Summary: (a) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000): ----Scope and powers of NADRA—Blocking of CNIC—Determination of citizenship status—Jurisdictional limits. The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) lacks jurisdiction to determine the citizenship status of individuals or to block their Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs) based on reports from intelligence agencies. The power to adjudicate citizenship disputes is exclusively vested in the competent authority under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, and the rules framed thereunder. Blocking or suspending a CNIC effectively amounts to suspending an individual's citizenship, which NADRA has no authority to do under the NADRA Ordinance, 2000. ----Cited Cases: Hafiz Hamad Ullah Sabbor v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2021 Islamabad 305) (b) Pakistan Citizenship Act (II of 1951): ----Determination of citizenship—Exclusive jurisdiction of competent authority—Illegality of NADRA’s actions. Under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, citizenship status can only be determined by the competent authority designated under the Act. NADRA, being an administrative body, cannot usurp this function or make citizenship determinations based on reports from intelligence agencies. Any such action is ultra vires of NADRA’s authority and constitutes a violation of the statutory framework governing citizenship rights. ----Cited Cases: Hafiz Hamad Ullah Sabbor v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2021 Islamabad 305) (c) Constitutional Rights: ----Fundamental rights—Right to citizenship—Unlawful blocking of CNIC. Blocking or suspending a CNIC without lawful authority infringes upon fundamental rights, including the right to identity, property ownership, and access to essential services. Such an act by NADRA constitutes an overreach of its statutory powers and is in violation of constitutional protections afforded to citizens. ----Cited Law: Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (d) Administrative Law: ----Jurisdictional limits of NADRA—Intelligence agency reports—No evidentiary value without determination by competent authority. Reports from intelligence agencies, without adjudication by the competent authority under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, do not hold legal weight in determining citizenship status. NADRA cannot rely solely on such reports to block or suspend CNICs. ----Cited Cases: Hafiz Hamad Ullah Sabbor v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2021 Islamabad 305) ----(e) Relief: ----Unblocking of CNIC—Direction to NADRA. NADRA was directed to immediately unblock the CNICs of the petitioners, as its actions were deemed illegal, ultra vires, and beyond its statutory mandate. ----(f) Disposition The writ petition was allowed, and NADRA was directed to unblock the CNICs of the petitioners forthwith.

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Summary: Legal Issues:The petitioner challenged the determination of Haseeb Khan's age, citing discrepancies in his date of birth records from NADRA and the Secretary Union Council Naryab, Hangu.The petitioner argued that the medical board's report, indicating Haseeb Khan's age to be between 16 to 20 years, was overlooked by the lower courts.The petitioner contended that the Trial Court should have cross-examined the members of the Medical Board before concluding.---Judgment:The Supreme Court, per Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.The Court found no merit in the petition, holding that in cases of age dispute with varying documentary proofs, the ossification test is the best way to determine age.The Court noted that if two views from the evidence are possible, the one favorable to the accused must be adopted, as per precedence.Considering the NADRA record, even if taken as true, Haseeb Khan was still a juvenile at the time of the offense.The Court found that the High Court had correctly appreciated the material aspects of the case in line with the guidelines established by the Supreme Court.----Legal Principles:Ossification test is the preferred method for determining age in the absence of conclusive documentary proof.In criminal cases, if two interpretations of evidence are possible, the interpretation favorable to the accused is to be preferred.Reports of experts in various fields can be used as evidence without necessarily calling the experts to testify, as per Section 510 of the Cr.P.C.----Significance:This judgment underscores the importance of medical evidence, such as the ossification test, in determining the age of an accused in the absence of consistent documentary evidence. It also reaffirms the principle of adopting the interpretation of evidence that favors the accused in case of ambiguity.

