Summary: The impugned transaction in the nature of joint venture regarding more than one million Acres of State land for Corporate Agriculture Farming between the Pakistan Army and the Caretaker Government of the Punjab in terms of Notification dated 20.02.2023 under Section 10(2) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 is unconstitutional and unlawful in view of Article 245 of the Constitution and Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017 being beyond the scope and mandate of the Pakistan Army and the Caretaker Government.

Summary: [The officer nominated by the President under Section 14(4) of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 only processes the representations filed before the President. The decision-making powers of the President are not delegated to the said officer as the final decision on the representation is taken only by the President] The case revolves around the interpretation of Section 14(4) of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013. This section pertains to the processing of representations made to the President of Pakistan. The key question is whether the word "processed" in the Act implies that the decision-making powers of the President have been delegated to the officer responsible for processing the representation. the Supreme Court examined Section 14 of the Act and the relevant rules. It concluded that the nominated officer responsible for processing the representation only performs administrative tasks and expresses views or recommendations, but does not decide the representation. The President retains the sole authority to make the final decision after considering the recommendations and applying independent judgment. The Court emphasized that the nominated officer's role is to assist the President, given the demanding nature of the President's position. The officer prepares the case, consolidates the record, and presents it for the President's decision. The Court highlighted the distinction between processing the representation and deciding on it, stating that the discretion to accept or reject a representation lies solely with the President. The Court referred to two previous decisions of the President, illustrating that the President may either agree or disagree with the recommendations of the nominated officer but retains the power to decide the representation based on his own reasons. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the nominated officer's processing of the representation does not divest the President of his decision-making powers. The President maintains full discretion in deciding the representation after due application of mind.

Summary: Facts:On May 19, 2023, the Federal Government of Pakistan issued Notification No. SRO.596(I)/2023, appointing an Inquiry Commission under Section 3 of the Pakistan Commissions of Inquiry Act, 2017. This Commission comprises Justice Qazi Faez Isa (Senior Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court), Justice Naeem Akhtar Afghan (Chief Justice of the High Court of Balochistan), and Justice Aamer Farooq (Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court).The Commission's task is to investigate whether leaked audio recordings, which surfaced on February 16, 2023, and involved alleged conversations among individuals, including judges of superior courts, undermine public trust and confidence in the judiciary's credibility, impartiality, and independence.---Issue:Whether the appointment of the Inquiry Commission by the Executive breaches the principle of separation of powers as established in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.Whether the Terms of Reference (TORs) for the Commission intrude into the domain exclusively reserved for the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), as per Article 209 of the Constitution.Whether the inquiry violates fundamental rights, particularly the right to privacy and dignity, as enshrined in the Constitution.Arguments:---Petitioner:The impugned notification violates the separation of powers by allowing the Executive to encroach upon the judiciary's domain.The TORs of the Commission extend its jurisdiction into areas reserved for the SJC, thus being unconstitutional.The inquiry into leaked audios infringes on the right to privacy and dignity, as there is no law that authorizes surveillance or hacking of judges' communications, except under very limited circumstances related to terrorism under the Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013.Respondent (Federal Government):Preliminary objection raised regarding the composition of the bench hearing the case, suggesting that the Chief Justice should recuse himself due to potential conflict of interest given the subject matter of the inquiry.Holding:The case raises significant constitutional questions regarding the balance of powers between the Executive and Judiciary, the scope of judicial independence, and the protection of fundamental rights, particularly the right to privacy.Reasoning:The petitioner's counsel argues that the Executive's action in forming the Commission to investigate matters potentially concerning judicial conduct oversteps constitutional boundaries, infringes on the judiciary's independence, and violates the principle of separation of powers.The inquiry into private communications, especially those involving members of the judiciary, without clear legal authorization, is contested as a violation of fundamental rights.

Summary: (A)Rule 19 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Appellate Tribunal Rules 2022, was mandatorily requiring that any person who was interested in result of the appeal should be impleaded and given an opportunity of hearing in the appeal before the appeal is decided by the Appellate Tribunal. (B) All the members and Chairman of Mines and Minerals Appellate Tribunal, must write their full names alongwith their designations on the decisions made by them in appeals.

