Summary: Facts:The appellant was added as defendant No. 16 in a civil suit after his application under section 12(2) of the CPC was accepted, and the case was remanded to the Civil Judge.The Civil Judge decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff on October 30, 2019, declaring the plaintiff the owner of the lands, with Mst. Gul Nargis and Muhammad Ghaffar as benamidars. The Sale Mutations were canceled, but the appellant was recognized as a bona fide purchaser without knowledge of the suit's pendency, entitled to compensation from the legal heirs at current market value.The appellant challenged the Civil Judge's decision, and the appeal was allowed contingent upon payment of court fees, which was not fulfilled, leading to the recall of the Appellate Court's judgment.The appellant then filed a civil revision before the High Court, which upheld the Appellate Court's decision based on non-payment of court fees without addressing the merits of the case.---Issues:Whether the judgments of the Appellate Court and High Court regarding non-payment of court fees are sustainable.The implications of non-payment or belated payment of court fees on the rights of the parties and the proceedings.----Rule:The Court Fees Act, 1870, and sections 148 and 149 of the CPC pertain to the payment of court fees and the court's discretion to extend time for its payment.----Analysis:The Supreme Court considered precedents regarding the Court Fees Act, 1870, emphasizing that it is a fiscal statute not intended to obstruct justice but to collect revenue for the State. The court has discretion under sections 148 and 149 of the CPC to extend time for payment of court fees.In several cases, the courts have allowed extensions for payment of court fees and have distinguished between situations where non-payment directly affects the opposing party's interests and those where it does not, suggesting that court fees are a matter between the court and the litigant, not affecting the opposing party's substantive rights.The appellate court's decision to condition its judgment on the payment of court fees, and the subsequent dismissal of the appellant's application for an extension due to unforeseen circumstances like the Covid-19 pandemic, raised questions about the appropriate handling of court fee requirements in the appeal process.---Conclusion:The Supreme Court is inclined to remand the case to the High Court for reconsideration on the merits, provided the issue of court fees is resolved in a manner consistent with the principles outlined in the discussed precedents. The court underscores that court fees should not impede justice and that the judiciary has the discretion to facilitate the resolution of cases on their substantive merits, irrespective of technicalities related to court fees.

Summary: (Service Tribunal can impose special costs while deciding the service appeal of a civil servant) The central issue before the court was whether the Federal Service Tribunal, while deciding appeals under the Service Tribunals Act 1973 or any application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, had the power to award costs. After considering the arguments presented by the petitioner's counsel and examining the case record, the court referred to Section 5(2) of the Act, which grants the Tribunal powers similar to a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The court concluded that since the Tribunal can interfere with factual findings and correct legal errors, the appeals before it are akin to first appeals under the CPC. Thus, the Tribunal possesses the powers of a first appellate civil court, including the power to award costs. The court explained that a first appellate court can award actual costs incurred in the appeal under Order 41, Rule 35(3) of the CPC. Additionally, it can impose special costs under Section 151, CPC if necessary to secure justice or prevent abuse of the court's process. These powers extend to applications under Section 12(2) of the CPC and other applications. In this case, the Tribunal, located in Islamabad, imposed special costs of Rs. 50,000 on the petitioner for filing a vexatious application under Section 12(2) of the CPC. The court found the Tribunal's exercise of discretion in imposing costs justified based on the facts and circumstances presented. The court dismissed the petitioner's leave to appeal, emphasizing the importance of regularly imposing reasonable costs to discourage frivolous litigation. The court highlighted the benefits of cost imposition, including promoting fairness, deterring frivolous lawsuits, encouraging settlement, and fostering efficient use of resources. By making litigants aware of potential costs, it ensures that only legitimate grievances are pursued, discourages baseless claims, encourages settlement, and streamlines proceedings. The court urged courts and tribunals to utilize their powers to impose costs effectively to address the problem of excessive pending cases and promote a more efficient justice system.

