Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O.XLI, R.27---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Suit for declaration regarding inheritance rights---Petitioners, as legal heirs of Abdul Hameed Khan, challenged gift mutation No.1375 dated 08.10.1925, transferring the estate of Abdul Karim Khan solely to one son, Muhammad Nawaz Khan, claiming it to be fraudulent---Trial Court and Appellate Court concurrently dismissed the suit and appeal, citing lack of locus standi, estoppel, and limitation. Held, revisional jurisdiction does not extend to re-evaluating concurrent findings of fact by subordinate courts unless gross misreading of evidence or violation of law is evident---Petition dismissed. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----S.3---Law of limitation---Inheritance rights---Claim filed 34 years after the death of Muhammad Nawaz Khan and 74 years after the gift mutation was sanctioned---Petitioners contended that the claim involved inheritance and thus limitation was not applicable. Held, limitation applies to stale claims unless expressly relaxed under the Limitation Act---Reliance placed on "Umer Baz Khan through L.Hrs v. Syed Jehanzeb and others" (PLD 2013 SC 268). (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872)---- ----S.101---Burden of proof---Inheritance claim---Petitioners' contention that Abdul Karim Khan died prior to the impugned mutation lacked evidentiary support---Courts held petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof regarding the fraudulent nature of the mutation and the timing of the death of Abdul Karim Khan. (d) Estoppel and waiver---- ----Proforma defendants proceeded ex parte at the trial stage and joined proceedings at the appellate stage without challenging the ex parte decree or filing an appeal. Held, such conduct constitutes waiver and estoppel against petitioners to challenge the impugned judgment and decree. ----Cited Cases: Abdul Haq and another v. Mst. Surrya Begum and others (2002 SCMR 1330) Mst. Grana through Legal Heirs and others v. Sahib Kamala Bibi and others (PLD 2014 SC 167) Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh and others (2007 SCMR 1446) Umer Baz Khan through L.Hrs v. Syed Jehanzeb and others (PLD 2013 SC 268) ----Disposition: Petition dismissed with no order as to costs.

Summary: Discussion: (1) Order XLI, Rule 1, 3 & 9 CPC. (2) Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. (3) Duty of Appellate Court to determine territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction at initial stage. (4) An act of the court shall prejudice no man (Actus curiae neminem gravabit).

Summary: Background:The case involves two civil petitions, No.1877-L and 1878-L of 2016, in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, originating from disputes over property ownership and the validity of gifts of property. The properties in question were initially owned by Ghulam Muhammad, who allegedly gifted them to his nieces, Khursheed Bibi and Jamila Begum (deceased), the respondents in the respective petitions. Faqir Muhammad, the petitioner, contested these gifts, claiming they were invalid as Ghulam Muhammad had previously agreed to sell the properties to other parties.The disputes led to civil suits and subsequent appeals. The Lahore High Court dismissed these appeals as being time-barred, noting that the petitioner failed to demonstrate due diligence in prosecuting the case or explaining the delays in filing the appeals. The key legal contention arose around the valuation of the property for jurisdictional purposes, which significantly impacted the legal proceedings and the forum in which the appeals were filed.----Issues:Whether the initial and subsequent valuations of the properties, as determined by the trial and appellate courts, were properly applied in accordance with the Suits Valuation Act, 1887.Whether the Lahore High Court erred in dismissing the appeals based on procedural grounds related to the timeliness and forum of the appeal filings.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the appeals were improperly dismissed on overly technical grounds without adequate consideration of the petitioner?s bona fide efforts and the judicial missteps that contributed to jurisdictional confusion. The Court emphasized the principle of "actus curiae neminem gravabit," asserting that no party should suffer due to the court's error. The Court ruled that the petitioner was not solely at fault for the jurisdictional errors, highlighted the lack of clear directives for amending the plaints according to the new valuation, and noted the role of court staff in failing to address these issues promptly.Ultimately, the Supreme Court converted the civil petitions into civil appeals and remanded the case back to the Lahore High Court for a decision on the merits, in accordance with the law, effectively nullifying the previous judgments which dismissed the appeals on procedural grounds.----Citations/Precedents:Suits Valuation Act, 1887Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), particularly Order XLI regarding the procedures for appeals.Limitation Act, 1908Article 10A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others (PLD 2016 SC 872): A precedent on the condonation of delay and the application of the principle "actus curiae neminem gravabit."Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali and others (PLD 1963 SC 382): Referenced for the doctrine that technicalities should not thwart justice unless necessary on grounds of public policy.---Quote:Discussion: (1) Order XLI, Rule 1, 3 & 9 CPC. (2) Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. (3) Duty of Appellate Court to determine territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction at initial stage. (4) An act of the court shall prejudice no man (Actus curiae neminem gravabit).

