Summary: Summary pending

Summary: ''If after grant of ad-interim pre-arrest bail in a case, accused has been arrested and confined in jail in another case then his petition for pre-arrest bail will not be dismissed due to non-prosecution rather same will be decided after procuring his attendance.'' ---- Context of the Petitions: The petitions were filed by Niazi after he was granted ad-interim pre-arrest bail in multiple cases but later convicted and sentenced in a separate case ("District Election Commissioner, Islamabad vs. Imran Khan Niazi"). Due to his imprisonment, Niazi could not appear before the Anti-Terrorism Court on scheduled dates. His absence led to the dismissal of his applications for exemption from personal attendance and pre-arrest bail by the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court.Petitioner?s Arguments: Niazi's counsel argued that his absence was not intentional but due to his imprisonment in another case. They contended that the Anti-Terrorism Court should have procured Niazi's attendance to decide the pre-arrest bail applications on merits, citing various precedents like ?SHAZAIB and others vs. The STATE? (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 886) and ?FARHAN MASOOD KHAN vs. STATE etc.? (PLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Lahore) 550).Prosecution?s Stance: The Prosecutor General, supported by the Additional Prosecutor General, maintained that since Niazi was convicted and imprisoned in another case, his applications for exemption from personal attendance and pre-arrest bail were rightly dismissed according to law. They referred to similar cases, including ?MUHAMMAD UMAR FAROOQ SALEEM vs. The STATE and another? (2022 P Cr. L J 1525).Court's Analysis and Decision: The Court noted that Niazi's inability to appear before the Anti-Terrorism Court was due to circumstances beyond his control. It held that the Anti-Terrorism Court erred in dismissing the applications for exemption from personal attendance and pre-arrest bail without considering the explained and satisfactory nature of Niazi's absence. The Court emphasized that rights of an accused to fair proceedings and due process are enshrined under Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan.Outcome: The Lahore High Court set aside the impugned orders dated 11.08.2023. It directed that the applications for pre-arrest bail be deemed pending before the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No.III, Lahore. The Court ordered that Niazi's personal attendance be obtained through video-link considering his safety and the applications for pre-arrest bail be decided on merits by 06.02.2024.

Summary: ''Worker or workman'' -- Definations --- Nature of the job description of Area Sales Manager, is supervisory, managerial and administrative as such, he is not a workman. ---- Issue:Whether the termination of Nawab Ali's services was lawful and in accordance with the terms of his employment contract and applicable laws.---- Arguments:Petitioner: Argued that his termination without notice and fault on his part was unlawful, citing precedents supporting the protection of workmen's rights.Respondents: Supported the dismissal of the appeal, contending that Ali's role was managerial, making him ineligible for the protections typically afforded to workmen under relevant employment laws.--- Decision:The petition was dismissed. The court found that Nawab Ali's role as Area Sales Manager was supervisory, managerial, and administrative, thus excluding him from the definition of a 'workman' under applicable employment laws. It was also noted that a full and final settlement had been made with the petitioner, and no outstanding salary claims were established.---- Reasoning:The court relied on previous rulings that defined the scope of 'workman' and concluded that roles involving managerial or administrative duties do not fall under this category.The court also emphasized that factual disputes over the nature of the settlement received by the petitioner could not be resolved in writ jurisdiction.--- Legal Principles:Employment contracts must be adhered to, and the terms set forth within them dictate the conditions under which employment may be terminated.The definition of 'workman' under employment law excludes individuals in managerial or administrative positions, affecting their eligibility for certain protections.Precedents Cited:Syed Mahtabul Hassan vs. Brooke Bond Pakistan Ltd. (1990 SCMR 956)Nasir Ahmad Siddique vs. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation through Chairman (1996 PLC 223)St. Patrick's High School and College through Rector/Principal vs. Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. V (2016 PLC 358)Getz Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs. Muhammad Nafees (2022 PLC 83 & 2021 SCMR 1785)Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. vs. Pakistan Tobacco Company, Employees' Union, Dacca (PLD 1961 SC 403)Athar Ali vs. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (2014 PLC 44)

Summary: Issue:Whether a suit for specific performance based on an agreement to sell can be decreed when the second marginal witness of the agreement is not produced by the vendee, in compliance with Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (QSO).Holding:The Regular Second Appeal (RSA) was dismissed for being without merit.Reasoning:The Court noted that while Article 79 of the QSO generally requires the examination of two attesting witnesses for the proof of a document, Article 81 provides an exception where the execution of a document is admitted by the executant himself. In this case, the appellant had admitted the execution of the agreement in a prior suit, making the examination of both marginal witnesses unnecessary. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that judicial proceedings carry a presumption of genuineness unless strong evidence to the contrary is produced, which the appellant failed to do. The Court also observed that the appellant did not challenge the proceedings of the prior suit in which he admitted the agreement, and therefore, the statement recorded during those proceedings remains valid and unchallenged.