Summary: The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenging the detention of his brother, Zeeshan Razzaq, under Section 3(1) of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. The detention order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Narowal based on the recommendations of the District Police Officer (DPO). The petitioner argued that the detention was unjustified and lacked any solid evidence or material against the detainee. -----Issues: 1- Whether the detention order issued under Section 3(1) of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, was justified and based on sufficient evidence. 2- Whether the petitioner's failure to file a representation before the Government of Punjab affected the maintainability of the writ petition. 3- Whether the apprehensions and recommendations by the DPO were sufficient grounds for the detention. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ----Detention Order Justification: The court found that the detention order issued by the Deputy Commissioner was based merely on the recommendations of the DPO without any solid or cogent evidence. The allegations against Zeeshan Razzaq were general and lacked specific material, such as audio/video recordings or written transcripts of the alleged speeches. The court emphasized that mere apprehensions without valid reasons or supporting evidence cannot justify curtailing an individual's liberty. ----Maintainability of the Writ Petition: The objection raised by the Assistant Advocate General regarding the maintainability of the writ petition due to the non-filing of a representation before the Government of Punjab was overruled. The court highlighted that the right to file a habeas corpus petition is a constitutional remedy available for addressing illegal confinement, and the availability of an alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Relevant case law, such as "Muhammad Irshad versus Government of the Punjab" (2020 P Cr.L J 206) and "Abdul Rauf versus Govt. of Punjab" (2023 LHC 2697), was cited to support this position. ----Apprehensions and Recommendations by the DPO: The court noted that the DPO's recommendations were based on mere apprehensions without any substantial evidence. The report did not provide any material to establish that the detainee was acting or about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or order. The Assistant Advocate General was unable to produce any evidence that Zeeshan Razzaq was a member of any banned group or involved in anti-state activities. The lack of any criminal case registered against the detainee further weakened the grounds for detention. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Irshad versus Government of the Punjab and others, 2020 P Cr.L J 206: Emphasized that the availability of an alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in habeas corpus matters. Abdul Rauf versus Govt. of Punjab, 2023 LHC 2697: Reiterated the maintainability of habeas corpus petitions despite alternative remedies. Abdul Latif Shamshad Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Kasur, 1999 PCr.LJ 2014: Established that the failure to make a representation before the provincial government does not bar the filing of a writ petition. Mst. Sana Jamil v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary and 5 others, 2016 PCr.LJ 424: Supported the maintainability of constitutional petitions in cases of illegal confinement. Syed Mubbashar Raza v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Home Department and 2 others, PLD 2015 Lahore 20: Highlighted the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in habeas corpus matters. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal versus Sadozai Khan and two others, 2021 YLR 1206: Stressed the importance of adhering to legal procedures and requirements. Maqsood Yameen versus R.P.O. Multan and others, 2015 PCr.LJ 923: Emphasized the necessity of valid reasons and supporting evidence for detentions.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 9, 10A, 14, 25 & 37(d)--- Incarcerated prisoners---Fundamental rights--- Release of inmates from the prisons on the basis of 'probation'---Duty of care owed by the State and its functionaries towards incarcerated prisoners explained. It is an undeniable fact that living conditions and the treatment of prisoners in overcrowded and inadequately equipped prisons profoundly affects the constitutionally guaranteed rights. Most of the victims of a non-functional criminal justice system are those who belong to economically and socially marginalized sections of the society. They do not have the means to access the courts nor has the State fulfilled its constitutional obligation to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice contemplated under Article 37(d) of the Constitution. The prisoner, whether convicted or non-convicted, has no choice but to place reliance for his right to life and other needs, such as medical attention, solely on the authorities holding him/her in custody. This reliance gives rise to a duty of care on the part of the State and its functionaries. The Constitution guarantees the right to life under Article 9. In the context of a prisoner, it is implicit in Article 9 that it is the duty of the State to ensure that every person incarcerated including those who are convicted for an offence and undergoing sentence, are treated in a manner that does not expose the latter to harm and that humane treatment is extended so long as the incarceration lasts. The prisoner is thus entirely dependent on the State and is at its mercy for the purposes of safeguarding the right to life. The State, therefore, owes a duty of care to every prisoner, regardless of the nature of offence for which the latter has been incarcerated. It is only liberty and the right of free movement that has been curtailed and definitely not the constitutional rights to life and to betreated with respect, having regard to the fundamental rights of inviolability of the dignity of man guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. Moreover, it becomes a duty of the functionaries to ensure that no prisoner is unjustifiably deprived of the right to liberty even if it is on the basis of being released on probation. It is a right of every eligible prisoner to be considered for the purposes of enjoying liberty on the basis of probation. The neglect of the executive authorities to perform their obligations and duties imposed by law and to give effect to the enforced laws, particularly relating to the inmates of prisons amounts to a breach of the duty of care that is owed to the incarcerated prisoner. This breach of a fiduciary duty could expose the concerned authorities and the State to be sued by the inmates of the overcrowded prisons for damages. Neglect or refusal to effectively enforce the enacted laws relating to release of a prisoner on the basis of probation is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, inter alia, under Articles 9, 10-A, 14 and 25. The respective Chief Executives' of the Federal Government and the provinces are directed to ensure that the enacted laws relating to release of a prisoner on the basis of probation are effectively implemented and made functional. The Federal and Provincial Governments, as the case may be, shall ensure that the prisoners who are eligible under the enacted laws for availing the benefit of being released on probation are identified and their cases are processed expeditiously. ------ (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 10-A, 14, 25 & 37(d)---Prisoners---Release on probation---Fundamental rights---Duty of care of State and prison authorities---Scope---Proceedings arose out of reports sought by Supreme Court regarding implementation of laws relating to release of prisoners on probation---Reports revealed grave prison conditions, overcrowding and non-functional enforcement of probation laws---Held, that a prisoner, whether convicted or under trial, remains entitled to constitutional protection of life, dignity and fair treatment---Incarceration curtails only liberty and freedom of movement and not the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution---Because prisoners are wholly dependent upon the State for protection of life, health and humane treatment, such dependence gives rise to a duty of care on the part of the State and its functionaries---Failure to ensure humane treatment and lawful consideration of eligible prisoners for probation amounts to infringement of constitutional guarantees, particularly where weak and marginalized prisoners suffer due to a dysfunctional criminal justice system---State was bound to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice in terms of Art.37(d) of the Constitution and could not permit prison conditions or administrative neglect to defeat rights guaranteed under Arts.9, 10-A, 14 and 25 of the Constitution. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9 & 14---Right to life and dignity of prisoners---Prisoner’s dependence on State---Extent of protection---Held, that in the case of a prisoner, the right to life under Art.9 of the Constitution includes the State’s obligation to ensure that every incarcerated person is treated in a manner which does not expose him to harm and that humane treatment is extended throughout the period of incarceration---A prisoner is entirely dependent on the State and remains at its mercy for safeguarding life and dignity---Therefore, the State owes a duty of care to every prisoner regardless of the nature of the offence for which he has been incarcerated---What stands curtailed is only liberty and free movement, and not the constitutional right to be treated with respect consistent with the inviolability of dignity of man guaranteed by Art.14 of the Constitution---Functionaries of the State are also under obligation to ensure that no prisoner is unjustifiably deprived of liberty, including where release on probation is lawfully available. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 10-A, 14 & 25---Probation laws---Non-enforcement---Effect---Right of eligible prisoner to be considered for probation---Held, that the benefit of release on probation is of pivotal importance in the context of unjustified deprivation of liberty and every eligible prisoner has a right to be considered for such release in accordance with law---Neglect or refusal by executive authorities to perform duties imposed by enacted probation laws and to give effect thereto, especially in relation to prison inmates, amounts to breach of the duty of care owed by the State and its functionaries---Such neglect is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts.9, 10-A, 14 and 25 of the Constitution---Failure to enforce probation laws effectively may also amount to breach of fiduciary duty, exposing the concerned authorities and the State to claims for damages by inmates of overcrowded prisons. (d) Administration of justice and prison administration ----Overcrowded prisons---Marginalized prisoners---Need for effective implementation of probation regime---Held, that overcrowded and inadequately equipped prisons seriously impair constitutionally protected rights and most victims of the non-functional criminal justice system belong to economically and socially marginalized classes who are least able to access courts---Prisons exist as institutions for reformation and social rehabilitation, and the failure of governments to operationalize probation laws defeats that purpose---Accordingly, the respective Chief Executives of the Federal Government and Provincial Governments were directed to ensure that enacted laws relating to release of prisoners on probation are effectively implemented and made functional and that all prisoners eligible under such laws are identified and their cases processed expeditiously. Disposition: Proceedings were disposed of by declaring that neglect or refusal to effectively enforce enacted laws relating to release of prisoners on probation is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 9, 10-A, 14 and 25 of the Constitution; the Federal and Provincial Chief Executives were directed to ensure effective implementation of probation laws and expeditious processing of all eligible prisoners’ cases. Raja Azmat Ali v. Abu Malik Naseem and another, 2023 SCMR 1867, decided on 23.05.2023.

