Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908: ----Arts. 91 & 120--- Suit for declaration and cancellation of sale deed instituted after lapse of 21 years---Bar of limitation---Petitioner sought declaration against a registered sale deed without offering any explanation for delay or claiming possession of the property---Held, suit was barred under both Art.91 (3-year limitation) and Art.120 (6-year limitation)---Petitioner's passive conduct amounted to acquiescence, allowing the respondent to continue as ostensible owner and deal with the land exclusively---Where petitioner fails to act diligently, her rights, if any, stand forfeited as a penalty for inaction. Cited Cases: • Mst. Grana v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 • Mst. Phaphan v. Muhammad Bakhsh 2005 SCMR 1278 • Lal Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf PLD 2011 SC 657 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 (b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908: ----O. II, R.2 & O. IX, R.9(1)--- Bar to second suit---Petitioner had earlier instituted suit on same cause of action which was dismissed for non-prosecution---Fresh suit barred under O. IX, R.9 unless dismissal was set aside by proper application---In absence of such application, subsequent proceedings were hit by legal prohibition. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: ----Arts. 17, 79 & 129(e)--- Presumption of regularity in public documents---Registered sale deed carries legal presumption under Art.129(e) which must be rebutted with solid evidence---Petitioner neither denied her thumb impression nor sought comparison with admitted signatures, nor produced any independent witness to prove alleged fraud---Mere assertion of fraud, unsupported by particulars or corroborating evidence, held insufficient---Respondents successfully discharged their burden by producing marginal witnesses and identifier. Cited Case: • Sikandar Hayat v. Sughran Bibi 2020 SCMR 214 (d) Civil Procedure Code, 1908: ----O. VI, R.4--- Pleading of fraud---Specific particulars of fraud must be pleaded and proved---General allegations are not sufficient---Petitioner failed to meet legal standards under O. VI, R.4 CPC by omitting to provide details, dates, or documents of alleged fraud---Her solitary statement without corroboration could not displace the statutory presumption attached to a registered document. (e) Revisional Jurisdiction---S. 115, C.P.C: Appellate court had rightly reversed the trial court’s decree based on proper appreciation of law and facts---Held, no jurisdictional error, illegality, or misreading of evidence was committed by appellate court---Preference given to findings of appellate court in case of divergence with trial court, absent compelling reason to interfere. ----Cited Cases: • Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar 2015 SCMR 1 • Madan Gopal v. Maran Bepari PLD 1969 SC 617 • Muhammad Nawaz v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan 2013 SCMR 1300 ----Disposition: Revision dismissed.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877) – ---- S. 39 – Cancellation of instruments – Fraud and forgery – Limitation – Whether suit barred by time – Plaintiff challenged a registered General Power of Attorney (GPA) and subsequent sale deeds as fraudulent and forged, seeking their cancellation and possession of the suit property – The High Court held the suit was within time under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 – Supreme Court held, however, that the suit was primarily for cancellation of instruments under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, which is subject to a three-year limitation under Article 91 of the Limitation Act – Since the plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged fraud as early as 1971 but filed suit in 1987, the claim was barred by time – Held, the consequential relief of possession could not survive once the claim for cancellation of documents was time-barred – Suit dismissed as time-barred. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908) – ---- Arts. 91, 142 & 14 – Limitation in suits for cancellation of documents – Plaintiff sought exemption from limitation under Section 14 of the Limitation Act – Whether time spent in pursuing remedies before other forums could be excluded – Supreme Court held that Section 14 was not applicable, as it only applies where proceedings were bona fide pursued before a court lacking jurisdiction – Plaintiff’s alleged recourse to martial law authorities did not qualify – Additionally, since no specific plea under Section 14 was raised in the plaint, no such exemption could be granted – Further held, where a suit involves multiple claims, the main relief determines the applicable limitation – In this case, since the primary relief was cancellation of documents, limitation was three years under Article 91, rendering the suit time-barred. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 (P.O. 10 of 1984) – ---- Art. 114 – Estoppel – Whether plaintiff estopped from challenging GPA and sale transactions – Plaintiff admitted knowledge of the GPA in 1971 and sale transactions in 1974 but did not object or take legal action for over a decade – He also allowed the attorney to act upon the GPA, leading to exemption and onward transfer of the property – Held, plaintiff was estopped under Article 114 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, as he had by conduct permitted others to act on the assumption that the GPA was valid – Supreme Court upheld the rule of estoppel, barring plaintiff from challenging the transactions at a belated stage. (d) Evidence Act & Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 – ---- Art. 129(g) – Burden of proof – Non-production of original documents – Presumption against party withholding evidence – Supreme Court noted that plaintiff did not produce the original GPA, sale deed, or rectification deed, which he alleged were forged – Held, burden of proof rested on plaintiff to establish forgery, and failure to produce original documents led to a presumption under Article 129(g) that the withheld evidence would have been unfavorable – Further held, where a document