Summary: Background: The appellants filed an appeal against the judgment of the Additional District Judge/Judge Family Court, Muzaffarabad, dated 04.08.2022. The judgment dismissed their application for adjustment of gold ornaments in the execution of a decree for dower and maintenance allowance filed by the respondent, Mst. Asima Bashir Abbasi. ----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the application for adjustment of gold ornaments in the execution of the decree. 2- Whether the executing court is bound to adhere strictly to the contents of the decree. 3- Whether the judgment and decree regarding the dower and maintenance allowance are final and executable as decreed. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Application for Adjustment of Gold Ornaments: The appellants argued that the trial court should have considered the gold ornaments allegedly taken by the respondent as part of the dower payment. However, the court found that the trial court had only observed that the respondent had taken gold and deposited it in the bank as a surety against a loan. There was no conclusive finding that this gold should be treated as part of the dower payment. --Executing Court's Boundaries: The court reiterated the settled principle that an executing court is bound to execute a final decree in its letter and spirit and cannot deviate from its terms. The executing court correctly followed this principle by dismissing the appellants' application for adjustment of the gold ornaments, as the decree specified the payment of Rs. 5,00,000/- in cash or kind (rooms, bathroom, kitchen), without any mention of the gold ornaments. --Finality of Judgment and Decree: The court noted that the judgment and decree had been appealed and upheld by both this Court and the Supreme Court, thus attaining finality. The executing court was right in observing that any grievance regarding the gold ornaments should be addressed through a separate legal action rather than through the execution proceedings. The court concluded that the appeal lacked merit and was dismissed with no order as to costs. The judgment of the trial court was upheld, and the execution of the decree was to proceed as originally decreed. ----Citations/Precedents: PLD 2003 Supreme Court (AJ&K) 14 PLD 2011 Lahore 450

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 44 of the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, challenging the order of the Judge Family Court Kotli dated 17.09.2019. The petitioner sought to set aside this order and to direct the Family Court to accept his application and record the remaining evidence of witnesses regarding the correct date of birth of the minor. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Family Court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s application regarding the minor's date of birth. 2- Whether the writ petition is maintainable given the existence of another adequate legal remedy. 3- Whether the Family Court has the jurisdiction to correct entries in birth certificates. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Family Court's Dismissal of Application: The Family Court dismissed the petitioner’s application, favoring the respondent’s evidence, which included a NADRA-issued "Form B" showing the minor's date of birth as 04.04.2009. The petitioner presented a birth certificate issued by the Municipal Corporation Kotli on 22.07.2006, stating the minor's date of birth as 09.06.2006. The court found the NADRA record to have a presumption of truth unless proven otherwise. --Maintainability of Writ Petition: The court highlighted that writ jurisdiction under Article 44 is not akin to a civil suit and should be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances where no other adequate remedy is available. The petitioner has the option to approach the Civil Court for a declaratory judgment regarding the correct date of birth, making the writ petition unnecessary. --Jurisdiction of Family Court: The court confirmed that the Family Court does not have the authority to correct entries in birth certificates. This responsibility lies within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, which can adjudicate on disputed questions of fact requiring evidence. The court dismissed the writ petition, affirming that the Family Court's order was just and correct. The petitioner was directed to seek resolution of the dispute regarding the date of birth through the Civil Court.

Summary: Background: The appellants filed a civil appeal against the judgment and decree dated 11.03.2019 passed by the District Judge Kotli, which upheld the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge Khuiratta dated 21.09.2016. The appellants’ predecessor had filed a suit for declaration claiming ownership of land and challenging the validity of a registered gift deed dated 06.10.1987. ----Issues: 1- Whether the decision of the lower courts was contrary to law or involved a substantial error. 2- Whether the suit filed by the appellants was barred by limitation. 3- Whether the gift deed dated 06.10.1987 was valid and within the share of the donor. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --No Substantial Error or Defect: The court found that the second appeal did not meet the criteria under Section 100 CPC, which permits second appeals only on grounds of a decision being contrary to law, failing to determine a material issue of law, or involving a substantial error in procedure. The findings of the lower courts were based on proper appraisal of evidence and law. --Limitation: The court held that the suit was barred by limitation. The gift deed was registered on 06.11.1987, and the suit was filed after more than 16 years, in 2003. Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1908, it is the duty of the court to dismiss suits filed beyond the prescribed period. The court emphasized that the limitation period is a mandatory provision and the suit was rightly dismissed by the lower courts for being time-barred. --Validity of the Gift Deed: The court found that the gift deed did not specify the measurement of the land or the share of the donor. However, the evidence showed that the donor transferred his sole share from different khewats to his sons. The court held that the gift deed was made in accordance with law and within the donor’s share. The claim of the appellants that the gift deed was made in excess of the donor’s share was unsupported by evidence. ----Citations/Precedents: PLD 1996 Peshwar 1 2009 SCR 38 1998 SCR 204 Akhtar Hussain & others Vs. Raja Mohammad Zarin Khan, 1993 SCR 114 PLD 2003 Supreme Court (AJ&K) 14 PLD 2011 Lahore 450 2015 SCMR 380 2017 YLR 229 1993 MLD 2126 2015 CLC 1290 PLD 2016 SC 705 PLD 1985 SC 153

