammad Abbas, 704/HC (CW-2) in Police Station: Saddar Pattoki, District Kasur while mentioning therein that he (complainant/PW-1) is resident of Dhana Chak No.12, Tehsil Chunian, District Kasur and cultivator by profession; on 25.06.2014 at about 7:30 p.m., he and his brothers namely Yasin, Qasim Ali, Naseem Asghar, sister namely Misbah Shaheen and other family members were present in their house; aforementioned accused persons while armed with their respective weapons trespassed into the house of the complainant forcibly defiling the sanctity of four walls of the house; Shah Nawaz raised lalkara to teach lesson to Yasin (brother of the complainant) for abusing and insulting them today over dispute of sewerage , upon which accused Ghulam Qadir fired shot with his rifle at Yasin, which landed at his right flank and went through and through; accused Kashif made fire with his .12-bore repeater, which crossed while touching upper side of head of Qasim; accused Shah Nawaz fired shot with his pump action and pallets landed on forehead, shoulder and chest of the complainant; accused Saif Ullah fired shot with his pump action and pallets hit at waist and backside of right shoulder of the complainant; accused Javed Asif fired shot with his repeater .12-bore landing at left shin of Misbah Shaheen; in the meanwhile remaining accused persons also resorted to indiscriminate firing; Ghulam Qadir and Shah Nawaz became injured due to firing of their companions; thereafter accused persons made good their escape with their respective weapons; besides the complainant, occurrence was witnessed by Qasim Ali, Misbah Shaheen and Naseem Asghar. Motive behind the occurrence was that about 10/15 minutes prior to the occurrence, a quarrel regarding sewerage , took place between accused persons Ghulam Qadir and Shah Nawaz with Yasin (brother of the complainant) and Yasin had abused accused persons Ghulam Qadir and Shah Nawaz; due to said grudge, accused persons in connivance with each other while armed with firearms trespassed into the house of the complainant defiling the sanctity of four walls of the house and committed murder of Yasin with fire shot; straight fire shots were made with intention to kill Qasim Ali, Misbah Shaheen and the complainant; Yasin was being taken to the hospital in injured condition but he succumbed to the injuries on the way. On the basis of aforementioned application (Ex.PA), case was registered vide F.I.R. No.270/2016 (Ex.CW-2/A) dated: 25.06.2016 under Sections: 302, 324, 452, 148, 149 P.P.C. at Police Station: Saddar Pattoki, District Kasur; however, being dissatisfied with the investigation carried out by the local police, complainant filed "complaint" against Ghulam Qadir, Shah Nawaz, Shoban (since dead), Imdad, Saif Ullah, Javed Asif, Kashif, Ali Akbar, Shabbir, Mirza Javed, Sajjad, Fiaz, Amir and Shah Muhammad under Sections: 302, 324, 337 A(i), 337 F(i), 148, 149, 449 P.P.C.. Accused persons were formally charge sheeted to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial however Sajjad, Fiaz and Amir became absent during trial; complainant produced three witnesses to prove the charge against the accused whereas seven witnesses were examined by the trial Court as Court Witnesses. Medical evidence was furnished by Dr. Muhammad Jawad Afzal (CW-5) and Dr. Sadia Ashraf (CW-6) whereas Muhammad Asif (complainant/PW-1), Qasim Ali (injured/PW-2) and Mst. Misbah Shaheen (injured/PW-3) have furnished the ocular account; investigation was conducted by Muhammad Iqbal, S.I. (CW-7); thereafter statements of the appellants and their co-accused persons were recorded under Section: 342 Cr.P.C. in which they refuted all the allegations levelled against them; the appellants did not appear as their own witnesses under Section: 340 (2) Cr.P.C., however, they produced some documentary evidence (Ex.DB, Ex.DC, Ex.DD, Ex.DE, Ex.DF and Mark-A) in their defence. Trial court after conclusion of trial while acquitting co-accused persons namely Shahnawaz, Imdad, Saif Ullah, Javed Asif, Ali Akbar, Shabbir, Mirza Javed, Shah Muhammad, Sajjad, Fiaz and Amir, has convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned above through the impugned judgment. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that convictions recorded against and sentences awarded to the appellants through impugned judgment are against the 'law and facts' and result of non-reading/misreading of evidence; ocular account is not trustworthy and also not supported by medical evidence; prosecution has failed to prove its case. Learned counsel for the appellants finally prayed for acquittal of the appellants and dismissal of P.S.L.A. filed against order of acquittal of accused persons as well as revision for enhancement of sentences. 5. Conversely, learned Deputy Prosecutor General and learned counsel for the complainant have supported the impugned judgment to the extent of convictions recorded against Ghulam Qadir and Kashif (appellants) and prayed for dismissal of their appeals. Learned Deputy Prosecutor General assisted by learned counsel for the complainant in support of petition for special leave to appeal (P.S.L.A.) against order of acquittal of Shah Nawaz, Imdad, Saif Ullah, Javed Asif, Ali Akbar, Shabbir, Mirza Javed, Shah Muhammad, Sajjad, Fiaz and Amir from the charges, has submitted that said order of acquittal is against the law and facts; result of misreading and non-reading of evidence; prosecution has proved its case against them too, up to hilt and they may be convicted and sentenced as per charge framed against them. In support of revision petition for enhancement of sentences of the appellants as well as for their conviction in offences under Sections: 148, 149, 449 P.P.C., learned counsel for the complainant has submitted that since prosecution has proved its case against Ghulam Qadir and Kashif (appellants) up to hilt, therefore, they may be sentenced accordingly. 6. Arguments heard. Record perused. 7. As per case of prosecution, Muhammad Asif (complainant/ PW-1) moved application (Ex.PA) for registration of the case at the Police Station and in the light of the same, FIR (Exh.CW-2/A) was registered at 09:05 p.m. on 25.06.2016. This case was registered against 14 (fourteen) accused persons and out of said fourteen accused persons, Ghulam Qadir (appellant in Crl. Appeal No.79724/2021) and Kashif (appellant in Crl. Appeal No.79726/2021) have been convicted and sentenced as detailed above whereas Shah Nawaz who according to case of prosecution raised lalkara and fired shot with pump action at complainant and pallets hit at the face, shoulder and chest of complainant, Saif Ullah who fired shot with .12-bore pump action at complainant, pallets of the same hit at waist and backside of right shoulder of the complainant, Javed Asif who fired shot with repeater .12-bore which hit at left shin of Misbah Shaheen, remaining accused persons who made firing at random and Ghulam Qadir as well as Shah Nawaz (aforementioned accused persons) received injuries due to their firing and accused who were armed with sota have been acquitted in this case through the impugned judgment dated: 02.12.2021 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pattoki however Shoban (accused) died during trial of the case. So co-accused persons namely Shah Nawaz, Saif Ullah and Javed Asif, who were attributed with effective roles of causing firearm injuries to the complainant (PW-1) and Misbah Shahin (injured witness/ PW-3) have been acquitted along with other acquitted co-accused persons and evidence of the prosecution witnesses to the extent of 11 (eleven) co-accused persons has been disbelieved, therefore, said evidence now can only be relied and used against Ghulam Qadir and Kashif (present appellants) if same is strongly corroborated by the independent evidence; in this regard, guidance has been sought from the dictum laid down in the cases of "Munir Ahmad and another v. The State and others" (2019 SCMR 79), "Altaf Hussain v. The State" (2019 SCMR 274), "Muhammad Idrees and another v. The State and others" (2021 SCMR 612), "Pervaiz Khan and another v. The State" (2022 SCMR 393), "Rafaqat Ali v. The State" (2022 SCMR 1107) and "Sajjad Hussain v. The State and others" (2022 SCMR 1540). As per own case of prosecution, occurrence took place at 7:30 p.m. on 25.06.2016 whereas same was reported to the police through written application (Ex.PA) at the Police Station at 09:05 p.m. when FIR (Ex.CW-2/A) was registered while distance of place of occurrence from the Police Station is just 16 (sixteen) kilometres as per column No.4 of the FIR and it is relevant to mention here that as per aforementioned FIR (Ex. CW-2/A), Yasin (deceased of the case) died on the way while taking to the hospital, meaning thereby that Yasin died before registration of the case i.e. 09:05 p.m. on 25.06.2016 whereas post-mortem examination was conducted on dead body of Yasin at 5:00 a.m. on 26.06.2016 while dead body as well as police documents were received at 4:00 a.m. on 26.06.2026; in this regard, relevant portion of statement of Dr. Muhammad Jawad Afzal (CW-5) who conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased in this case, is hereby reproduced as follows:- "Stated that on 26.06.2016, I was posted as MO at THQ, Pattoki. On the same day, dead body of deceased namely Muhammad Yasin son of Bashir Ahmed was brought by Zulfiqar and Muhammad Iqbal SI, P.S Saddar Pattoki, district Kasur at 04:00 AM and I received police documents at 04:00 AM and conduct autopsy at 05:00 AM on same date." meaning thereby that post-mortem examination was conducted after about nine and half hours of the occurrence and after about seven and half hours of registration of the case as per own case of the prosecution. So, it is crystal clear that post-mortem examination has been