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan –----Art. 199---High Court's revisional jurisdiction---Scope and limitations---Petitioners challenged appellate court’s judgment rejecting their claim to be legal heirs of a deceased property owner, asserting that two individuals with similar names were the same person---High Court found that the petitioners failed to produce any documentary evidence proving their assertion, whereas the appellate court had already examined the matter thoroughly---Held, High Court cannot interfere in factual findings unless misreading or non-reading of evidence is established, which was not done in this case.(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) –----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Interference by High Court---Principle---High Court dismissed the revision petition after finding that both appellate and trial courts had correctly examined the available evidence and drawn reasonable conclusions---Petitioners had failed to prove that Sharaf Ali Shah son of Riasat Ali Shah and Sharaf Shah son of Mehar Shah were the same person, as no official records supported this claim---Held, High Court does not act as a reappreciating forum in revision; its role is confined to correcting jurisdictional errors, which were absent in this case.(c) Civil Law –----Burden of proof---Legal heirs and succession claims---Petitioners claimed inheritance rights based on alleged mistaken identity in official records but failed to produce any credible evidence to substantiate their claim---Held, burden of proof lies on the party asserting a claim, and mere assertions without supporting documentation cannot be entertained in court.Cited Case: Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza (2008 SCMR 329)(d) Appellate Review –----Scope of Supreme Court’s interference in concurrent findings of lower courts---Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that where lower courts have properly appreciated evidence and there is no jurisdictional defect, Supreme Court will not interfere---Petitioners failed to show any substantial error of law or procedural irregularity warranting appellate intervention.----Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal dismissed; appellate court's decision upheld.

Summary: Discussion: (1) In the time barred petitions filed by the Government, administrative delays due to lengthy procedure cannot be considered sufficient cause. (2) No preferential treatment can be accorded to Government Departments for condoning the delay. (3) Law aids those who are vigilant but not those who are sleeping or slumbering. (4) SOP (PLD 2003 Journal 95) made out for this purpose has not been implemented----The petitioner sought condonation of a 31-day delay in filing the petition, arguing that the delay was due to administrative procedures and circumstances beyond their control. However, the court found the explanation for the delay insufficient, highlighting a trend where government departments routinely seek condonation of delay without adequate justification. M/s SKB-KNK Joint Venture Contractors thr. Regional Director v. Water & Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and others (2022 SCMR 1615): Government departments are treated like ordinary parties before the court, and no preferential treatment is given to them. Food Department, Gujranwala thr. Deputy Director and others v. Ghulam Farid Awan (2010 SCMR 1899): Government cases filed beyond the time limit might be to favor litigants or to hide illegality or negligence. No preferential treatment should be given to government functionaries. Khuda Bakhsh and others v. Muzaffar thr. L.Rs. and others (2007 SCMR 1032): Delays caused by lethargy in government offices are not considered sufficient grounds for condonation. Government of Pakistan thr. Ministry of Works and another v. M/s Malbrow Builders, Contractor, Sialkot (2006 SCMR 1248): Delays cannot be condoned without sufficient cause; laxity, carelessness, and a cursory approach are not sufficient grounds. Province of Punjab v. Sh. M. Riaz Shahid (2005 SCMR 1435): Government entities cannot be treated differently from ordinary litigants regarding limitations. Delay due to government processes is not a sufficient ground for condonation. Province of Punjab thr. Secretary Education v. Kishwar Qudus Paul (2004 SCMR 571): Delays in government offices cannot be considered sufficient cause for condonation. Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and another v. Muhammad Rafique Siddiqui (2004 PLC (C.S.) 962): Completion of formalities is not sufficient grounds for condoning delay. These cases underscored the principle that the law treats government departments and litigants equally and that delays caused by government processes or negligence are not automatically grounds for condonation. Each case must be examined on its merits, and sufficient cause must be shown for condoning delay. The court emphasized the need for government departments to adhere to strict timelines and procedures and highlighted the consequences of failing to do so. Ultimately, the court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and the Civil Petition itself, directing relevant authorities to take note of the judgment for compliance and information.