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997: ----S. 33---- Appeal against refusal of prior approval for appointment of Chief Executive—Maintainability of appeal—Refusal letter issued by the Director, Company Law Division, SECP, challenged by the Appellant before the Islamabad High Court, which held that the remedy of appeal under Sec. 33 of the SECP Act was available—Held, the matter was referred to the Licensing and Registration Division of SECP for decision on merits, with direction to issue a speaking order after granting an opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties—Appeal disposed of accordingly. (b) Associations with Charitable and Not-for-Profit Objects Regulations, 2018: ----Reg. 7, Cl. (xvi)---- Requirement for prior approval of Chief Executive appointment—Director, SECP, denied approval and issued determination under Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013, treating the Appellant as a "public sector company"—Appellant contended that this exceeded the scope of its application and sought referral of the matter back for re-examination—Matter referred to SECP's concerned department for reevaluation in light of the regulations. (c) Principles of natural justice: ----Right to be heard---- Impugned letter issued by SECP without providing the Appellant an opportunity of hearing—Held, such omission was contrary to principles of natural justice—Matter referred back to SECP's concerned division with instructions to decide the matter on merits after providing an opportunity of hearing to all relevant stakeholders. -----Disposition: Appeal referred to Licensing and Registration Division, SECP, for reevaluation and decision through a speaking order, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. Appeal disposed of.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969): ----Ss. 156(1)(89), 157(1), 157(2), & 181---- Smuggling of foreign-origin diesel oil—Concealment under liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cover load—Confiscation of vehicle and goods—Adjudicating authority ordered confiscation of smuggled diesel oil while granting the vehicle owner the option to redeem the vehicle upon payment of 20% redemption fine under Sec. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969—Appellant Collectorate challenged the redemption option on grounds of an altered vehicle design for smuggling—Held, no evidence of false cavities or repeated use of the vehicle for smuggling was provided—Order of adjudicating authority upheld by the Tribunal. ----Cited Cases: Nazir Ahmed v. Chairman Customs Appellate Tribunal Customs Reference No. 52 of 2015 (Lahore High Court) Faiz Muhammad v. Federation of Pakistan & Others Civil Petition No. 4580 of 2021 (Supreme Court of Pakistan) (b) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969): ----S. 168---- Seizure of smuggled goods—Recovery of 49,770 liters of foreign-origin diesel oil concealed under LPG cover load—Customs staff intercepted vehicle based on prior information—Goods seized under Sec. 168 for violation of Customs Act, 1969, including misuse of altered vehicle design—Adjudicating authority confiscated the goods due to lack of proof of legal importation and imposed a personal penalty on the vehicle owner. (c) S.R.O. 499(I)/2009: ----Clause (b)---- False cavities and exclusive use for smuggling—Appellant Collectorate argued that the vehicle fell under S.R.O. 499(I)/2009, which prohibits redemption of vehicles used exclusively or with false cavities for smuggling—Tribunal observed that the photographs and case record did not substantiate the existence of false cavities or exclusive smuggling use—Vehicle allowed to be redeemed under Sec. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969. (d) Principles of Evidence: ----Burden of Proof---- Claim of altered vehicle design—Collectorate failed to provide sufficient evidence such as photographs, diagrams, or expert analysis to support allegations of false cavities or engineered designs for smuggling—Tribunal held that unsubstantiated claims could not form the basis for denying redemption—Reliance placed on Supreme Court judgment in Faiz Muhammad v. FOP & Others. ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Order of adjudicating authority upheld, allowing vehicle redemption upon payment of 20% fine under Sec. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969, and maintaining confiscation of smuggled diesel oil.