conducted with delay and reason for such delay is very much clear from aforementioned statement of Dr. Muhammad Jawad Afzal (CW-5) that police papers were handed over to the Doctor at 04:00 a.m., which state of affairs clearly shows that police papers for autopsy were not promptly prepared and time was consumed for consultation, deliberation and tailoring story for registration of the case which resulted into preparation of documents for autopsy with delay and ultimately conducting post-mortem examination with delay also and in such circumstances, First Information Report (crime report), which is cornerstone of the case of the prosecution, cannot be termed as promptly recorded rather it can be safely said that same was recorded with delay, however, ante-time has been mentioned in the record, and such sort of FIR cannot provide any support to the case of prosecution and superstructure i.e. case of prosecution raised on the basis of such sort of FIR is bound to fall and in this regard, cases of "Haroon Shafique v. The State and others" (2018 SCMR 2118), "Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State" (2019 SCMR 1068), "Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others" (2020 SCMR 192) and "Muhammad Adnan and another v. The State and others" (2021 SCMR 16) can be safely referred. It is well settled that when there is delay in reporting the incident to the police, then prosecution is under obligation to explain such delay and failure to do that will badly reflect upon the credibility of prosecution version. In this regard, guidance has been sought from the case of "Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others" (PLD 2019 SC 64); relevant portion from paragraph No.29 of said case law is hereby reproduced: - "There is no cavil to the proposition, however, it is to be noted that in absence of any plausible explanation, this Court has always considered the delay in lodging of FIR to be fatal and castes a suspicion on the prosecution story, extending the benefit of doubt to the accused. It has been held by this Court that a FIR is always treated as a cornerstone of the prosecution case to establish guilt against those involved in a crime; thus, it has a significant role to play. If there is any delay in lodging of a FIR and commencement of investigation, it gives rise to a doubt, which, of course, cannot be extended to anyone else except to the accused?" So far as ocular account in this case is concerned, same was provided by Muhammad Asif (complainant/PW-1), Qasim Ali (PW-2) and Mst. Misbah Shaheen (PW-3). By now it is also well settled that mere presence of injury on the person of prosecution witness does not stamp him to be a truthful witness; in this regard, guidance has been sought from the cases of "Amin Ali and another v. The State" (2011 SCMR 323), "Muhammad Arif v. The State" (2019 SCMR 631) and "Ishtiaq Hussain and another v. The State and others" (2021 SCMR 159). It is also relevant to mention here that Muhammad Asif (complainant/PW-1) introduced dishonest improvements and contradictions during his statement before the court and detail of the same reads as follows:- "It is correct that I did not get recorded in the application for registration of FIR (Exh.PA), private complaint (Exh.PB) and in my cursory statement that accused Ghulam Qadir was armed with riffle but not specifically mentioned the bore of weapon i.e. 303 bore. It is correct that in private complaint as well as in my cursory statement I had not mentioned that accused Imdad Hussain was armed with .30-bore pistol, Shabbir Hussain, Ali Akbar were armed with Sotas, accused Shoban, accused Mirza Javeed, accused Sajjad, accused Fayyaz were all armed with .30 bore pistols and accused Amir and Shah Muhammad were armed with Sotas." "It is correct that in my application for registration of FIR, private complaint and cursory statement that I had not mentioned that any of accused was armed with .9MM pistol." Dishonest improvements, omissions and contradictions introduced by Qasim Ali (PW-2) are as follows:- "It is correct that in my statement to the police and cursory statement in the private complaint, I stated that accused Ghulam Qadir was armed with riffle but I did not specify its bore i.e.303 bore." "On first inspection by I.O. he prepared on-scaled site plan on pointation of me and other eye-witnesses. It is correct that I did not specific place where injured accused persons Shahnawaz and Ghulam Qadir sustained injuries. It is correct that in my statement to the police and cursory statement, I did not specify that who fired at accused persons Shahnawaz and Ghulam Qadir and fire shot were made us in self defense." "It is correct that I did not witness fact of taking snaps of dead body and recovery memos thereof. It is correct that in my statement to the police I stated that Yasin in injured condition was being taken to hospital and on his way he died without mentioning his transportation to Jinnah Hospital, Lahore." "It is correct that in my statement to the police, cursory statement and examination in chief I did not specify the accused persons who made fire shots of Kalashnikov and .9MM pistol of which seven crime empties of .9MM and live crime empties of Kalashnikov were recovered vide recovery memo. Exh.PC. It is correct that during the course of investigation I had been appearing before SHO, DSP and SP investigation Kasur where I did not specify that who made fire shots of Kalashnikov and .9MM pistol." Dishonest improvements, omissions and contradictions introduced by Mst. Misbah Shaheen (PW-3) are also reproduced as under:- "It is correct that in my statement to the police and cursory statement in the private complaint, I stated that accused Ghulam Qadir was armed with riffle but I did not specify its bore i.e. .303 bore." "On first inspection by I.O. he prepared un-scaled site plan on pointation of me and other eye-witnesses. It is correct that I did not specific place where injured accused persons Shahnawaz and Ghulam Qadir sustained injuries. It is correct that in my statement to the police and cursory statement, I did not specify that who fired at accused persons Shahnawaz and Ghulam Qadir and fire shots were made by my brothers in self defense." "I was in THQ hospital, Pattoki when I received information from my brother Qasim that my brother Yasin deceased succumbed to the injuries on way to Lahore and I received that information on 25.06.2016 at 09:30 PM. I was medically examined at THQ, Chunian after 2/3 days of the occurrence." "It is correct that in my statement to the police I stated that Yasin in injured condition was being taken to hospital and on his way he died without mentioning his transportation to Jinnah Hospital Lahore." "It is correct that in my statement to the police, cursory statement and examination in chief I did not specify the accused persons who made fire shots of Kalashnikov and .9MM pistol of which seven crime empties of .9MM and five crime empties of Kalashnikov were recovered vide recovery Exh.PC. It is correct that during the course of investigation I had been appearing before SHO, DSP and SP investigation Kasur where I did not specify that who made the shots of Kalashnikov and .9MM pistol." "It is correct that our statements were recorded on 26.06.2016." Therefore, all eye-witnesses (mentioned above) including complainant and injured witnesses have made dishonest improvements in order to strengthen the case. It is trite law that if prosecution witness including injured witness introduces dishonest improvement in order to strengthen the case, then his evidence is to be thrown away altogether and cannot be relied upon; in this regard, guidance has been sought from the cases of "Muhammad Mansha v. The State" (2018 SCMR 772), "Muhammad Arif v. The State" (2019 SCMR 631), "Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State" (PLD 2021 SC 600) and "Khalid Mehmood and another v. The State and others" (2021 SCMR 810). It is also relevant to mention here that it is mentioned in the application for registration of the case (Exh.PA), FIR (Ex.CW-2/

Summary: ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Conversion fee, challenge to---Relevant authority charging rate which was not yet approved--- Charging of rate prevalent on the date of filing of application---Scope-- -Principle of non-retroactivity, applicability of---Facts in brevity were that the petitioner filed a Constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution challenging the vires of the order passed by the Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division (respondent No.2) with the contention that the order was illegal and without lawful authority, as it imposed a conversion fee based on a notification that was still in the drafting stage and was not formally approved---It was the case of the petitioner that he should have been charged according to the rate applicable at the time of filing of his application---The petitioner's appeal was dismissed summarily, citing revised rates---Moot point for determination by the High Court was as to "whether the petitioner was liable to pay conversion fee as per the rate prevailing at the date when he moved an application before the concerned authority/respondent for the said purpose and what would be the effect of the principle of non-retroactivity in such like matters?"