Summary: The writ petition arises from an order dated 11.06.2022, issued by the Civil Judge 1st Class Islamabad-West, which dismissed an application under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) filed by the petitioner, Hamid Nasrullah Ranjha. The case revolves around a suit for specific performance of an agreement-to-sell dated 15.11.2004, filed by the plaintiff, Awais Razzaq, against the defendant, Syed Nazaqat Ali Shah, and the Secretary of the Supreme Court Employees Co-operative Housing Society (SCECHS), regarding a plot in Sector G-17/1, Islamabad. ----Issues: 1- Whether the suit for specific performance of the agreement-to-sell was processed and decreed appropriately by the Trial Court. 2- Whether the Trial Court failed to consider the substantial questions of fraud, misrepresentation, and collusion raised by the petitioner in his application under Section 12(2) CPC. 3- Whether the Trial Court erred in not allowing the petitioner to present evidence in support of his claims. 4- Whether the Trial Court acted mechanically without scrutinizing the validity and authenticity of the documents presented by the plaintiff. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Trial Court decreed the suit without proper judicial scrutiny of the agreement-to-sell dated 15.11.2004 and failed to notice crucial discrepancies such as the incorrect date mentioned in the plaint (15.02.2004 instead of 15.11.2004). The Court proceeded mechanically, accepting the defendant’s affidavit without contest. The petitioner’s allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and collusion were significant and required thorough examination. The Trial Court dismissed the petitioner’s application without allowing him to present evidence, violating principles of natural justice and fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution. The Trial Court overlooked the substantial delay (17 years) in filing the suit for specific performance. The plaintiff's claim should have been assessed against Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which limits the right to sue to three years from the date fixed for performance or from the date of refusal if no date is fixed. The Trial Court did not address the defective nature of the plaint and the reliance on unregistered agreements. Both the agreements between the plaintiff and the defendant and between the petitioner and the defendant were unregistered, but the Court only penalized the petitioner for relying on an unregistered document. The Trial Court’s discretion in decreeing the suit was exercised arbitrarily without sound legal principles, particularly given the delay and lack of evidence. The court failed to verify the veracity of the plaintiff’s claim even when the defendant conceded. The writ petition is allowed ----Citations/Precedents: Misbah Khanum v. Kamran Yasin and another (2022 SCMR 1629) Lahore Development Authority v. Arif Manzoor Quireshi (2006 SCMR 1530) Mrs. Anees Haider v. S. Amir Haider (2008 SCMR 236) Rao Abdul Rehman (deceased) through legal heirs and others v. Muhammad Afzal (deceased) through legal heirs and others (CP No. 1133-L of 2016) Khudadad v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah alias S. Inaam Hussain and others (2022 SCMR 933)

Summary: Background: This civil revision petition was filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), challenging the judgment and decree dated 21.10.2013 passed by the District Judge, Kasur. The District Judge had allowed the respondents' appeal against the dismissal of their suit for declaration by the Civil Judge, Kasur, on 06.11.2010. The trial court had dismissed the respondents' suit as being time-barred. However, the appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to frame issues, record evidence, and decide the case on its merits. -----Issues: 1- Whether the suit filed by the respondents, 25 years after the alleged cause of action, was time-barred. 2- Whether the respondents' suit should have been converted into an application under Section 12(2) of the CPC. 3- Whether the appellate court was correct in remanding the case to the trial court for fresh adjudication on the merits after framing issues. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the respondents' claim of fraud needed to be examined on its merits and could not be dismissed outright on the grounds of limitation. The appellate court was justified in remanding the matter for proper adjudication by framing issues and recording evidence. The claim, being based on alleged fraud, could potentially be governed by Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which provides for the extension of limitation when fraud is involved. The trial court’s failure to consider this was a clear error. Conversion to Application under Section 12(2) CPC: The court upheld the appellate court’s decision to treat the respondents' suit as an application under Section 12(2) of the CPC. It emphasized that procedural laws are meant to facilitate justice, and converting the suit into an application under Section 12(2) of the CPC was appropriate, given the nature of the allegations. The court referred to the precedent set in Noorul Amin and another v. Muhammad Hashim and others (1992 SCMR 1744), which supported such conversions in cases involving fraud. Remanding the Case: While remanding the case for fresh adjudication, the appellate court had directed the trial court to frame issues and record evidence. The Lahore High Court partially agreed with the remand but clarified that it is not mandatory in every case to frame issues or record evidence when disposing of an application under Section 12(2). The trial court should follow the procedure outlined in Section 12(3) CPC, which allows for expedited proceedings and the use of affidavits to prove or disprove facts, unless the court deems otherwise. The court, therefore, set aside the judgment of the District Judge, Kasur, and directed the civil court to adjudicate the application expeditiously, in accordance with Section 12(3) of the CPC. -----Citations/Precedents: Bashir Ahmed through Legal Representatives and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others (PLD 2019 SC 504) Noorul Amin and another v. Muhammad Hashim and others (1992 SCMR 1744) Sheikh Haroon-u-Rehman v. Muhammad Rafique and others (2022 CLC 167) Ghulam Muhammad v. Ahmed Khan (1993 SCMR 662) Amiran Bibi and others v. Muhammad Ramzan and others (1999 SCMR 1334) Ms. Amina Bibi v. Nasrullah and others (2000 SCMR 296) Warriach Zarai Corporation v. F.M.C. United (Pvt.) Ltd. (2006 SCMR 531)

Summary: Article 181 of the Limitation Act is applicable to application under section 12(2) C.P.C.

