Summary: Pending

Summary: The Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 S.11EE & Fourth Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan Arts. 4 & 199--- Proscription of a person in the Fourth Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act , 1997---Nature and exercise of powers of proscription under S.11EE of Anti-Terrorism Act , 1997---Essential pre- requisites/criteria for making an order under S.11EE of Anti-Terrorism Act , 1997 Held. Mere involvement in criminal cases was no ground to curtail the liberty of a citizen, which was guaranteed by Art. 4 of the Constitution---Inclusion of the name of petitioner in Fourth Sched. of Anti-Terrorism Act , 1997 for indefinite period was not only against the law but flagrant violation of inalienable rights of citizen to enjoy protection of law or to be treated in accordance with law- --Constitutional petition was allowed and the authorities were directed to remove the name of petitioner from the Fourth Sched. of Anti-Terrorism Act , 1997. ---The petitioner, a prominent political figure, argues that the respondents (law enforcement) targeted him to curtail his liberty, and despite previous legal proceedings, the authorities refused to remove his name from Schedule-IV. The court has heard arguments from both parties.The judgment, delivered on 07.12.2023 by Hon'ble Justices Kamran Hayat Miankhel and Muhammad Ijaz Khan, declares the impugned notification and order as wrong, illegal, arbitrary, and against fundamental rights. The court finds that the petitioner's inclusion in Schedule-IV lacks justification, as he has not been convicted in criminal cases, and the evidence presented is insufficient. Citing previous legal precedents, the court emphasizes the need for valid reasons to list a person under Schedule-IV.In conclusion, the court sets aside the impugned notification, directing the authorities to immediately remove the petitioner's name from Schedule-IV. The judgment also converts the writ petition into an appeal under Section 11-EE of the Anti-Terrorism Act, '1997, as per the petitioner's inadvertent filing.

Summary: Article 13 and 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Sections 500/505/120-B/124A, PPC, 7 ATA.ii) Quashment of second FIR of the same incident registered in another district on video of the same incident gone viral on Social Media.iii) After registration of one FIR every second/other version of the same incident shall be considered as a statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.PC.iii) Doctrine of "Double Jeopardy". No one should be punished twice for the same offence. ---- The court, referring to relevant legal provisions and precedents, held that once an FIR is registered for a cognizable offense, it is treated as a "case." Any subsequent versions or circumstances related to the same incident should be investigated under the same case without the need for separate FIRs. The court cited Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and police rules to support this position.The court emphasized that allowing multiple FIRs for the same incident could lead to abuse of the legal process and violate the principle of double jeopardy. It relied on judgments from both Pakistani and Indian courts, such as "Mst. Sughran Bibi vs the State" and "Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs Union of India," to establish the legal principles governing the prohibition of multiple prosecutions for the same offense. ---- The court allowed the petitioner's petitions, quashing the multiple FIRs filed against Muhammad Azam Khan Swati. The court directed the petitioner's release in connection with the questioned FIRs. The judgment highlighted the importance of protecting individuals from double prosecution and ensuring a fair and just legal process.

Summary: ''It is an oft-repeated principle of law that whenever some miscellaneous application is pending before the Court, it shall decide the same in the first stance before finalizing the lis and passing the final order/judgment. Failure to decide the miscellaneous application before passing the final verdict would render the same nullity in the eye of law. To this effect, guidance from the case of MUHAMMAD UMER vs. MUHAMMAD QASIM and another (1991 SCMR 1232).'' --- This case, Stereo.HCJDA 38, involves a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the validity of an order dated December 9, 2022. The order, issued by the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, affirmed a previous order from May 19, 2022, by the Civil Judge Class-I, Rawalpindi.The background of the case is a suit for declaration filed by respondents, claiming to be legal heirs of Arif Hussain, who passed away on November 9, 2018. The suit resulted in an ex-parte decree on March 19, 2019. The petitioners, upon learning of this, filed an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking annulment of the judgment and decree. They argued that petitioner No.1's name was included in the suit, but she never participated, and all proceedings were conducted by respondent No.1 without authorization.The trial court dismissed both the application under section 12(2) and another application for summoning a witness. The petitioners then filed a revision petition, which was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge.The petitioners contended that the ex-parte decree was obtained through misrepresentation, and the trial court failed to address this issue properly. They argued that the revisional court acted like a post office and did not exercise its jurisdiction.The judgment by Mirza Viqas Rauf allows the petition, setting aside the orders of December 9, 2022, and May 19, 2022. The application under section 12(2) of the CPC is deemed pending before the Senior Civil Judge, who is instructed to decide it afresh within three months from the date of the first appearance of the parties. The parties are directed to appear before the Senior Civil Judge on January 10, 2024. No costs are awarded. The decision refers to legal principles emphasizing the need to decide miscellaneous applications before passing final judgments.