---Held: Rights of the parties were to be governed/decided as per the law prevailing at the time when cause of action had accrued, particularly in the matters pertaining to fiscal disputes, unless manifest intention of the law was otherwise---Law did not recognize any retrospective enforceability of a fiscal measure and issuance of a notification was not of any significance in legal importance till it was published in an official Gazette---A party had a right to have his petition heard on the basis of the law prevailing on the day he filed his petition---Since the impugned order failed to specify the applicable provisions of law for it to be deemed a speaking order, the same was set-aside and the matter was remanded back to the respondent No.2 to decide it afresh---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Sutlej Cotton Mills Ltd. Okara v. Industrial Court, West Pakistan, Lahore and others PLD 1966 SC 472; Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali and another v. The State PLD 1975 SC 506; The Karachi Development Authority, Karachi v. Works Co-Operative Housing Society, Karachi and another PLD 1978 SC 307; City District Government, Karachi v. Muhammad Irfan and others 2010 SCMR 1186 and Government of Sindh through Secretary Agriculture and Livestock Department and others v. Messrs Khan Ginners (Private) Limited and 57 others PLD 2011 SC 347 rel. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S.24A---Constitutional petition---Passing of non-speaking order by public functionary, challenge to---Failing to mention applicable provisions of law---Effect---Petitioner invoked Art. 199 of the Constitution to challenge the vires of the order passed by respondent No.2 (Commissioner) on the ground that it unlawfully relied on an unapproved draft notification to impose a conversion fee, whereas the applicable rate was contended to have been the one prevailing at the time of filing of his application---Validity---Respondent No.2 failed to mention relevant provision of applicable law in the impugned order which was a legal lacuna---The impugned order did not fulfill the ingredients of a speaking order, therefore, same was set-aside and the matter was remanded back to the respondent No.2 to decide it afresh---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Retrospective and prospective effect of a statute---Scope---A law that takes away or abridges the substantive rights of the parties only applies prospectively, unless either by express enactment or by necessary intendment the legislature gives to it the retrospective effect. Taisei Corporation and another v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Mst. Sobia Hanif v. The Collector (Deputy Commissioner), Lahore District, Lahore and 5 others 1993 CLC 2073; Major (Rtd.) Muhammad Suleman Khan v. D.C./Registrar, Lahore District 2002 CLC 226; Sardar Muhammad v. Province of Punjab through Sub-Registrar and another 2017 CLC Note 49; Mrs. Nighat Saimi and another v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Revenue and 10 others PLD 2017 Sindh 596; Syed Ali Shah v. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Defence and 2 others 1994 CLC 369 and Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited v. Abrar Ahmed and 4 others 2019 CLD 578 ref. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Retrospective and prospective effect of a statute---Scope---The proper approach to the construction of a statute as to its prospective or retrospective applicability, in the absence of legislature's express enactment or necessary intendment, is not to decide what label to apply to it, procedural or otherwise, but to see whether the statute, if applied retrospectively to a particular type of case, would impair existing rights and obligations. Taisei Corporation and another v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Mst. Sobia Hanif v. The Collector (Deputy Commissioner), Lahore District, Lahore and 5 others 1993 CLC 2073; Major (Rtd.) Muhammad Suleman Khan v. D.C./Registrar, Lahore District 2002 CLC 226; Sardar Muhammad v. Province of Punjab through Sub-Registrar and another 2017 CLC Note 49; Mrs. Nighat Saimi and another v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Revenue and 10 others PLD 2017 Sindh 596; Syed Ali Shah v. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Defence and 2 others 1994 CLC 369 and Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited v. Abrar Ahmed and 4 others 2019 CLD 578 ref. (e) Legislation--- ----Non-retroactivity, principle of---Scope---Principle of non-retroactivity in context of prospective, fair and transparent application of laws---Scope---The principle of non-retroactivity was first articulated in Roman law, where, already by the end of the second century B.C. it applied in both criminal and civil law to protect the existing legal order and economic interest---Its significance is such that the individuals should be able to rely on laws in the expectation that the State will not afterward interfere with individuals' rights---This expectation would help to ensure the equality of all before the law, guarding predictability and legal certainty---The principle of non-retroactivity is actually a fundamental concept (in law) and it makes sure that statute/law is applied prospectively, rather than retrospectively---Its basic and most important purpose is to protect rights of individuals and organizations by preventing arbitrary or unjust applications of the relevant law---This principle is essential in ensuring that the laws and regulations are applied in a fair and transparent manner---One of its legal features is to restrict the enactment of retroactive laws, which can undermine trust in the legal system and create uncertainty---So, it can be safely stated that non-retroactivity is the legal principle that laws do not apply retroactively and ex-post facto laws are forbidden---This principle may be applied to judicial decisions as well as statutory law. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4 & 199---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24A---Public functionary---Duty to pass speaking order---Scope---Every citizen of the country has an inalienable right to be treated in accordance with law as envisaged by Art. 4 of the Constitution---Hence, it is duty and obligation of every public functionary to act within four corners of mandate of the Constitution and pass a speaking order. Town Committee, Piplan v. Muhammad Hanif and others 2008 SCMR 723 rel. (g) Administration of justice--- ----Speaking orders, passing of---Duty, significance and scope---Litigants who bring their disputes to the law courts with the incidental hardships and expenses involved do expect a patient and a judicious treatment of their cases and their determination by proper orders---A judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the court has applied its mind to the resolution of the issues involved for their proper adjudication---The ultimate result may be reached by a laborious effort, but if the final order does not bear an imprint of that effort and on the contrary discloses arbitrariness of thought and action, the feeling with its painful results, that justice has neither been done nor seems to have been done is inescapable---When the order of a lower court contains no reasons, the appellate court is deprived of the benefit of the views of the lower court and is unable to appreciate the processes by which the decision has been reached. Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 rel. Arfan Ullah Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Fayyaz Ahmad Khan for Petitioner. Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocates General, Sh. Kamran Shehzad on behalf of the Respondent No.3/District Council, Attock. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss. 497(5), 435, 369 & 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 148 & 149---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Ad-interim pre-arrest bail---Non-appearance of petitioner/accused---Petitioner was granted post-arrest bail in the case but later on it was cancelled---Petitioner challenged the bail cancellation order by filing revision petition but the same was dismissed due to the petitioner's non-appearance---Petitioner challenged the bail cancellation order by filing another revision petition---Validity---Dismissing the matter solely due to the petitioner's absence might have defeated the very purpose for which it was admitted---Therefore, although the Court retained the discretion to dismiss application for non-prosecution, judicial propriety demanded that such discretion be exercised cautiously where the petition had passed the threshold of admission---Even where a revision petition was dismissed in default, the aggrieved party may seek its restoration under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court---High Court was empowered under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., to set aside such an order if sufficient cause for non-appearance was shown---Restoration in such circumstances did not attract the prohibition under S. 369, Cr.P.C., as a dismissal for non- prosecution did not constitute a judgment on merits---Second revision petition against the same order was not maintainable where the first was dismissed for non-prosecution because such dismissal did not operate as a decision on merits---However, that did not leave the aggrieved party remediless---Appropriate course was to seek restoration of the earlier petition under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., by demonstrating sufficient cause for non-appearance---Mere assertion is not enough, the reasons must be stated with particularity and supported by material on record, where possible-- -Petition being not maintainable was dismissed accordingly. Nisar Ahmad v. The State and another 1975 PCr.LJ 400; Muhammad Ramzan v. Allah Ditta and others 1982 SCMR 215; Munir Ahmad v. The State 1991 MLD 1781; Muhammad Hanif v. The State 1991 PCr.LJ 1353; Yar Mat Khan v. The State and another 2004 PCr.LJ 468 and Maulvi Asad Ahmad alias Asad and others v. The State and another PLD 1990 Lah. 1 rel. Hafiz Naimat Ullah for Petitioner. Rana Tasawar Ali Khan, Deputy Prosecutor General for Respondents.

Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)--- ----Ss.5, 6, 7 & 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11--- Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.483---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.193 & 228---Suit for recovery of damages on account of defamation---Defence of 'absolute privilege', availability of---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Factual controversy---Recording of evidence, requirement of---Order of Trial court rejecting the plaint set aside as the matter required recording of evidence---The appellant filed a defamation suit against the respondents for allegedly issuing a defamatory letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) which he claimed damaged his reputation---Trial court rejected the plaint under O.VII R.11 CPC on the ground that the impugned letter was issued in the respondents' official capacity and was protected under "absolute privilege" as per S.6 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 (the Ordinance, 2002) and S.483 of the Companies Act, 2017 (the Act 2017)---The appellant challenged this rejection in the present appeal contending that such determinations required evidence and could not be resolved at the preliminary stage---Two important points for consideration by the High Court were as to "i. Whether the defamatory letter qualified as a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of S.483 of the Act, 2017? and; ii. Whether the defamatory letter was written by the respondents in their personal or official capacity?"---Held: Perusal of S.483 of the Act, 2017 revealed that whilst powers of the civil court had been vested in the Commission for the purposes outlined in subsection (1) of S.483 in respect of any "proceedings" or "enquiry", the same attained the status of a "judicial proceeding" only within the meaning and for the purposes of Ss.193 and 228 of the P.P.C.---The defamatory letter visibly did not fall in the said category and it could not be classified as part of a "judicial proceeding"---Therefore, reliance of the Trial court on the above noted provision, at least for the purposes of rejection of plaint, was unfounded and incorrect---With regards to the second question for determination by the High Court, same required evidence to be recorded---The appellant should have been given an opportunity to examine the respondents and put forward necessary questions to them to determine the capacity in which the defamatory letter was written---The conclusion by the Trial Court in reference to the said letter being written by the respondents in their "official positions" could not have been made prior to recording of evidence--- Trial Court went over and above the permissible scope of O.VII R.11 C.P.C.---Perusal of the impugned order reflected that the Trial court had not distinguished between rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit---Matter was remanded back to the Trial Court with a direction to conclude the proceedings within six months---Order of rejection of plaint was set aside and present appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Haji Abdul Karim v. M/s. Florida Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 247 rel. (b) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)--- ----S.8---Suit for recovery of damages on account of defamation---Prerequisites---Notice of action, requirement of---Scope---The scheme under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, being special law, is peculiar---Prior to institution of the suit the plaintiff is mandated to issue a notice under S.8 of the Ordinance, 2002 within the time stipulated in the said provision. Muhammad Ali Lakhani for Appellant along with Farmanullah and the Appellant Asim Iqbal. Ghazi Khan Khalil along with Ameer Nausherwan, Zeeshan Ahmed Kalhoro, Kumail Abbas and Aftab Ali for Respondents. Ahmed Khan Khaskheli, A.A.G for the State. Date of hearing: 25th April, 2025. judgment Muhammad Jaffer Raza, J .--- The instant Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed under Section 15 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ("Ordinance") impugning the order dated 29.07.2024 passed in Defamation Suit No.183/2023, whereby the plaint filed by the Appellant was rejected under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. 2. Succinctly stated, the Appellant filed Suit No.183/2023 against the Respondents for damages on account of defamation before the learned trial Court. Thereafter, the Respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. and the same was allowed vide Impugned order dated 29.07.2024. 3. Learned counsel for the Appellant has argued that the Impugned order is beyond the permissible scope of Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. as expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haji Abdul Karim v. M/s. Florida Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. Learned counsel has stated that the letter dated 29.04.2023 ("defamatory letter"), written and signed by the Respondents, was defamatory in nature, which gave rise to the cause of action against the Respondents. It is specified that in the instant judgment the term "defamatory letter" is used for the purposes of identifying the said letter only and is not a determination on whether the said letter was defamatory. 4. The learned counsel in compliance of the provisions of Section 8 of the Ordinance issued legal notice dated 22.05.2023 to the Respondents and thereafter preferred the above-mentioned suit. The learned counsel has stated that the application filed by the Respondents under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. was primarily filed on the ground that the defamatory letter, which is the subject matter of the above-mentioned suit, was written by the Respondents in their official capacity and therefore their employer should have impleaded as Defendant in the said suit. Learned counsel has argued that even if the above was a permissible defence under Section 5 of the Ordinance, even then a rejection of the plaint was not warranted under the permissible scope of the above noted provision. 5. Conversely learned counsel for the Respondents has argued that Sections 6 and 7 of the Ordinance are squarely applicable to the case at hand as the defamatory letter which is the subject matter of the above-mentioned suit is covered by "absolute privilege" as defined under Section 6 of the Ordinance. In the same vein the learned counsel has also placed reliance on Section 483 of the Companies Act, 2017 ("Act") and states that the alleged defamatory letter, written to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan ("SECP") qualifies as "judicial proceeding" and therefore can be classified as "absolute privilege". He has further argued that no evidence in respect of the said defence needs to be recorded and the plaint can be rejected without appreciating the contents of the written statement. Learned counsel has further contended that the ground of absolute or qualified privilege, being legal in nature, can be taken at any stage. 6. Further the learned counsel has argued that the defamatory letter does not give rise to cause of action against the present Respondents as the defamatory letter was issued under the instructions of their employer. Therefore, the Respondents could not be sued personally for their acts and omissions which were done in their "official capacity". Learned counsel has further advanced the said argument and averred that the application filed by the Appellant under Order I Rule 10, C.P.C. seeking impleading of the employer of the Respondents as party further buttresses his contention. Lastly, he has relied upon the case of M. Moosa v Mahomed and others. 7. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the Appellant has argued that Section 483 of the Act is specific to proceedings under Sections 193 and 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 ("P.P.C.") and therefore is not attracted to present case. Learned counsel has argued that the defamatory letter was sent in reply to the letter issued by SECP dated 18.04.2023. It is argued that the notice to SECP was sent by the Appellant as counsel for his client and the Respondents used this as an opportunity to defame the Appellant and tarnish his reputation. Lastly, learned counsel has contended that if the Impugned order is set aside, he will during the course of evidence, cross-examine the Respondents vis-?-vis their above noted contentions. 8. I have heard the learned counsel and perused the record. The scheme under the Ordinance, being special law, is peculiar. Prior to institution of the suit the Plaintiff is mandated to issue a notice under Section 8 of the Ordinance within the time stipulated in the said provision. At this juncture it will be relevant to reproduce Section 8 of the Ordinance which reads as follows: - "8. Notice of action. - No action lies unless the plaintiff has, within two months after the publication of the defamatory matter has come to his notice or knowledge, given to the defendant, fourteen days notice in writing of his intention to bring an action, specifying the defamatory matter complained of." 9. Further, the defences available to the Defendant in a suit under the Ordinance have been clearly defined in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Ordinance, which are reproduced below: - "5. Defences.