is challenged as forged, mere allegations do not shift the burden; initial burden remains on the challenger to prove forgery. (e) Bona fide purchaser – Protection under Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – ---- S. 41 – Whether appellant was a bona fide purchaser – Appellant purchased the property from a subsequent transferee who had acquired title through a registered sale deed – Appellant also constructed a bungalow on the plot and remained in uninterrupted possession since 1973-74 – Supreme Court held, where transactions are not void ab initio, protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies, and appellant’s title could not be disturbed – Further held, where a sale deed is executed by an attorney under a registered GPA, and no fraud is proved, subsequent transactions do not require cancellation. Cited Cases: • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh, 2007 SCMR 1446 • Abdul Majeed v. Muhammad Subhan, 1999 SCMR 1245 • Muhammad Akbar Shah v. Muhammad Yusuf Shah, PLD 1964 SC 329 • Mst. Hameeda Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum, PLD 1975 SC 624 • Abdul Rehman v. Ghulam Muhammad, 2010 SCMR 978 Disposition: Appeal allowed by majority (2-1). Judgment of the High Court set aside. Trial court’s judgment dismissing the suit restored.------ (2a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched. Arts. 91 & 142---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.8 & 39---Suit for cancellation of general power of attorney, sale agreement and sale deed and recovery of possession of immoveable property---Plaintiff joining several causes of action and seeking multiple remedies/relief in the suit---Primary remedy/relief---Ancillary, incidental and consequential remedies/relief---Question as to which remedy was to be considered for the purposes of ascertaining the limitation period for filing suit---Plaintiff allegedly executed and got registered an irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of the defendant/attorney--Defendant on basis of such power of attorney sold out the suit plot to a third person, who in turn sold it to the appellant---About 16 years after the date of execution/registration of the general power of attorney in favour of defendant, plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of documents and possession of the suit land alleging that the power of attorney, sale agreements and sale deeds were obtained by fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and manipulation---Trial Court dismissed the suit on the basis that it was barred by limitation--High Court, however, decreed the suit on the grounds that suit being for possession of immovable property was filed within twelve years and was thus within the time limit---Legality--Suit filed by plaintiff had been treated by the High Court to be one for possession and Art.142 of First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908 had been resorted to---Where an instrument, was alleged to have been obtained by fraud, undue influence, coercion or misrepresentation, it was not a document which could be held to be void ab initio or on the face of it void, but it was required to be determined and adjudged by the court of law as voidable or void as the case may be and in such an eventuality, the matter shall squarely be covered by S.39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877---Suit filed by the plaintiff in the present case was in fact for cancellation of the documents on the allegations of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation, which (suit) squarely fell within the purview of S.39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and per Art.91 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, the prescribed period of limitation for such suit was three years---Plaintiff was primarily challenging the documents as being invalid against him on the ground of fraud, forgery, misrepresentation etc., and as a consequential relief he unambiguously was seeking a decree for possession of suit land by further asking for the demolition of the superstructure existing thereupon---Relief for possession claimed by plaintiff upon proper construction of the plaint and the frame of the suit was merely ancillary, incidental, consequential and dependent upon the primary relief of cancellation of the documents which was the basic and the foundational relief being sought---Where the main relief was time barred and the bar was not surmounted by the plaintiff, the incidental and consequential relief had to go away along with it and the suit was liable to be dismissed on account of being time barred---Plaintiff had knowledge of the general power of attorney and all the transaction(s) of sale in favour of third party and the appellant made through the defendant/attorney, but did not bring any legal action under S.39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, within the prescribed period of (3 years) limitation per Art.91 of First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908---Suit filed by the plaintiff was, thus, barred by time and was accordingly dismissed---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S. 3 & Preamble---Law of limitation---Object, scope and significance. Law of limitation was founded upon public policy and State interest, and it was vital for an orderly and organized society and the people at large, who believed in being governed by systemized law. The obvious object of law of limitation was that if no time constraints and limits were prescribed for pursuing a cause of action and for seeking reliefs/remedies relating to such cause of action, and a person was allowed to sue for the redressal of his grievance within an infinite and unlimited time period, it shall adversely affect the disciplined and structured judicial process and mechanism of the State, which was sine qua non for any State to perform its functions within the parameters of the Constitution and the rule of law. Law of limitation was considered prescriptive and preventive in nature and served as a major deterrent against the factors and the elements which could affect peace, tranquility and due order of the State and society. The law of limitation