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed two suits for declaration based on a registered sale deed, which were initially dismissed. Upon appeal, a compromise decree was entered on 29.02.1994, based on statements by two of the respondents, without the involvement of their sister contending that the compromise was fraudulently entered to deprive her of her rightful inheritance, filed applications under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), which were initially dismissed. She then filed civil revisions, which led to the setting aside of the compromise decree by the Lahore High Court. This judgment was further challenged by the petitioners. -----Issues: 1- Jurisdiction of the Court: Whether the Lahore High Court had the jurisdiction to dismiss the original suits while allowing the revision petitions related to the Section 12(2) C.P.C. applications. 2- Right to a Fair Hearing: Whether the petitioners were denied the opportunity to present their defense, violating the principle of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard). 3- Legal Consequence of Accepting Applications under Section 12(2) C.P.C.: Should the case be restored for trial on the merits instead of dismissing the suit outright? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the original suits after setting aside the compromise decree. Once the compromise was nullified under Section 12(2) C.P.C., the appropriate action would have been to restore the appeals and decide the case on its merits, rather than dismissing the suits outright. The dismissal deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to defend themselves and seek a decision on the merits of the appeals. The Court recognized that the petitioners were not given a fair hearing, as they were not present or represented when the decision was made, and the principle of audi alteram partem was violated. This warranted a reconsideration of the case. In line with the precedent established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-ur-Rehman (2015 SCMR 1708), the Court ruled that upon setting aside the compromise decree, the proper course of action was to restore the appeals and include Mst. Mumtaz Mai as a necessary party. The appeals should be decided on their merits, not dismissed summarily. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Mumtaz Mai v. Sajjad Hussain (PLJ 2015 Lahore 581) Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-ur-Rehman (2015 SCMR 1708)

Summary: The dispute revolved around the transferability of plot No. 12-H/2, G-8 Markaz, Islamabad, which the CDA claimed was a non-transferable plot restricted to the family of the original allottee. The CDA argued that the High Court failed to consider the relevant provisions of the allotment letter and lease agreement. They contended that certain plots, including the disputed plot, reserved for social welfare projects like clinics, could not be transferred except in exceptional cases. On the other hand, the respondent, Ahmed Murtaza, filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of the disputed plot. The suit was decided in his favor through a consent decree, and the plot was transferred to him. The CDA challenged the judgment and decree, leading to a series of legal proceedings and appeals. The Supreme Court examined the facts of the case and found that the CDA had previously transferred the disputed plot to various individuals outside the family members, despite its claim of non-transferability. The court also noted that the CDA did not disclose these facts in its petition and deliberately neglected to mention the orders related to the objection petition and the civil petition filed before the Supreme Court. The court emphasized that the CDA had already challenged the transfer in a previous case, which was decided against them, and subsequently withdrew their petition. The court concluded that the matter had been decided on its merits in a previous case, and the CDA was bound by the findings of that case. The court criticized the CDA for pursuing frivolous litigation, wasting the time of the court and the respondents. It noted that the CDA had transferred the plot to non-family members multiple times without raising any objections, but chose to dispute the transfer to the respondents. The court denounced this behavior and emphasized the need for institutions like the CDA to take responsibility for their actions and decisions. In light of these findings, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and imposed special costs on the CDA for their conduct in pursuing meritless litigation. The court expressed its concern over the wasted time and resources caused by such actions and emphasized the importance of acting in good faith and disclosing relevant facts in legal proceedings.