Summary: ''Discussion: (1) The doctrine of legitimate expectation is equated with fairness and equity. (2) Article 3 of the Constitution casts obligation upon the State to ensure the elimination of all forms of exploitation. (3) According to principle of promissory estoppel when one party by his words or conduct made to the other clear promise it cannot resile.'' --- Facts:NADRA advertised for Customer Service Executive (CSE) positions in Swat, for which the respondents applied, qualified the test and interview, but were appointed as Data Entry Operators (DEOs) on a daily wage basis for one-month job training.Despite qualifying for CSE posts, the respondents were not appointed as such, leading them to file writ petitions in the High Court, which were allowed, directing NADRA to appoint the respondents as CSEs.---Issue:Whether NADRA's action of appointing the respondents as DEOs instead of CSEs, for which they qualified, was justified and whether the High Court's direction to NADRA to appoint the respondents as CSEs was appropriate.---Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the High Court's decision to direct NADRA to appoint the respondents as CSEs.---Rationale:The Court found that NADRA's recruitment process for CSE positions led the respondents to have a legitimate expectation of being appointed as CSEs upon qualifying for the position.The appointment of the respondents as DEOs instead of CSEs was seen as a violation of the recruitment process's terms and conditions.The doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel supported the respondents' case, as they acted on NADRA's promise by participating in the recruitment process and qualifying for the CSE positions.The Supreme Court differentiated this case from previous rulings where contractual employees' writ petitions were dismissed, noting that the respondents were not seeking regularization of contractual employment but appointment to the positions for which they had applied and qualified.---Decision:The Supreme Court found no irregularity in the High Court's judgment directing NADRA to appoint the respondents as CSEs, affirming that the respondents were entitled to such appointments based on the recruitment process and their legitimate expectations.

Summary: (a) Public Procurement Rules, 2004 (PPRA Rules) ----Rules 33, 38, and 44—Public procurement—Cancellation of tender—Interpretation of PPRA Rules—Maintainability of writ petition—Petitioner challenged the cancellation of tender by NADRA, arguing that the issuance of a purchase order constituted a binding contract under Rule 44 of the PPRA Rules, and cancellation violated Rules 33 and 38. The court held that Rule 33 applies only to the rejection of bids before their acceptance, and Rule 38 governs the acceptance of the most advantageous bid if the procurement proceeds. Rule 44 provides that a procurement contract is effective upon bid acceptance only if no formal signing of a contract is required. In the present case, the purchase order was conditional on the signing of a formal contract, which had not occurred. (b) Contracts—Nature and enforceability ----Software supply agreements—Conditional purchase orders and the doctrine of "agreement to agree"—Court emphasized that software supply, installation, and maintenance contracts involve detailed terms requiring a definitive agreement. The purchase order issued by NADRA was expressly contingent on signing a formal contract. Even if a contract was assumed to exist, its breach could not be addressed under constitutional jurisdiction but rather through a suit for damages. (c) Constitutional law—Scope of judicial review ----Writ of mandamus—Limits of judicial intervention in public procurement—Court clarified that a constitutional court cannot compel a public procurement agency to proceed with a project it no longer wishes to implement, as this would amount to specific performance of a contract, which is not enforceable in constitutional jurisdiction. The petitioner’s remedy, if any, lies in appropriate forums outside of constitutional writ jurisdiction. (d) Natural justice ----Right to hearing—Cancellation versus abandonment of procurement—Court held that the cancellation of tender did not constitute an adverse action against the petitioner. As the project itself was abandoned, there was no violation of the petitioner’s rights that warranted a hearing. The petitioner did not acquire a vested right to demand the implementation of the project or its execution through external sourcing. Disposition: The writ petition was dismissed, with the court holding that constitutional jurisdiction could not be invoked to enforce procurement decisions or compel the implementation of projects abandoned by a public authority. The petitioner was advised to seek remedies, if any, in other forums. Cited Case: • Messers Fast Track v. FIA (2021 CLC 1160 Islamabad).