required that a person must approach the Court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence, without dilatoriness and negligence and within the time provided by the law; as against choosing his own time for the purpose of bringing forth a legal action at his own whim and desire. Because if that was so permitted to happen, it shall not only result in the misuse of the judicial process of the State, but shall also cause exploitation of the legal system and the society as a whole. This was not permissible in a State which was governed by law and Constitution. The object of the law of limitation and the law itself, prescribing time constraints for each cause or case or for seeking any relief or remedy had been examined by the courts in many a cases, and it had been held to be a valid piece of legislation, and law of the land. Law of limitation should be strictly construed and applied in its letter and spirit, and by no stretch of legal interpretation it could be held that such law was merely a technicality and that too of procedural nature. Rather from the mandate of S.3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 it was obligatory upon the court to dismiss a cause/lis which was barred by time even though limitation had not been set out as a defence. This showed the imperative adherence to and the mandatory application of such law by the courts. Law providing for limitation for various causes/reliefs was not a matter of mere technicality but foundationally of the "LAW" itself. Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh and others 2007 SCMR 1446 ref. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S. 3 & First Sched.---Suit---Several causes of action---Multiple remedies/relief sought--Limitation---Scope---Plaintiff joining several causes of action and seeking multiple remedies/relief in the suit---Primary remedy/relief---Ancillary, incidental and consequential remedies/relief---Question as to whether the cause of action/remedy entailing the maximum period of limitation should necessarily and mandatorily be resorted to and should cover the question of limitation for the purposes of the whole suit, regardless of whether the suit was barred by time for other cause(s) of action or relief---To ascertain the application of the correct Article from the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, the frame of the suit should be considered, adverted and adhered to---Test for determining the period of limitation was to see the true effect of the suit and not its formal or verbal description---Legal aspect (of the suit) should be examined by taking into consideration the facts of each case and particularly the frame and object of the suit, taking inter alia further into account the contents of the plaint itself---Point to be determined was what main relief was being sought by the plaintiff and whether the other remedies asked for (which may be carrying longer period of limitation) were ancillary, dependent and consequential to the main relief---Where the main/basic/foundational relief being sought was time barred and the bar was not surmounted by the plaintiff, the incidental and consequential relief had to go away along with it and the suit was liable to be dismissed on account of being time barred. Mst.Fattan Bi and 2 others v. Fateh Muhammad and 6 others PLD 1974 Lah. 458; Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh 15 Cal. 58 [Privy Council] and Bashir Ahmad v. Partab 1989 MLD 4314 ref. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 114---Estoppel---Scope---Where a person was aggrieved of a fact, he had a right, rather a duty to object thereto to safeguard his right, and if such a person did not object, he shall be held to have waived his right to object and subsequently shall be estopped from raising such objection at a later stage---Person was estopped by his own conduct, if he though was aware of certain fact(s), which was likely to cause harm to his rights and adversely affect him and was prejudicial against him, avowedly or through some conspicuous act or by omission, intentionally permitted and allowed another person to believe a thing to be true and act on such belief without taking any steps to controvert or nullify such adverse fact and instead he slept over the matter--- Such waiver or estoppel may arise from mere silence or inaction or even inconsistent conduct of a person. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 114---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 203, 206 & 207---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 39 --- Suit for cancellation of general power of attorney, and consequential sale agreement and sale deed---Estoppel---Scope---Silence and inaction on part of plaintiff in safeguarding his right---Effect---Waiver of right to object---Suit plot was exempted in favour of plaintiff/respondent by the Development Authority as compensation for acquired land--Plaintiff purportedly executed and got registered an irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of the defendant/attorney---Defendant pursued the exemption of the suit plot with the Development Authority on behalf of the plaintiff---Subsequently defendant on basis of the power of attorney sold out the suit plot to a third person, who in turn sold it to the appellant--About 16 years after the date of execution/registration of the general power of attorney in favour of defendant, plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of documents and possession of suit land alleging that the power of attorney, sale agreements and sale deeds were the result of fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and manipulation---Validity---Plaintiff admittedly came to know about the general power of attorney in favour of defendant in the year 1971, but did not take recourse to the proper legal action---Plaintiff according to his own statement was aware of the sale having been made in favour of third party in 1974, but no action was taken for assailing the same in time and he remained silent---General power of attorney which was the basis of alleged fraud was undisputedly in the knowledge of the plaintiff since 1971, but he slept over the matter, and allowed