Summary: BackgroundThis judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan consolidates Civil Appeal No. 1191 of 2016 and Constitution Petition No. 18 of 2000 due to common legal and factual questions involved. Both cases concern former military officers, Ex. Col. Muhammad Azad Minhas and Col. Inayatullah Khan, who challenged their convictions by the Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The appellants were accused and convicted of failing to report a conspiracy to wage war against Pakistan and were subsequently dismissed from service and imprisoned.---IssuesThe Supreme Court reviewed several key issues:Whether the proceedings under the Pakistan Army Act against the appellants were conducted with jurisdiction and without mala fides, affecting the appellants' fundamental rights.Whether an accused can be convicted of an alternative charge if the main offense is not proved.The maintainability of Constitution Petition No. 18/2000.The applicability of laches and the reasonableness of the delay in filing the constitutional petitions.The entitlement of dismissed officers to military privileges and benefits post-dismissal.---Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeJurisdiction and Mala Fides: The Court held that the Field General Court Martial had appropriate jurisdiction to try the appellants under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. There was no evidence of mala fides or jurisdictional error affecting their fundamental rights.Conviction on Alternative Charge: The Court affirmed that the appellants could legally be convicted of an alternative charge under the provisions of the Pakistan Army Act, despite the primary charge not being proven, as sufficient evidence supported the alternative charges.Maintainability of Petitions: The Court ruled that the constitutional petition challenging military court convictions is generally not maintainable unless there is evidence of mala fides or procedural irregularities. In this case, no such evidence was presented.Delay and Laches: The Court found the considerable delay in filing the petitions unjustifiable. It emphasized that constitutional remedies must be sought promptly and that laches can bar relief when there is an unreasonable delay.Entitlement to Privileges: The Court concluded that dismissal from military service validly strips an officer of all associated privileges and benefits, such as housing and memberships, which are contingent upon active service status.

Summary: Facts: Ijaz ul Haq negotiated with Mrs. Zahida Parveen Ahmed, the owner of the property, through her mother and attorney, Begum Maroof Ahmed, to purchase an industrial plot in Islamabad. A contract was executed, with a part payment made, and the balance was due by a certain date. The balance was not paid, leading to a dispute and subsequent suit for specific performance initiated by Ijaz ul Haq. During the trial, it was realized that Zahida Parveen Ahmed, the property owner, was a necessary party to the suit and was subsequently added, though after the statute of limitations for her inclusion had expired.Issue 1: Whether the suit was time-barred concerning the property owner, Zahida Parveen Ahmed, who was added as a defendant after the prescribed limitation period.Holding on Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the suit was indeed time-barred concerning Zahida Parveen Ahmed, as she was added as a defendant after the expiration of the limitation period. Therefore, the suit could not be maintained against her or the attorney, Begum Maroof Ahmed.Issue 2: Whether Ijaz ul Haq proved his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.Holding on Issue 2: The Court found that Ijaz ul Haq failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract. The Court noted that the plaintiff did not testify personally to establish his readiness and willingness, and his attorney's testimony was deemed irrelevant to this issue. Additionally, there was no evidence to show that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or arrangements to pay the balance at the appointed time.

Summary: ''The law of limitation is fully applicable to petitions for leave to appeal in matters relating to pre-arrest bail and there is no relaxation as far as the period of limitation is concerned unless sufficient cause is shown for the delay, as required under the law. After dismissal of the petition for pre-arrest bail by the High Court, this Court should be approached promptly in a pre-arrest bail matter to avail the remedy available under the law and to actualize the right of access to justice.'' --- Issue:Whether the law of limitation applies to petitions for leave to appeal in pre-arrest bail matters and whether delay in filing such petitions can be condoned without showing sufficient cause.----Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn after the petitioner's counsel expressed a desire to withdraw it, following extensive arguments regarding the applicability of the law of limitation to pre-arrest bail matters and the lack of an application for condonation of delay.---Reasoning:The Court clarified that the law of limitation fully applies to petitions for leave to appeal in pre-arrest bail matters, just like other criminal petitions under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. A delay beyond the 30-day limitation period must be supported by an application for condonation of delay, showing sufficient cause. The Court distinguished between pre-arrest and post-arrest bail matters, noting that leniency in condoning delays for incarcerated individuals does not apply to pre-arrest bail petitions since the petitioner is not deprived of liberty and does not face the same constraints. The Court emphasized the importance of approaching the Court promptly in pre-arrest bail matters to ensure timely access to justice and prevent potential abuse of legal processes to evade law enforcement.

Summary: Background: The Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation, Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), filed a reference application challenging the Appellate Tribunal’s acceptance of an appeal by the taxpayer. The taxpayer had argued that the original assessment order was invalid as it was passed beyond the mandatory time limit prescribed under the Customs Act, 1969. The Department, however, failed to provide any records of an authorized extension for this delay. -----Issues: 1- Whether the reference was maintainable given that the assessment order was passed beyond the legally prescribed time limit. -----2- Whether the authorization for filing the reference complied with Section 196(1) of the Customs Act, 1969. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Limitation and Validity of Order: The court held that it was the Department's responsibility to prove the original assessment order was passed within the prescribed 120-day period. Since the order was issued 41 days late and there was no documentation of an authorized extension, the assessment order could not be sustained in law. The Supreme Court has previously established that orders passed beyond mandatory time limits are invalid, and this objection could be raised at any stage. --Authorization: The respondent also questioned the lack of written authorization for the Additional Director to file the reference. The Department failed to meet the requirements of Section 196(1) of the Customs Act, as no valid authorization was produced. The court dismissed the reference as it was based on an unsustainable and unauthorized order.

Summary: Application of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act,1908 to the Family Courts Act, 1964 and Family Court Rules 1965.