Summary: The Commissioner shall not invoke the provisions of Section 140 without seeking prior approval from FBR --- The provisions of Section 140 shall be invoked, when Commissioner believes that the taxpayer may run away with the demand, which will become irrecoverable forever ---- The petitioner, was aggrieved by the withdrawal of an amount from his personal account under Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ("Ordinance of 2001"). The petitioner argued that the notice sent to the bank lacked details of the demand under an assessment order against him.The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore, who appeared on behalf of the respondent, attempted to justify the action under Section 140, stating that the demand was against a company of which the petitioner was a director. The Commissioner claimed that a notice had been served on the petitioner under Section 139 before taking action under Section 140.However, the court found that the notice under Section 140 did not disclose the service of notice under Section 139, which was contrary to the established procedure. The court cited previous judgments emphasizing the importance of confronting the taxpayer with non-recoverability of the demand through a notice under Section 139 before invoking Section 140. It stressed that the taxpayer's fundamental rights under Article 10A of the Constitution were violated when due process was not followed.The judgment further highlighted the need for notices to contain necessary details, such as the assessment, its finality, consequent demand, and information about earlier notices to which the taxpayer did not respond. The court criticized the reckless recovery actions by Taxation Officers and directed the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to issue a notification warning Taxation Officers about disciplinary proceedings for misusing their powers and infringing upon fundamental rights.Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner, ordering the illegally recovered amount to be returned within 15 days. The judgment emphasized the importance of adhering to due process and respecting taxpayers' rights in income tax recovery cases.

Summary: Validity of gift transaction ---- effect of non-challenging of gift by the donor and ---- limitation. Adverting to the first limb of controversy it is noticed that to this effect issue No.7 was framed. Being the plaintiffs, it is the claim of the petitioners that gift mutation is a product of fraud. Contrary to this the "respondents" pleaded that gift transaction was valid one. In terms of Order VI Rule 4 of the "C.P.C." a party pleading any misrepresentation or fraud is obliged to narrate particulars to that effect. When plaint is examined in this context it is clearly lacking any details or particulars that how the transaction was tainted with fraud. There can be no cavil that mutation by itself is not a document of title and it is only an acknowledgment of the original transaction, which has taken place prior to the incorporating/sanctioning of mutation and a person relying upon mutation has to establish the original transaction in the first instance. Article 113 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ordains that no fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings. Now attending the last point for determination, which relates to limitation, it is observed that a suit for declaration of any right as to any property, the person claiming such right has to institute the suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and the limitation of such suit is to be regulated and governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Suit was instituted by the petitioners on 30th July, 2003 challenging the validity of gift mutation on the ground of fraud asserting that the cause of action accrued to them six months before institution of the suit on claim of the respondents' that they are exclusive owners of the "suit land". Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 ordains that any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled. ---- Case Details:Abdul Rehman, a landlord, had two sons (Muhammad Afsar and Muhammad Khan) and a daughter (Aksar Jan). He purportedly gifted 101 Kanal 19 Marla of land to Muhammad Khan, which was contested by Muhammad Afsar's successors (the petitioners).The petitioners claimed the gift mutation was fraudulent. The respondents (legal heirs of Muhammad Khan) defended the gift's validity. ---- Validity of Gift Transaction:The court examined whether the gift transaction was valid, considering evidence and the plea of fraud. The principle that mutation itself is not a title document but an acknowledgment of a transaction was applied, similar to the findings in ?Faqir Ali vs. Sakina Bibi? (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 85) and ?Noor Din (Deceased) vs. Pervaiz Akhtar? (2023 SCMR 1928).Non-challenging of Gift by the Donor:The court noted that the donor, Abdul Rehman, and Muhammad Afsar did not challenge the gift in their lifetimes. Citing ?Ghulam Abbas vs. Mohammad Shafi? (2016 SCMR 1403) and ?Muhammad Rustam vs. Mst. Makhan Jan? (2013 SCMR 299), the court held that successors are precluded from disputing the gift based on estoppel.Limitation:The suit?s timeliness was questioned, with the court applying Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The right to sue was deemed to start from the date of the donor?s knowledge, not the petitioners, based on principles from ?Salamat Ali vs. Muhammad Din? (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 353).Appellate Court?s Findings Preferred:In revisional jurisdiction, preference is given to the appellate court's findings unless proven legally infirm or materially irregular, as established in ?Muhammad Nawaz vs. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan? (2013 SCMR 1300) and ?Amjad Ikram vs. Mst. Asiya Kausar? (2015 SCMR 1).Conclusion:The court found no illegality or material irregularity in the appellate court?s judgment. The petitioners failed to establish their claim of fraud and the suit was deemed time-barred. The civil revision petition was thus dismissed.