the said power of attorney to be utilized against his interest, which culminated into the sale firstly in favour of third party and thereafter in favour of the appellant---Defendant in fact virtually procured the exemption of the suit plot on the basis of the said power of attorney, and thereafter entered into an agreement with the Development Authority---Plaintiff having come to know of the power of attorney neither sought revocation of the same as per S.203 of the Contract Act, 1872, nor issued a notice for its revocation or renunciation according to Ss.206 & 207 of the Contract Act, 1872 or a public notice to renounce the same---Plaintiff since the year 1971 never even bothered to visit the suit land to see its physical condition, whether it was vacant or had been constructed upon---All such facts put together led to the conclusion that the rule of estoppel squarely operated against the plaintiff, within the purview of Art.114 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the case was estopped by his own conduct from filing the suit--- Appeal was dismissed accordingly. (f) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 39---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 54---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 182--Suit for cancellation of registered power of attorney and sale deed---Plea of fraud and fabrication---Burden of proof---Scope---Where plaintiff (alleged executant) himself was challenging the power of attorney and consequential sale deed, and all such documents were registered with the sub-Registrar, it was the plaintiff's duty to bring on record the said documents and discharge the initial burden by establishing that they were invalid. Per Ejaz Afzal Khan, J; disagreeing with Mian Saqib Nisar, J. [Minority view] (g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 8 & 39 ---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 41---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.129(g)---Suit for cancellation of general power of attorney, sale agreement and sale deed and recovery of possession of immoveable property---Claim based on documentary evidence--Documents not proved---Effect---Plaintiff, who was owner of suit plot, allegedly executed and got registered an irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of the defendant/attorney---Defendant on basis of such power of attorney sold out the suit plot to a third person, who in turn sold it to the appellant---Plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of documents and possession of the suit land alleging that the power of attorney, sale agreements and sale deeds were obtained by fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and manipulation---Trial Court dismissed the suit, however, High Court, reversed findings of Trial Court and decreed the suit---Validity---Only question requiring consideration, in the present case was whether the appellant proved the documents which were sheet anchor of his claim--Case of the appellant was that he purchased the property in dispute from a third party, who purchased it from the defendant, who allegedly held a general power of Attorney on behalf of the plaintiff---Appellant did not prove any of the documents; he did not even examine the person who was holding general power of attorney on behalf of plaintiff to prove that in fact he was holding such power of attorney---Question as to who executed the power of attorney, who scribed it, who witnessed it, what was the consideration, if any, where and in whose presence was it paid, were the (sort of) queries to be addressed before examining the sustainability of the superstructure raised thereon---Appellant could not assert his title to the suit property when he neither proved the general power of attorney nor the deeds witnessing the alleged sale transactions nor confronted the plaintiff therewith---Failure of appellant to examine the attorney, the attesting witnesses of the power of attorney, the executant of the sale deeds and their attesting witnesses would give rise to a presumption under Art. 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadal, 1984, that the evidence which could be but was not produced, would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person withholding it---Appellant in such circumstances could not be termed a bona fide purchaser either so as to entitle him to protection under S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882---High Court had rightly decreed the plaintiff's suit--Appeal was dismissed accordingly. [Minority view] Zar Wali Shah v. Yousaf Ali Shah and others 1992 SCMR 1778 and Syed Phul Shah v. Muhammad Hussain and 10 others PLD 1991 SC 1051 distinguished. (h) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched. Arts. 91 & 142---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.8 & 39---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 2(g) & 17---Suit for cancellation of general power of attorney, sale agreement and sale deed and recovery of possession of immoveable property---Property transferred under a void and fraudulent agreement---Suit filed by owner of such property for its possession--Limitation period---Scope---Plaintiff, who was owner of suit property, allegedly executed and got registered an irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of the defendant/attorney--Defendant on basis of such power of attorney sold out the suit plot to a third person, who in turn sold it to the appellant---About 16 years after the date of execution/registration of the general power of attorney in favour of defendant, plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of documents and possession of the suit land alleging that the power of attorney, sale agreements and sale deeds were obtained by fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and manipulation---Trial Court dismissed the suit on the basis that it was barred by limitation, as limitation period for filing a suit for cancellation of documents was three years---High Court, however, decreed the suit on the grounds that suit being for possession of immovable property was filed within twelve years and was thus within the time limit---Legality---Appellant did not