- In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if he shows that- (a) he was not the author, editor, publisher or printer of the statement complained of; (b) the matter commented on is fair and in the public interest and is an expression of opinion and not an assertion of fact and was published in good faith; (c) it is based on truth and was made for public good; (d) assent was given for the publication by the plaintiff; (e) offer to tender a proper apology and publish the same was made by the defendant but was refused by the plaintiff; (f) an offer to print or publish a contradiction or denial in the same manner and with the same prominence was made but was refused by the plaintiff; (g) the matter complained of was privileged communication such as between lawyer and client or between persons having fiduciary relations; and (h) the matter is covered by absolute or qualified privilege. 6. Absolute privilege. - Any publication of statement made in the Federal or Provincial legislatures, reports, papers, notes and proceedings ordered to be published by either House of the Parliament or by the Provincial Assemblies, or relating to judicial proceedings ordered to be published by the Court or any report, note or matter written or published by or under the authority of a Government, shall have the protection of absolute privilege. Explanation. - In this section legislature includes a local legislature and Court includes any tribunal or body exercising the judicial powers. 7. Qualified privilege. - Any fair and accurate publication of parliamentary proceedings, or judicial proceedings which the public may attend and statements made to the proper authorities in order to procure the redress of public grievances shall have the protection of qualified privilege." 10. At this juncture it will be expedient to bifurcate the grounds taken by the learned counsel for the Respondent for rejection of plaint and frame points of determination accordingly. The following points of determination are framed for effective adjudication: - i. Whether the defamatory letter qualifies as a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of Section 483 of the Act? ii. Whether the defamatory letter was written by the Respondents in their personal or official capacity? POINT NO.1 11. Prior to adjudicating this question, it will be germane to reproduce Section 483 of the Act. The same reads as follows: - 483. Powers of the Commission in relation to enquiries and proceedings.-(1) The Commission, an authorised officer or the registrar, as the case may be, shall, for the purposes of a proceeding or enquiry in exercise of its or his powers and discharge of functions, have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath or affirmation; (b) compelling the discovery or production of any document or other material object; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; and (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and documents. (2) Any proceeding before the Commission, an authorised officer or registrar, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860), and the Commission, an authorised officer or registrar shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898). (Emphasis added) 12. Bare perusal of the above reproduced section reveals that whilst powers of the civil court have been vested in the commission for the purposes outlined in subsection (1) of Section 483 in respect of any "proceedings" or "enquiry", the same attain the status of a "judicial proceeding" only within the meaning and for the purposes of Sections 193 and 228 of the P.P.C. The defamatory letter visibly does not fall in the said category and in that respect, it is held that the said letter cannot be classified as part of a "judicial proceeding". Therefore, reliance of the learned trial court on the above noted provision, at least for the purposes of rejection of plaint, was unfounded and with respect, incorrect. 13. For the purposes of the present appeal it will be beneficial to discuss another ancillary aspect of what has already been held above. Even if the defamatory letter is held to be a part of a "judicial proceeding" the Impugned order is unclear as to whether the same attracts absolute or qualified privilege within the meaning ascribed to them under the Ordinance. I will leave it to a more opportune moment to adjudicate whether either privilege can be a ground for rejection of plaint. For the purposes of the instant judgment, the same is immaterial in light of what has already been held in paragraph No.12 above. Consequently, the reliance of the learned counsel for the Respondent on the judgement in the case of M. Moosa (supra) is misplaced. POINT NO.2 14. Bare reading of the question framed indicates that the same requires evidence to be recorded. The Appellant ought to be given an opportunity to examine the Respondents and put forward necessary questions to them to determine the capacity in which the defamatory letter was written. The conclusion by the learned trial court in reference to the said letter being written by the Respondents in their "Official Positions" could not have been made prior to recording of evidence. 15. It is therefore held that the learned trial Court went over and above the permissible scope of Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. and failed to appreciate the dicta laid down in the judgment of Florida Builders (supra). Bare perusal of the Impugned order reflects that the learned trial Court has not distinguished between rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit. 16. In light of what has been held above, the instant appeal is allowed within no order as to costs. The matter is remanded back to the learned trial Court who is further directed to conclude the proceedings in the above-mentioned suit within a period of six (06) months from today. The pending CMAs are disposed of accordingly. UN/A-46/Sindh Appeal allowed.

Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----S. 126---Rectification of Register---Terms "member" and "shareholder"---Distinction---Terms "member" and "shareholder" are often used synonymously yet both are different---For a person to become a shareholder, allotment or purchase of shares from another shareholder is enough---No person can be treated as a member of a company until his name is entered in the Register of Members of the company---If a shareholder (whose name is entered as a member) sells his shares to another person, such seller has to be treated as member until his name is replaced with the name of purchaser in the Register---In case a person subscribes to shares of a company, he may not be treated as a shareholder until the shares are actually allotted to him---After allotment, such person is not a member until his name is entered in the Register of Members. Abdullah Khan Usmani v. Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others 2022 CLD 821 rel. (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----S. 126---Rectification of Register---Remedies---If a person, outside the scope of member, debenture-holders or shareholders, believes that default or unnecessary delay has happened in registering members, shares, or debenture-holders affecting his claimed rights, such person has certain options depending on his status which may include lodging of a complaint with Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (which can conduct an inspection, investigation or can even issue orders to a company to correct the defaults, if necessary) and may avail remedy in Civil Court due to breach of a contract. (c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----S. 126---Rectification of Register of Shares---High Court, jurisdiction of---Pre-conditions---Expression "aggrieved person"---Scope---Petitioners invoked original jurisdiction of High Court seeking rectification of Register of Shares of respondent / company on the basis of sale agreement executed by respondents / shareholders in their favour and sought entering their names in the Register---Validity---Requirement of transfer of shares as envisaged under S. 126(1)(b) of Companies Act, 2017 is that the person has to be an "aggrieved person"---Expression "aggrieved person" includes a transferor of shares who handed over transfer documents to transferee who lodged them with the company and the same were rejected by the company as bad delivery---So long as grievance of a member or an aggrieved person or company if there has been default or unnecessary delay in entering in the Register the fact of any person having become or ceased to be a member, an application under S. 126 of Companies Act, 2017 can be made---Cause of action to invoke provisions of S. 126 of Companies Act, 2017 arises only when the fact of any member having ceased to be a member is brought before the company or its board and there is default or delay in taking decision---Petitioners failed to furnish any evidence that they approached Board of Directors of respondent / company seeking removal---Petitioners sought directions against respondent / shareholders and Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to record transfer of shareholding of petitioners in the "Company" regardless of becoming members, debenture holders or shareholders of the "Company" and without fulfilling requirement of S. 126(1)(a) of Companies Act, 2017---Petitioners