Summary: BackgroundIn the case of Masooma and another v. Federal Government through Ministry of Interior Pak Secretariat and another (PLD 2024 Balochistan 33), the petitioners, Masooma and another individual, both of Afghan descent and born in Pakistan, sought directions for the issuance of Computerized National Identity Cards (CNIC). They had married Pakistani citizens and fulfilled all legal requirements for obtaining CNICs, but their applications were denied due to the absence of a Certificate of Domicile from the Federal Government.---IssuesThe core issue addressed in this case was whether the petitioners were entitled to obtain CNICs. The legal examination centered on the interpretation and application of Sections 10(2) and 17 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, in conjunction with Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The case involved questions about the rights of individuals born in Pakistan to Afghan parents and the procedural requirements for such individuals to acquire Pakistani citizenship through marriage.---Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeThe High Court determined that while the petitioners were potentially eligible for Pakistani citizenship due to their birth in Pakistan and marriage to Pakistani nationals, they needed to formally obtain a Certificate of Domicile as required under Section 17 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951. The court acknowledged the hardship faced by the petitioners due to the non-issuance of CNICs but affirmed that the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) lacked the jurisdiction to issue CNICs without the requisite Certificate of Domicile. The petitions were disposed of with a directive that the petitioners should approach the Federal Government to obtain the necessary Certificate of Domicile in the prescribed manner.---Citations/PrecedentsPakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 (Sections 10(2) and 17)Constitution of Pakistan, Article 199National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000Suo Motu case No.1/K of 2006 (PLD 2008 Federal Shariat Court) - This case was referenced regarding the discriminatory nature of certain provisions in the Citizenship Act, deemed in violation of constitutional and international norms regarding gender equality.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 44 of the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, challenging a Family Court order regarding guardianship of a minor. The central issue involved conflicting birth dates for the minor: the petitioner claimed a birth date of 09.06.2006, registered by the minor’s grandmother with the Municipal Corporation, while the respondent (the minor’s mother) provided a NADRA-issued "Form B" listing the birth date as 04.04.2009. The petitioner sought guardianship and requested that the Family Court accept the birth certificate showing the 2006 date, but the Family Court dismissed his application. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Family Court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s application for guardianship based on conflicting birth dates. -----2- Whether the Family Court has the jurisdiction to determine the validity of birth records or correct entries in official documents. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the Family Court lacks jurisdiction to correct or adjudicate discrepancies in official birth records, as this is beyond its scope. The NADRA "Form B" holds a presumption of correctness, which can only be rebutted in a civil court. The court advised the petitioner to seek a declaration from the Civil Court if he wishes to challenge the accuracy of the birth records. The High Court also reiterated that writ jurisdiction is limited to cases with no adequate alternative legal remedy, which was not applicable here. -----Citations/Precedents: Article 44, AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974 – Establishes the grounds for filing a writ petition in AJ&K. Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 – Governs guardianship cases but does not empower the Family Court to amend or determine the validity of official documents like birth certificates. NADRA Records Presumption of Correctness – NADRA-issued documents are presumed correct unless proven otherwise in a competent court.

Summary: Background: In this case, the petitioners, who are employees of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), filed a constitutional petition seeking directives for their promotion and compliance with the promotion policy. The petitioners claimed they were entitled to promotions to higher posts due to their improved qualifications but were not considered for such promotions. Instead, new recruitments were made for the positions reserved for the promotion quota. ----Issues: 1- Whether the constitutional petition is maintainable given that the relevant service regulations and promotion policy of NADRA are non-statutory. 2- Whether the petitioners are entitled to promotions under the promotion policy despite the recruitment of new employees. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome The constitutional petition is not maintainable. The court held that the service regulations and promotion policy of NADRA are non-statutory as they were framed by the Authority under Section 45 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000, without the approval of the Federal Government. Since the regulations are non-statutory, the relationship between NADRA and its employees is governed by the principle of 'master and servant,' and thus, the constitutional petition for enforcing such regulations or promotion policy is not maintainable. The petition was dismissed as not maintainable. ----Citations/Precedents: Maj. (Retd.) Syed Muhammad Tanveer Abbas vs. Federation of Pakistan (2019 SCMR 984) Established that the regulations of NADRA are non-statutory. Chairman NADRA, Islamabad vs. Muhammad Ali Shah (2017 SCMR 1979) Reinforced the non-statutory nature of NADRA’s regulations. MUHAMMAD ZAMAN and others vs. Government of Pakistan (2017 SCMR 571) Confirmed the non-statutory status of service regulations. P.T.C.L. vs. Masood Ahmad Bhatti (2016 SCMR 1362) Highlighted that non-statutory regulations preclude constitutional petitions for employee grievances. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited vs. Said Rehman (2013 SCMR 642) Discussed the implications of non-statutory service regulations. Pakistan Defence Officers’ Housing Authority vs. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmad (2013 SCMR 1707) Clarified the applicability of 'master and servant' principle in cases of non-statutory regulations.