Summary: Background: Petitioners, filed a constitutional petition challenging the order/letter No.307-9/AC LK dated 17.10.2022, issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Lower Kurram, Sadda. This order directed the dispossession of the petitioners from the disputed premises. The respondents relied on the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Alternate Dispute Resolution Act, 2020 (ADR Act). ----Issues: 1- Whether the order by the Assistant Commissioner under the ADR Act was valid and lawful. 2- Whether the consent of the parties, as required by the ADR Act, was obtained for referring the civil dispute to the Saliseen (mediators). ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Validity of the Order: The Assistant Commissioner issued the impugned order based on powers purportedly vested by the ADR Act. However, the court noted that Section 3 of the ADR Act requires explicit consent from the parties involved for referring the matter to the Saliseen. The impugned order directed the police to vacate the disputed premises and maintain possession, which exceeded the scope of maintaining the status quo as permitted by the ADR Act. --Consent Requirement: The court found that the required consent from the petitioners was not present. Although there was a mention of earlier consent for a private Jirga, no consent was obtained at the time the impugned order was issued. Any previous consent could not be considered valid for all times, and fresh consent was necessary when the matter was taken up by the Assistant Commissioner. The writ petition was allowed, setting aside the impugned order. The petitioners were granted liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for their immovable property dispute through the proper legal forums. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 3 of the ADR Act: The court emphasized that any reference to the Saliseen requires explicit consent from the parties and that the scope of the interim injunction under the ADR Act is limited to maintaining the status quo, not altering it. The court analyzed the ADR Act's Section 3, highlighting that consent is a sine qua non for referring disputes to the Saliseen. The decision reinforced that injunctive powers under the ADR Act are limited and must be used strictly to prevent further aggression or maintain the status quo without altering it.