could not be termed as members, debenture-holders or shareholders of respondent / Company---High Court declined to interfere in the matter as the petitioners failed to prove themselves to be members, debenture holders or shareholders of respondent / Company, who without fulfilling requirements of S. 126(1)(a) of Companies Act, 2017 could not invoke S.126(1)(b) of Companies Act, 2017---Petition was dismissed in circumstances. Kausar Rana Resources (Private) Limited and others v. QATAR Lubricants Company W.L.L. (QALCO) and others 2025 SCMR 517; Mian Javed Amir and others v. United Foam Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore and others 2016 CLD 393 ; Ch. Shaukat Ali Noon and another v. Tehzeb Bakers (Pvt.) Limited and others 2024 CLD 113; Alliance Textile Mills Limited and 8 others v. Mrs. Naheed Kayani and 9 others 2015 CLD 1532; Khurshid Ahmed Khan v. Pak Cycle Manufacturing Company Limited PLD 1987 Lah. 1; Haji Abdur Rehman v. Umar Farooq Miankhel and others (I.C.A. No.3 of 2005); Fawwad Butt v. Messrs Mary (Pvt.) Limited and 5 others 2015 CLD 1309; Zakir Latif Ansari and another v. Pakistan Industrial Promoters Ltd. and 2 others 1988 CLC 1541; Mrs. Yasmeen Lari v. Mums Lahore Investment Ltd. and 2 others PLD 1981 Lah. 90 and Amhed Kuli Khan Khattak v. Creek Marina (Singapore) (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive Officer and 5 others 2012 CLD 879 rel. Sultan Mazhar Sher, Advocate Supreme Court with Syed Asad Haider for Petitioners. Barrister Usama Rauf with Malik Saqib Muhammad Khalid for Respondent No.1. Jamal Mehmood Butt, with Hafiz Muhammad Tanveer Nasir and Ms. Javeria Rehman Faisal for Respondent No.2. Tariq Mahmood on behalf of Respondent No.3. Barrister Omar Azad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court, Husnain Raza and Fatima Shabbir, for Respondent No.4/SECP. Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate General on behalf of Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi. Dates of hearing: 20th November, 2024, 28th January and 30th March, 2025. Prima facie, companies' shares are freely transferable; as we have seen, it is this feature which constitutes one of the great advantages of an incorporated company. Unless the company's regulations provide otherwise, the shareholder is entitled to transfer to whom he will. But, as we have also seen, the company's regulations may place restrictions on the right to transfer and at present must do so if the company is a private one. These restrictions may take any form, but in practice they normally either give the existing members a right of pre-emption or first refusal, or confer a discretion on the directors to refuse to pass transfers. Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (Fourth Edition) Chapter 19, Page 445, London Stevens & Sons 1979

Summary: Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 6 (14), 279 & 283---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 9 & 19---Reference by Official Assignee---Release of sale proceeds---Scheme of Arrangement---Objection, non-filing of---Official Assignee sought permission to release sale proceeds of pledged goods to the agent, in accordance with the Scheme of Arrangement---Bank objected to release of sale consideration under Scheme of Arrangement earlier approved by High Court on the plea that it had filed suit for recovery of finance---Validity---While hearing Reference filed by Official Assignee, High Court could not delve into the Scheme of Arrangement as the same was sanctioned by High Court in its company jurisdiction under Companies Act, 2017---Leave to defend application was neither heard nor decided---Bank, subject to decree passed in its favor, could file for execution under S. 19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Neither the decree nor entire exercise would be in vain---It was open for bank to have assailed the Scheme under S. 6(14) of Companies Act, 2017---Omission of bank to assail Scheme of Arrangement in such regard was fatal---High Court directed the Official Assignee to release the amount lying with him to the "Agent" after deduction and adjustment of the amount referred by Official Assignee---Reference was allowed accordingly. Paramount Spinning Mills Limited and others's case 2020 CLD 1443; Messrs Pakland Cement Limited's case 2002 CLD 1392 and Gulshan Weaving Mills Limited v. Al Baraka Bank Limited 2018 CLD 737 rel. Khawaja Shamsul Islam for Plaintiff. Muhammad Ali Akbar and Hameed Bukhsh for Defendant No.1. Ms. Heer Memon for the UBL Bank. Hashmatullah Aleem for the Bank Al Falah. Baqar Raza for the Intervener.

Summary: Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 6(14), 279 & 283---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001),Ss. 9 & 19---Reference by Official Assignee--- Release of sale proceeds---Scheme of Arrangement---Objection, non-filing of---Official Assignee sought permission to release sale proceeds of pledged goods to the agent, in accordance with the Scheme of Arrangement---Bank objected to release of sale consideration under Scheme of Arrangement earlier approved by High Court on the plea that it had filed suit for recovery of finance---Validity---While hearing Reference filed by Official Assignee, High Court could not delve into the Scheme of Arrangement as the same was sanctioned by High Court in its company jurisdiction under Companies Act, 2017---Leave to defend application was neither heard nor decided---Bank, subject to decree passed in its favour, could file for execution under S. 19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Neither the decree nor entire exercise would be in vain---It was open for bank to have assailed the Scheme under S. 6(14) of Companies Act, 2017---Omission of bank to assail Scheme of Arrangement in such regard was fatal---High Court directed the Official Assignee to release the amount lying with him to the "Agent" after deduction and adjustment of the amount referred by Official Assignee---Reference was allowed accordingly. Paramount Spinning Mills Limited and others' case 2020 CLD 1443; Messrs Pakland Cement Limited's case 2002 CLD 1392 and Gulshan Weaving Mills Limited v. Al Baraka Bank Limited 2018 CLD 737 rel. Khawaja Shamsul Islam for Plaintiff. Muhammad Ali Akbar and Hameed Bukhsh for Defendant No.1. Ms. Heer Memon for UBL Bank. Hashmatullah Aleem for Bank Al-Falah. Baqar Raza for Intervener. Order Muhammad Jaffer Raza, J.--- 1-13. Adjourned. 16. Deferred. 14-15. Through the instant order Official Assignee's References Nos. 13/2020 and 14/2025 shall be adjudicated and necessary orders shall be passed thereon. Brief facts pertaining to the said reference are noted hereinafter. Vide order dated 07.04.2015 the learned Official Assignee was directed to sell the pledged goods. Subsequently, an offer was received and the same was accepted which is reflected in the order dated 28.08.2015. The total consideration for the said sale was agreed, amount of which is reflected in Official Assignee Reference No.13/2020. Thereafter, the matter came up for further orders. It is also reflected in the said reference that vide letter dated 09.07.2020, the scheme of arrangement in petition bearing J.C.M. No.14/2019 under Sections 279 and 283 of the Companies Act, 2017 ("Act, 2017") was placed before the Official Assignee. The said scheme was allowed by this Court in the above-mentioned petition vide order dated 06.02.2020. It was requested that the amount as reflected in the Reference No. 13/2020 be released in accordance with the scheme of arrangement. Learned counsel M/s. Muhammad Ali Akbar, Hameed Bukhsh, Heer Memon, Hashmatullah and Baqar Raza, advocates have jointly argued that the scheme of arrangement was approved by this Court in the above-mentioned petition and the said scheme was not impugned by the Plaintiff bank. They have further stated that considering the said scheme was not impugned before any competent forum, therefore, it is not open to creditors who are alien to the scheme of arrangement, to dispute the same at this stage and forum. Learned counsel has relied upon the following judgments: - l Paramount Spinning Mills Limited and others l Messrs Pakland Cement Limited Conversely, learned counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff bank has stated that the banking suit has been preferred under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ("FIO, 2001") and leave to defend application is pending adjudication. He has further stated that if the sale consideration as reflected in the above-mentioned reference of the Official Assignee is released to the "Agent", pursuant to the scheme of arrangement, the suit which is pending adjudication will be frustrated. He further argued that the Plaintiff bank has not participated in the above scheme and therefore, entire sale consideration which is lying with the learned Official Assignee may be released to the Plaintiff bank. He has further argued that there are orders in the instant banking suit and the same cannot override the orders of an order of another learned Single Judge of this Court. Learned counsel has thereafter invited my attention to salient features of the scheme of arrangement which reflects that the Plaintiff bank in the instant suit is also a creditor. He has specifically referred to schedule "F" of the scheme of arrangement which refers to the pendency of the instant suit. He further referred