Summary: Bail denied----Background: The petitioner, sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 354/2023, registered at Police Station FIA, Gujranwala, for offenses under section 18 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, section 6 of the Passport Act, 1974, and sections 34/109 PPC. The case arose from a raid conducted by the Federal Investigating Agency (FIA) on a house in Gujranwala, where the petitioner was allegedly found with counterfeit travel documents and equipment used for human trafficking. ----Issues: 1- Whether the FIA conducted the raid lawfully, without a search and seizure warrant. 2- Whether the involvement of local inhabitants was necessary during the raid. 3- Whether the petitioner was falsely implicated and the actual culprits were released. 4- Whether the offenses under section 18 of the Emigration Ordinance and section 6 of the Passport Act were applicable to the facts of the case. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Lawfulness of the Raid: The court acknowledged that the raid was conducted based on urgent source information at 3:30 a.m. when no court was available to issue a search warrant. The urgency of the situation justified the procedural irregularities or illegalities in the process. The court held that unless the petitioner could demonstrate during the trial that the actions caused him serious prejudice, the raid would not be invalidated. ---Involvement of Local Inhabitants: The petitioner argued that the FIA violated section 103 Cr.P.C. by not involving local inhabitants in the raid. The court noted that police witnesses are as credible as any other witness unless they have animosity towards the accused. The petitioner was advised to show cause at the trial why the proceedings could not be relied upon. ---False Implication: The petitioner claimed innocence, stating he was not arrested at the scene and was made a scapegoat. The prosecution maintained that the petitioner was caught red-handed. The court found that prima facie, the evidence satisfied the ingredients of the offenses under the Emigration Ordinance and the Passport Act. ---Applicability of Offenses: The court determined that section 18 of the Emigration Ordinance, which falls under the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C., was applicable given the nature of the crime. Additionally, the petitioner had a previous conviction under the same section, indicating a repeat offense. The court dismissed the bail application, citing that the petitioner failed to make a case for bail and the offenses charged were substantiated by the evidence presented. The petitioner was remanded to custody pending trial. ----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Azam v. The State (PLD 1996 SC 67) Muhammad Hanif v. The State (2003 SCMR 1237) Riaz Ahmad alias Raju v. The State (2004 SCMR 988) Naseer Ahmad v. The State (2004 SCMR 1361) Zafar v. The State (2008 SCMR 1254) Najib Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2017 Sindh 53) Justice Qazi Faez Isa and others v. President of Pakistan and others (PLD 2022 SC 119) Fida Jan v. The State (2001 SCMR 36) State through A.-G, Sindh, Karachi v. Hemjoo (2003 SCMR 881) Arshad Mahmood v. The State (PLD 2008 SC 376) Syed Zulfiqar Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1450)

Summary: Background:The petitioners challenged the judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan, Quetta, which allowed a petition filed by Syed Haji Muhammad Ayub (the respondent) under Article 199 of the Constitution. The respondent sought proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.), alleging illegal possession of property by the petitioners.----Issues:Whether the Judicial Magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under section 145 of the Cr.P.C.Whether the jurisdictional requirements for initiating proceedings under section 145 were met.Whether the powers exercised by the Judicial Magistrate were lawful.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that the Judicial Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and exercise powers under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. The jurisdiction was exclusively vested in a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or an Executive Magistrate empowered by the Provincial Government.The Court found that the dispute did not meet the jurisdictional requirements for initiating proceedings under section 145. The alleged breach of peace was vague and unsubstantiated, and the respondent was not in possession of the property in question.The powers exercised by the Judicial Magistrate were deemed unlawful and without jurisdiction. Despite lacking authority, the Magistrate virtually adjudicated on property rights and possession in favor of the respondent.