prove any of the documents on which he based his claim---Appellant neither proved the general power of attorney nor the deeds witnessing the alleged sale transactions nor confronted the respondent therewith---Plaintiff, in such circumstances, did not need to institute a suit for declaration or cancellation of documents, which had no existence---Plaintiff needed to institute a suit for possession on the basis of title within a period of 12 years, and that was what he did---Appellant who was left with sheer possession could not defend it in a possessory suit instituted by the plaintiff on the basis of title---Failure to question a transaction within the period of limitation would certainly matter, if it had any existence and effect, but where it had no existence and effect, it could not in any manner have life breathed into it, and passage of time or length of years could not give it any existence and effect---Building a castle of limitation in defence of such a transaction or its beneficiary on the basis of documents which were neither produced nor proved, would amount to building a castle in the air---Such exercise would be all the more unwarranted when the beneficiary (i.e. appellant) himself did not stir even a straw to prove his claim---Although the law of limitation ensured order in the society but it could not be used as a bulwark to perpetuate a gain having its origin in fraud which not only vitiated the most solemn transaction but the very fabric of the society--Shielding a transaction based on fraud and forgery would be more chaotic and disorderly than undoing it---Limitation could not shield a transaction having no effect and existence on account of fraud and forgery---Plaintiff, in the present case thus could not be non-suited on account of his failure to institute a suit for declaration or for cancellation of documents within the time provided by the statute---High Court had rightly held that plaintiff's suit was for possession of suit property, which was filed within the limitation period of twelve years--Appeal was dismissed accordingly.[Minority view]. Abdul Majeed and 6 others v. Muhammad Subhan and 2 others 1999 SCMR 1245; Mst. Hameeda Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum PLD 1975 SC 624 and Abdul Rehman and others v. Ghulam Muhammad through L.Rs and others 2010 SCMR 978 ref. (i) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 2(g) & (i)---Void and voidable transaction, setting aside of---Scope---When a transaction was voidable it was essential that it was set aside but if it was void the question of setting it aside would not arise. Muhammad Akbar Shah v. Muhammad Yusuf Shah and others PLD 1964 SC 329 ref. (j) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Preamble---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 17---Limitation could not shield a transaction having no effect and existence on account of fraud and forgery. Abdul Majeed and 6 others v. Muhammad Subhan and 2 others 1999 SCMR 1245; Muhammad Akbar Shah v. Muhammad Yusuf Shah and others PLD 1964 SC 329; Mst. Hameeda Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum PLD 1975 SC 624 and Abdul Rehman and others v. Ghulam Muhammad through L.Rs and others 2010 SCMR 978 ref.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) – Ss. 42 & 39 – Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – Ss. 12(2), O. XXIII, R.3 – Administration of Justice Compromise in civil suits – Annulment of compromise deed on the basis of fraud – Retrospective effect of amendments in procedural law – Suit for cancellation of decree or proceedings based on fraud and misrepresentation – Scope. Respondents filed a declaratory suit seeking cancellation of a sale deed, and during the pendency of the suit, a compromise was recorded. Before the compromise decree could be passed, the appellant alleged fraud and sought annulment of the compromise. The trial court, instead of passing the decree, framed issues on the appellant’s objections. The respondents challenged this, and the Supreme Court directed the trial court to pass the decree in terms of the compromise under O. XXIII, R.3, C.P.C. After the Supreme Court's decision, the appellant filed a separate declaratory suit for possession of the property, which was later amended. The trial court rejected the plaint under S.12(2), C.P.C., on the ground that the amended law had retrospective effect. The High Court upheld the rejection. The appellant contended that the amendment to S.12(2), C.P.C., adopted in Azad Kashmir in 2003, could not apply retrospectively to his case. Conversely, the respondents argued that the amendment was procedural and applied retrospectively, rendering the suit incompetent. Held, that retrospective application of amendments in procedural law depends on whether it causes inconvenience or injustice. The amendment in S.12(2), C.P.C., being substantive in nature, could not operate retrospectively if it prejudiced the parties. The amendment did not affect suits filed prior to its enforcement, and the appellant’s suit was competent. The trial court could have treated the suit as an application under S.12(2), C.P.C., rather than rejecting it purely on technical grounds. Courts lean in favor of adjudication on merits rather than suppressing remedies based on procedural technicalities. Rejection of the suit merely because the word “plaint” was used instead of “application” was unjustified. The impugned judgment and decree were set aside, and the case was remanded for adjudication on merits. ----Cited Cases: Fateh Muhammad’s case 1981 CLC 1130 Adnan Afzal’s case PLD 1969 SC 187 1981 CLC 1248 1992 SCMR 1744 ----Disposition: Appeal allowed, impugned judgment set aside, case remanded to trial court for decision on merits.