to schedule "C" and in this regard states that the liability of the Plaintiff bank in the instant suit is clearly laid down and recognized in the said scheme. He has, thereafter, relied upon Sections 3 and 4 of the FIO, 2001 and stated that the same will override other laws as the same is special law which determines all the disputes between the financial institution and the customer. He has averred that he will be running from "pillar to post" for satisfaction of his potential decree in the instant suit if the amount lying with the Official Assignee is released to the "Agent" and the Plaintiff Bank will be left with a "paper decree" without any possibility of its realization. He has further contended that the said scheme of arrangement is contrary to the provisions of Sections 279, 280, 283 and 285 of the Act, 2017. He has lastly referred to order dated 01.07.2015 in which it was ordered that the sale proceeds may not be released to the Plaintiff bank without permission of this Court but shall be considered at the time of release/distribution of the sale proceeds. I have heard all learned counsels and perused the record. I have specifically examined the references which are being adjudicated vide the instant order. It is clear that the scheme of arrangement was sanctioned by this Court in petition bearing J.C.M. No. 9/2020 and the same was sanctioned vide order dated 24.11.2021. At this juncture, I have examined the scheme of arrangement which defines UBL as the Agent in clause 1.1. The scheme coined under the Act, 2017 is peculiar and envisions that once a scheme of arrangement has been approved and sanctioned by the competent Court it is not open to any other creditor and/or alien to the proceedings to raise objections on the same. My discretion in respect of the reference filed by the Official Assignee is restricted only to adjudicate as to whether the amount which is lying with the Official Assignee can be released to the Agent mentioned in the scheme of arrangement. It is not open for me to examine the validity and legality of the said scheme. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff bank in this reference merit no consideration. A similar issue came up in the case of Paramount Spinning Mills Ltd. (supra). The contention of the learned counsel in the cited judgment (only reproduced to exhibit the similarity in the argument) and findings of the Court are reproduced below: - "4??.He has also referred to the provisions of F.I.O. and has contended that this being a special law, must override any other provisions of Companies Act and in terms of the F.I.O., no such Scheme can be approved, whereas, it is only the Banking Court(s) having jurisdiction, who can decide the cases in accordance with F.I.O. Insofar as the judgment of the learned Division Bench in the case of Gulshan Weaving Mills Limited (Supra) as relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner No.1 is concerned, he has argued that on facts the same is not squarely applicable, whereas, even the said judgment supports the case of the objectors. He has prayed for dismissal of the Petition." 20. In view of hereinabove facts and circumstances of this case I am of the view that the objections of Bank of Punjab cannot be sustained as the law is already settled in our jurisdiction through the case of Gulshan Weaving Mills Limited (Supra), which is a Division Bench judgment of this very Court, whereas, even in the English and Indian Jurisdiction the same principle applies that if once a Scheme of arrangement or a compromise is agreed upon by a class of creditors and a resolution to that effect is passed by them, then the said Scheme is binding on all including the non-consenting creditors. Since all requisite formalities as prescribed in law have been completed and complied with by the petitioners in accordance with the Companies Act, 2017 read with the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, and I am satisfied that the petitioners have made out a case, therefore, the petition is allowed as prayed. The Petitioners to act further pursuant to the grant of this petition in accordance with the approved Scheme in question." It is apparent from the reading of the above quoted judgment that learned Single Judge of this Court after examining various judgments from multiple jurisdictions, has held that once a scheme of arrangement is agreed upon by a class of creditors, the said scheme is binding on all non-consenting creditors. The learned Single Judge in this regard placed reliance on the case of Gulshan Weaving Mills Limited v. Al Baraka Bank Limited where the learned Division Bench was pleased to overrule identical objections and the scheme was allowed by the learned Division Bench of this Court. The arguments of the learned counsel for the Plaintiff bank are similar to the arguments raised by the learned counsel in the judgment of Pakland Cement Limited (supra). The said arguments are reflected in paragraph number 5 and are reproduced below:- "5(b)under section 27 of the Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance. 2001 (hereafter referred to as "the 2001 Ordinance"), any proceedings. judgment or decree passed by the Banking Court cannot be revised, reviewed or recalled by any other Court- except in appeal under section 22 of the 2001 Ordinance. Through the present petition the petitioner seeks modification and alteration of the orders/judgments/decrees/ proceedings finalized by the Banking Court. As such any assumption of jurisdiction under section 284 of the 1984 Ordinance would violate the finality clause contained in the 2001 Ordinance. Further reliance is placed upon section 7(4) of the 2001 Ordinance which provides that no Court other than the Banking Court shall have jurisdiction in relation to the matters falling within the scope of the Banking Court including execution of decrees. It is contended that as the matter concerns execution of the decrees, the Company Judge has no jurisdiction. Reliance is also placed upon section 4 of the 2001, Ordinance which gives the said Ordinance an overriding effect on all or any other law inconsistent therewith. In particular reference is invited to the following judgments, wherein it has been contended that a special law overrides general law and since in the present case the 2001 Ordinance is a special law it overrides the 1984 Ordinance which is a general law." After recording the contention of the learned counsel, the learned single judge held as under: - 8. The second objection of Mr. Mandviwala that any assumption of jurisdiction in the present case would violate sections 27, 7(4) and 4 of 2001 Ordinance also seems out of order. Through the present scheme of Arrangement recoveries of outstanding debts is being facilitated with the collateral attempt to keep the petitioner alive. There is nothing in the Banking Laws or the Civil Procedure Code which mandates that no attempt should be made to keep a Company alive. In the present scheme of Arrangement there is also no attempt to reduce the decretal amounts or the amounts owed by the petitioner to Banks/DFIs and Financial Institutions. As such the present proceedings can by no means be construed as being in conflict with the decrees/orders or judgments passed by the Banking Court or any appeals thereto. As such sections 27, 7(4) and 4 of the 2001 Ordinance neither stand violated nor there is any conflict thereof with section 284 of the 1984 Ordinance. This is not the first time when the Legislature in its own wisdom has provided for banking laws to co-exist with the provisions in the companies jurisdiction for rehabilitation and restructuring. Under the Companies Act, 1913 sections 153 and 153-A had provided for facilitation of arrangements and compromise in a manner similar to section 284 of the 1984 Ordinance. While the Companies Act, 1913 occupied the field sections 3, 6(4) and 11 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 co-existed which provided for overriding of the Banking Laws, ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts in matters to which the Special Court (i.e. Banking Court) had jurisdiction and finality attached to the orders/judgments/decrees of the Special Court i.e. Banking Court, respectively, in a manner similar to the arrangement envisaged under the 2001 Ordinance. Upon the advent of the 1984 Ordinance, the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 was also brought in the field which also provided for overriding effect of the banking laws (section 3), ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts (section 5(3)) and finality attached to orders of the Banking Tribunal including execution proceedings (sections 10 and 11). However, the law-makers in their own wisdom enacted section 284 of the 1984 Ordinance and the two schemes co-existed. Even under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 section 3 contained the overriding clause, section 7(4) provided the ouster clause and section 27 provided the finality clause. The law-makers legislated the Banking Law regime without any amendment in the scheme of section 284 of the 1984 Ordinance. Even in India, under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 sections 391, 392, 393 and 394 provide for enforcing a scheme of arrangement for the purposes of reconstruction and rehabilitation of companies. In the Province of East Pakistan v. Siraj-ul-Haq Patwari