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to set aside the judgments and decrees passed in 1991 and 1993, arguing that they were unaware of the suit and had not been represented. The suit in question was filed by the petitioners' predecessors and others, challenging the legality of certain land mutations. During the pendency of the suit, two of the plaintiffs, Sher Muhammad and Muhammad Sharif, were murdered by their own brothers, Bashir Ahmad and Muhammad Hanif. After the deaths, the petitioners, being legal heirs, claimed they were not summoned and that fraud and collusion had led to the dismissal of their suit. The Civil Judge and the Additional District Judge dismissed their application and revision petition, respectively, leading the petitioners to file the present writ petition. ----Issues: 1- Whether the judgment and decree dated 16.09.1991 were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation and should be set aside under Section 12(2) CPC. ----2- Whether the petition was time-barred. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the judgments and decrees were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. The respondents failed to summon the legal heirs of the deceased plaintiffs (petitioners), some of whom were minors at the time, and manipulated the proceedings by colluding with the surviving plaintiffs. The court found that the trial court should have ensured the proper representation of the petitioners. The respondents' failure to contest the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and the fact that their counsel later appeared as a witness for the respondents, further indicated fraudulent conduct. Therefore, the court set aside the judgments and decrees. On the issue of whether the petition was time-barred, the court found that the original decision on this issue was in favor of the petitioners, and since the respondents did not challenge that decision, it had attained finality. Thus, the court reversed the findings of the revisional court on this issue. ----Citations/Precedents: Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali etc. Vs. Chief Settlement Commissioner & Others (PLD 1973 SC 236) Lahore Development Authority Vs. Firdous Steel Mills (Pvt.) Limited (2010 SCMR 1097) Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority Vs. Government of Sindh and others (2022 SCMR 595) Abdul Hameed through L.Rs. and others Vs. Shamasuddin and others (PLD 2008 SC 140) Muhammad Amjad Khan Afridi and others Vs. Shad Muhammad and others (PLD 2022 SC 27) Syed Sharif ul Hassan through L.Rs. Vs. Hafiz Muhammad Amin and others (2012 SCMR 1258) Misbah Khanum Vs. Kamran Yasin Khan and another (2022 SCMR 1629) Khairati and 4 others Vs. Aleem-ud-Din and another (PLD 1973 SC 295) Government of N.W.F.P through Chief Secretary and others Vs. Muhammad Zaman and others (1996 SCMR 1864) Nazim-ud-Din & Others Vs. Sheikh Zia-Ul-Qamar & Others (2016 SCMR 24)

Summary: When the compromise between the parties was developed during the course of arguments and the terms thereof were duly recorded in the order and it was also held that in case of failure to abide by the compromise, the civil revisions are liable to be dismissed, the applicants/petitioners cannot take a somersault by asserting that the petitions were part heard and proceedings were never concluded and on misrepresentation of the respondents side, the decision was rendered inasmuch as such assertions do not fall under the purview of Section 12(2) CPC, more particularly, when the counsels, who appeared on the date of passing of the impugned order, never supported the said assertions by way of an affidavit and amounts to an assault on the sanctity of judicial proceedings under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 which act is liable to be deprecated in strongest terms possible.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.12(2), O.VI, R. 4 & O. I, R. 8---Bar to further suit---Particulars to be given wherenecessary---Plea of fraud and misrepresentation---Burden of proof---Scope---Respondentsfiled a suit for declaration and permanent injunction within the scope of O.I, R.8, C.P.C., onbehalf of three tribes---Suit was decreed---Petitioner filed application under S.12(2), C.P.C.,alleging fraud as well as misrepresentation and lack of knowledge regarding the decree---Application was concurrently dismissed---Validity---Since provision of S. 12(2), C.P.C., wasinvoked by the petitioner so the entire burden to prove fraud and misrepresentation was uponhis shoulder---Necessary particulars constituting fraud and misrepresentation had not beenmentioned in detail within the scope of O.VI, R.4, C.P.C.---Proper publication was made inthe suit prior to proceeding with the case---Petitioner had tried to justify delay of 17 years infiling the application by pleading lack of knowledge but it was admitted that the petitioner'suncle was party to the judgment and decree---Petitioner had neither filed any revenue recordnor had he relied upon any document which could justify his locus standi to file applicationunder S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Constitutional petition was dismissed. ---- This application was aimed at setting aside a judgment and decree issued on 29th February 2000. The underlying lawsuit had been filed in a representative capacity under Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. by individuals belonging to different tribes against members of other tribes. Noor Khan alleged that the judgment and decree had been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. However, the Court pointed out that the burden of proving these allegations rested entirely on him and that he had not provided sufficient and specific details as required by Order VI, Rule 4, C.P.C.The Court also noted that proper publication in the newspaper had been carried out before proceeding with the case, indicating that the legal requirements for a representative suit had been met. Noor Khan's attempt to justify the 17-year delay in filing the application under section 12(2), C.P.C. by claiming a lack of knowledge was undermined when it was revealed that his uncle was a party to the judgment and decree. Furthermore, Noor Khan failed to meet the criteria of an aggrieved person, as he had not presented any revenue record or relied on any documents to establish his standing to file the application under section 12(2), C.P.C. The Court cited the Happy Family Associate v. Pakistan International Trading Company case (PLD 2006 SC 226), which emphasized that section 12(2) and section 151, C.P.C., should not be used as substitutes for regular appeal, revision, or review and should not be resorted to unnecessarily to frustrate decrees or their execution. Given these considerations, the Constitutional petition filed by Noor Khan was found to lack merit and was consequently dismissed by the Court.