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – S. 9, S. 100, O. XXI, R. 101 – Registration Act (XIV of 1908) – S. 60 Suit for possession without cancellation of registered sale deed – Maintainability – Appellant/defendant claimed ownership of disputed property based on a registered sale deed executed by his father – Respondent/plaintiff contended that the sale was without consideration and procured through undue influence exerted upon an ailing and visually impaired father – Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the sale was duly registered, and there was no proof of undue influence – District Court reversed the decision, finding that the sale was executed by an elderly and dependent father without consideration and under the influence of the vendee/son – High Court summarily dismissed the second appeal, holding that findings of fact by the lower appellate court were conclusive – Supreme Court upheld the decision, ruling that a suit for possession could be maintained despite the absence of a claim for cancellation of the sale deed, particularly where the sale was found to be without consideration and executed under undue influence. Cited Cases: Ramchandra v. Laxman AIR 1945 PC 54 Abdullah Khan v. Nisar Muhammad Khan PLD 1965 SC 690 Hamida Begum v. Murad Begum PLD 1975 SC 624 Risal Singh v. Monohar AIR 1927 Lah. 748 Raghavendra v. Venkatasami AIR 1930 Mad. 251 Muhammad Hayat v. Muhammad Nawaz PLD 1971 SC 366 Pirla v. Noora PLD 1976 Lah. 6 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – S. 100 – Scope of second appeal High Court’s summary dismissal of appeal – Whether justified – Appellant contended that the High Court erred in dismissing the appeal summarily without addressing discrepancies in findings of the trial and appellate courts – Supreme Court observed that where no concurrent findings of fact exist, a second appeal may be entertained if legal principles governing the case were misapplied – However, in the present case, all lower courts had sufficiently examined the issues, and the High Court was justified in dismissing the second appeal summarily, as the matter was conclusively determined based on factual findings. (c) Registration Act (XIV of 1908) – S. 60 – Presumption of correctness of registered documents – Rebuttal Effect of registered sale deed and endorsements by Sub-Registrar – Burden of proof – Appellant argued that presumption of correctness attached to endorsements on the sale deed, confirming payment of consideration – Supreme Court held that while a presumption exists under S. 60 of the Registration Act regarding the execution of the sale deed, the same could be rebutted through cogent evidence – In the present case, the presumption stood rebutted as no witness testified to the actual payment of consideration, and circumstances indicated that the vendor was an elderly, ailing, and visually impaired individual dependent on the vendee. (d) Undue Influence – Burden of proof on transferee Sale by an aged, dependent father to one son excluding the other – Absence of justification – Whether sale was vitiated by undue influence – Supreme Court reaffirmed that where a transaction involves an aged and dependent individual dealing with a person in a dominant position, the burden lies on the transferee to prove that the transaction was executed freely and with consideration – Absence of any evidence to justify the exclusion of the other son, coupled with the vendor’s failing health and dependence on the vendee, warranted an inference of undue influence – Lower appellate court correctly set aside the sale on these grounds.

Summary: Background: The petitioner challenged judgments and decrees passed by the Civil Judge and Additional District Judge, Jhang, which dismissed his suit for declaration. The petitioner claimed proprietary rights over land allotted under a cultivation scheme, supported by a sale deed and mutation attested by the revenue authorities. The Board of Revenue later canceled the allotment, alleging a violation of lease conditions and misuse of the property. The petitioner argued the cancellation was unlawful as the proprietary rights had already vested. -----Issues: 1- Can the Board of Revenue cancel an allotment after proprietary rights have been granted through a registered sale deed and mutation? -----2- Did the Board of Revenue follow the necessary procedural requirements, including issuing a show-cause notice, before canceling the allotment? -----3- Can the Civil Court intervene in matters where the Board of Revenue has canceled an allotment? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Proprietary Rights: Once the sale price has been paid, the mutation is attested, and the conveyance deed is registered, the proprietary rights become absolute. The Board of Revenue has no authority to unilaterally cancel such allotments unless there is documented evidence of fraud or significant statutory violations. --Procedural Fairness: The Board of Revenue failed to issue a formal show-cause notice or provide an opportunity for the petitioner to contest the cancellation. This violated principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. --Jurisdiction: The Civil Court is competent to adjudicate disputes where administrative actions, such as cancellations, are found to be in violation of legal and procedural safeguards. The revision petition was allowed, and the judgments of the Civil Judge and Additional District Judge were set aside. The court reinstated the petitioner’s proprietary rights over the disputed property. -----Citations/Precedents: Province of Punjab v. Abdul Latif and 2 others (PLD 1990 Lahore 66) Established that once proprietary rights are granted, the Board of Revenue cannot cancel them arbitrarily. Muhammad Liaquat and 5 others v. Member Board of Revenue (Colonies), Punjab, Lahore and 3 others (2000 CLC 953) Reinforced that absolute ownership is conferred after confirmation of proprietary rights and registration of conveyance deeds. Province of Punjab and others v. Waseem Arshad and others (PLD 2023 Lahore 564) Highlighted the requirement for procedural fairness and strict compliance with statutory provisions in canceling allotments. Commissioner Multan Division, Multan and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others (2015 SCMR 58) Emphasized the principle of natural justice and the necessity of show-cause notices in cases involving cancellation of rights. Anjuman-e-Ahmadiya, Sargodha v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha & another (PLD 1966 Supreme Court 639) Affirmed the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to address administrative actions contrary to law.