Summary: (a) Educational institution-Muhammad Zubair Chaudhry v. Pakistan Medical and Dental Council 2023 SCMR 2145; Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan PLD 2022 SC 92 and Director (Studies), Dr. Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management, Nutrition and Catering Technology Chandigarh and others v. Vaibhav Singh Chauhan (2009) 1 SC 59 ref. (b) Administration of justice- -Equity-Scope-Courts have never permitted their judicial powers to be invoked or used for retention of illegal and ill-gotten gains-Nor have the Courts ever opted to exercise their powers in aid of injustice or to grant any relief to persons with unclean hands or for protecting the unethical or underserved benefits. Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 483 ref. Ms. Pareesa Nawaz Bhutto, Dir. Admn. and Basharat Memon, Dy. Director (via video link, Karachi) for Department.

Summary: (a) Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 2009- -R. 1(n)-Balochistan Civil Servants Act (IX of 1974), S. 2(1)(b)-Employees of Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat-Not civil servants-Officers and employees of the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat belong to the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat Service as defined under Rule 1(n) of the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 2009 and they do not enjoy the status of a civil servant within the meaning of Balochistan Civil Servants Act, 1974. (b) Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 2009- -Rr. 6 & 8(a) & Sched. A-Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat, appointment in-Non-transparency in appointment-Conflict of interest-Petitioner was appointed as Deputy Secretary BS- 18 (Legislative Drafting) in the Assembly Secretariat while his father was serving as its Secretary-Mode of appointment adopted by the Secretariat was through initial recruitment-Qualifications and conditions described in the advertisement appear to have been tailored to restrict the eligibility criteria to a limited number of candidates which included the petitioner-High Court had rightly observed that there was no justifiable reason for such restriction and that it violated the principle of transparency-However, the petitioner was one of the very few candidates who met the restricted eligibility criteria described in the advertisement-Selection committee was reconstituted by the Secretary i.e. the petitioner's father, while under the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 2009 ('Rules of 2009') the Speaker was the competent authority and there was nothing on record to show that the latter's approval was sought-Entire recruitment process i.e. approval for appointment through the mode of initial recruitment, setting out the qualifications and conditions regarding eligibility, reconstitution of the selection committee, failing to place the cases of Assistant Secretaries before the competent forum for assessing their eligibility and, subsequently, the petitioner's appointment were in clear breach of the Rules of 2009-It was not disputed that the method of recruitment explicitly prescribed to fill the post of Deputy Secretary BS-18 under Schedule A of the Rules of 2009 was by promotion from amongst the Assistant Secretaries (BS-17) on seniority cum fitness basis and possessing five years' service as such-No process was undertaken by the competent authority to assess whether Assistant Secretaries (BS-17) were eligible to be considered for promotion in accordance with the qualifications and conditions prescribed under the Rules of 2009-Entire process was adopted to benefit the petitioner who happened to be the son of the Secretary of the Assembly Secretariat-Latter had given approvals for undertaking the recruitment process and had only recused himself belatedly and that too to the extent of chairing the meeting of the selection committee-It thus raised profound questions in the context of conflict of interest-Present case was a classic example of abuse of public power in order to benefit a family member-Petitions were dismissed. (c) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 4, 9, 25 & 27-Public sector posts-Appointment-Transparency-Appointments against posts in the public sector are to be made strictly in accordance with applicable rules/regulations and without any discrimination and in a transparent manner-It is essential that all appointments in the public sector are based on the process that is palpably and tangibly fair and within the parameters of its applicable rules-Appointment made in a nontransparent manner and in violation of the law offends the fundamental rights of the general public and the citizens under Articles 4, 9, 25 and 27 of the Constitution-Due diligence must be exercised while making appointments and in doing so a fair and transparent selection process ought to be adhered to-Adherence to a credible and transparent selection process with due diligence is the pre-requisite in order to ensure good governance-It is inevitable to observe highest standards of diligence, transparency and probity in selecting a person for a post-Public authority possessed with powers under the relevant laws can only use them for and to advance the public good-Choosing persons for public service is not just providing a job and the consequent livelihood to the one in need but is a sacred trust to be discharged by the ones charged with it, honestly, fairly, in a just and transparent manner and in the best interest of the public-Individuals so selected are to be paid not out of the private pockets of the ones appointing them but by the people through the public exchequer and not selecting the best as public servants was a gross breach of the public trust and was an offence against the public who had the inherent right to be served by the best. Syed Mubashir Raza Jafri and others v. Employees Old Age Benefit Institutions (EOBI) and others 2014 SCMR 949; Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana and others v. Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1159; Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 132 and Chief Secretary Punjab and others v. Abdul Raoof Dast 2006 SCMR 1876 ref.