PLD 1966 SC 854 the Honourable Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that laws should be interpreted in a manner so as to be saved rather than destroyed. Unless and until there is a clear cut conflict which is irreconcilable, the Courts should lean in favour of a harmonious interpretation so as to avoid any conflict and keep the laws operating in their occupied fields in order to avoid any provision becoming redundant or surplus (see PLD 1963 SC 663). The interpretation offered by the learned counsel for the objectors would leave section 284 of the 1984 Ordinance and the entire scheme for any restructuring and rehabilitation redundant. There is no conflict between the banking laws and the scheme of section 284 of the 1984 Ordinance. The two co-exist as they have co-existed before. As such the objection regarding jurisdiction is hereby repelled. I have already observed above that whilst hearing the abovementioned reference I cannot delve into the scheme of arrangement as the same was sanctioned by this Court in its company jurisdiction under the Act, 2017. In regards to the objection of the learned counsel for the Plaintiff bank in respect of the instant suit pending adjudication, it is noted that that leave to defend application is yet to be heard and decided. The Plaintiff bank, subject to instant suit being decreed in their favor, can file for execution under Section 19 of the FIO, 2001 and, therefore, I disagree with respect to the learned counsel for the Plaintiff bank that the decree and the entire exercise will be in vain. Further, it was open for the Plaintiff Bank to impugn the said scheme under Section 6 (14) of the Act, 2017. The same is reproduced below: - 6. Procedure of the Court and appeal.----- (14) Any person aggrieved by any judgment or final order of the Court passed in its original jurisdiction under this Act may, within sixty days, file a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan: Provided that no appeal or petition shall lie against any interlocutory order of the Court. The omission of Plaintiff bank to impugn the said scheme of arrangement in this regard is fatal and therefore, leave me with no option but to direct the Official Assignee to release the amount lying with him to the "Agent" after deduction and adjustment of the amount mentioned in Reference No.14/2025. Order accordingly. MH/J-6/Sindh Order accordingly.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 15(2)(ii), proviso---Ejectment of tenant---Default in payment of rent---Subsequent payment---Effect---Petitioner / tenant claimed that subsequently it paid the rent due, therefore, there was no default under proviso to S. 15(2)(ii) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Validity---Provision of proviso to S. 15(2)(ii) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was available, where sole ground in rent application against tenant was default and the tenant on the first day of hearing had admitted his liability to pay---Rent Controller was to satisfy that tenant had not made such default on any previous occasion and the default was not exceeding six months---Only if such conditions were met, the Rent Controller was mandated to direct tenant to pay all rent claimed on a date to be fixed by Rent Controller, thereafter he was mandated to dismiss the rent application---High Court declined to interfere in eviction orders passed by two Courts below, as subsequent tender of rent by petitioner / tenant did not extinguish the default---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Allies Book Corporation v. Sultan Ahmad and others 2006 SCMR 152; Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others PLD 2007 SC 45; Aamir Aslam Shaikh and others v. Court of Ivth Rent Controller Karachi (South) and others C.P. No. S-518 of 2013; Haji Abdul Ghani v. VIIth Additional District Judge, South Karachi and 2 others 2008 CLC 1598; Shakila Appa (Late) v. Nadeem Ghani and others 2022 CLC 1146; Mrs. Alima Ahmad v. Amir Ali PLD 1984 SC 32; Syed Waris Ali Tirmizi v. Liaquat Begum 1980 SCMR 601 and Messrs Pragma Leather Industries v. Mrs. Sadia Sajjad PLD 1996 SC 724 ref. Ali T. Ebrahim for Petitioner. Shan ur Rehman for Respondents. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2025.

Summary: Section: 497 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. . Sections: 9(1)/3E/15 Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. Sections. 6(1) (3) /20 Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018. i. Release of juvenile accused on bail, enroped for recovery of huge quantity of Charas from vehicle driven by him. ii. Sub-section 3 to the section 6 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 provides that where a juvenile is detained for commission of a minor or a major offence for the purpose of the Act, he shall be treated as an accused of commission of a bailable offence. iii. In presence of reasonable grounds for believing that release of juvenile on bail will bring him in association with criminals or expose him to any other danger, juvenile shall be placed under custody of suitable person or Juvenile Rehabilitation Centre established under Section 20 of the Act. iv. Non-establishment of Juvenile Rehabilitation Centre by authorities: the law is not mere formality rather it is a binding obligation and a necessary force that upholds order, protects rights and ensure justice in society. The enforcement of a law/statute is not optional but a mandatory and vital duty entrusted to every state functionary.

Summary: (a)The record shows that there was a delay of two hours in the lodging of the FIR. However, such delay alone is not sufficient to be considered fatal to the Prosecution`s case. While an unexplained delay may give rise to suspicion or create a possibility of deliberation and fabrication, it is the accused`s responsibility to establish that the delay was deliberate and made with the intent to falsely implicate an innocent person. In the present case, the two-hour delay was plausibly explained by the complainant; therefore, the delay does not adversely affect the prosecution’s version. Similarly, the belated nomination of the accused in the FIR, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, is not only explainable but also legally sustainable. Delay in naming an accused does not automatically render the prosecution`s case doubtful. If the delay is properly explained—for instance, due to trauma, confusion at the time of the incident, or identification issues—then such nomination can still hold evidentiary value. The apex Court has consistently held that each case must be assessed on its own facts, and a belated mention does not, by itself, justify rejection of the prosecution`s claim. (b)There is no cavil to the proposition that before the identification parade, the witness must disclose the context in which he identified the accused—i.e., the part played by the accused during the commission of the offence, and how and under what circumstances he identified the accused. However, if the identity of the accused persons is proved by other convincing evidence, non-identification or absence of an identification test becomes immaterial. Whenever it is found that a witness has made a dishonest improvement in order to strengthen the prosecution, that improved portion of the statement must be discarded. Once it is shown that a witness has consciously tailored or augmented his testimony to plug gaps, it is not safe to place reliance on such statements, as that testimony becomes unworthy of credence. Courts must be vigilant against after-the-fact embellishments aimed at securing a conviction at all costs. The proper judicial response to a proved dishonest improvement is to exclude the tainted portion from consideration and examine whether the residual testimony remains credible and sufficient to sustain the charge. In other words, a witness’s dishonest exaggeration affects only the embellished portion of his statement and does not automatically discredit the entirety of his testimony, especially if the remainder finds support from other evidence. This approach reflects a balanced evidentiary rule: it penalizes falsehood but salvages the truth in a witness’s account, rather than throwing out the baby with the bathwater. (c)The failure to produce eyewitnesses may raise an adverse inference only where the prosecution abandons neutral or independent witnesses while relying solely on related or interested ones. The decision to produce or withhold a particular witness during trial lies within the discretion of the prosecution. (d)Mere relationship of a witness to the victim is not sufficient to discard his testimony. What matters is the intrinsic worth of the statement, its consistency with surrounding facts, and whether it inspires confidence. (e)A judicial confession, if found to be voluntary, true, and recorded in accordance with law, can form the basis for conviction against its maker. Retracted confessions, if otherwise recorded in accordance with law and found to be truthful and voluntary, may still be relied upon for conviction. (f)Mere lapse of time between arrest and recording of the confessional statement does not, per se, vitiate its evidentiary value. What is crucial is whether the delay was reasonably explained and whether the confession was recorded in a free atmosphere, without any inducement, threat, or coercion.