Summary: Background: Zulfiqar Ali (the petitioner) filed a suit on 02.09.2003 for specific performance of an agreement dated 23.07.2003, permanent injunction, and cancellation of a sale deed dated 13.06.2009 in favor of respondent No. 3 regarding the disputed property. The trial court, on 22.09.2020, decreed the suit in favor of Zulfiqar Ali, directing the cancellation of the sale deed. However, the appellate court, in a judgment dated 29.10.2021, set aside the trial court’s judgment, determining that respondent No. 3 was a prior purchaser of the property and thus upheld the sale deed. The appellate court granted the petitioner relief under section 65 of the Contract Act, 1872. Aggrieved by this, Zulfiqar Ali filed civil revision petitions, which faced delays in re-filing due to procedural deficiencies. ---- Issues: ---- 1) Whether the civil revisions were filed within the legally prescribed limitation period. ---- 2) Whether the revision petitioner had a valid claim for the specific performance of the agreement and the cancellation of the sale deed. ---- 3) Whether the delay in re-filing the civil revisions could be condoned based on the petitioner’s explanation. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Time-Barred Revisions: The court found that the civil revisions were filed after a delay of 530 days, far exceeding the 90-day limitation period provided under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petitioner's argument that the revisions were filed within time after excluding the period spent on preparing certified copies was dismissed. Based on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Asad Ali and Others vs. The Bank of Punjab and Others (PLD 2020 SC 736), the court held that the revisions were time-barred, as the petitioner failed to re-file the petitions within the prescribed period after office objections were raised. ---- Merits of the Case: The appellate court’s decision that respondent No. 3 was a prior purchaser of the property (based on the agreement dated 15.03.2001 and the sale deed dated 13.06.2009) was not contested by the seller, Mirza Altaf. The petitioner could not provide any convincing evidence that the seller denied this agreement or sale deed. Therefore, the appellate court’s refusal to cancel the sale deed and its decision to grant relief under section 65 of the Contract Act, 1872, were found to be justified. ---- Condonation of Delay Denied: The petitioner’s application for condonation of delay, citing that the case files were misplaced during a shift in the counsel's office, was rejected as implausible. The court noted that the delay of 14 months in re-filing the revisions was excessive and unsupported by credible evidence, relying on Lahore Development Authority vs. Muhammad Rashid (1997 SCMR 1224) and Province of Punjab vs. Muhammad Sarwar (2014 SCMR 1358). ---- Outcome: The court dismissed the applications for condonation of delay. Consequently, the civil revisions (Civil Revision No. 25008 of 2023 and Civil Revision No. 25021 of 2023) were dismissed in limine. No costs were awarded. ---- Citations/Precedents: Asad Ali and Others vs. The Bank of Punjab and Others (PLD 2020 SC 736) Lahore Development Authority vs. Muhammad Rashid (1997 SCMR 1224) Province of Punjab vs. Muhammad Sarwar (2014 SCMR 1358)

Summary: The petitioners, including Niagara Mills (Pvt) Limited and others, challenged the consolidated judgment passed by the Judicial Officer of the Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation (PCBL) on 01.10.2021. The judgment annulled the sale of a 26-kanal, 18-marla property located in Faisalabad, ordering the cancellation of three sale deeds to the extent of 20-kanals and 8-marlas. The petitioners acquired the property from the National Industrial Cooperative Finance Corporation (NICFC) through a negotiated sale facilitated by the PCBL, the statutory liquidator managing the disposal of assets from undesirable cooperative societies. The sale was questioned, and PCBL sought to annul the transaction 14 years after the sale based on allegations of fraud. --- Issues: 1) Whether the Judicial Officer had the legal authority to annul the sale of the property. ---2) Whether the PCBL could challenge a concluded sale transaction after a lapse of 14 years. ---3) Whether the sale was fraudulent or collusive, justifying its cancellation. ---4) Whether the Judicial Officer’s decision to annul the sale deeds was lawful. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Authority of the Judicial Officer: The court held that the Judicial Officer, as a delegate of the PCBL, had quasi-judicial powers to review and annul the sale of the property. The delegation of such powers was authorized under Section 11 of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies Act, 1993, allowing the Judicial Officer to confirm, reverse, or modify the Board's actions. ---- Reopening of Sale Transaction: The doctrine of finality or past-and-closed transactions was not applicable since the full transfer of the property had not been completed (6-kanals and 10-marlas remained untransferred). The Cooperatives Board retained the authority to reopen the sale due to allegations of fraud, which vitiates any transaction, regardless of time elapsed. --- Fraudulent Sale: The court found substantial irregularities in the sale process. The sale was not conducted through a public auction as initially advertised, and there was no valid explanation for switching to a negotiated sale. The terms of the sale were also unclear, with delays in payments and no approval of the conditions by the PCBL. These factors led the court to conclude that the sale was fraudulent and collusive, warranting cancellation. ---- Cancellation of Sale Deeds: The Judicial Officer had the authority to cancel the sale deeds as a consequence of the fraudulent sale. The court affirmed that the cancellation was a logical outcome of nullifying the fraudulent transaction, which was within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Officer, and did not require involvement of the civil courts. ---- Citations/Precedents: Telecard Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, 2014 CLD 415 Muhammad Ashraf Khan v. Muhammad Khan, 2004 CLC 1133 Amir Jamal v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq, 2011 SCMR 1023 Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana v. Pakistan, 2013 SCMR 1159 S.M. Waseem Ashraf v. Federation of Pakistan, 2013 SCMR 338 Administrator, Thal Development v. Ali Muhammad, 2012 SCMR 730 Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, PLD 1973 SC 236 Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation v. Zeenat Bibi, 2020 YLR 2421 Director, Directorate-General of Intelligence v. Messrs Al-Faiz Industries, 2006 SCMR 129 Shahida Bibi v. Habib Bank Limited, PLD 2016 SC 995 Mrs. Sultana Ahmed v. Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd, 2003 YLR 1760 Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation v. Muhammad Ilyas, PLD 2014 SC 471 Muhammad Hayat v. Muhammad Nawaz, 1971 SCMR 414

Summary: Section 39 of Specific Relief Act. Cancellation of Document. An instrument inherently void not required a formal cancellation under Section 39 of Specif Relief Act. Object of Law is to advance justice and remedy the wrong forthwith, instead of putting a law abiding person through the mill. to enforce orderly behaviour in a society. General Damages awarded for sufferings of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs awarded general damages due to protracted litigation and on account of fraudulent act of Defendants. ---- The plaintiffs, represented by Advocates Adnan Ahmed and Bilawal Channa, sought the cancellation of a sale deed dated May 21, 2009, concerning property No.C-95 Block-10, Scheme No.16, F.B. Area, Karachi, claiming it was forged and fabricated. The property in question was originally 700 square yards but had been subdivided into two plots. The defendants did not appear in court, leading to ex parte proceedings.The court framed several issues, including the maintainability of the suit, the ownership of the plaintiffs over the suit property, the validity of the impugned sale deed, and the entitlement of the plaintiffs to damages. After reviewing the evidence, the court found the suit maintainable, affirmed the plaintiffs' ownership of the property, and declared the impugned sale deed void and ordered its cancellation. The court noted that the impugned sale deed, claimed to have been executed by a representative of the deceased original owner and a court-appointed official, was inherently illegal due to discrepancies in property details and previous valid transactions.Although the plaintiffs sought damages of over one crore rupees, the court awarded general damages of Rs.200,000 due to the lack of specific evidence for the claimed amount but acknowledged the plaintiffs' expenses and efforts in pursuing the litigation for a decade.The court's decision emphasized the importance of legal ownership and possession, the integrity of property transactions, and the need for justice against fraudulent activities.

Summary: Specific Performance of Contract (Cancellation of Sale Deed) - Sale Deed registered in favour of defendants are valid documents and have been entered by the authorized Attorney (having registered sub-irrevocable general power of attorney which is in pursuance of earlier registered irrevocable general power of attorney given by the legal heirs to one of legal heirs) of the plaintiffs. Suit dismissed.