Summary: Petitioner is aggrived that despite being a citizeb his CNIC has been blocked by NADRA

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Arts. 9, 15, 19 & 19-A----Fundamental rights----Citizenship----Right to nationality----Scope----Citizenship is a fundamental right, and its arbitrary deprivation results in statelessness, violating Articles 9 (right to life and liberty), 15 (freedom of movement), 19 (freedom of speech), and 19-A (right to information) of the Constitution----Supreme Court of the United States in Clemente Martinez Perez v. Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General of the United States of America (356 U.S. 44 (1958)) held that ‘citizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights’----Islamabad High Court reiterated that stripping a person of their citizenship arbitrarily denies them employment, access to banking, education, healthcare, and other essential rights, effectively rendering them stateless. (b) Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 ----Ss. 4, 14-A, 16----Citizenship by birth----Deprivation of citizenship----Jurisdiction----Scope----Section 4 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, explicitly provides that every person born in Pakistan is a citizen by operation of law, and the Federal Government can only deprive a person of citizenship under Section 16, subject to strict statutory safeguards----The authority to determine citizenship vests exclusively with the Federal Government, and not with the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) or intelligence agencies----Islamabad High Court held that NADRA’s actions of blocking, suspending, or canceling CNICs on the basis of intelligence agency reports were unlawful and without jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Lt. Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty PLD 1961 SC 119 • The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd v. Pakistan PLD 1972 SC 279 • Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies-II v. Hamdard Dawakhana (Waqf), Karachi PLD 1992 SC 847 • Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs 1999 SCMR 1881 (c) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 ----Ss. 9, 10, 18(2)(a)----Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC)----Authority of NADRA----Scope----Registration under Sections 9 and 10 of the NADRA Ordinance is an acknowledgment by the State of an individual’s citizenship----Section 18(2)(a) permits cancellation of a CNIC only on grounds of fraud, false representation, or concealment of material facts----Islamabad High Court declared NADRA’s practice of blocking or canceling CNICs without due process or proper adjudication as ultra vires the Ordinance and the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Umar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2017 Karachi 585 • Najeebullah v. Director NADRA, Balochistan PLD 2016 Quetta 1 • Khan Zaman v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2011 Peshawar 47 (d) Administrative Law----Jurisdiction of Intelligence Agencies----Determination of citizenship----Scope ----Intelligence agencies have no jurisdiction to determine a person’s citizenship status----Islamabad High Court held that reports from intelligence agencies cannot serve as the basis for depriving a person of citizenship----Only the Federal Government, acting under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, has the authority to revoke or alter citizenship status. (e) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) Ordinance, 2002 ----S. 19----Media restrictions----Freedom of speech----Scope----PEMRA’s order barring news channels from inviting or projecting a petitioner on television was held to be unlawful and a violation of Article 19 of the Constitution----Islamabad High Court declared PEMRA’s actions as an abuse of power, lacking legal justification. Disposition: Petitions allowed. CNICs of petitioners restored. PEMRA’s ban on media coverage of the petitioner set aside. NADRA and intelligence agencies barred from interfering in citizenship determinations without lawful authority.