Summary: S.2---Direct appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of a tribunal created by Provincial law---Question as to whether an appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) against anorder of a tribunal created by a Provincial law to which the proviso to clause (2) of the saidArticle has not been made applicable?Held, that an appeal to the Supreme Court under clause (3) of Article 212 of the Constitutionagainst a decision of an Administrative Tribunal created by a Provincial law is maintainable if,and only if, clause (2) applies to the said Tribunal, if., it is covered by an appropriate resolutionof the Provincial Assembly and consequent Federal legislation in terms of the proviso to clause(2)---Door to the judicial remedy provided by clause (3) opens if, and only if, clause (2) isapplicable and not otherwise. The appeal against the judgment or order of Khyber PakhtunkhwaService Tribunal lies to the August supreme Court of Pakistan under Article 212(3) of theConstitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. (PLD 2023 SC 190 Distinguished)

Summary: Background: The petitioners challenged the orders dated 13.01.2023 and 28.12.2022 passed by the Additional District Judge/Zila Qazi, Bajaur, under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 1977 (the Act of 1977). The petitioners sought the reversal of these orders and the rejection of the suit filed by Mst. Mahi Sultan (respondent No. 1) on the grounds that the suit was unjustified and illegal. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Additional District Judge/Zila Qazi, Bajaur had jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit filed by Mst. Mahi Sultan. 2- Whether the notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Bajaur to vacate the premises was lawful under the Act of 1977 and the Rules of 2018. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Jurisdiction of the Tribunal: The court observed that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the property is public and whether any lease or license in respect of such public property has been determined. The court noted that Mst. Mahi Sultan’s allotment had been canceled before the suit was filed, making her possession unauthorized at the time of filing the suit. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit when the allotment was already canceled and the property was acknowledged as public property. --Legal Framework and Authorities: The court highlighted that the Estate Officer has the authority under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 1977, to issue notices for the vacation of premises. Since there was no provision in the Act of 2018 or the Rules of 2018 for serving a notice for vacation, the Estate Officer's notice under the Act of 1977 was lawful. The court noted that Mst. Mahi Sultan did not seek redress through the appropriate appellate authority under Rule 35 of the Rules of 2018. --Injunction Requirements: The court noted that for granting an injunction, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. The Tribunal had failed to properly assess these requirements in favor of Mst. Mahi Sultan. ----Citations/Precedents: Mian Hakim Ullah and 2 others Vs. Additional District Judge/Tribunal, Nowshera and 4 others (1993 SCMR 907)

Summary: Writ PetitionHeld:1. O. XXIII, R. 3 Withdrawal of suit, the simplicitor withdrawal of earlier writ petition without permission to file a fresh one, debars institution of second writ petition regarding the same subject matter.2. There must be a request for permission to bring afresh a writ petition. Where no such request is made, the withdrawal would be simplicitor alone.3. In the instant case, the petitioner did not obtain permission of the Court to bring a fresh writ petition.(Writ Petition was Dismissed).